The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi/Chapter V

CHAPTER V
THE SOUL

IT has by this time appeared that the doctrine of the mortality of the human soul, by which the name of Pomponazzi is best known, was but a consequence of his general view of the soul's nature. The question of the mortality or immortality of the soul was the question whether the soul were separable or inseparable from the body, whether, that is, it were in its nature "material" or "immaterial." In all Pomponazzi's discussions, these three questions were treated as convertible: they were the same question in different forms. It was upon this question that he took up that curious and interesting middle position, that the soul is "material and immaterial" that conception of "mind in matter" which is the characteristic feature of his philosophy. Meanwhile the arguments on which he most relies to prove the mortality of the soul, although he avails himself also of various ethical and cosmological considerations, are arguments drawn from the nature of intelligence as in man 1.

His conception of the problem of immortality found expression, accordingly, in words like these: "Pomponazzi enquires whether the soul be mortal or no; and it must first be asked whether it be material; for if it be material, it is mortal; if it be immaterial, it is immortal 2 ."

1 Cf. De hum. cc. vm. and IX.; Comin. de An. ff. 130, 131, 137; Apologia, Lib. I. cap. iii.

2 " Quaerit Pomponatius utrum anima sit mortalis, vel non; et primum quaerendum est utrum sit materialis; si enim est materialis est mortalis, si est immaterialis est immortalis." Comm. de An. f. i3or.

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Holding firmly to his idea that the human soul has and can have but one mode of existence, that human intelligence has not and never can have any other than one way of knowing, he enquires what this nature is, and this mode of operation; pro posing so to determine whether a disembodied and post-mundane existence be compatible with the nature of the soul.

He does not find this question determined by any organic unity of body and mind, any subsistence of mind in body, which should make mind a merely physical or material product. On the contrary he holds that in its highest, its truly characteristic functions, mind does not employ any specific physical organ at all 1.

But two opposite aspects of mental action equally impressed Pomponazzi; and the fact of their combination was the problem which he set himself to solve. He found the characteristic quality of thought as such, and thus of human thought, to be the possibility of abstraction from all particulars, in independence of every limitation of hie et mine and with absolute transcendence of all material conditions. On the other hand, following Aristotle, he noticed the dependence of thought on its object, the acquisition of all knowledge through sense-experience, and the apprehension of the universal, by us, only in the particular instance 2.

The customary arguments for the "immateriality" of intelligence were three in number: (a) the power to receive the "forms" of material things, implying indifference to those or to any particular forms 3; (b) the power to think in universals* and

1 De Imm. X. p. 80. " Intellectui, qua intellectus est, accidit esse in materia, non tamen in aliqua parte ponitur corporis ipsum intelligere, sed in toto categorematice sumpto; non enim in aliqua parte, quoniam sic esset organicus intellectus, et vel non omnia cognosceret, vel si omnia cognosceret ut cogitativa, tantum singulariter et non universaliter cognosceret Quamquam autem sic totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus, quasi ut subjectum, non tamen est vere ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo corporali."

This he designated the mind's dependence on the body "tanquam de objecto."

3 " Anima est receptiva omnium formarum materialium.-.Recipiens debet esse denudatum a natura rei receptae." De Imm. VII. p. 32. Cf. X. p. 78; Comtn. de An. f. 130; Apol. I. ii. 56 b; iii. 57 c.

4 "Si intelligit omnia necesse est immixtum esse." (Comm. de An. f. 130 v.) "Cum ipse intellectus sit in hac quantitate, quomodo igitur species in eo recepta poterit universaliter repraesentare? " De Imm. x. p. 78.

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contemplate abstractions of which the senses have no cognisance, such, for example, as the mathematical point or line, the indivisible, the infinite 1, or immaterial beings such as God and the higher Intelligences 2; and (c) the mind's power of reflection upon itself \

Pomponazzi admits the force of all these considerations, but not, in its full scope, the inference that was drawn from them. Admitting that the human soul is possessed of intelligence, and of intelligence exercising these "higher" functions just specified, which belong to it as intelligence he yet could not forget that as a matter of fact human intelligence is known to us only as residing in the body; that its whole known history is a corporeal history, and its only observed exercise takes place under corporeal conditions at least in so far as all the objects of human thought, the materials on which human intelligence is exercised, are drawn from a material world (" dependere tanquam de objecto "). To affirm any other mode of existence for the human soul, or for intelligence as in man, was not only to go beyond the warrant of experience; it was to contradict all that we know of the soul, and every idea of human nature with which experience supplies us.

Pomponazzi accordingly set himself to discover and to express a conception of the human soul, and of intelligence or reason as in man (anima intellectiva), which should embrace these seemingly contrary aspects of it. He conceived himself to have arrived at it in the formula: Anima humana de immaterialitate participat. Or rather, this was one of the many ways in which he sought to express the idea of an intelligence, material, in a sense, in its origin, material certainly in the mode of its existence, yet possessed of the essential attributes of intelligence and therefore in another sense immaterial: an intelligence, whose existence before or survival after its embodiment in matter was inconceivable, and so far as reason shows, impossible, yet exercising functions which could by no means be ascribed to matter. Two points may be regarded as fixed in Pomponazzi's

1 Comm. de An. f. 130 v.

2 Op. cit. f. 130 v.; cf. De Imm. x. p. 82; Apol. I. ii. f. 56 b; iii. ff. 58, 59.

3 Comm. de An. f. 130 v.; De Imm. X. p. 76; Apol. I. iii. 59 d.

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theory of the soul. One is, that there is and can be no evidence for any existence of the soul as disembodied, for any exercise of human intelligence except with reference, direct or indirect, to a material subject-matter (pbjectum as he calls it). The other certain thing is that human intelligence is itself, for Pomponazzi, always something immaterial; nothing could be further from the mark than to call him, as he has been called, a materialist.

The position of Pomponazzi may be defined, in a preliminary way, in the terms of his own thought, by saying that he denied the " separability " of soul from body without denying, its "immateriality." The current formula was that "inseparability" meant materiality and corruptibility; while immateriality implied " separability " and potential immortality. Pomponazzi holding the inseparability of the soul from the body (namely, tanqnam de objecto] and denying in consequence the soul's immortality, yet regarded the soul qua intellectiva as immaterial.

