The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Arnold)/Chapter XVII

Lincoln now magnanimously gave General McClellan another and a splendid opportunity to achieve success. His command embraced the army of the Potomac, the remains of the army of Pope, and the troops of Burnside, while to these were added the large number of recruits and volunteers which poured in from the loyal states, so that he had, before November, more than two hundred thousand soldiers under his command.

If he had possessed to any extent the elements of a hero, if he could have led a rapid and brilliant campaign, he had now the opportunity, and the people would have eagerly crowned him with the laurels of victory. But as soon as he was settled in his command, he continued to make the old complaints and calls for more troops. He wished those engaged in the defense of Washington sent to him, even if the capital should fall into the hands of the enemy.

Colonel Miles and General Julius White, in September, 1862, occupied the picturesque village of Harper's Ferry, with some twelve thousand soldiers. On the 11th, McClellan asked that these troops be directed to join his army. That order was not given, but it was suggested to him that he open communication with Harper's Ferry, and that then these troops would be under his command. On the 13th, he knew that Lee's army was divided, and that Jackson had been detached from the main army for the purpose of capturing Harper's Ferry. McClellan by promptness could have saved Harper's Ferry. Swinton, who excuses him when he can, says: "If he had thrown forward his army with the vigor used by Jackson... he could have relieved Harper's Ferry, which did not surrender until the 15th." Palfrey, in his "Antietam and Fredericksburg," says: "He was not equal to the occasion. He threw away his chance, and a precious opportunity of making a great name passed away."

On the 17th, was fought the bloody battle of Antietam. Of this battle, alluding to McClellan's delay in attacking while Lee's forces were divided, Palfrey says: "He fought his battle one day too late, if not two." "He did very little in the way of compelling the execution of his orders." A very large portion of his army did not participate in the battle, and Palfrey adds: "It is probable, almost to a point of certainty, that if a great part of the Second and Fifth corps, and all the Sixth, animated by the personal presence of McClellan, had attacked vigorously in the center, and Burnside on the Federal left,... the result would have been the practical annihilation of Lee's army!"

McClellan, against the advice of Burnside and others, decided not to renew the attack on the 18th. "It is," says Palfrey, "hardly worth while to state his reasons." Two divisions had joined him. "The fault was in the man. There was force enough at his command either day had he seen fit to use it." By the time that McClellan got ready to renew the attack Lee was gone. On the 18th, the enemy were permitted to retire across the Potomac. The Union army slowly followed, occupying Maryland Heights on the 20th, and Harper's Ferry on the 23d of September. On the 7th of October, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan that "the army must move. The country is becoming very impatient at the want of activity of your army, and we must push it on."

The President was also impatient at these slow movements of McClellan, and to a friend of the General's who called at the White House, he said, doubtless with the expectation that it would be repeated: "McClellan's tardiness reminds me of a man in Illinois, whose attorney was not sufficiently aggressive. The client knew a few law phrases, and finally, after waiting until his patience was exhausted by the non-action of his counsel, he sprang to his feet and exclaimed: 'Why don't you go at him with a Fi Fa, demurrer, a capias, a surrebutter, or a ne exeat, or something; and not stand there like a nudum pactum, or a non est?'"

By the 6th of October, the President's impatience of McClellan's long delay induced him to telegraph the General: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him South." McClellan did not obey. On the 10th, Stewart, a rebel cavalry officer, crossed the Potomac, went as far as Chambersburgh in Pennsylvania, made the circuit of the Federal army, and re-crossed the Potomac without serious loss. This was the second time Confederate cavalry had been permitted to ride entirely around McClellan's army. On the 13th of October, the President made one more effort to induce McClellan to act, by writing him a long and kindly personal letter. The letter was as follows:

"My Dear Sir:-- You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing?  Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

"As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation, as you would have to do without the railroad last named.  He now wagons from Culpepper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry.  He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are.  I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of time which cannot and must not be ignored.

"Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is 'to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own.' You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor.  Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours?  You dread his going into Pennsylvania.  But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communication to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do, but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind, all the easier.

"Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is, by the route you can, and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march.  His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord.  The roads are as good on yours as on his.

"You know I desired, but did not order you, to cross the Potomac below, instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. The idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize, if he would permit.  If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications.  If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track.  I say try; if we never try, we shall never succeed.  If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him.  This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

"Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility for supplying from the side away from the enemy, is remarkable, as it were by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub towards the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket, and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington.  The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.  The gaps through the Blue Ridge, I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to-wit: Vestala, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five; and Thornton's, fifty-three. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length, running for Richmond ahead of him, enable him to move his way; if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

"Yours Truly, A. LINCOLN."

