The Civil Service and the Patronage/Chapter 07

period from 1845 to 1865 marks the apogee of the spoils system in the United States: the old traditions of respectability had passed away, and the later spirit of reform had not arisen; the victors divided the spoils and were unashamed. The general interest was turned almost completely from attempts to limit the patronage of the executive and to improve the service, to the rival fortunes of the office beggars. These were, perhaps, watched with an interest the more keen because of the lack of sporting contests, of national base-ball leagues, and international yacht races. Horace Greeley paraded a contempt for such petty squabbles, and attributed to his subscribers a like disdain, but nevertheless added that those who wished the correct news in regard to such matters should read the Tribune. The presidential election became a quadrennial &ldquo;event,&rdquo; with the civil service as the prize. Every 4th of March great mobs filled the capital, and the streets and saloons were crowded with men betting heavy expense and vast loss of time on the chance of getting something out of the hurly-burly. This period can

best be made clear by first giving a brief account of each administration, and then examining the structure of the spoils system.

Of no previous president had so little been known before inauguration as of Polk, and consequently the development of his policy was closely watched. Whig papers predicted that a sweep would be made, but for a time it hung fire. March 28, 1845, John Quincy Adams heard that Buchanan, Walker, and Mason were against a general turnout; Marcy, Bancroft, and Johnson for it, and that Polk also favored it. By April 2 the proscription had begun, and Adams talked of it with Joseph Gales, who said that for the first time rotation was distinctly avowed as a motive for making removals.

Within the Democratic party there were many men who thought that they could dictate to this upstart president, but those who knew him did not share this opinion. Buchanan wrote to Governor Shunk of Pennsylvania, December 18, 1844: &ldquo;You ask my advice in regard to recommendations from you to President Polk. I think you ought to be cautious in giving them, if you desire that they shall produce the effect your recommendations well deserve.&rdquo; Buchanan's impression that caution would be necessary in dealing with the president must have been strengthened when, in February, 1845, the latter told him that he must retire from the cabinet if he became a candidate for the presidency; and that while head of a department he must not be long absent from Washington. The clearest indication of Polk's independence is given by his treatment of the various Democratic factions. Calhoun probably expected to retain his position as secretary of state, for his policy seemed

to harmonize with that of the president, yet he was allowed to retire. Tyler, as we have seen, hoped that his friends would be left in their respective offices, but he was disappointed. Polk did confirm his own brother in the post of chargé d'affaires at Naples, to which Tyler had appointed him, and continued a few others in office. John G. Mason, Tyler's secretary of the navy, was made attorney-general because he was Polk's personal friend, and some members of the third party were transferred to inferior places; but the majority were removed or they resigned.

Much more striking was the fate of the Globe. Since its foundation it had been the exponent of the Jacksonian democracy, and the Blairs fully expected that such would continue to be the case. The fact that they had supported the nomination of Van Buren and opposed the annexation of Texas was offset by their acquiescence in accomplished events; while a recognition of their claims would tend to salve the wounds which the Baltimore convention had caused; moreover, the influence of the dying Jackson was enlisted on their side. All this availed not against Polk's desire to be master. The venerable Mr. Ritchie was called from the Richmond Enquirer and established at Washington as editor of the Union, which was destined to occupy until 1857 the position, now given it of official organ of the Democratic party. Polk seems to have used the patronage for the purpose of pushing through his own policy, rather than of cementing alliances with hostile factions.

Three hundred and forty-two removals were made during Polk's administration; but the country was by this time so used to the practice that little complaint is heard, save in the case of one long lingering survivor of the Revolution. The president was, however, criticised as introducing politics into the naval service by displacing General McNeil and his

from the dry dock at Brooklyn, a criticism that grew more general as the Mexican War progressed. Wise men regretted, what we must all now most deeply lament, that the policy of rotation led to the recall of Henry Wheaton, at a time when the perfection of his equipment promised a splendid fruition for American diplomacy. In regard to appointments, Webster wrote to his son Fletcher, March 13, 1845, &ldquo;I must do him the justice to say, however, that he appears to me to make rather good selections from among his own friends.&rdquo; On the whole, many of his appointments were praised, while none excited any very marked disapproval, except from those immediately interested.