To return then to the accepted proofs of the immateriality of intelligence we have to note Pomponazzi's attitude towards them in view of his peculiar conception of human intelligence. As I have already said, he admits in a general way their validity. But he seeks to define or limit, in the interest of his own theory, the inference to be drawn from them. He does not allow that they imply, in the case of human intelligence, absolute "immateriality " in the sense of the soul's entire independence of matter or its possible separation from the body; and seeks to find room within their scope for his own conception of a relative independence and a soul immaterial yet not separable. Accepting the received marks of an " immaterial " intelligence he seeks so to interpret them at least in the manner and degree in which they characterise human intelligence as to permit and even justify his view of the soul as de immaterialitate, or de immortalitate, participans.

Thus with reference to the argument from the soul's reception, in cognition, of material forms, he points out that if in one part of it the soul thus " receives " matter in knowledge, in other aspects of its nature it is not capable of any such action 1; and

1 " Ipsa materialiter operatur ut vegetativa, non omnes formas recipit ut sensitiva." De Imm. vm. p. 36.

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thus far may with equal reason be concluded to be material or immaterial. He also argues that the conjunction of intelligence with matter does not forbid its exercising this power of cognition, and that it is not necessary that soul should be absolutely independent of matter in order to apprehend matter 1.

He clears up the point by reference to an analogy which had been drawn in favour of absolute immateriality, from the case of sensation. The organ of sense, it had been said, must itself be clear of the particular sensible property which it is to apprehend; thus, if various colours are to be perceived, the eye must be in a neutral condition in relation to all colour. Pomponazzi pointed out in reply that the sense organ has nevertheless other physical properties, and is itself physical 2. So, on this analogy, the mind may apprehend material things in knowledge and yet itself be in a real way dependent upon matter 3.

In the Apologia Pomponazzi quotes the case of sense-perception as that of an admittedly physical power which nevertheless " receives " material objects in cognition. Wherefore, he says, it cannot be maintained that cognition of material things implies an organ independent of matter 4.

1 De 1mm. cap. X.

2 " Materiale universaliter non impeditur per coexistentiam alterius materialis a cognitione; sic enim visus non cognosceret colores, cum visui sint conjunctae primae qualitates; sed bene per coexistentiam alicujus illorum quorum ipse est perceptivus impeditur; per rubedinem enim impeditur a cognitione aliorum colorum quorum et rubedinis est perceptivus." Op. cit. x. p. 77.

3 " Si intellectus esset pura forma materialis, cum omnium formarum materialium est perceptivus, impediretur ab earum cognitione: at ipsum esse immaterialem probatum est, licet non simpliciter immaterialis sit; quapropter per coexistentiam forma rum materialium non impeditur." The result of this discussion is a clear distinction between knowledge and the conditions of knowledge, between the physical aspect of the act of knowledge and its cognitive value, in the case both of sense-perception and of knowledge generally. " Revera intellectus humanus non potest intelligere nisi in materia sint quale et quantum sensibile, cum non possit operari nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenient!; non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat, imo ut satis liquet non sequitur in sensu; nam virtus visiva non videt nisi oculus sit calidus, non tamen per caliditatem vel aliquam aliam qualitatem realem videt, sed per speciem visibilem." Op. cit. x. p. 77. Cf. Comm. de An. ff. 126 9.

4 " Primum autem quod adducebatur erat, quoniam ex eo quod humanus animus omnia materialia intelligit inferebatur ipsum esse omnino immaterialem. Ad quod imprimis dicimus non esse verum materiam, qualitercumque acceptam, materialium cognitionem impedire. Etenim unusquisque sensus exterior... sua objecta, quae mate-

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But he does not take up a merely defensive attitude on this point, or rest satisfied with maintaining, negatively, that his view of the mind is consistent with the possibility of knowledge that knowledge is not impossible to an essentially embodied intelligence. He claims expressly that since human knowledge is by presentation of sensible objects, it is only as the mind is related to matter tanqnam de objecto that knowledge takes place at all 1.

So, too, in considering the second supposed note of immateriality, the mind's power of abstraction, and of forming general conceptions, he insists upon the distinction that general conceptions, as entertained by human intelligence, are mediated through a knowledge of particulars that is, ultimately through sense-perception. For the human mind, Pomponazzi uniformly maintains, general conceptions are formed by an induction from particulars and the universal considered as realised in particulars. And thus cognition through sense, and the embodiment of intelligence, are not only consistent with the fact of human intelligence, but are inseparable characteristics of thought as it exists in man 2.

rialia sunt, cognoscit. Ratio ilia nulla est, si quidem virtus materialis omnia materialia

potest cognoscere Quare si sensus omnia sensibilia cognoscit, virtus materialis omnia

materialia cognoscere potest; non igitur ex eo quod omnia materialia cognoscit, arguenda est immaterialitas." Apol. I. iii. f. 57 c, d; and passim. Cf. Fiorentino, Pomponazzi, pp. 200, 201.

1 " Anima humana sic potens recipere omnes species formarum materialium duas habet conditiones: unam scilicet quod secundum se est immaterialis et non indigens organo tanquam subjecto pro quanto recipit et intelligit ilia, quod nos concedimus: verum alteram habet quoniam formas illas non recipit nisi mota a phantasmatibus sicut plane ibi docet Aristoteles, quare indiget organo tanquam objecto." De hum. X. p. 75.

