The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Arnold)/Chapter XVI

That a consecutive narrative might be given of the action of Congress and of the Executive, on the all-important question of slavery, up to the period of emancipation, military movements have been neglected. Everything depended upon the success of the Union armies. Laws and proclamations, without victories, would amount to little. The President realized this, and on the threshold of the war, his most anxious thought, and most difficult problem, was to find officers who could lead the Union troops to victory. The republic had few soldiers of experience. Scott and Wool had won reputation in the war of 1812, and in Mexico, but were old for active service. Military skill must be developed by costly experience. In his appointments to high command, the President, without regard to party or personal considerations, sought for skill and ability. None realized more fully than he, that the success of his administration depended upon the triumph of his armies. Hence, while he appointed Fremont, and Hunter, and McDowell, Banks, and others, from among his political and personal friends, he did not hesitate to give to those who had hitherto acted with the democratic party, such as McClellan, Halleck, Buell, Grant, and others, the very highest positions. The question with him was--who will lead our troops to the most speedy and decisive victories?

The general plan of the war seemed to be: first, to blockade the entire coast of the insurgent states; second, the military occupation of the border slave states, so as to protect and sustain the Union men resident therein; third, the recovery of the Mississippi River to the Gulf, by which the Confederacy would be divided, and the great outlet of the Northwest to New Orleans and the ocean would be secured; fourth, the destruction of the rebel army in Virginia, and the capture of Richmond, the rebel capital. To accomplish these purposes, and to resist their accomplishment, stupendous preparations were made on both sides.

In the autumn of 1861, General George B. McClellan had under his command, at Washington and its vicinity, on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio, and at Fortress Monroe, more than two hundred thousand well armed men. General Halleck, who was in command in the West, had a very large army. McClellan was a skillful organizer, and had the power of making himself personally popular, but was slow, very cautious, and was never ready. With his magnificent army, greatly exceeding that which confronted him--he lay inactive all the fall of 1861, and the winter of 1861-2, into February, permitting the Potomac to be closed by batteries on the western shore, above and below his army, and the rebel flag to be flaunted in his face, and in that of the government, from the Virginia hills overlooking the capital.

It was the era of brilliant reviews and magnificent military displays, of parade, festive parties, and junketings. The President was impatient at this inactivity, and again and again urged action on the part of the General. But McClellan, having in August, 1861, offended General Scott, by whom he was styled "an ambitious Junior," and caused the old veteran to ask to be placed on the retired list, was left in command. When urged to action by the President, he always had some plausible excuse for delay. At length the patience of the Executive was exhausted, and, on the 27th of January, 1862, he issued an order that a general movement of the land and naval forces should be made, on the 22d of February, against the insurgents. This order has been much criticised. It was addressed to the army and navy generally, but was intended especially for General McClellan and his army.

A brief recital of what had been done at the West and elsewhere, will show that, with the exception of the great army of the Potomac, the forces of the republic had been active, energetic, and generally successfu1. On the 6th of November, 1861, General U. S. Grant, moving from Cairo, attacked Belmont, and destroyed the military stores of the enemy at that place. On the 10th of January, 1862, Colonel James A. Garfield attacked and defeated Humphrey Marshall, at Middle Creek, Kentucky. On the 18th of January, General George H. Thomas, a true and loyal Virginian, who, like Scott, was faithful to his flag, gained a brilliant victory over the rebel Generals Zollikoffer and Crittenden, at Mill Spring.

The Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, having their sources far within the rebel lines, and running to the north and west, empty into the Ohio. To secure these rivers from Union gun-boats, the insurgents had constructed and garrisoned Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland. Flag-officer Foote, one of the most skillful and energetic officers of the navy, commanded the Union fleet on the Western rivers. Co-operating with General Grant, they planned an attack on Fort Henry. On the 6th of February, Foote, with his gun-boats, attacked and captured that Fort--not waiting for the arrival of Grant, who was approaching. Grant and Foote then moved to the attack of Fort Donelson. On the 16th of February, they invested the fort. After several days hard fighting, the rebel General Buckner sent a flag of truce to General Grant, asking a cessation of hostilities, to settle terms of surrender. Grant replied: "No terms except unconditional surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your works." Buckner did not wait the assault, but surrendered at discretion. This victory, and the note of Grant, gave to him the sobriquet of "Unconditional Surrender Grant." Arms, stores, and more than twelve thousand prisoners were captured. This brilliant victory electrified the country, and the President, impatient, and careworn over the long and mysterious delay of the army of the Potomac, looked ten years younger upon the evening of the reception of the inspiring news.

