The Principles of Masonic Law/Chapter XXIV

The penalties of suspension and expulsion are terminated by restoration, which may take place either by the action of the lodge which inflicted them, or by that of the Grand Lodge.

Restoration from definite suspension is terminated without any special action of the lodge, but simply by the termination of the period for which the party was suspended. He then at once reenters into the possession of all the rights, benefits, and functions, from which he had been temporarily suspended.

I have myself no doubt of the correctness of this principle; but, as it has been denied by some writers, although a very large majority of the authorities are in its favor, it may be well, briefly, to discuss its merits.

Let us suppose that on the 1st of January A.B. had been suspended for three months, that is, until the 1st day of April. At the end of the three months, that is to say, on the first of April, A.B. would no longer be a suspended member--for the punishment decreed will have been endured; and as the sentence of the lodge had expressly declared that his suspension was to last until the 1st of April, the said sentence, if it means anything, must mean that the suspension was, on the said 1st of April, to cease and determine. If he were, therefore, to wait until the 1st of May for the action of the lodge, declaring his restoration, he would suffer a punishment of four months' suspension, which was not decreed by his lodge upon his trial, and which would, therefore, be manifestly unjust and illegal.

Again: if the offense which he had committed was, upon his trial, found to be so slight as to demand only a dismissal for one night from the lodge, will it be contended that, on his leaving the lodge-room pursuant to his sentence, he leaves not to return to it on the succeeding communication, unless a vote should permit him? Certainly not. His punishment of dismissal for one night had been executed; and on the succeeding night he reentered into the possession of all his rights. But if he can do so after a dismissal or suspension of one night, why not after one or three, six or twelve months? The time is extended, but the principle remains the same.

But the doctrine, that after the expiration of the term of a definite suspension, an action by the lodge is still necessary to a complete restoration, is capable of producing much mischief and oppression. For, if the lodge not only has a right, but is under the necessity of taking up the case anew, and deciding whether the person who had been suspended for three months, and whose period of suspension has expired, shall now be restored, it follows, that the members of the lodge, in the course of their inquiry, are permitted to come to such conclusion as they may think just and fit; for to say that they, after all their deliberations, are, to vote only in one way, would be too absurd to require any consideration. They may, therefore, decide that A.B., having undergone the sentence of the lodge, shall be restored, and then of course all would be well, and no more is to be said. But suppose that they decide otherwise, and say that A.B., having undergone the sentence of suspension of three months, shall not be restored, but must remain suspended until further orders. Here, then, a party would have been punished a second time for the same offense, and that, too, after having suffered what, at the time of his conviction, was supposed to be a competent punishment--and without a trial, and without the necessary opportunities of defense, again found guilty, and his comparatively light punishment of suspension for three months changed into a severer one, and of an indefinite period. The annals of the most arbitrary government in the world--the history of the most despotic tyrant that ever lived--could not show an instance of more unprincipled violation of law and justice than this. And yet it may naturally be the result of the doctrine, that in a sentence of definite suspension, the party can be restored only by a vote of the lodge at the expiration of his term of suspension. If the lodge can restore him, it can as well refuse to restore him, and to refuse to restore him would be to inflict a new punishment upon him for an old and atoned-for offense.

On the 1st of January, for instance, A.B., having been put upon his trial, witnesses having been examined, his defense having been heard, was found guilty by his lodge of some offense, the enormity of which, whatever it might be, seemed to require a suspension from Masonry for just three months, neither more nor less. If the lodge had thought the crime still greater, it would, of course, we presume, have decreed a suspension of six, nine, or twelve months. But considering, after a fair, impartial, and competent investigation of the merits of the case (for all this is to be presumed), that the offended law would be satisfied with a suspension of three months, that punishment is decreed. The court is adjourned sine die; for it has done all that is required--the prisoner undergoes his sentence with becoming contrition, and the time having expired, the bond having been paid, and the debt satisfied, he is told that he must again undergo the ordeal of another trial, before another court, before he can reassume what was only taken from him for a definite period; and that it is still doubtful, whether the sentence of the former court may not even now, after its accomplishment, be reversed, and a new and more severe one be inflicted.