2 " Ea quae sunt in intelligentiis (scil. superioribus) sunt simpliciter actu intellecta, et penitus a materia denudata; quae autem sunt in sensu sunt mere intellecta in potentia; quae vero sunt in intellectu humano medio modo se habent, quoniam species primo universaliter repraesentat, secundario vero ut in supposito, quando- quidem ex toto absolvi non potest a materia, cum intellectus pro quacunque sui cognitione moveatur ab objecto et in singular! speculetur universale, sicut dictum est." (De Imm. X. p. 78.) " Per intellectum in naturam elephantis ascendimus universaliter quae neque est signati individui neque particularis cognitio...sed quanquam ita sit hoc tamen fieri nequit absque adminiculo sensuum, quum sine phantasmate hoc fieri non potest, velut in nobis experiri possumus. Semper etenim in quacunque nostra intellectione, quantumcunque abstracta sit, aliquid corporeum ante intellectum ponimus. Quare nos immaterialia materialiter, intemporalia temporaliter cognoscimus, e contrario modo intelligentiis se habentibus," etc. {Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a.) "Cum dicitur

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Pomponazzi's view is that man's power of universal thought is in this respect deficient, and that human thought falls short of the ideal of thought as such 1. Fiorentino considers that he was hampered by the Aristotelian doctrine of imagination, while denying himself the resources of the Nous by means of which Aristotle escaped into the region of absolute thought; and that he really failed to allow to the human mind the possession of universal conceptions 2. But the truth rather seems to be that while, in his investigation of human knowledge, Pomponazzi approximated to a truer view of the nature of thought, he was still haunted by the mediaeval idea of absolute thought which made it consist in pure abstraction, and placed the " universal " in antagonism with the "particular." He did attribute to human intelligence universal thought in the only real meaning of the term removing, in the human instance, the opposition of universal and particular, of thought and sense. While this is our chief interest in his speculative position, we need not over look the survival in him of an older mode of thought; and his ascription to the Divine and to the superior Intelligences of an

quod cognoscit universalia, dicit Alexander quod cognoscit universale comparando unam rem alteri; sed non fit hoc per virtutem immaterialem, sed materialem." Comm. de An. f. 137 v. Cf. ff. 151 155.

1 Cf. the allusions to superior intelligence in the passages quoted in the last note; see especially Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a: "...e contrario modo intelligentiis se habentibus,

nam materialia imroaterialiter et temporalia intemporaliter cognoscunt Quare ipsae

solae sincerum universale cognoscunt, et sine alicujus sensus vel corporis adminiculo; quum et ipsae solae vere et proprie sunt immateriales." Cf. De Imm. XII. p. 90: " Participat (animus humanus) de proprietatibus immortalitatis, cum universale cog- noscat, tametsi ejusmodi cognitio valde tenuis et obscura est."

Of God and of the infinite, in particular, says Pomponazzi, we have only vague and inadequate conceptions. " Cum dicis quod Deum intelligit, dicit (Alexander) quod Deum anima non cognoscit nisi caecutiendo, ex eo quod non intelligit nisi per phantasmata; et hoc non arguit earn esse immaterialem, imo opponitur ex eo quod non bene cognoscit. Et similiter dico quod non intelligit infinitum nisi caecutiendo et confuse." "Dico," concludes Pomponazzi in the same passage, "quod intellectus indiget abstractione, sed non omnimodo, quia per phantasmata intelligit; imo arguit nostram sententiam quod, cum per phantasmata intelligat, partim sit abstractus et partim non, non ex toto." Comm. de An. f. 137 v.

2 " Ei si fa forte dei detti di Aristotile, che sensa l'intelletto passive non si pu6 pensare, che il conoscere non e sensa fantasmi; ma Aristotile seppe disvilupparsi da questo legame, a contemplare l'universale col Noo speculativo. II Pomponazzi, volendo schivare ogni incongruenza, restrinsi soverchiamente l'importanza e l'attivit^ dell intelletto umano." Fiorentino, Pomponazzi^ p. -203.

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apprehension of universals apart from any process of experience, and of universals in pure abstraction, need no more surprise us than his belief in the mythological "Intelligences" themselves. The fact to be observed, as suggestive of the immanent movement of his thought, is his relegating such imagined modes of reason to a transcendent realm, and, as the result of his analysis of human experience and human modes of knowledge, attributing to reason in this sublunary sphere an altogether opposite character.

While holding thus that intelligence, as human, derives all knowledge and all the materials for general conceptions from the data of sense through imagination, he does not consider that an intelligence so placed is either incapable of abstract thought, or itself material.

In the first place he does not allow that the capacity for abstract thought implies absolute immateriality, or that the sort of " dependence " on the body in which he defines the soul of man to stand is inconsistent with its possession of the power of thought 1.

His general position in this respect is brought into view by an argumentum ad hominem which he employs in the Apologia, in support of his idea of an intelligence " immersed " in matter. A common feature in the mediaeval psychology of knowledge was the vis cogitativa, whose function was an act of generalisation which did not amount to pure abstraction, and was therefore not assigned to intellectus as such, but which mediated between the data of sense presented in imagination and the proper act of thought. Now this power of cogitare was classed among the potencies of the animal soul, and allowed to reside in matter. Yet it was a power of receiving in knowledge the forms of things; the drawing of inference came within its scope; it was, in a sense, a power of thought 2. If "thought" then, in this sense, is not incompatible with a physical origin and a physical

1 See De Imm. ix. pp. 58 ff., X. pp. 78 ff.

2 " Ponit (Averroes) cogitativam exspoliare substantias ab omni sensibili communi et proprio; quare et sine quantitate cognoscit eas; idemque Thomas et Aegidius Romanus in quampluribus locis affirmant; dicuntque ipsam cogitativam discurrere, quum appellant ipsam rationem particularem." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 c.

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basis, why should absolute immateriality be predicated even of the highest exercise of thought possible to man 1?

On this analogy, and on general grounds, he does not see why the power of thought should not be actually physical in its natural source and organ even as cogitativa was supposed to be. So far from the capacity of abstraction implying total independence of matter, he does not see that it must necessarily exclude the physical nature of the thinking power; although for his own part he is not disposed to adopt that hypothesis 2.

For the power of thought is not, he ultimately decides, itself to be regarded as a product and quality of matter. The characteristic distinction drawn by him is that, " as human," intelligence is inseparably connected with matter (per quandam concoinitantiam), but that this connection does not affect its proper nature as intelligence 3. What he denies is that thought

1 " Advertendum autem esthumanum animum rationabiliter poni habere potentias non affixas organo, et ipsum existentem materialem; narn ex communi omnium con- sensu cogitativa cognoscit omnia materialia, syllogizat et particulariter, quum est in confinio intellectus, et participat de intellectu; quid igitur vetat et humanum intellectum...paululum plus elevari quam cogitativa, sic quod et universaliter cognoscit et syllogizat, non excedendo tamen limites materiae, quum semper a phantasmate dependet, cum continue et tempore? Nam rationalis dicitur et non vere intelligens. Quare cum discursu cognoscit et temporaliter; si namque ab hujuscemodi liberaretur

non amplius rationalis esset, et sic natura sua periret Cogitativa virtus extensa est,

quum omnes affirmant ipsam esse virtutem sensitivam; ipsaque potest sequestrare substantias a quantitate, quamvis sit in quantitate. Quid igitur obstat et ipsum intellectum existentem materialem et extensum, secundum quendam altiorem gradum quam sit cogitativa ipsa, infra tamen limites materiae, et universaliter cognoscere et universaliter syllogizare; non discedendo tamen penitus a materia quum in omni tali cognitione dependet a phantasmate? Puto itaque quod qui tenet cogitativam esse talem ut diximus, multum probabiliter habet tenere et de intellectu."