General Floyd, late the treacherous Secretary of War under Buchanan, and who had been in command, was conscious that a man who had plotted treason against the national government while in the Cabinet, deserved punishment as a traitor, and fled at night before the surrender. These substantial victories compelled the evacuation by the rebels of Kentucky, and opened Tennessee to the Union forces. Bowling Green, called by the insurgents the Gibraltar of Kentucky, was, on the 15th of February, occupied by General Mitchell of the Union army.

On the 24th of February, the Union troops occupied Nashville, the capital of the great state of Tennessee, and, in March thereafter, Andrew Johnson, having been appointed provisional governor, arrived, and the persecuted Unionists of the state gladly rallied around him. In East Tennessee--his old home--loyalty was general, and the Union flag was hailed with exclamations of joy and gratitude.

On the 6th, 7th, and 8th of March, was fought the battle of Pea Ridge, and General Halleck telegraphed with exultation: "The Union flag is floating in Arkansas." On the 13th of March, General John Pope, of Illinois, moving down the west bank of the Mississippi, compelled the evacuation of New Madrid, and then laid siege to Island No 10, in the Mississippi, which, on the 7th of April, he captured, with provisions, arms, and military stores.

Thus the Union forces had been steadily advancing in the valley of the Mississippi. Buell's army was at Nashville, and the Confederates saw with dismay Missouri, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Tennessee, wrenched from them, and realized that unless the armies of Grant and Buell could be driven back, the whole valley of the Mississippi would be lost.

Lee seemed to calculate, with confidence, that all would remain "quiet on the Potomac" as usual, for he sent Beauregard from his army in Virginia to the West, while the rebel forces west of the Alleghanies were placed under the command of their ablest general, Albert Sidney Johnston. He realized the vast, perhaps decisive importance of the impending conflict in the valley of the Mississippi. In his address to his army, before the battle of Shiloh, he said: "Remember, soldiers, the fair, broad, abounding lands, the happy homes, that will be desolated by your defeat. The eyes and hopes of eight millions of people rest upon you."

On the 6th of April, the great armies met on the bank of the Tennessee and fought the terrible and bloody battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburgh Landing. General Grant occupied the southern bank of the river. Buell was approaching from the north. It was the intention of the Confederates to surprise and whip Grant before Buell could come to his support. Before six o'clock, on the morning of April 6th, the rebel columns attacked furiously, and rushing on like a whirlwind, threatened to drive the Union troops into the river. Grant arrived on the field at 8 A.M., and, rallying and re-forming his lines, with unflinching determination, continued the fight. Charge after charge was made by the impetuous and confident Confederates, but they were met with dogged and persistent courage. Thus the fight went on during the long day, but the Union troops were gradually forced back towards the river, into a semi-circle, with the river in the rear. The Union General Wallace, and the rebel commander Johnston, with many other brave and distinguished officers on both sides, were killed. The long dreary day closed, with the advantage all on the side of the rebels, and Beauregard at evening announced a complete victory. But with the night Buell arrived with his gallant army, and the morrow brought victory to the Union arms. Grant had exhibited those stubborn, resolute, persistent qualities, which would not know defeat. With the fresh troops of Buell and Lew Wallace, he early the next morning attacked the rebels, drove them from the field, and pursued them towards their intrenchments at Corinth.

This, one of the most bloody battles of the war, was fought by troops not many months in the service, but many of whom had been already often in battle. It was a long, terrible fight, but when the sun went down on the second day, it went down on an army of flying rebels, who had gained an experience of the courage, persistence, and efficiency of the soldiers of the West, which they never forgot.