The analogy of a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a certain period, and who, on the expiration of that period, is at once released, has been referred to, as apposite to the case of a definite suspension. Still more appropriately may we refer to the case of a person transported for a term of years, and who cannot return until that term expires, but who is at liberty at once to do so when it has expired. "Another capital offense against public justice," says Blackstone, "is the returning from transportation, or being seen at large in Great Britain before the expiration of the term for which the offender was sentenced to be transported." Mark these qualifying words: "before the expiration of the term:" they include, from the very force of language, the proposition that it is no offense to return after the expiration of the term. And so changing certain words to meet the change of circumstances, but leaving the principle unchanged, we may lay down the law in relation to restorations from definite suspensions, as follows:

It is an offense against the masonic code to claim the privileges of Masonry, or to attempt to visit a lodge after having been suspended, before the expiration of the term for which the offender was suspended.

Of course, it is no crime to resume these privileges after the term has expired; for surely he must have strange notions of the powers of language, who supposes that suspension for three months, and no more, does not mean, that when the three months are over the suspension ceases. And, if the suspension ceases, the person is no longer suspended; and, if no longer suspended he is in good standing, and requires no further action to restore him to good moral and masonic health.

But it is said that, although originally only suspended for three months, at the expiration of that period, his conduct might continue to be such as to render his restoration a cause of public reproach. What is to be done in such a case? It seems strange that the question should be asked. The remedy is only too apparent. Let new charges be preferred, and let a new trial take place for his derelictions of duty during the term of his suspension. Then, the lodge may again suspend him for a still longer period, or altogether expel him, if it finds him deserving such punishment. But in the name of justice, law, and common sense, do not insiduously and unmanfully continue a sentence for one and a former offense, as a punishment for another and a later one, and that, too, without the due forms of trial.

Let us, in this case, go again for an analogy to the laws of the land. Suppose an offender had been sentenced to an imprisonment of six months for a larceny, and that while in prison he had committed some new crime. When the six months of his sentence had expired, would the Sheriff feel justified, or even the Judge who had sentenced him, in saying: "I will not release you; you have guilty of another offense during your incarceration, and therefore, I shall keep you confined six months longer?" Certainly not. The Sheriff or the Judge who should do so high-handed a measure, would soon find himself made responsible for the violation of private rights. But the course to be pursued would be, to arrest him for the new offense, give him a fair trial, and, if convicted again, imprison or otherwise punish him, according to his new sentence, or, if acquitted, discharge him.

The same course should be pursued with a Mason whose conduct during the period of his suspension has been liable to reproach or suspicion. Masons have rights as well as citizens--every one is to be considered innocent until he is proved guilty--and no one should suffer punishment, even of the lightest kind, except after an impartial trial by his peers.

But the case of an indefinite suspension is different. Here no particular time has been appointed for the termination of the punishment. It may be continued during life, unless the court which has pronounced it think proper to give a determinate period to what was before indeterminate, and to declare that on such a day the suspension shall cease, and the offender be restored. In a case of this kind, action on the part of the lodge is necessary to effect a restoration.

Such a sentence being intended to last indefinitely--that is to say, during the pleasure of the lodge--may, I conceive, be reversed at any legal time, and the individual restored by a mere majority vote the of lodge. Some authorities think a vote of two-thirds necessary; but I see no reason why a lodge may not, in this as in other cases, reverse its decision by a vote of a simple majority. The Ancient Constitutions are completely silent on this and all its kindred points; and, therefore, where a Grand Lodge has made no local regulation on the subject, we must be guided by the principles of reason and analogy, both of which direct us to the conclusion that a lodge may express its will, in matters unregulated by the Constitutions, through the vote of a majority.

But the restoration of an expelled Mason requires a different action. By expulsion, as I have already said, all connection with the Order is completely severed. The individual expelled ceases to be a Mason, so far as respects the exercise of any masonic rights or privileges. His restoration to the Order is, therefore, equivalent to the admission of a profane. Having ceased on his expulsion to be a member of the lodge which had expelled him, his restoration would be the admission of a new member. The expelled Mason and the uninitiated candidate are to be placed on the same footing--both are equally unconnected with the institution--the one having never been in it, and the other having been completely discharged from it.