After stating the theory of the Arabians of the manner in which the (immaterial) "intellectus agens " acted on the (physical) "virtus imaginativa" to produce "cogi tativa," he explains that something of the same sort is his idea of intelligence in man: " Sicut enim apud dictos cogitativa etsi sit extensa non tamen afficitur ab extensione, sic et apud nos intellectus; vero non absolute ut materialis est sed quatemis de immaterialitate participat et ab intellectu agente illustratur." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 c, d. Cf. Comtn. de An. f. 128.

2 " Sic itaque existimo quod sive intellectus ponatur indivisibilis, sive extensus, nihil cogit ipsum esse simpliciter immateriale; verum mihi magis placet ipsum ponere inextensum." Apol. \. iii. f. 59 d.

3 " Intellectus humanus est in materia quasi per quandam concomitantiam; et ipsum intelligere quodam modo est in materia sed satis accidentaliter; quoniam intellectui, qua intellectus est, accidit esse in materia." De /mm. x. pp. 79, 80.

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is material in the sense that it can be quantitatively regarded; since it cannot be so regarded it is not "material 1 ." So far, then, he admits the argument that the power of abstraction cannot be attributed to matter. He does so, because he distinguishes between matter and thought as such. He draws the distinction which was by far the best legacy left by Averroism to after generations between the physical conditions and the essential nature of human thought, between the physical conditions of human thought and the nature of thought as thought. While intelligence, he thus distinguishes, exists in man only as embodied, intelligence as such is by no means of the nature of body 2.

The precise deductions thus drawn by Pomponazzi from the power of abstract thought as possessed by the mind of man are summarised in the following passage from the Apologia. After explaining the manner in which the human mind knows universals, he continues " Since our knowledge of the universal is as I have described, it is worth while to see how that can take place suitably to the nature of the soul. I would say therefore: Since every soul or at least every complete soul is indivisible in respect of its essence (I mean indivisible not in the sense in which a point in a line is indivisible but in virtue of being the negation of the category of quantity, as we say a sound is in divisible), such indivisibility belongs most appropriately to the human soul, which is nearest to the Intelligences, and exists as

1 " Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in corpore vel in eo non esse modo quantitative; unde dicimus intellectum non indigere corpore ut subjecto in sui intellectione, non quia intellectio nullo modo sit in corpore ...sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo quantitative et corporali non est in eo." De hum. IX. p. 58.

2 "Si dicitur, cum ipse intellectus sit in hac quantitate, quomodo igitur species in eo recepta poterit universaliter repraesentare? Cui dicitur hoc nihil prohibere; primo quia accidit sibi qua intellectus est ut sit in quantitate; secundo quoniam etsi est in quantitate tamen quantitas non est principium illius operationis, neque in eo opere ea per se utitur." De hum. x. p. 78. Cf. Apol. I. iii. 59 b. Again: " Intellectus humanus non potest intelligere nisi in materia sint quale et quantum sensibile, cum non possit operari nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione con- venienti; non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat, imo ut satis liquet non sequitur in sensu; nam virtus visiva non videt nisi oculus sit calidus, non tamen per caliditatem vel aliquam aliam qualitatem realem videt, sed per speciem visibilem." De /mm. x. p. 77.

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intermediate between material and immaterial beings. Hence, by reason of its homogeneity with material beings, though in respect of its substance it is itself indivisible, nevertheless it has all those extended and organic faculties that subserve the percipient and vegetative soul. But in so far as the human soul itself participates in immateriality, and is in the neighbourhood of immaterial beings and coterminous with them, it has intellect and will, which are faculties that do not imply extension. Wherefore the form received in it is received as unextended; whence it comes to pass that such a form represents its object universally. But since this form both in coming into existence and in continuing to exist depends on an image which is extended and determinate, it does not represent the universal in complete purity, but only points out the universal in the individual 1 ."

Towards the argument for the soul's absolute independence of matter derived from the capacity of self-knowledge, Pomponazzi adopts an exactly similar attitude. The human mind, he says, does not possess such a self-knowledge as he imagines to belong to superior intelligences and to be the ideal or perfect self-knowledge namely a direct or intuitive consciousness of self. Human self-consciousness, he remarks, is essentially mediated through some particular experience; self-knowledge

1 "Cum itaque nostra cognitio de universal! talis sit qualem diximus, operae pretium est videre quam convenienter istud fiat. Dicam igitur; Cum omnis anima saltern perfecta indivisibilis sit secundum essentiam (dico autem indivisibile non veluti punctum in linea, verum secundum privationem generis quantitatis, qualiter sonum dicimus esse indivisibilem), talis indivisibilitas niaxime convenit animae humanae, quae est propinquissima intelligentiis, mediaque existit inter materialia et immaterialia. Unde [not universal! as Ferri has transcribed the contraction un, Introd. p. 72] ratione unigeneitatis cum materialibus tametsi ipsa secundum substantiam indivisibilis est, habet tamen omnes illas vires extensas et organicas quae sensitivae et vegetativae deserviunt; at qua ipsa humana anima de immaterialitate participat, estque in convicinio sive confinio immaterialium, habet intellectum et voluntatem quae sunt vires non extensae. Quare species in ea recepta inextense recipitur; unde fit ut talis species universaliter repraesentet. At cum dicta species et in fieri et in conservari dependet a phantasmate quod extensum et signatum est; idcirco non sincere omnimodo universale repraesentat, sed universale in singulari demonstrat." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a.

Cf. Comm. de Anima, f. 137 v.: "...quod cum per phantasmata intelligat, partim sit abstractus et partim non: non ex toto Non omnimodo abstrahitur a corpore, quia eget eo ut phantasmate; et argumentum non concludit nisi quod secundum eas partes per quas anima intelligit non sit materialis, sed a materia abstracta, non tola anima."