On the 30th of May, the batteries of General Halleck, commanding in the West, opened on the rebel fortifications at Corinth, in the state of Mississippi, and the rebels were driven out, abandoning their fortifications with a vast quantity of military stores. Such, in brief, is the eventful story of the armies of the West, during the year 1861 and the earlier part of 1862. Nor were the national forces idle at the extreme South.

On the 8th of February, 1862, Roanoke Island, on the coast of North Carolina, was captured by General Burnside and Admiral Goldsborough, with prisoners, arms, and military stores. On the 14th of March, General Burnside captured Newburn. On the 11th of April, General David Hunter captured Fort Pulaski, and on the 25th of April, 1862, Macon in Georgia was taken.

New Orleans, at the mouth of the Mississippi, was early in the war an object of anxious consideration on the part of the President. Having passed his life in the West, knowing this great river as one who in early manhood had urged a boat over its majestic waters, he had seen its thousands of miles of navigable tributary streams, and itself from the Gulf to the far North, covered with steamers, carrying to salt water the vast products of a delta and territory more productive than that of the Nile. From the beginning, he felt perfectly certain that the hardy Western pioneers would "hew their way to the sea." New Orleans had long been the object of national pride. The victory of General Jackson at that place had always been regarded as one of the most brilliant military achievements on record. This interesting city, over which had floated the lilies of France; this metropolis of the Southwest had fallen by the treason of General Twiggs, an unresisting victim, into the toils of the conspirators.

In the autumn of 1861, an expedition under the command of Captain David G. Farragut, and General B. F. Butler, was organized for its capture. Farragut was a native of Tennessee, a hearty, bluff, honest, downright sailor, full of energy, determination, and ability; with a courage and fertility of resources never surpassed. He was one of those men who dare everything, and rarely fail. There is no brighter name than his among the naval heroes of the world. On the 25th of March, 1862, Butler landed his troops on Ship Island, in the Gulf of Mexico, between New Orleans and Mobile. On the 17th of April, Farragut with his fleet arrived in the vicinity of the forts which guarded the approach to the city. After bombarding these forts for several days without reducing them, with the inspiration of genius he determined to run past their guns. The hazard was fearful. Forts St. Philip and Jackson, on opposite sides of the river, mounted over an hundred heavy cannon; besides this, the river was blocked up by sunken hulks, piles, and every obstruction which could be devised. In addition, he would have to encounter thirteen gunboats, the floating ironclad Louisiana, and the ram Manassas. The authorities at New Orleans were confident. "Our only fear," said the city press, "is that the Northern invaders will not appear." Farragut soon dissipated these fears. On the night of the 24th of April, amidst a storm of shot and shell, the darkness illuminated by the mingled fires of ships, forts, and burning vessels, he passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip; he crushed through all obstructions; he destroyed the ram and gunboats which opposed him; he steamed past the batteries; he ascended the great river, and laid his broadsides to the proud city of the Southwest.

The town of one hundred and fifty thousand people surrendered, and the flag of the Union floated once more over the Crescent City, never again to be removed. For, as was grimly said by a rebel officer on the fall of Richmond, "It has never been the policy of the Confederates to retake the cities and posts captured by the Union forces." Baton Rouge, the capital of Louisiana, was taken without resistance on the 7th of May, Natchez on the 12th, and for a time the Mississippi was opened as far up as Vicksburg.

As the President read the report of these various successes, he could not fail to compare and to contrast them with the inaction of the grand army of the Potomac. Of that army great and sanguine expectations had been formed. It was commanded, as has been stated, by George B. McClellan, who at the time of his appointment, in November, 1861, as General in Chief of the armies of the, United States, was less than thirty-six years of age. Popular feeling, eager to welcome victories and to reward him with honor, had already called him the "Young Napoleon."

The army of the Potomac was regarded as the main army; it was encamped in and around Washington, the source of supplies; when there were not arms for all, this army was first supplied, and if there was a choice, this body of troops had the preference. It is not intended to question the patriotism or the courage of the General in Chief, nor to suggest a doubt of his loyalty, but he did not disguise his hostility to the radicals. He had no sympathy for the abolitionists, and he let them know it. While condemning secession, he had more sympathy for slaveholders than for slaves. He criticised freely the radical acts of Congress and the administration, and he very soon became the center around which gathered all who opposed the radical measures of the President and of Congress. They flattered the young general, and suggested to him that he could become the great pacificator. This may aid in explaining his strange and mysterious inactivity.

