The Mohler/Opinion of the Court

It is insisted that the loss occurred through a peril of navigation, which was one of the exceptions contained in the bill of lading, and that, therefore, the carrier was excused from a delivery of the wheat. The burden of proof lies on the carrier, and nothing short of clear proof, leaving no reasonable doubt for controversy, should be permitted to discharge him from duties which the law has annexed to his employment. This burden has been assumed by the carrier, and the case was heard on the testimony introduced by the respondents, the libellant having called no witnesses.

It may be true, as the answer implies, that the boat would have safely made the passage if the wind had not driven her against the pier, but this does not solve the difficulty. The inquiry is whether the passage should have been undertaken at all in the general bent of the weather on that day. If the carrier had sufficient warning to put him on his guard, and chose to neglect it and take the chances of a venture when common prudence told him there was danger in it, he cannot escape on the ground that the particular peril which finally overcame him was a sudden gust of wind. The general doctrine that a carrier is not answerable for goods lost by tempest has no application to such a case.

It is undeniable that the weather was boisterous during the afterpart of the day on which the loss occurred, and that the boat laid up at Mendota, on account of the wind. It had at best only 'abated' or 'calmed down' when she left Mendota and proceeded on her voyage. There is a singular discrepancy in the testimony of the master and the mate as to the condition of the wind after the departure from Mendota, and as to where it was that the wind began to blow hard; the master swearing that there was no great wind until the boat met the Julia, and that this was but a quarter of a mile above the piers; the mate giving a very different account as to both facts. Both these officers had equal opportunities of judging, and there is nothing in the record affecting the credibility of either. In such a case the defence fails, for the respondents have no right to ask the court to prefer the testimony of one witness over the other when there is nothing in the record to show that one is more reliable than the other.

Apart from this there is enough in the evidence to establish satisfactorily that the weather had not cleared, nor the direction of the wind changed, and that the boat should either not have left her moorings at Mendota, or have landed at some proper point before the piers were reached. It won't do to say that the wind had moderated, and that the officers of the boat thought they could get through without trouble. They had no right to think so, for on such a day squalls were likely to arise at any moment, and it was bad seamanship, being forewarned, to attempt to go through such a dangerous place in the river. It is difficult at all times to make the passage of these piers, and especially so in sudden gusts of wind blowing from the south, which was the case on that day. And this difficulty is enhanced in the night-time, and when the current, by reason of high water, is increased.

Any prudent officer would have stopped until the weather became calm. At any rate it was the duty of the master of the boat in question to have done so, and, failing in this duty, he is chargeable with the consequences of his negligence, which, in this case, were lamentable, for not only was the property in his charge destroyed, but a human life lost. The officers of steamers plying the Western waters must be held to the full measure of responsibility in navigating streams where bridges are built across them. These bridges, supported by piers, of necessity increase the dangers of navigation, and river-men, instead of recognizing them as lawful structures built in the interests of commerce, seem to regard them as obstructions to it, and apparently act on the belief that frequent accidents will cause their removal. There is no foundation for this belief. Instead of the present bridges being abandoned, more will be constructed. The changed condition of the country, produced by the building of railroads, has caused the great inland waters to be spanned by bridges. These bridges are, to a certain extent, impediments in the way of navigation, but railways are highways of commerce as well as rivers, and would fail of accomplishing one of the main objects for which they were created-the rapid transit of persons and property-if rivers could not be bridged. It is the interest as well as the duty of all persons engaged in business on the water routes of transportation to conform to this necessity of commerce. If they do this and recognize railroad bridges as an accomplished fact in the history of the country, there will be less loss of life and property, and fewer complaints of the difficulties of navigation at the places where these bridges are built. If they pursue a different and contrary course, it rests with the courts of the country, in every proper case, to remind them of their legal responsibility.

DECREE AFFIRMED.