The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 9

CHAPTER 9: FIGHTING HELIBORNE INSERTIONS
Soviet technology often had minimal impact on the Mujahideenguerrilla. Many Mujahideen tactics were virtually unchanged andstill effective from their combat with Great Britain in the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries. Soviet high-performance aviationposed a direct threat to the civilian populace of Afghanistan, but, theMujahideen learned how to avoid or misdirect high-performanceaircraft. However, the Soviet transport helicopter and helicoptergunship proved to be major concerns to the Mujahideen. Helicopters,and later the SU-25 close air support aircraft, were potent systems inthe Soviet arsenal that the Mujahideen respected and feared. Soviettransports could land raiding parties deep in Mujahideen areas whilegunships and close support aircraft could attack any opposition.Throughout the war, the Mujahideen had difficulty countering heli-borne insertions, but they did learn that planning, drills and airdefense ambushes could help alleviate the 'heliborne threat. Page 228 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 1 SOVIET HELIBORNE RAID ACHIEVES SURPRISEby Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah In the mid 1980s, Mujahideen forces based in Alingar District of the Laghman Province intensified their attacks on Soviet/DRAcolumns moving between Alingar and the provincial capital of MehtarLam. Mujahideen action included harassing supply columns, blockingtraffic and launching raids on security outposts protecting governmentestablishments. These actions were usually conducted by local resis-tance groups of 30 to 70 men. Most were affiliated with the Hezb-eIslami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIH). Mujahideen commanders dispersed their men, weapons and equip-ment in the villages and hideouts and sometimes even buried theirweapons between actions. However, rarely a day would pass in theregion without some combat initiated by the Mujahideen or the DRAforces. In response, the Soviet/DRA forces targeted suspected bases orhouses (permanent residences or headquarters) of major Mujahideencommanders in the area. Most of the raids were conducted by groundtroops. However, after 1984, Soviet special forces launched severalheli-borne raids on Mujahideen targets in the region. Their action atBadiabad Village was one of these. In the summer of 1985, a Soviet heli-borne detachment raided thehouse of a local Mujahideen commander, Mamur Ghulam Jailani, inthe village of Badiabad. The village is located about 15 kilometersnortheast of Mehtar Lam on the main road connecting the provincialcapital with the Alingar District (Map 9-1 - Badiabad). CommanderJailani commanded 150 Mujahideen located in and around Badiabad.His group was armed with automatic rifles, RPG-7 grenade launchers and a few heavy, and light machine guns. The Soviet raid began around 0900 hours with successive gun runsby pairs of helicopter gunships. Continual heavy helicopter rocket andmachine gun raked the village and gave the villagers little opportuni-ty to move into the surrounding hills—a standard practice by womenand children to escape the ground force attacks that usually followed Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH party in Laghman. Hejoined Hekmatyar in the fight against Daoud--before the communist revolution. He had noformal military education. Dr. Abdul Qudus was a guerrilla commander under Sidiqullah.He doubled as the force medic, since he received medic's training in Pakistan. [Map sheet3086, vic grid 1745]. Page 230 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War air strikes. That day Commander Jailani was staying two villagesaway at Mirza Qala, less than one kilometer to the east. His 14-year-old son was alone in the house during the raid. The youngster waswounded, but managed to escape. The aerial preparation continued about 30 minutes without anyMujahideen reaction or return fire. Four lift helicopters then set downin some corn fields 200-300 meters west of the commander's house.The corn stalks were about 20-30 centimeters high at the time. About40 commandoes disembarked and immediately split into three groups.Two 10-man groups secured the northern and southern flanks of thevillage and a 20-man group stormed through the village to the houseonly to find that it was empty. The commandoes, seized (stole) cashand other valuables in the house and destroyed what they could nottake away. They searched several neighboring houses and found onlywomen and children. They detained two unarmed Mujahideen whohad buried their weapons. They were later released. Several Mujahideen groups from the surrounding villages moved toBadiabad to fight the Soviets, but none arrived on time. The Sovietdetachment withdrew unopposed and flew away in the helicopters thatbrought it in. The entire action lasted about an hour. COMMENTARY: Soviet intelligence as to the location of the commander'shouse was good, probably reflecting the presence of an informer in thearea. However, the Soviets did not have current intelligence to pin-point when the commander would be in his house. This indicates thatthey were relying on only one intelligence asset and should have direct-ed other assets to supplement their agent's reports. The resulting lackof accurate, current intelligence resulted in a failed mission. On theother hand, the guerrillas did not have an early warning system andhad not developed and rehearsed a plan or drills to counter a Soviet-helicopter raid. This lack may