Near the end of October McClellan started, and on the 2d of November his army crossed the Potomac. Thus the autumn had gone by, from the battle of Antietam on the 17th of September until the 2d of November, before McClellan crossed the Potomac. The President had written, begged, and entreated McClellan to act. In his letter of October 13th, he says: "I say try. If we never try, we shall never succeed." "We should not operate so as to merely to drive him (the enemy) away." In a dispatch on the 27th day of October, the President says: "I now ask a distinct answer to the question: "Is it your purpose not to go into action again until the men now being drafted are incorporated in the old regiments?" The patience of Mr. Lincoln was finally exhausted, and, on the 5th of November, he issued an order relieving McClellan, and directing him to turn over the command to General Burnside. Thus ends the military career of George B. McClellan.

The judgment of General Palfrey, who served under him, is certainly not too severe. He sums up his military history in these words: "His interminable and inexcusable delays upon the Peninsula afforded great ground for dissatisfaction, and they seemed--to say no more--to be followed by similar delays upon the Potomac." "He never made his personal presence felt on a battle-field.

McClellan retired to New Jersey, to emerge no more except as the candidate for the Presidency, in 1864, of the party who declared "the war a failure." He contributed to this failure, in so far as it was one--considering the means at his command to make it a success--more than almost any other man. But he himself was the most conspicuous failure of the war. After all his disasters and delays upon the Peninsula, the President generously re-instated him in command, and at Antietam and afterwards, he had golden opportunities to redeem his failure. He was retained long after his removal had been demanded by the friends of the President. The patience, fidelity, and forbearance of the President in his treatment of McClellan, is strikingly illustrated by his correspondence. History will censure him for adhering to the General too long rather than for any failure to support him. But McClellan was a courteous gentleman, whose personal character was amiable and respectable. Mr. Lincoln respected his private virtues, and said of him: "With all his failings as a soldier, McClellan is a pleasant and scholarly gentleman. He is an admirable engineer, but," he added, "he seems to have a special talent for a stationary engine."

On the 9th of November General Burnside assumed command of the great army. He was a frank and manly soldier, of fine person, and everywhere respected as a gentleman and an unselfish patriot. He accepted the high position with diffidence, and with the consciousness that he would scarcely receive the earnest cooperation of the favorite generals of McClellan. On the 12th of this month, Generals Halleck and Meigs visited him in his camp, and held a conference on the movements to be made. Halleck and Burnside failed to agree, and the subject was referred to the President. Burnside's plan was to make a feint on Gordonsville, but to concentrate rapidly and attack Fredericksburg. The President, in assenting to Burnside's plan as reported by Halleck, said to the General: "He thinks it (the plan) will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise not."

The absolute necessity of rapid movement, and the crossing of the Rappahannock before Lee could concentrate his army and fortify Fredericksburg, were obvious. By some misunderstanding or gross neglect, the pontoons with which to cross the river were not sent forward in time. This delay was fatal in its consequences. Burnside arrived at Falmouth, on the banks of the Rappahannock, on the 19th of November, but the pontoons did not arrive until the 25th. By this delay, all the advantages of surprise were lost; the enemy had time to concentrate his army on the heights overlooking Fredericksburg, to intrench and prepare to meet the attack. There has been much discussion as to who was responsible for this delay in the arrival of the pontoons. Considering the importance of their being there in time, and that the fate of the movement depended on their presence when needed, it would seem that all were negligent--Halleck, and Meigs, and Burnside. Each should have known personally that the pontoons were there in time. When, on the 13th of December, Burnside attacked Fredericksburg, he found Lee with his army concentrated and occupying a strong position which had been well and skillfully fortified. The assault on these works was gallantly made, but, as might have been anticipated, was repulsed with terrible slaughter. Lee occupied a fortified ridge, the approach to which was swept by artillery. It is difficult to understand why this army should have been ordered across a river like the Rappahannock, and to assault a fortified position so well covered by breast-works and rifle-pits; or why, when the delay of the pontoons and failure to surprise the enemy rendered success impossible, some flank movement, such was repeatedly made by Sherman and Grant, should not have been made, thus forcing the enemy to battle on more equal ground.

After a fearful loss of life, the troops were withdrawn to Falmouth, and there the two armies confronted each other from the opposite banks of the river.