It will be remembered that on the 27th of January the President issued an order for active operations. This order contemplated a general advance in concert by all the forces in the field. On the 31st of January, the President ordered an expedition, the immediate object of which was to seize and occupy a position on the railway southwest of Manassas Junction. McClellan did not move until early in March, and then reached Centreville with his immense army, to find it abandoned, and wooden guns in position on the works behind which the rebels, in far inferior numbers, had remained all the autumn and winter unassailed. But his words, addressed to his army at Fairfax Court House, led the country to hope that he would now make up in energy and celerity his long delay. He said: "The army of the Potomac is now a real army. Magnificent in material, admirable in discipline, excellently equipped and armed. Your commanders are all that I could wish."

Such being the case, and with a force more than one hundred and fifty thousand strong, carrying three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, a brilliant and triumphant campaign was confidently looked for. Lincoln had given McClellan his confidence, and was very slow to withdraw it, for he was always noted for the unflinching fidelity with which he stood by those whom he trusted. He had sustained this general against a very large majority of the earnest Union men of the nation. The committee on the conduct of the war appointed by Congress, the fiery Secretary of War, and many others, had chafed and complained during all the winter of 1861-62 at McClellan's inactivity. He had done a great work in organizing this splendid army, but he could not be made to lead a bold, aggressive campaign. Could this army, on the day it struck its tents around Washington, have been transferred to the command of a rapid, indefatigable, and energetic officer like Sheridan, or to the hero of Atlanta and the "Grand March," or to Thomas, or to the unflinching iron will of Grant, it would have marched into Richmond long before McClellan reached the Chickahominy.

Celerity of movement, quick and rapid blows, were impossible with the amount of impedimentia which hampered McClellan's movements. Washington was an attractive place to the gay young officers of this army. Members of Congress were curious to learn what was the camp equipage which required six immense four-horse wagons drawn up before the door of the general, each wagon marked: "Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac;" and when it was reported that Grant had taken the field with only a spare shirt, a hair brush, and a tooth brush, comparisons were made between Eastern luxury and Western hardihood.

During this long inaction on the Potomac, while the forces of the West were capturing Forts Donelson and Henry, and driving the rebels out of Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee, the impatience of the President was not always suppressed. On one occasion he said: "If General McClellan does not want to use the army for some days, I should like to borrow it and see if it cannot be made to do something."

On the 8th of March, the President directed that, Washington being left entirely secure, a movement should begin not later than the 18th of March, and that the General in Chief should be responsible for its commencement as early as that day. Also that the army and navy should cooperate in an immediate effort to capture the rebel batteries on the Potomac. The army did not cooperate, and the batteries were not captured.

On the 12th of March, at a council of war held at Fairfax Court House, a majority decided to proceed against Richmond by Fortress Monroe. The President acquiesced, although his opinion had been decidedly in favor of a direct march upon Richmond. His acquiescence was upon the condition that Washington should be left entirely secure, and the remainder of the force move down the Potomac to Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between Washington and Fortress Monroe, "or at all events to move at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route."

While impatiently following the slow movements of McClellan, the nation was electrified by news of a conflict upon the water, between the iron clad "Virginia" and the "Monitor," which took place on the 9th of March, 1862. When Norfolk was shamefully abandoned in the spring of 1861 by the federal officers, among other vessels left in the hands of the enemy was the "Merrimac." Sheathing her sides with iron armor, and changing her name to the "Virginia," on the 9th of March she steamed down the James, and attacked and destroyed the United States frigates, "Cumberland" and "Congress." The officers of the "Cumberland" fought until the ship went down with her flags still flying. The "Minnesota," coming to the aid of the "Cumberland," ran aground and lay at the mercy of this terrible iron-clad battery. But just at the time when it seemed that the James, and the Potomac, and Washington itself, was at the mercy of this apparently invulnerable ship, there was seen approaching in the distance, a low, turtle-like looking nondescript, which, as she came nearer, was made out to be the iron-clad "Monitor," just built as an experiment by the distinguished engineer, Erricsson. She mounted two eleven inch Dahlgren guns, carrying one hundred and sixty-eight pound shot. As compared with the "Virginia," she was a David to a Goliath. She boldly and successfully attacked her gigantic enemy, thereby saving the fleet, and perhaps the capital. Whole broadsides were fired at the little "Monitor," with no more effect than volleys of stones would have had.