have saved the Soviet force. The guerrillas' lack of an overall village security plan and slowreaction time cost the resistance a good opportunity for inflicting heavylosses on the raiding detachment. A good security plan would concen-trate on destroying the lift ships first and then fragmenting anddestroying the raiding detachment piecemeal. Eyewitnesses say that Jailani had left an RPG-7 in his house. Asthe Soviet gunships started strafing the village, he asked for a volun-teer to go to the village and retrieve the valuable weapon. He offered40,000 Afghanis (about 100 dollars) as a reward. His 17-year-oldnephew, Ismail, volunteered, reached the embattled house and Chapter 9, Vignette 1 Page 231 retrieved the weapon minutes before the Soviets stormed the place. Instead of retiring with the RPG-7, the Mujahideen commandercould have it used against the raiding force—perhaps to knock outenemy helicopters. There was no lack of brave men among theMujahideen, like Ismail, who rushed to the village for combat. TheMujahideen, in this case, demonstrated a lot of individual courage butlittle tactical teamwork, initiative or cohesiveness. About one month later, the Mujahideen had another chance andreversed the outcome of a similar raid just four kilometers north ofBadiabad. This is the subject of the next vignette. Page 232 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 2 SOVIET RAID ON KANDAby Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah In July 1985, about one month after the Soviet raid on theMujahideen base in the village of Badiabad, the Soviets made asimilar attack against the resistance base of Doctor Alkozai at KandaWarajayee. Kanda Warajayee, commonly called Kanda, is located onthe main road between the provincial capital of Mehtar Lam andthe Alingar District in the Laghman Province. The village is nearlyeight kilometers south of the Alingar District center. I located my base just outside the village to the west of themain road. I moved all the crew-served weapons from my house inthe village to the base since the Soviets had conducted a series ofraids on the homes of known Mujahideen commanders. I located mybase in a ruin near an intermittent drainage ditch and protected itwith security posts and crew-served weapons firing positions. One day in July 1985, a group of six Soviet helicopters flew intomy area. The helicopter group included four gunships which startedfiring at positions around my house. It seemed to me that the enemyintended to land troops and mount a raid on my house. TheMujahideen in my base opened up with machine gun fire on theenemy helicopters. This forced the Soviets to land at a distance fromthe village. As the helicopters landed about three kilometers awayfrom Kanda on Shakhatara Dashta (plain), six of my Mujahideencarried an 82mm Chinese-manufactured recoilless rifle to a naturaldrainage ditch which extended from the village to the Prang GharMountain to the west (Map 9-2 - Kanda). The Soviet soldiers jumped from their helicopters onto the openterrain near a flock of sheep. The Soviets promptly gunned down theunarmed teenage shepherd. The enemy then tried to advance onKanda under the air cover provided by their gunships. But the inten-sity of fire from my Mujahideen pinned them down in the open. Asthe fire fight continued, more of my Mujahideen rushed into the fray.This forced the Soviet troops to withdraw, quickly board their heli-copters and fly away. The Soviet raid was a complete failure. Haji Sidiqullah and Dr. Abdul Qudus are the narrators of the previous vignette. iMap sheet3086, vic grid 1948]. Page 234 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen's prompt reaction to the enemy attacksaved the day. The Mujahideen had learned that enemy airmobileassaults in a guerrilla-controlled area have little chance of successwhen met with coordinated fire from multiple directions. Dr. Alkozaihad planned for enemy air assault and positioned weapons to deal withthat possibility. On the other hand, the Soviet forces paid heavily for theirattempt to land small units in an area totally dominated by the resis-tance. A heliborne attack may succeed when it is launched against anenemy caught by surprise and unable to respond swiftly. However,heavy Mujahideen ground fire should have convinced the Soviet com-mander to abort his mission. Instead, he relied on gunship fire tocarry the day and was forced to withdraw from a hot LZ. He waslucky not to lose some lift ships, particularly since his landing zonewas so close to the objective. Soviet intelligence about their target appears to have beengood, but the Soviet commander lacked the complete intelligencepicture about the strength and location of guerrilla forces. If the Sovietcommander had inserted some forces to secure the high groundoverlooking Kanda before landing the bulk of his force, he mighthave been able to suppress guerrilla crew-served weapons and accom-plish his raid. Page 236 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 9, Vignette 3 Page 237 VIGNETTE 3 AIR ASSAULT ON MARO STRONGHOLDby Toryalai Hemat In April 1987, the Soviets and DRA launched a combined strike onthe Mujahideen stronghold in Nangrahar Province, Shinwar Districtnear the Nazian Valley. The Nazian Valley was heavily populated,although many of the inhabitants had emigrated to Pakistan to avoidthe Soviet bombing attacks. The Mujahideen stronghold that theenemy wanted was at Maro, some 70 kilometers southeast ofJalalabad near the Pakistan border. Several Mujahideen groupsfrom different factions were located around Maro and