The rule for the admission of new members, as laid down in the Thirty-nine Regulations, seems to me, therefore, to be applicable in this case; and hence, I conceive that to reverse a sentence of expulsion and to restore an expelled Mason will require as unanimous a vote as that which is necessary on a ballot for initiation.

Every action taken by a lodge for restoration must be done at a stated communication and after due notice, that if any member should have good and sufficient reasons to urge against the restoration, he may have an opportunity to present them.

In conclusion, the Grand Lodge may restore a suspended or expelled Mason, contrary to the wishes of the lodge.

In such case, if the party has been suspended only, he, at once, resumes his place and functions in the lodge, from which, indeed, he had only been temporarily dissevered.

But in the case of the restoration of an expelled Mason to the rights and privileges of Masonry, by a Grand Lodge, does such restoration restore him to membership in his lodge? This question is an important one, and has very generally been decided in the negative by the Grand Lodges of this country. But as I unfortunately differ from these high authorities, I cannot refrain, as an apology for this difference of opinion, from presenting the considerations which have led me to the conclusion which I have adopted. I cannot, it is true, in the face of the mass of opposing authority, offer this conclusion as masonic law. But I would fain hope that the time is not far distant when it will become so, by the change on the part of Grand Lodges of the contrary decisions which they have made.

The general opinion in this country is, that when a Mason has been expelled by his lodge, the Grand Lodge may restore him to the rights and privileges, but cannot restore him to membership in his lodge. My own opinion, in contradiction to this, is, that when a Grand Lodge restores an expelled Mason, on the ground that the punishment of expulsion from the rights and privileges of Masonry was too severe and disproportioned to the offense, it may or may not restore him to membership in his lodge. It might, for instance, refuse to restore his membership on the ground that exclusion from his lodge is an appropriate punishment; but where the decision of the lodge as to the guilt of the individual is reversed, and the Grand Lodge declares him to be innocent, or that the charge against him has not been proved, then I hold, that it is compelled by a just regard to the rights of the expelled member to restore him not only to the rights and privileges of Masonry, but also to membership in his lodge.

I cannot conceive how a Brother, whose innocence has been declared by the verdict of his Grand Lodge, can be deprived of his vested rights as the member of a particular lodge, without a violation of the principles of justice. If guilty, let his expulsion stand; but, if innocent, let him be placed in the same position in which he was before the passage of the unjust sentence of the lodge which has been reversed.

The whole error, for such I conceive it to be, in relation to this question of restoration to membership, arises, I suppose, from a misapprehension of an ancient regulation, which says that "no man can be entered a Brother in any particular lodge, or admitted a member thereof, without the unanimous consent of all the members"--which inherent privilege is said not to be subject to dispensation, "lest a turbulent member should thus be imposed upon them, which might spoil their harmony, or hinder the freedom of their communication, or even break and disperse the Lodge." But it should be remembered that this regulation altogether refers to the admission of new members, and not to the restoration of old ones--to the granting of a favor which the candidate solicits, and which the lodge may or may not, in its own good pleasure, see fit to confer, and not to the resumption of a vested and already acquired right, which, if it be a right, no lodge can withhold. The practical working of this system of incomplete restoration, in a by no means extreme case, will readily show its absurdity and injustice. A member having appealed from expulsion by his lodge to the Grand Lodge, that body calmly and fairly investigates the case. It finds that the appellant has been falsely accused of an offense which he has never committed; that he has been unfairly tried, and unjustly convicted. It declares him innocent--clearly and undoubtedly innocent, and far freer from any sort of condemnation than the prejudiced jurors who convicted him. Under these circumstances, it becomes obligatory that the Grand Lodge should restore him to the place he formerly occupied, and reinvest him with the rights of which he has been unjustly despoiled. But that it cannot do. It may restore him to the privileges of Masonry in general; but, innocent though he be, the Grand Lodge, in deference to the prejudices of his Brethren, must perpetuate a wrong, and punish this innocent person by expulsion from his lodge. I cannot, I dare not, while I remember the eternal principles of justice, subscribe to so monstrous an exercise of wrong--so flagrant an outrage upon private rights.