On the 3rd of April, the President ordered the Secretary of War to direct General McClellan "to commence his forward movement from his new base at once." On the 5th of April, General McClellan, when near Yorktown, said to the President: "The enemy are in large force along our front, ...their works formidable," and adds: "I am of opinion I shall have to fight all the available force of the rebels not far from here." On the other hand, the rebel General Magruder, in his report of July 3rd, says that the whole force with which Yorktown was held, was eleven thousand, and that a portion of his line was held by five thousand men. "That with five thousand men exclusive of the garrisons, we stopped and held in check over one hundred thousand of the enemy... The men slept in the trenches, and under arms, but to my great surprise, he (McClellan) permitted day after day to elapse without any assault."

This force detained McClellan from April 1st to May 4th. With an army of nearly or quite one hundred thousand men, he set down to a regular siege, and when he was fully ready to open with his great guns, the enemy had left. A vigorous and active commander would not have permitted this handful of men to delay his march. On the 11th of April, the President telegraphed to McClellan: "You now have one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think that you had better break the enemy's line at once."

In reply to McClellan's constant applications for re-enforcements, the President, on the 9th of April, wrote him a very kind and frank letter, in which, among other things, he says: "I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you, is with you by this time, and if so, I think that it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you--that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements alone; and once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting near Manassas, was only shifting, not surmounting the difficulty... The country will not fail to note--and it is now noting--that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated. I beg to assure you I have never written... in greater kindness, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act."

Yet McClellan, disregarding these urgent and repeated appeals and orders, still remained in front of the works at Yorktown. His "long delay," as Johnston called it, was as inexplicable to the Confederates, as to the administration at Washington. On the 22d of April, General Joseph E. Johnston, writing to Lee, says, "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack."

No one can read the official records of the war, as published by the government, without being impressed by the patience and forbearance of the President. Earnestly, and frequently, and vainly, he urged, entreated, and directed McClellan, again and again, "to strike a blow." The impartial judgment of the future will be that Lincoln's forbearance was continued long after it had "ceased to be a virtue."

On the 6th of April, the President telegraphed to McClellan: "I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown at once." On the 9th of April, he said: "I think it the precise time for you to strike a blow. It is indispensable for you to strike a blow. You must act." On the 1st of May, he asked: "Is anything to be done?" On the 25th of May, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed McClellan: "I think the time is near at hand when you must either attack Richmond, or give up the job, and come to the defense of Washington."

On the 21st of June, McClellan, from his camp on the Chickahominy, addressing the President, asked permission "to lay before your Excellency my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country." The President replied, with great good nature and some sarcasm: "If it would not divert your time and attention from the army under your command, I should be glad to hear your views on the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country."

On the 27th of June, McClellan announced his intention to retreat to the James River, and he had the indiscretion to send to the Secretary of War an insubordinate and insulting dispatch, in which he says: "If I save this army, I tell you plainly, I owe no thanks to you, nor to anyone at Washington. You have done your best to destroy this army." Such a dispatch addressed to any government, the head of which was less patient and forbearing than Lincoln, would have resulted in his removal, arrest, and trial. The great army, with its spirit unbroken, at times turning at bay, retreated to Malvern Hill.

On the 7th of July, while at Harrison's Landing, McClellan had the presumption to send to the President a long letter of advice upon the general conduct of the administration. This letter is important, as it illustrates the character of the man, and the relations between him and the Executive. Unfortunately for his usefulness as a soldier, he had permitted himself to become the head of a party, and was looking to the Presidency, at the hands of those in opposition to the President, and whose nominee he became at the next Presidential election.