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always takes place, in us, on the occasion of some other specific act of knowledge, and the human mind only knows itself in knowing something else 1. The self-consciousness which was supposed to imply independence of matter was really an " absolute " self-consciousness, self-moved to the knowledge of itself. And Pomponazzi had not much difficulty in shewing that this was not the nature of self-consciousness in man, though (as he still conceded) it might well be its character in higher beings 2.

Once more, also in the Apologia, Pomponazzi argues from the analogy of the admittedly physical powers of human or animal nature, inferring that a knowledge of self, at least in the degree and manner in which it exists in man, does not imply " separability " from matter. Thus he ascribes to the senses a perception of their own operations 3 and traces a rudimentary form of self-consciousness in the lower animals 4.

Thus by a criticism of the received marks of "immateriality" and a comparison of them with the facts of human nature as he saw it, Pomponazzi defended his conclusion that the soul is partly material and partly immaterial, simpliciter materialis and immaterialis secundum quid; or, as he otherwise expresses it, de immaterialitate participat.

On this conclusion as to the soul's nature, rigorously main tained, and coupled with a refusal to entertain any hypothesis of the soul's changing, under other conditions, what he conceives to be its fundamental nature, Pomponazzi bases his denial of immortality. It is indeed a little disconcerting to find him embodying his doctrine on that subject in the strange formula

1 "Licet non cognoscat se per speciem propriam sed aliorum... secundum tamen illud esse potest quoquo modo supra seipsum reflectere et cognoscere actus suos, licet non primo et ita perfecte sicut intelligentiae." De hum. x. p. 76. Cf. Apol. I. iii. f. 59 d, 60 a: " Intellectus intelligendo alia se intelligit," etc.

2 " In eis (rationalibus, i.e. hominibus) idem non est primo movens et primum motum, veluti est in intelligentiis, unde in eis non est perfectus circulus." Apol. I. iii. f. 60 a.

3 " Sensum sentire se sentire....Quis autem ambiget sensum esse virtutem or- ganicam?" Op. cit. I. iii. f. 59 d.

4 " Neque negandum est bestias se cognoscere. Omnino enim fatuum et sine ratione videtur dicere ipsas se non cognoscere, cum diligant se, et suas species. Omne namque animal diligit suum simile," etc. Op. cit. I. iii. f. 60 a.

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that the soul is simpliciter mortalis et immortalis secundum quid (as against the opposite doctrine of simpliciter immortalis et mortalis secundum quid), since the question of the soul's existence seems to admit only of the alternative answers Yes and No; and the phrase de immortalitate participat seems merely unintelligible. But we have to remember once more how the question of the immortality and the immateriality of the soul were for Pomponazzi bound together. De immaterialitate participat is what he means; and he frequently expresses himself in this more accurate form of words 1. He does not hesitate to draw the inference of the soul's mortality so far that is as reason and philosophy carry him, and with all due reserve. Since the soul is "partly" material, and at the same time is one and indivisible, its perishability is for Pomponazzi an inevitable inference. Partly immaterial, doubtless, the soul is also; but immaterial absolutely, or "separable," it certainly is not.

On a review of Pomponazzi's reasonings we find that three considerations principally impressed him. The first was the patent fact of the embodiment of human intelligence. The soul of man, in the Aristotelian meaning of the term, was in some at least of its operations plainly physical (anima vegetativa^ sensitivd). Even as intellectual (anima intellectiva), therefore, since the soul is one, it had its corporeal aspect 2; and thought

1 E.g. Apol. i. iii. f. 59 a.

2 See Comm. de An. ff. 253 v., 254 r.: " (Intellectus) quatenus intellectus non eget corpore Anima autem nostra secundum quod est intellectiva realis (utitur) in intelligendo organo corporeo...nec ex toto et omni modo in intelligendo eget organo corporeo quia non eget eo ut subjecto Anima autem nutritiva secundum quod realiter eadem est cum vegetativa et sensitiva et sic in suis operationibus, quae sunt pertinentes ad vegetationem et sensationem, indiget corpore ut subjecto, quia omnes tales operationes fiunt cum conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hie et nunc; ideo in talibus operationibus anima intellectiva, quatenus sensitiva aut vegetativa, indiget corpore ut subjecto; modo cum operatio eiusdem animae intellectivae, quatenus in tellectiva est, quae est intelligere, fiat sine conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hie et nunc; ideo in ista sua operatione non eget corpore ut subjecto, sed bene ut objecto, quia quidquid intelligatur ab anima nostra intelligitur per aliquid corporeum." Cf. De Nutritione, I. xxiii. f. i3ob: " Quamquam id quod est anima intellectiva sit extensum est enim sensitivum et nutritivum ut supponimus, quae sunt extensa ut tamen intelligit et recipit species intelligibiles non utitur corpore, neque ut sic afficitur quantitate....Nam intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum; cum quo tamen stat quod et sit materialis."

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in man, although not corporeal in its nature, acted only on occasion of physical impressions, and in permanent connection with, if not in dependence on, a bodily organisation.

These facts, taken in connection with the admittedly in corporeal nature of intelligence and the consequent incorporeal aspect of anima intellectiva, presented a problem. And early in the De Immortalitate, weighing against one another the considerations that suggested the corporeity and mortality or the immateriality and immortality of the soul, Pomponazzi treated the question provisionally as dubious or at least unconcluded 1. Subsequently however, and in his writings generally, he defined the human soul as both material and immaterial, although being one, and in one aspect material, it is therefore mortal, and its participation in immateriality does not guarantee its actual immortality 2.

A " part " of the soul might indeed be in a certain sense immaterial 3, for this was Pomponazzi's belief about the anima intellectiva*. While the human intelligence derived all its knowledge through the bodily organisation, it was not a product of the organisation, did not depend on it for its existence 5. Thus so far as thought qua thought was concerned, the bodily organisation was the condition, and not the cause either of its existence or of its operation 8.