In 1849 the Whigs still had some qualms of conscience about making any extensive sweep; but, as the Republic said, &ldquo;If, forsooth, the administration adopt the construction contended for by the party of the spoils [that the Whigs should make no removals], proscription will be perpetuated and the Whig Republican party proscribed forever.&rdquo; &ldquo;Thus far on my way to Washington,&rdquo; wrote Seward, &ldquo;I find myself floating on a strongly increasing tide of people. . . . The world seems almost divided into two classes, both of which are moving in the same direction; those who are going to California in search of gold, and those going to Washington in quest of office. How many adventurers are preparing themselves for disappointment, revenge, and misanthropy!&rdquo;

The man who was to determine the fate of these eager pilgrims was even less known politically than Polk, and among

his many negative recommendations which were pressed upon public notice was the suggestion that, as he was not a politician, he would have no friends to reward with office, and could therefore proceed with impartiality, but after the election enough &ldquo;original&rdquo; Taylor men sprang up to absorb all offices had he yielded to them. Taylor's policy continued for some time problematical. He said in his inaugural that he would make &ldquo;honesty, capacity and fidelity indispensable prerequisites to the bestowal of office&rdquo;; but many feared that a fourth prerequisite was intended, though not mentioned; namely, antenomination support of General Taylor. It was thought that he might, acting under the direction of his secretary of state, Clayton, try to build up a new faction. In Massachusetts the division between the Taylor men, of whom Abbott Lawrence was the most prominent, and the supporters of Webster, who could not get over their disappointment at losing the nomination, was very bitter; and it was expected that this and similar feuds would be reflected in the appointments. Taylor did not quite justify these predictions, for, while he held aloof from the old party leaders, he did not refuse them recognition, and appointed friends and relatives of both Webster and Clay to office. Yet Clay was much displeased, and considered the appointments of Taylor both &ldquo;wrong and impolitic&rdquo;; he was disappointed at finding a second Whig President intractable, and was incensed at the weight given to Crittenden's advice, which Seward described as being &ldquo;at once honest, misconceived, and erroneous.&rdquo;

A significant contest took place in regard to the New York appointments. Seward became friendly with the president's brother, and expected, as senator, to control the patronage in that state; but Taylor developed an unusual respect for the vice-president, and when the time came, Mr. Fillmore, an opponent of Seward, was found firmly intrenched in the confidence of the executive. February 27, 1849, Seward, always

wrote to his wife that he and Mr. Fillmore had &ldquo;begun to agree.&rdquo; Later, when more aware of his difficulties, he wrote to Weed, &ldquo;I have stipulated for time and inaction concerning Marshals, Postmasters, District Attorneys, and there I leave these matters.&rdquo; At that time he was employed until eleven every morning with applicants for office. March 10 he wrote again to Weed: &ldquo;Mr. F. cannot now agree to anything but that he and I shall go together to the Secretary and each name a candidate for Marshal. . . . The Cabinet is not unfavorable, but timid in their conduct between F. and myself. General Taylor has got out by casting all responsibility on the Cabinet.&rdquo; Again, March 24: &ldquo;Let Governor Fish now write to me when you have any advice to give the Cabinet. Some of the members take that point with great respect. It is the State Administration at Albany that is to be strengthened, and the Governor is its acknowledged head. This saves the necessity of deciding between the V. P. and the Senator.&rdquo; This suggestion was acted upon and the affair was settled; Seward wrote, March 29, that &ldquo;every member of the Cabinet breathed more freely.&rdquo; In the preliminary encounter as a whole, Fillmore fared rather better than Seward; but later events brought the latter into the closest intimacy with the president, who came to listen attentively to the seductive voice of Seward's alter ego, Thurlow Weed.

Under Taylor 540 of the 929 presidential officers were removed; and in his first year, out of the total civil service of 17,780, 3406 were removed and 2802 resigned. When Congress met in December, 1849, this record was violently attacked, Senator Bradbury leading the way with a resolution asking the president to lay before the Senate &ldquo;all charges which have been preferred or filed in any of the departments against individuals who have been removed,. . . with a specification of the cases, if any, in which the officers charged have had opportunity to be heard, and a statement of the number of removals made under each department,&rdquo; a resolution which he amended later by adding, &ldquo;including subordinates in the customs-houses, and other branches of the public service.&rdquo; The debate was acrimonious,

but purely partisan, the Democrats accusing the president of insincerity, and the Whigs defending his action on the ground that it was made necessary by the previous conduct of the Democrats. No useful suggestions were made in the discussion.