The high command which Mr. Lincoln had given him; the crowd of staff-officers and subordinates, by which he was surrounded and flattered; his personal popularity with his soldiers; all these had turned his head, and his failures as a leader did not restore his judgment. This young captain of engineers, not thirty-seven years old, who had never seen a day's service in public life, whose studies had been those of a civil and military engineer, and who, by the grace and favor of the President was in command of the army, undertook to enlighten the Executive on the most grave, and novel, and complex questions involved in the civil war. Questions which taxed to the utmost the ablest and most experienced statesmen of the world. This young engineer and railroad president had the presumption to advise and seek to instruct the President and his Cabinet.

The tone of the letter was immodest and dictatorial. McClellan said to his commander: "Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws upon the people of every state." Then he tells the Executive how the war must be carried on. "Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of states, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for one moment." And he then intimates, that unless his views as presented, "should be made known and approved, the effort to obtain the requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies."

The President had a right to expect from the commander of his armies personal fidelity and sympathy, if not loyalty to his administration. General McClellan gave him neither. He was in the hands, and he was the instrument, of those who wished to overthrow the administration, and to go into power upon its ruins. Knowing this, Mr. Lincoln continued him at the head of the armies, and urged him again and again "to strike a blow," to achieve those victories which might have made him President. General McClellan had done nothing then--he has done nothing since--to justify or excuse the presumption of his conduct.

On the 8th of July, 1862, the President visited the camp of General McClellan, and, was depressed upon finding that, of the magnificent army with which that general had started to capture Richmond, and with all the re-enforcements which had been sent to it, there were now remaining only eighty-five thousand effective men. There is a touching story in Roman history of the Emperor Augustus calling in vain upon Varus to give him back his legions. The President might well have said to McClellan, at Harrison Landing: "Where are my soldiers, where the patriotic young volunteers, vainly sacrificed in fruitless battles from Yorktown to Malvern Hill, and the still larger numbers who have perished in hospitals, and in the swamps of the Chickahominy?" "What has been gained by this costly sacrifice?"

The records of the Confederates make it perfectly clear that there were several occasions when the army of the Potomac could have broken through their thin lines and gone into Richmond, but McClellan had not the sagacity to discover it, and if he had known of their weakness, he would probably have hesitated until it was too late. The disasters and failures of the great army of McClellan, contrasted with the brilliant successes at the West, naturally suggested the transfer to the East of some of the officers under whom these successes had been achieved. On the 11th of July, 1862, Halleck had been appointed General in Chief, and on the 23d he entered upon his duties as such.

General John Pope, son of Nathaniel Pope, United States District Judge of Illinois, in whose courts the President had for many years practised law, was believed to be one of the most brilliant and rising young officers of the West. He had been successful at Island No. 10, and at New Madrid on the Mississippi. Lincoln knew him and his family well. They had been neighbors, and the President rejoiced in his fame. On the 27th of June he issued an order, creating the army of Virginia, under the command of General Pope, to consist of the three army corps of Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell. Fremont resigned on the ground that Pope was his junior.

On the 14th of July, Pope assumed command, and issued an address to his army in which he said:

"I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek an adversary, and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude. I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving; that opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. In the meantime, I desire you to dismiss certain phrases I am sorry to find in vogue amongst you."

"I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them--of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable line of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of itself. Let us look before us and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance--disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever."

This indiscreet address, though so full of the ardor of a young, successful, and sanguine soldier, was as bad in taste as mistaken in policy. While it indicated a vigorous policy and a spirited campaign, it naturally created an intense feeling of hostility against him among the officers of the army of the Potomac. It aroused local jealousy, and increased the prejudice which resulted in the sacrifice of Pope and others. At the close of a brilliant and successful campaign it would have been more excusable.

The failure of McClellan's campaign did not in the least dishearten the North, nor shake the determination of the people to crush the rebellion. It created the necessity for still greater efforts. The governors of seventeen states met at Altoona, in Pennsylvania, on the 28th of June, and united in an address to the President, announcing the readiness of the people of their respective states to respond to a call for more soldiers, and their desire for the most vigorous measures for carrying on the war. The President issued a call for three hundred thousand additional volunteers.