1 " Ex eo namque quod talis essentia formas omnes materiales recipit, quia recepta in ea sunt actu intellecta; quod non utitur organo corporeo; quod aeternitatem et superna affectat; ideo concludebatur quod ipsa sit immortalis. Sed pariter cum ipsa materialiter operatur ut vegetativa, non omnes formas recipit tit sensitiva, et eadem organo corporeo utitur, temporalia et caduca affectat; probabitur quod ipsa vere et simpliciter sit mortalis, verum ex ea parte qua intelligit secundum quid erit immortalis, turn quia intellectus non conjunctus materiae est incorruptibilis, sed materiae conjunctus est corruptibilis, turn quia in tali opere non fungitur instrumento corporali, sicut etiam ipse (Thomas) dicit quod taliter est per accidens et secundum quid mate- rialis; non enim major ratio de uno quam de altero videtur." De Imm. vm. p. 36.

2 De Imm. cap. ix. and/auzYn; Comm. de An. f. 137 v.

3 "Ex ea parte qua intelligit, secundum quid erit immortalis." De Imm. vm. p. 56. "Secundum eas partes per quas anima intelligit, non est materialis. " Comm. de An. f. 137 v. " Intellectus... qua intellectus est, non dependet a materia, neque a quantitate." De Imm. vm. p. 59.

4 " Mihi magis placet ipsum (scil., intell. hum.) ponere inextensum." Apol. i. iii. f. 59 d. 5 See De Imm. cap. x.

6 "Intellectus humanus...esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenient!, non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones intelligat." De Imm. X. p. 77.

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But again the soul was "partly material 1 ," and human intelligence (anima intellective?) so far dependent on matter as to be inseparable from it. How this should be, must depend upon the nature of matter and of intelligence respectively.

The second fact on which the mind of Pomponazzi dwelt was the character of intelligence as human.

The intermediate position occupied by man in the universe, between purely spiritual beings on the one hand and material or merely animal existences on the other, was a leading idea with Pomponazzi as with so many of his predecessors. It finds expression on almost every page of his writings. His mind dwelt upon it so habitually that it moulded his thoughts on every subject. But especially did it determine his doctrine of human nature, which was perhaps the most thorough-going and logical application made by any of the mediaeval thinkers of the theory of a hierarchy of beings and the intermediate nature of man.

Intelligence, as has been said, was for Pomponazzi the " immaterial part " of the human soul. But this superior part of man was itself of an intermediate nature and grade. For the intermediate nature of man did not mean, for Pomponazzi, simply a nature compounded of both body and soul; the idea, in his mind, referred to an intermediate position occupied by man's soul (the " form " of his existence) among the hierarchy of beings 2.

Now Pomponazzi's conception of human intelligence, of the degree and manner in which the higher power of thought existed in man, was affected in two respects by his idea of man as an intermediate being; or, alternatively, it may be said that his general idea of man was corroborated by his conception of human intelligence. The dogma of man's intermediate place in nature is reflected in a twofold modification of the theory of human intelligence; its influence acted in two opposite directions to produce the same effect. On the one hand we find

1 " Partim abstractus et partim non, non ex toto." Comm. de An. f. 137 v.

2 "Visa itaque multiplici ancipitique hominis natura, non ea quidem quae ex compositione materiae et formae resultat, sed ea quae ex parte ipsius formae seu animae," etc. De Imm. n. p. 7.

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Pomponazzi lessening the distance between man and the lower orders of being, and on the other hand emphasising the distinction between mind in man and a supposed absolute Intelligence. We have already seen that Pomponazzi laboured to trace analogies between thought and the lower powers of the soul. He sought to find parallels to what were supposed to be the unique and peculiar operations of the intellectual power, in the senses or in other supposed powers of the mind that were admitted to have a physical basis and origin. He aimed at diminishing the distance between attributes which were supposed to be the distinguishing property of man, alone among all mundane existences, and those capacities which were ascribed to his physical nature or allowed to be shared in, to a greater or less degree, by lower animals. The express design of Pomponazzi was of course to shew that the intermediate nature of man meant an inseparable relation in him between body and soul, and thus his mortality. Apart from that particular deduction from the premises, these psychological comparisons of Pomponazzi have a twofold interest. In the first place they mark the tendency of his mind towards a more scientific psychology based on a prevailing sense of the unity of mental life. Secondly we see here a real attempt to relate man to nature and especially to forms of life below him in the scale of being, and thus witness an early beginning of the comparative and historical method through which alone a science of human nature is possible, and by which an intelligible account of man and of reason is substituted for dogmatic conceptions alike of body and of soul.

We have also to note on the other hand the contrast which Pomponazzi drew, and which was never absent from his mind, between the mode of intelligence observed in man and that which was supposed to characterise a superior order of thinking beings. The human mind was constantly regarded by him in the light of a comparison with those Intelligences which filled so large a place in the world of mediaeval thought, and which, although they were by no means a primary interest to Pomponazzi, yet occupied always the background of his theory. In them, and in the Deity, the perfection of intelligence was supposed

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to be realised. Space and time were in their thought absolutely transcended and all things considered in pure and abstract generality. Their general conceptions also were not formed by induction from concrete and particular reality, but by a direct intuition addressed to the universal as such, and as opposed to the particular. I do not enter upon the discussion of the value of such an ideal of thought implying as it does that things considered as in space and time are not considered truly, and by a logical fiction distinguishing the universal from the particular as a real object of thought But it is evident that such an ideal has little bearing on the actual process of human knowledge, and involves the condemnation of all that presents itself as truth to the human mind. Pomponazzi has at least the credit of perceiving this clearly; and it was significant of his position as a pioneer of a naturalistic view of man and a humanistic view of reason that he drew the distinction between thought in man and that ideal of absolute thought which tradition had handed down to him. He deferred to that ideal: it had a real place in his belief. Yet at the same time he felt its irrelevancy to the problem of thought which actually presented itself to him in man. And even if (as may be admitted) his doctrine of the Intelligences was more than a merely perfunctory homage to received beliefs in theology and cosmology, it remains true that the chief energies of his mind were given to the new questions about human thought which were opening up before him, and to the analysis of the real process of experience.

Accordingly he defines intelligence in man by contrast with the supposed perfect Intelligences 1.