When Fillmore succeeded to the presidency in 1850, there was almost as complete a change of policy as if an opposing party had come into power, and the drooping interest in the patronage revived. July 12, 1850, Seward wrote that Washington was &ldquo;filling up with strangers&rdquo;; and letters and newspapers are full of the absorbing topic. Seward, of course, fell from favor. He wrote to Weed, July 15: &ldquo;I shall not touch, or attempt to touch, an appointment. I shall vote for all appointments.&rdquo; In order to get rid of Weed, Fillmore offered him the Austrian mission. On the other hand, the traditional leaders of the party felt their influence revive. Clay wrote to his son, in August, that his relations with Mr. Fillmore were &ldquo;perfectly friendly and confidential,&rdquo; which of course meant that his advice was generally followed, and added that he anticipated that his candidate for the Lexington post-office would prevail. Fillmore made eighty-eight removals, indicating that he did not attempt entirely to undo the work of his predecessor, but that he did make use of his power to support his policy by rewarding his friends.

The independent attitude of Polk had been followed by the split in the Democratic party in 1848. Probably in the tangle of motives which drew the adherents of Van Buren to the point of actual separation, resentment at their exclusion from office would be found to be a cord of some strength. When, therefore, all factions came together in 1852, it was expected that all would receive a share of the fruits of victory. President Pierce was not adverse to such a policy: like Polk, in being a dark horse, he differed from him both in distinctly aiming for a second term and in trying to conciliate and patch together the

various factions of the party, rather than in boldly taking the lead.

He settled to his task in a businesslike way; but though he fixed hours for callers, he was pursued by them at all times and in all places. The cabinet officers received applicants, mechanically heard their stories, filed their papers, and then discussed their cases. It had by this time become the custom to put aside all ordinary business for the first month after the inauguration, in order that the administration might devote all its energies to the war of the spoilsmen. Pierce made Marcy secretary of state, a step which, it was feared, indicated a tendency to favor the &ldquo;Softs&rdquo; in the New York appointments; but a slate, greatly commended for its cleverness, was arranged for the state, which offset this danger by giving the best local appointments to the faithful &ldquo;Hards&rdquo; or &ldquo;Hunkers,&rdquo; while the &ldquo;Softs&rdquo; or &ldquo;Barnburners,&rdquo; or &ldquo;Van Buren men,&rdquo; received just enough to keep them quiet.

Through the country at large, office-seekers were divided into &ldquo;Old Fogies&rdquo; and &ldquo;Young Americans.&rdquo; The &ldquo;Old Fogies&rdquo; in New York State were the members of the Albany Regency; they had for a long time monopolized appointments, and as early as 1845 were unpopular as habitual office-holders. It was pointed out that an aristocracy was but a group of men enjoying the sole benefit of state emoluments, and that by this definition the Regency had ceased to be democratic. Since 1830 national politics had been controlled by one generation of leaders in both parties, and each proscription meant, to a great extent, simply the return of those exiled by the last. Was this rotation in office? Marcy was an Old Fogy, and seems to have been largely influential in selecting men for foreign posts; the New York Herald was led to complain that Young America was exiled to Central America. It advertised white hair-dye for office-seekers. Aside from these family quarrels, Pierce's appointments excited comparatively little comment; the press was apathetic.

For President Buchanan it was left to round out the spoils system. Pierce had made 883 removals, thus practically exorcising all non-Democratic elements from the civil service. Now Buchanan attained the presidency, as the Herald said, &ldquo;with infinite labor, at vast expense, and by the skin of his teeth.&rdquo; Much of this effort had been caused by the office-holders, nearly all of whom had aided Pierce in his struggle for renomination. Should they be spared, though they were Democrats? Were not the supporters of the successful candidate the real victors? Buchanan decided that the civil service should be remanned, and announced that no one should, unless under exceptional circumstances, receive a reappointment after his commission expired. The argument used to defend this innovation was, of course, the long-suffering one of rotation in office, which now was understood as implying that offices were but prizes and should not be enjoyed for more than four years by any good Democrat. The idea was not a new one, for Andrew Johnson, when member of Congress in 1846, had offered a resolution to the effect that subordinate positions should be held for eight years as a maximum.