Pope had but about thirty-eight thousand men. With this small force he was to defend Washington, hold the valley of the Shenandoah, and repel the expected approach of Lee. He was early aware that he had incurred the hostility of McClellan, and that he could not rely on the hearty cooperation of that general and his subordinates. Conscious of this, and seeing the fearful odds he was to encounter, he asked to be relieved. This was declined, and there was nothing left for him but to do all that was possible with the force under his command. Lee and the army of Virginia were nearer Washington than McClellan. General Burnside had brought his army to Fortress Monroe, ready to cooperate with McClellan. A bold move upon Richmond would keep Lee on the defensive, but such a movement under McClellan--judging from the past--could scarcely be expected. It was determined to withdraw McClellan's army from the James, and concentrate it with the command of Pope. Pope was active and vigilant, and did all that could be done with the force under his control. On the 14th of August, he was reinforced by General Reno's division of Burnside's army. On the 16th, he captured a letter of General Lee to Stuart, showing that Lee was preparing to mass an overwhelming force in his front, and crush him before he could be re-enforced from the army of the Potomac. He retired on the night of the 18th behind the Rappahannock. The presence of the army of McClellan was now imperatively needed, and its absence made Pope's position critical.

Where was it, and why did it not cooperate with Pope? It made no movement towards Richmond nor towards Pope. Why was this, and who was responsible for Pope's defeat? Let us examine the orders which were sent to McClellan, and try to determine whether he honestly and in good faith obeyed these orders, or whether he sullenly disregarded them, and left Pope to be crushed. As early as the 30th of July, McClellan had been ordered to send away his sick and wounded, and to clear his hospitals, preparatory to moving. This order was repeated August 2d. On the 3d, he was directed to prepare to withdraw his army to Acquia Creek, a stream that empties into the Potomac, and within supporting distance of Pope. He remonstrated, delayed obedience, and remained where he was until the 6th. He was then advised that "the order to withdraw would not be rescinded," and it was said to him, with emphasis: "You will be expected to obey it with all possible promptness." On the 6th, he was ordered to send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries to Burnside, who was at Acquia Creek. Instead of obeying promptly, he sent reasons for still further delay, and said he would "obey as soon as circumstances would permit it."

McClellan did not arrive at Alexandria until August 26th. On the 9th, General Halleck telegraphed as follows: "I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them, and move forward to the Potomac. You must send re-enforcements instantly to Acquia Creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity!" This was August 9th and yet re-enforcements did not leave Fortress Monroe for Acquia, until the 23d of August! On the 10th, a week after the order was first given, Halleck again telegraphed: "The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements. That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained."

Pope was gallantly fighting against an overwhelming force. Lee was massing troops to crush him and reach Washington, and yet McClellan did not move. On the 12th of August, General Halleck telegraphed:

"'The Quartermaster General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the country is now under your control. Burnside moved nearly thirteen thousand troops to Acquia Creek in less than two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All the vessels in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that eight or ten thousand of your men could be transported daily. There has been, and is, the most urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington.'"

On the 21st, Halleck again telegraphed to McClellan at Fortress Monroe:

"'The forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition,' etc."

On the evening of August 23d, the reluctant and tardy McClellan at last sailed from Fortress Monroe, arriving at Acquia Creek on the morning of the 24th, and at Alexandria on the 27th of August!

It would seem that no candid mind can read the correspondence between Halleck and McClellan and the President, from early August until September, without being convinced that McClellan neglected to obey orders, and that he did so with a knowledge of the dangerous position of Pope. If Porter, or any of McClellan's lieutenants had been in the position of Pope, would he have been left to fight, with the force at his command, the battles of the 27th, 28th, and 29th of August?

It may be asked--as it often has been--why was not McClellan removed? He was popular with his army. His subordinates were generally his friends. He was the head, and expected candidate of the democratic party for the Presidency. It had been the earnest endeavor of Mr. Lincoln to unite and combine with the republican party all of the democrats who were loyal to the Union; the removal of McClellan would be regarded by many as a political movement, and for these and other political reasons, his removal was considered unwise.

Meanwhile Pope was being driven towards Washington, by Jackson, Longstreet, and Lee himself, and neither Porter, nor Franklin, nor any of McClellan's subordinates, came to his aid. Porter, although within the sound of Pope's artillery and the rebel guns, and conscious of his critical position, did not go to his support. He was tried for his disobedience to orders, found guilty, and dismissed from the army. This judgment the President approved.