there wereprobably some 500 well-armed Mujahideen in the stronghold area.The Soviets called this stronghold the Melava fortified region.1 For 18 days prior to the attack, the Soviets hit the area withairstrikes. Then, a mechanized Soviet/DRA column moved eastfrom Jalalabad and, when it reached Shinwar Town, it split in two(Map 9-3 - Maro). One column moved through Shinwar and up theNazian Valley, while the other column moved further to the east to the subdistrict of Dur Baba and then attacked to the southwest.Commander Saznur and his men defended on the Dur Babaapproach. Commander Khaled and I, along with our 10 otherMujahideen, defended Ghazgisar—the highest ground in the areaoverlooking Maro. The enemy launched heavy air strikes against us.Following the airstrikes, Soviet helicopters landed air assault forceson the high ground between the two axes.2 Some 40 or 50 heli-copter sorties were involved. One of the landing zones was right infront of us. The fighting was fierce. Nine of my group were killed bythe bombing or while fighting the air assault force. Only Khaled, Toryalai Hemat was a regiment commander of a mobile force allied with the lUA--IslamicUnion of Afghanistan of Sayyaf. He fought in many provinces in Afghanistan. [Map sheet3185, vic grid 8892]. 1 A Soviet account of this action is contained in vignette 26 of The Bear Went Over theMountain. The Soviet account mistakenly has the action to the northeast of Jalalabad, amistake that Les Grau made based on a similar name and some vague text. 2These were two battalions from the 56th Air Assault Brigade in Gardez. The battalionsdrove to Jalalabad and then to Shinwar. They staged the air assault from a field site inShinwar. Why they did not fly to Jalalabad airfield and then stage the air assault from theairfield is a mystery. The ground force was most likely from the Soviet 66th SeparateMotorized Rifle Brigade and the DRA 11th Infantry Division. Page 238 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Abdul Wakil and I survived. The Mujahideen [under CommanderSaznur] initially stopped the column from Dur Baba, but the columncoming from the Nazian Valley advanced quickly and captured Maro.In my group, we three survivors were caught between two LZs. Wesnuck out of the area and crossed the border into Pakistan and hikedto the nearby village of Bazar. When the enemy took Maro, many Mujahideen fled across theborder and assembled at Bazar (Tirah Agency in Pakistan).Reinforcements from the HIH and IUA factions poured into thearea. Arab volunteers along with Talibs from religious schools alsocame for the fighting. We launched a counterattack. The fighting forthe bases was so fierce that at times it was hand-to-hand combat. Ipersonally was so close to some Russians during the fighting that Iwould recognize them today. The enemy left many vehicles behindand many dead on the ground. The Soviets did not usually leavetheir dead, but we counted 75 Soviet KIA. I do not know the totalnumber of Mujahideen casualties, but I do know of 72 Mujahideenkilled and wounded. The Soviets only held Maro for three days. Theyburned and destroyed what they could and mined the area beforethey withdrew. COMMENTARY: The Soviet air assault raids on mountain base campsusually lasted for one to three days. As in this instance, the Sovietspreferred to have ground forces involved to link up 'with the airassault forces. They tried to seize the area, destroy as much of the base as possible, lay down mines and depart. And, they tried toavoid getting trapped in the mountains fighting the Mujahideen ontheir turf. As in Zhawar and Magistral, the Mujahideen initiallyretreated, regrouped and reinforced and then launched a punishingattack. The close proximity of this base to Pakistan allowed theMujahideen to do this. The Soviet planning and execution of thisaction was well done, but they apparently were late in withdrawingand had to fight a running withdrawal. The Mujahideen distribution of forces on the two axes was unevenand the air assault prevented the Mujahideen from employing areserve against the threatened axis. Part of the maldistribution isdue to the fact that various factions of various strengths were in thearea and missions were assigned by faction, not by strength.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY
In the early days of the war, Soviet air assault missions were rathertimid and unimaginative. Later, the Soviets became more confidentwith the air assault concept and struck deeper and more aggressively.Ambush forces were delivered by helicopter, and raiding forcesstruck deep at Mujahideen supply bases and staging areas and evenconducted raids against Mujahideen redoubts such as the one at Maro.The Soviets usually sent a ground element to link up with the airassault element if the air assault element had to remain in the area forany length of time. Soviet air assaults relied on helicopter gunshipsand SU-25 close air support aircraft for fire support, but frequentlybrought their artillery with them by helicopter. The Mujahideen learned to counter air assaults with thoroughplanning, immediate action drills, an early warning system and airdefense ambushes. They learned to mine likely LZs, employ massedRPG fire against hovering or landing helicopters, and to try andoverrun a LZ before the air assault forces had an opportunity to getorganized and oriented. They also learned to "hug" Soviet forces sothat helicopter gunships could not fire at them. Mazer-e11110 tSharif KABUL 2 AsadabadJalalabad 4 Herat Gardez Afghanistan Chapter 10 KandaharIncidents