Much criticism of this new practice was nevertheless aroused. Marcy said that the maxim, &ldquo;To the victors belong the spoils,&rdquo; was attributed to him, but that he never would have advised pillaging one's own camp. Yet so good was party discipline that no serious trouble resulted, and many faithful partisans even resigned voluntarily in order to maintain their standing in the party. The principle of rotation was not carried to an entirely logical conclusion; many an officer escaped incidentally through some unusual political influence, and the whole South was exempted. It was said that the North and West demanded change, but not the South; and Buchanan was enough of a Democrat to execute the will of the people according to local tastes.

Buchanan's interpretation of rotation in office was acted upon steadily until Roosevelt succeeded McKinley in 1901; and another innovation made in 1857 has continued to the present time, and will probably prove permanent, that is, the abolition of the official organ of the administration. He gave to Allen, the editor of the Union, the collectorship of Portland, Maine, and announced that no paper would succeed to the intimate relation with the government which it had occupied. Yet the Union continued its existence and still enjoyed, to some extent, the confidence of the cabinet.

At the time of the inauguration, the Herald expressed the hope that the new president would not attempt, as the last one had done, to conciliate all factions, but would pursue an independent course. This required more moral courage than Buchanan possessed, and he soon became involved in the usual meshes of intrigue, while endeavoring to arrange all-satisfying slates for Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York. The contests for the appointments in these cities throw much light on the politics of the time, and one example is worth giving as an illustration of the influences at work in securing appointments. In New York, the focus of the excitement, the most respected of the factions was the New York Hotel set, consisting of the capitalists of the Democratic party. These men were reported to have a special claim on the president, as they had contributed heavily to carry the Pennsylvania state election, which had such an important bearing on the nominating convention of 1856; and it was whispered besides that, unless they were conciliated, Robert J. Walker would not accept the governorship of Kansas. They secured the collectorship for Augustus Schell, an eminently

respectable gentleman. At the opposite extreme of the social scale was the unterrified city democracy of the &ldquo;Bloody Sixth,&rdquo; headed by the mayor, Fernando Wood. The New York Hotel set furnished money, Wood supplied votes. Isaiah Rynders, as the chief representative of this element, obtained an important office, &mdash; the marshalship; he was a notorious politician, with an evil reputation of many years' standing, and his appointment was gleefully derided by the opposition press. Between these extremes were cliques and factions of varying degrees of respectability and rapacity. &ldquo;Prince John&rdquo; Van Buren, one of the most accomplished of political anglers, landed the next most important office, the postmastership, for his friend, Isaac Fowler, or rather, he secured for him an exemption from the principle of rotation. The naval office was obtained by General Sickles for his friend, Samuel B. Hart.

In national politics, Buchanan favored the South, and his administration of the patronage reflects this tendency. One of the most notable instances was that of the California appointments. All the patronage for that state was given to Dr. Gwin, of a well-known proslavery expansionist family of Mississippi; while Broderick, the other senator, of more moderate views, was totally excluded from favor. The Kansas appointments afford another example of the same tendency.

Buchanan's removals were scattered through his entire term. The Democratic party was gradually disintegrating under the stress of the slavery contest; the orthodox were becoming steadily fewer, while the recalcitrant needed constant punishment. The most important break was that which occurred when Douglas proved unwilling to support the administration in its Kansas policy; when, in 1858, he was contending with

Lincoln for the senatorship from Illinois, he was read out of the party, and the whole executive patronage was turned against him. It was probably because of these feuds that Buchanan's appointments were more severely criticised than those of any previous president except Jackson. In themselves they do not seem to have been noticeably worse.

We are very prone to disentangle the web of the past, pick out the salient features, and then imagine that they, and they alone, absorbed contemporary attention as well as our own. Thus, when we speak of the Republican victory of 1861 and the inauguration of Lincoln, we think of the on-coming Civil War, and picture the men of that date as occupied wholly with the insoluble problems of slavery. Very differently employed, however, was the mind of the average politician: it was a party victory, and the customary scenes of party triumph were to be witnessed in the threatened capital. Lincoln said that he felt like a man who was letting offices in one end of his house while the other was burning down. An interesting illustration of conditions in Washington is given by one of the participants, who says that a large number of enthusiastic Republicans who desired post-offices formed a guard to protect the president from assassination, thinking that thereby they might obtain easy access to him and so press their claims to the best advantage.

