The Crayfish (Huxley)/Chapter 1

persons seem to believe that what is termed Science is of a widely different nature from ordinary knowledge, and that the methods by which scientific truths are ascertained involve mental operations of a recondite and mysterious nature, comprehensible only by the initiated, and as distinct in their character as in their subject matter, from the processes by which we discriminate between fact and fancy in ordinary life.

But any one who looks into the matter attentively will soon perceive that there is no solid foundation for the belief that the realm of science is thus shut off from that of common sense; or that the mode of investigation which yields such wonderful results to the scientific investigator, is different in kind from that which is employed for the commonest purposes of everyday existence. Common sense is science exactly in so far as it fulfils the ideal of common sense; that is, sees facts as they are, or, at any rate, without the distortion of prejudice, and reasons from them in accordance with the dictates of sound judgment. And science is simply common sense at its best; that is, rigidly accurate in observation, and merciless to fallacy in logic.

Whoso will question the validity of the conclusions of sound science, must be prepared to carry his scepticism a long way; for it may be safely affirmed, that there is hardly any of those decisions of common sense on which men stake their all in practical life, which can justify itself so thoroughly on common sense principles, as the broad truths of science can be justified.

The conclusion drawn from due consideration of the nature of the case is verified by historical inquiry; and the historian of every science traces back its roots to the primary stock of common information possessed by all mankind.

In its earliest development knowledge is self-sown. Impressions force themselves upon men's senses whether they will or not, and often against their will. The amount of interest which these impressions awaken is determined by the courser pains and pleasures which they carry in their train, or by mere curiosity; and reason deals with the materials supplied to it as far as that interest carries it, and no farther. Such common knowledge is rather brought than sought; and such ratiocination is little more than the working of a blind intellectual instinct.

It is only when the mind passes beyond this condition that it begins to evolve science. When simple curiosity passes into the love of knowledge as such, and the gratification of the æsthetic sense of the beauty of completeness and accuracy seems more desirable than the easy indolence of ignorance; when the finding out of the causes of things becomes a source of joy, and he is counted happy who is successful in the search; common knowledge of nature passes into what our forefathers called Natural History, from whence there is but a step to that which used to be termed Natural Philosophy, and now passes by the name of Physical Science.

In this final stage of knowledge, the phenomena of nature are regarded as one continuous series of causes and effects; and the ultimate object of science is to trace out that series, from the term which is nearest to us, to that which is at the furthest limit accessible to our means of investigation.

The course of nature as it is, as it has been, and as it will be, is the object of scientific inquiry; whatever lies beyond, above, or below this, is outside science. But the philosopher need not despair at the limitation of his field of labour: in relation to the human mind Nature is boundless; and, though nowhere inaccessible, she is everywhere unfathomable.

The Biological Sciences embody the great multitude of truths which have been ascertained respecting living beings; and as there are two chief kinds of living things, animals and plants, so Biology is, for convenience sake, divided into two main branches, Zoology and Botany.

Each of these branches of Biology has passed through the three stages of development, which are common to all the sciences; and, at the present time, each is in these different stages in different minds. Every country boy possesses more or less information respecting the plants and animals which come under his notice, in the stage of common knowledge; a good many persons have acquired more or less of that accurate, but necessarily incomplete and unmethodised knowledge, which is understood by Natural History; while a few have reached the purely scientific stage, and, as Zoologists and Botanists, strive toward the perfection of Biology as a branch of Physical Science.

Historically, common knowledge is represented by the allusions to animals and plants in ancient literature; while Natural History, more or less grading into Biology, meets us in the works of Aristotle, and his continuators in the Middle Ages, Rondoletius, Aldrovandus, and their contemporaries and successors. But the conscious attempt to construct a complete science of Biology hardly dates further back than Treviranus and Lamarck, at the beginning of this century, while it has received its strongest impulse, in our own day, from Darwin.

My purpose, in the present work, is to exemplify the general truths respecting the development of zoological science which have just been stated by the study of a special case; and, to this end, I have selected an animal, the Common Crayfish, which, taking it altogether, is better fitted for my purpose than any other.

It is readily obtained, and all the most important points of its construction are easily deciphered; hence, those who read what follows will have no difficulty in ascertaining whether the statements correspond with facts or not. And unless my readers are prepared to take this much trouble, they may almost as well shut the book; for nothing is truer than Harvey's dictum, that those who read without acquiring distinct images of the things about which they read, by the help of their own senses, gather no real knowledge, but conceive mere phantoms and idola.