In the campaign of 1862, in the East, the results were on the whole favorable to the rebels. With a much smaller force, they kept the Union army during all the autumn of 1861 and the winter of 1862 in the defences of Washington. They blockaded the Potomac. They had, by the blunders and want of vigor of McClellan, repulsed him from Richmond. They had sent Stonewall Jackson like an eagle swooping down through the valley of the Shenandoah, driving Banks across the Potomac, and escaping from Fremont and McDowell. They had frightened McClellan from Richmond without ever decidedly defeating his combined army. On the contrary, his troops often gained great advantages over the rebels, yet he would never follow up these successes and seize the fruits of victory; but always, after knocking the enemy down, would stop, call for re-enforcements, or run away from them.

Then came the hard fought campaign of Pope, when, if McClellan and Porter had loyally obeyed and heartily cooperated with Pope, the armies of McClellan, Pope, and Burnside would have been consolidated on the field of Manassas, and would have crushed the much smaller force of Lee. Then came the rebel march into Maryland, the battle of Antietam, a repulse of Lee which ought to have been a crushing defeat, followed again by the long delays of McClellan--a dreary waste of time, and of inactive complaint. Then came McClellan's removal, Burnside's campaign, and the slaughter of Fredericksburg. Such is the sad story of the brave but badly commanded army of the Potomac to the close of 1862.

Burnside survived his terrible defeat; survived to render good but subordinate service on the field, and died a useful and respected senator in Congress from Rhode Island.

The progress of the Union armies was also checked in the West. Buell was forced back, and the rebel General Bragg entered Kentucky, and occupied Frankfort, Lexington, and other important positions. A provisional government was organized by the rebels at Frankfort. Louisville and Cincinnati were threatened and fortified. On the 8th of October, the battle of Perryville was fought. On the 25th, Buell was superseded by General Rosecrans.

Vicksburg, on the Mississippi, a strong position by nature, and fortified with skill, was still an insurmountable obstacle to the complete recovery by the Union troops of the Mississippi. Generals Sherman and McClernand, on the 29th of December, 1862, made a gallant assault upon the defences in the rear of this stronghold, but were repulsed with serious loss. On the 31st of December, the Union army under Rosecrans fought the battle of Stone River, where there was great loss on both sides, but the rebels, under their able leader, Johnston, retreated to Murfreesboro.

The year 1862 closed in gloom. There had been vast expenditures of blood and treasure by the government, and great successes, yet the Union cause had suffered still greater defeats and many grievous disasters, and the hopes of the insurgents rose high.

The President was greatly depressed by the terrible defeat at Fredericksburg, and especially by the great and useless sacrifice of the lives of his gallant soldiers. The leading generals of the army of the Potomac were quarreling and abusing each other. Burnside demanded the peremptory removal of several of them, and among others that of Hooker, making this the condition of his retaining his own command. The Cabinet was divided, and its members denouncing each other. Faction ran high in Congress, and the committee on the conduct of war became censorious and abusive. The press grew bitter, arrogant, and denunciatory, Mr. Greeley in the New York Tribune demanding foreign intervention, and declaring to Raymond that he would drive Lincoln into it.

Leading officers of the army went so far as to say that "both the army and the government needed a dictator." During these gloomy days, in which it seemed that many of the leading men in civil and military life lost their heads, and were ready for almost any change, however wild, the President was calm, patient, tolerant of those who differed from him, and hopeful. At this crisis, when his generals were denouncing each other, his Cabinet quarreling and making combinations against him, Congress factious, foreign nations hostile and ready to recognize the Confederacy, and some in high position calling for a dictator; it is not too much to say that Lincoln bore on his Atlantean shoulders the fate of the republic, that his firm, vigorous hand saved the country from anarchy and ruin.

On the 26th of January, the President sent the following letter to General Hooker:

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., January 26, 1863.

Major General Hooker.--General: I have placed you at the head of the army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons; and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe that you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can be dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability. which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticizing their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but, with energy and sleepless vigilance, go forward and give us victories.

Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN.

Hooker passed three months in preparation, and then suffered the terrible defeat of Chancellorsville, and again was the brave army of the Potomac beaten by superior generalship. Among the misfortunes of the rebels in this battle was the death of their most brilliant soldier, Stonewall Jackson. It was the nature of Mr. Lincoln to do full justice to his enemies. His heart was touched by the death of Jackson, and he said to a friend who praised the dead: "I honor you for your generosity to one who, though contending against us in a guilty cause, was a gallant man. Let us forget his sins over his fresh made grave."