Contemporaries complained that Lincoln devoted too much time to such matters; and now that criticism of him has become somewhat akin to treason, lamentation is made that these petty affairs were so much forced upon him. The fact is, it was part of Lincoln's God-given fitness for his time and place that he was a politican as well as a statesman. The Republican party was new; it was composed of diverse, hostile elements; it was full of petty jealousies, and its discipline was not good: if it was to be kept together, much depended on a proper disposition of the favors the president could bestow. If he had had no patronage,

if the spoils system had not been in vogue, all might have been well; but, as conditions were, the appointment to a petty post-office might be fraught with much import to the safety of the Union.

Lincoln made 1457 removals, there being 1639 places within his gift. When it is remembered that to many posts in the South no appointments could be made, and that consequently no removals are noted, it will be seen that the sweep was the most thoroughgoing that had ever been made; indeed, it was almost complete. This fact is partly to be explained by the long years during which Southern influence had been predominant at Washington, a circumstance which had made loyal men keenly suspicious of all who had obtained government favors. The stress and confusion of the time, and the rapid changes of the political kaleidoscope, are indicated by the fact that the occupants of some offices were changed two and three times between 1861 and 1865.

In making appointments, Lincoln pursued a middle course between Polk's independence and Pierce's attempt to please all factions. He took pains to consult every one who had any right to be heard, but controlled everything with a loose yet powerful rein. He had the faculty of pleasing men by asking their advice even if he did not take it. He let everything that would settle itself do so, provided certain general conditions were complied with. He made no attempt to obtain the men best fitted to perform the functions of the various offices, except in case of the very highest; for minor places he did not even insist that a man be fit. When a man was once appointed, Lincoln would neither remove him until he was thoroughly discredited, nor promote him; for in either case there would be a new office to fill.

Among the things considered in conferring office, geography

was very prominent throughout the administration; but the early attempt to procure a balance between the various elements &mdash; Whig, Democratic, Abolitionist, and Know-Nothing &mdash; that had combined to make up the Republican party was abandoned as time went on. The new division that grew up between the Radicals and the Conservatives was treated with an even hand, a policy which of course seemed unequal to some of those most interested. One of Secretary Chase's correspondents wrote that there was &ldquo;war from the White House&rdquo; upon Chase's friends. There was no such war. Lincoln wrote to an over-zealous postmaster the best letter ever written on the subject of the participation of government officials in party politics. While offices in general were used to prevent, and not to encourage, faction fights, and so skilfully used that the end was often obtained, minor places were often employed to please powerful individuals; and Lincoln did not forget himself in this connection, but appointed relatives and friends to places which might profit them and not harm the country. In general, Lincoln used his patronage which, it must be remembered, was enormously increased by the war for the purpose of serving the country by solidifying the Republican party. While he did not attempt any personal aggrandizement, he yet balked at nothing when the greater object was in view. Charles A. Dana gives an incident that seems authentic. He says that Lincoln, in order to secure the admission of Nevada as a state, &mdash; upon which, as he thought, hung the fate of the thirteenth amendment, &mdash; authorized the offer of several good offices to some doubtful congressmen to secure their votes.

Military appointments were treated, as they have been nearly always in time of war, as standing somewhat apart. The selection of volunteer officers was largely the work of the governors,

but Lincoln took care that they should not appoint Republicans only. It is, of course, unnecessary to point out that this separation was not by any means complete, and that politics interfered often and seriously with the good conduct of the war. If Lincoln had made appointments for merit only, the war might have been shortened; on the other hand, he might not have preserved a united North to carry on the war.

Lincoln showed to what use the spoils system could be put by a statesman, but he nipped in the bud a further development of the system, which was threatened. Politicans began to ask why, if rotation were correct doctrine, and a man should hold office only four years, a general sweep should not follow the beginning of every new term, even if a president succeeded himself. A demand gained ground that Lincoln should entirely re-allot the offices after March 4, 1865; and Washington was, as usual, filled with office-seekers on that day. Lincoln, however, was unwilling to go through the worry and labor of the task, and made a conclusive announcement that the administration would remain unchanged throughout. From that time the popularity of rotation declined. The tide had turned.