The third consideration by which Pomponazzi's mind was governed was the idea of intelligence or thought as something sui generis. The relation of thought to its object in the act of

1 See Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a. Cf. f. 59 c: " Intellectum humanum...paululum plus ele- vari quam cogitativa, sic quod et universaliter cognoscit et syllogizat, non excedendo tamen limites materiae, quum semper a phantasmate dependet, cum continue et tempore. Nam rationalis dicitur, et non vere intelligens. Quare cum discursu cognoscit et temporal iter "; and De Imm. xii. p. 90: "Non enim vere (anima) appellatur intellectualis sed rationalis; intellectus enim simplici intuitu omnia in- tuetur; at ratiocinatio discursu, compositione, et cum tempore, quae omnia attes- tantur super imperfectione et materialitate ejus."

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knowledge was clearly distinguished by him, as indeed by mediaeval thinkers generally, from any physical relation whatever 1.

For the maintenance of this distinction, the Middle Ages were largely indebted to Averroes. The Averroist metaphysics was in many respects a hindrance to mental progress; but it was a powerful barrier against materialism, and was largely instrumental in protecting from it mediaeval philosophy, and perhaps, indirectly, modern philosophy as well.

Pomponazzi also attributed thought as such, in its essential and peculiar nature, to the soul of man. In this he went against Averroism, at least in the letter, although even in distinguishing so absolutely as he did, in a metaphysical sense, between the soul of man and the intellectual principle, Averroes came near to abolishing his own distinction; since just in so doing he ipso facto attributed every actual exercise of reason in man to intelligence in the proper sense of the word; and thus the metaphysical dualism, at its extreme, wrought its own destruction. So soon as a thinker appeared, like Pomponazzi, starting from an empirical and psychological rather than a metaphysical point of view, a transition was rapidly accomplished; and Averroism was one of the principal influences which led Pomponazzi at once to apprehend the essential nature of thought and to recognise the activity of thought in the mental processes of man.

The language which Pomponazzi uses in constantly speaking of the subjectum of human thought shews the influence of Averroist discussions upon his mind. The question of the nature of human thought, as it presented itself to him, was the question of what should be considered to be the subjectum or metaphysical substrate of intelligence in man; and his characteristic position was that, while the human mind depends on matter and on a corporeal instrument for the objects of its thought, it does not depend on matter subjective. Now the precise meaning of this distinction is not, as has usually been supposed, that the higher or rational powers of man act in independence of a corporeal organ. In a sense, Pomponazzi holds they do so; in

1 See Comm. de An. ff. 126 129.

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another sense they use the body, the " whole body," as an instrument. But what Pomponazzi denies is that matter is the subjectum of mind, that mind subsists in matter 1.

Intelligence is, in its nature, independent of matter. Its independence, according to Pomponazzi, is perfectly realised only in the higher Intelligences. But in the case of human intelligence also the independence of thought is to be maintained quatenus ad subjectum; or, as he also expresses it, human intelligence is independent of matter qua intellectus, though not qua humanus*. Thought in man has the quality of thought as such, and stands above the category of quantity and physical categories generally. This idea of human reason distinguishes the doctrine of Pomponazzi absolutely from materialism. It is expressed in an important paragraph: " Not to be in an organ or not to need it as a substrate of existence, means either not to be in body, or not to be in it in a quantitative way. Hence we say that intellect does not need body as a substrate, in its intellection of itself, not because intellection is in no sense in body... but that in so far as it is called intellection it is not in

1 " Quamquam...totum corpus ponatur instrumentum intellectus quasi ut subjectum, non tamen vere est ut subjectum, quoniam intelligere non recipitur in eo modo cor- porali." De Imm. x. p. 80. (See the whole passage in note 2, p. 135.)

2 See Apol. \. iii. f. 59 b: " Ex his autem patere potest qualiter intellectus nullius corporis est actus. Illud enim universaliter verum est de quocunque intellectu, sed non eodem modo; quum et intellectus dicitur fere equivoce de diis et nobis; intellectus enim deorum, qui vere intellectus est, penitus nullius corporis actus est, quum in intelligendo non indiget corpore veluti subjecto vel veluti objecto. Quare simpliciter et vere illud dictum verificatur de diis, et de intellectu secundum se, quoniam in tellectus qua intellectus non indiget corpore. At noster intellectus, ut visus est, quamvis non indigeat corpore ut subjecto, indiget tamen ut objecto. Quare non ex toto noster intellectus nullius est corporis actus. Unde propositio assumpta, si referatur ad humanum intellectum, restringenda est quantum ad subjectum, et non quantum ad objectum. ...Exponi etiam potest, et melius, veluti dictum est, quod humanus intellectus nullius corporis est actus, qua scilicet intellectus est, licet non qua humanus." In another place (De Nutritione, I. xxiii. f. 130 b) he clearly states that the subjectum of thought as human is intelligence intelligence as timeless and unquantified; it is this, he says, which Aristotle had in view when he spoke of intelligence coming from without. " Dicimus Aristotelem per ea verba voluisse ostendere gradum intellectivum in hominibus convenire cum separatis a materia quantum ad aliquas conditiones: utpote quod non indiget materia vel organo ut subjecto; quare quasi extrinsecus venire videtur, et quoniam sic operando non con- tinetur neque quanto neque tempore; ut sic videtur esse aeternus, quanquam re vera non sit aeternus," etc. Cf- De Imm. passim.

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an organ and in body, since it is not in that in a quantitative and corporeal way. Wherefore the intellect can have itself as its object, can reason, and have universal conceptions, which faculties that use material organs and are extended cannot do. All this arises from the essential nature of intellect, since in so far as it is intellect it does not depend on matter or on quantity, because if the human intellect is said to depend on it, this is true in so far as it is conjoined with sense, so that it is an accident to it qua intellect to depend on matter and quantity. Whence also its operation is not more separate from matter than its essential nature, for unless intellect had an element which in virtue of itself could exist apart from matter, the operation itself could not take place except in a quantitative and corporeal way. But although the human intellect, as has been held, does not in its operation of thinking employ quantity, nevertheless since it is conjoined with sense, it cannot be separated altogether from matter and quantity 1 ."

The subjectum, in short, of the operations of intelligence, is intelligence itself. This is the metaphysical meaning of Pomponazzi's denial of mind's dependence on body tanquam de subjecto*.

