The Steamer Syracuse/Opinion of the Court

It is unnecessary to consider the evidence relating to the alleged contract of towage, because, if it be true, as the appellant says, that, by special agreement, the canal-boat was being towed at her own risk, nevertheless, the steamer is liable, if, through the negligence of those in charge of her, the canal-boat has suffered loss. Although the policy of the law has not imposed on the towing boat the obligation resting on a common carrier, it does require on the part of the persons engaged in her management, the exercise of reasonable care, caution, and maritime skill, and if these are neglected, and disaster occurs, the towing boat must be visited with the consequences. It is admitted in the argument, and proved by the evidence, that the canal-boat was not to blame, and the inquiry, therefore, is, was the steamer equally without fault? It frequently happens in cases of collision that the master of the vessel could not have prevented the accident at the moment it occurred, but this will not excuse him, if, by timely measures of precaution, the danger could have been avoided. Testing the present case by this rule there is no difficulty in determining by whose fault this collision occurred. It may be true, that the master of the Syracuse, after he got his boat off the Battery with her two, in making the turn to go up the East River, was unable to keep the canal-boat from striking against the brig, but the question arises, ought he to have encountered this peril?

Manifestly not, under the proof furnished by the officers of the Syracuse themselves. In the state of case disclosed by the master and pilot, is it not plain that ordinary prudence required the master to stop where he was able to hold his tow, long enough to ascertain the state of things at the Battery? The master tells us that in the night-time, as a measure of precaution, he had stopped some distance above that place, and left his tow there until morning. If this precaution was necessary at night, why not in daylight; as the ebb tide was very strong, and the danger, therefore, imminent? It is no valid excuse for proceeding down the river, that, when off Thirteenth Street, it was impossible to know the width of the gangway through which the vessels must pass to get into the East River, because it was easy to tell, even at that distance, that the river at the Battery was full of vessels, and, therefore, in the state of the tide, dangerous to navigate with such a fleet of boats. In view of the magnitude of the tow, the admitted danger of handling it in a strong ebb tide where there is a large amount of shipping, and the ability to stop where the tow could be managed, it was, to use the mildest term, negligence to make the attempt to pass the Battery into the East River. As the master could have stopped anywhere above Thirteenth Street, it was his duty, under the circumstances, to have done so, and either to have divided his tow, or remain there until the tide had slacked. If companies engaged in the business of towing, will, through greed of gain, undertake to transport from Albany to New York, more canal-boats in one tow than can be safely handled in the waters of New York, they must see that the large amount of property intrusted to their care is not placed in jeopardy, through the want of preliminary caution and foresight on the part of the officers of their steamers.

It is objected that the libel does not specifically charge this antecedent negligence as a fault. This is true, and the libel is defective on that account, but in admiralty an omission to state some facts which prove to be material, but which cannot have occasioned any surprise to the opposite party, will not be allowed to work any injury to the libellant, if the court can see there was no design on his part in omitting to state them. There is no doctrine of mere technical variance in the admiralty, and subject to the rule above stated, it is the duty of the court to extract the real case from the whole record, and decide accordingly. It is very clear that the libellant had no design in view in omitting to state the failure to stop as a fault, and equally clear, that the proof on that subject, coming, as it did, from the opposite party, could not have operated to surprise them.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.