It is not intended to review the trial of Porter. At 12 o'clock, on the 27th of August, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan: "Telegrams from Porter to Burnside." "Porter is marching on Warrenton to reinforce Pope... Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches," etc.

On the 25th Halleck telegraphed to McClellan:

"Not a moment must be lost is pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced." See Report on the Conduct of War, Pt. 1, pp. 459, 461.

On the same day he telegraphed again:

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's troops towards Manassas; they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious, without our aid.  If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

At 3 P.M., on the 29th, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan, in reply to his dispatch of 12 M.:

"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information ay Anandale as to prevent his going further, otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax.  Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts.  Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is.  I am tired of guesses."

At 2:40, the President, in his intense anxiety to know the fate of the army fighting against odds, telegraphed to McClellan to know: "What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?"

At 2:45, General McClellan replied:

"The last news I received from the direction of Manassas, was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville, and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable.  I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope.  Second, To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all means to make the capial perfectly safe.  No middle course will now answer.  Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it.  I wish to know what my orders and authority are.  I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give.  I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders.  It will not do to delay longer."

General Halleck telegraphed the following peremptory order, at 7:30, on the 29th:

"You will immediately send construction train and guards to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this.  I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening at Alexandria.  This is all contrary to my orders.  Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience.  That corps must push forward as I directed, to protect the railroad, and open communications with Manassas." His conduct has been much discussed. He was found guilty by a court of general officers, composed of men of the highest character. There does not seem to be any room for doubt that he did not give Pope his loyal and hearty support. Some of his apologists have said that this ought not to have been expected; that it was not in human nature. This depends on the sort of human nature. A true patriot and soldier would have forgotten his grievances, and those of his chief; would have been at the front in the battle. His duty clearly was to do his utmost to relieve Pope. Few candid men will believe he did this. Suppose McClellan had been in the position of Pope--are there any who believe Fitz-John Porter would have left him alone "to get out of his scrape?" Or suppose Porter had been fighting Lee and his whole army, as Pope was, would it have taken McClellan an entire month to come up the Potomac to his relief? No, McClellan would have joined his favorite lieutenant long before the arrival of Longstreet, and Lee would have had to meet the combined armies. If McClellan had been exposed as Pope was, the guns of Porter would have been playing upon the enemy, and not at rest in sullen silence in his camp.

On the 2d of September, Pope fell back to the fortifications of Washington. The situation was critical. As Pope retired to Washington, Lee advanced towards Maryland, threatening the capital. The defeat of Pope might have been prevented by the union and co-operation with him of McClellan. Two courses of action were discussed in the Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln. One, urged by the friends of McClellan, was to place him in command of all the forces, including the remnants of the army of Virginia; the other, to arrest him and some of his subordinates, and try them for disobedience and insubordination. General Halleck, the Secretary of War, and others, charged him with being responsible for the defeat of Pope, and many in high positions declared that he ought to be shot for his military offences. It was one of the most critical periods of the war. Party spirit was a violent faction in Congress, and as represented by the press, was intemperate. The army was split by cabals, jealousies, and quarrels. This, with defeat and disaster in the field, made the prospect gloomy and perilous, but the President's fortitude and courage did not desert him. Unselfish and firm, he trusted in the people and in God. That firm belief in an overruling Providence, which some called superstition, sustained him in this the darkest hour.

McClellan was the representative man of the so-called war democrats. He had the confidence of his officers, and was personally popular with the soldiers. The President yielded to the military necessity, or supposed military necessity, and placed him again in command of all the troops, and McClellan assumed the responsibility of defending the capital, and defeating Lee. Indeed, it seems the wisest thing he could have done. The army of the Potomac was demoralized, some of it on the verge of mutiny, and the conduct of Franklin and Fitz-John Porter indicates the spirit in which McClellan's lieutenants would have supported any other chief. With Lee and his victorious troops menacing Washington, it was a military necessity; Lincoln, with his usual good sense, saw and yielded to it.