1 " Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in corpore, vel in eo non esse modo quantitative; uncle dicimus intellectum non indigere corpore ut subjecto in sui intellectione, non quia intellectio nullo modo sit in corpore... sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo quantitative et corporali non est in eo; quapropter potest intellectus reflectere supra seipsum, discurrere, et universaliter comprehendere, quod virtutes organicae etextensae minime facere queunt; hoc autem totum provenit ex essentia intellectus, quoniam qua intellectus est non dependet a materia, neque a quantitate, quod si humanus intellectus ab ea dependet, hoc est ut sensui conjunctus est, quare accidet sibi qua intellectus est a materia et quantitate dependere; unde et eius operatic non est magis abstracta quam essentia, nisi enim intellectus haberet quod ex se posset esse sine materia, intellectio ipsa non posset exerceri nisi modo quantitative et corporali. At quamvis intellectus humanus, ut habitum est, intelligendo non fungatur quantitate; attamen quoniam sensui conjunctus est, ex toto a materia et quantitate absolvi non potest." (De I mm. IX. p. 58.) Again he says, " Intellectus humanus est in materia quasi per quandam con- comitantiam et ipsum intelligere quodam modo est in materia sed satis accidentaliter, quoniam intellectui, qua intellectus est, accidit esse in materia." (Op. cit. x. p. 79.) The distinction of thought from matter is for Pomponazzi axiomatic.

2 u Vere secundum essentiam ipsum intelligere esse in ipso intellectu juxta illud 3 de anima, anima est locus specierum, non tola sed intellectus ." (De Imm. x. p. 79.) " Immediatum enim subjectum intellectionis et volitionis sunt intellectus et voluntas, quae non sunt organicae potentiae... quoniam omne organicum est quan-

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The strength of this position is in its signalising the peculiar nature of intelligence. Its weakness is the metaphysical conception of thought as subjection a mechanical category from which it would be impossible to deduce personality. Still, in a sense, under the guidance of Averroes, an attempt is here made to formulate the problem which Aristotle had ignored the metaphysical question of the nature of thought and its relation to the individual human soul, to which Aristotle had attributed its possession.

Pomponazzi, meanwhile, following Aristotle, also attributed thought in that true and immaterial sense to the individual soul of man.

The mind of man, while in a sense it is in body, is not so in a physical sense. To deny that mind subsists physically in matter (de subjecto) does not necessarily mean to separate mind from matter. Mind would be said to be independent of matter (intellectum non indigere corpore ut subjecto), if it were not " in matter" at all: it is so, however, also if it be not in matter in a physical or quantitative sense. Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere may, says Pomponazzi, have either of these meanings; and while he does not hold the existence of human intelligence apart from body, he yet is not shut up to its physical subsistence in body 1.

This is further expressed in his ascribing to the human mind, in its rational or intellectual aspect, "indivisibility," which he explains to mean its exemption from the category of quan

tum... Ipsae vero solae sunt indivisibiles. Et secundum istum modum verificatur illud Aristotelis 3 de anima, scil. anima est locus specierum, non tota sed intellectus ." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 b.

1 "Non esse in organo, sive subjective eo non indigere, est vel non esse in corpore vel in eo non esse modo quantitative: unde dicimus intellectum (scil. humanum) non indigere corpore ut subjecto non quia intellectio nullo modo fit in corpore sed pro tanto intellectio dicitur non esse in organo et in corpore, quoniam modo quantitativo et corporali non est in eo." (De Imm. ix. p. 58.) Cf. Apol. i. iii. f. 59b; " Dicimus. ..humanam intellectionem non esse in corpore, non quoniam non sit in materia; quandoquidem hoc fieri inimaginabile est, cum enim anima sit in materia impossibile est quin et accidens ejus non sit in materia... sed pro tanto dicitur in tellectionem non esse in corpore, quum ipsa non dicitur esse in materia modo quantitativo, sed inextense; et nullo pacto in organo recipitur, veluti sensatio et omnis operatio vegetativae."

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tity 1. Thus his conclusion with regard to man is: " The human intellect cannot think unless a qualified and a quantified sensible object exist in matter, since it cannot operate unless it itself exists, and it itself cannot exist without an appropriate modifica tion (of body): nevertheless it does not follow that it thinks by means of these modifications.... Although its existence implies quantity, yet quantity is not the ground of its operation-"

On the one hand, that is to say, Pomponazzi affirms the embodiment of human intelligence, on the other the difference between thought and all that is physical. All the operations of the human mind, he constantly maintains, take place through the apprehension of physical objects by the bodily senses; and he never appears concerned to establish an activity of human thought, even in its highest functions of self-consciousness or the apprehension of universal ideas, that is unaccompanied by bodily organisation. But thought cannot be physical in its nature: the subjectum of intelligence cannot be the body or matter in any form 3.

Accepting the antiquated form of expression, we may take this as an affirmation that thought is sni generis. And it is interesting to note that, instead of endeavouring to find specific operations of thought independent of a physical concomitant, Pomponazzi rests upon the distinction of the physical and the intellectual. He is not concerned with a question of fact, but with the nature of intelligence.

1 " Dico autem indivisibile non veluti punctum in linea verum secundum privationem generis ejus." Apol. I. iii. f. 59 a.

These views are maintained by Pomponazzi with substantial uniformity in all his writings. Florentine {Pomponazzi, pp. 173 175) laboured to shew that Pomponazzi's standpoint changed with the advance of his thought, and that he moved gradually towards a professed materialism. Prof. Ferri has abundantly shewn that the facts do not bear out this theory. In the De Immortalitatt it is unflinchingly maintained that the soul is inseparable from the body; in the De Nutritione it is equally made plain that intelligence is to be considered as " immaterial " in its nature (" Intellectus qua intelligit est immaterialis ad modum expressum "). See De Nutr. I. xxiii. f. i3ob.

2 "Intellectus humanus non potest intelligere, nisi in materia sunt quale et quantum sensibile, cum non operari potest nisi ipse sit, ipseque esse non potest nisi cum dispositione convenienti: non tamen sequitur quod per tales dispositiones in- telligat....Etsi est (intellectus) in quantitate, tamen quantitas non est principium illius operationis." De Imi. x. pp. 77, 78.

3 " Quanquam totum corpus ponatur instrumentum...non tamen vere est ut subjectum." De Imm. x. p. 80.