The Civil Service and the Patronage/Chapter 05

election of Jackson threw both his friends and his foes into a fever of expectancy. There was enough of the Delphic element in his utterances to give color to every story as to his intentions; and rumor followed hot upon rumor through the streets of Washington, out into the country presses, and back again in new fantastic guise. The office-holding class and their friends put on a bold face. Webster wrote in January, 1829, &ldquo;Great efforts are making to put him up to a general sweep, as to all offices; springing from great doubt whether he is disposed to go it.&rdquo; The inaugural did not cast Webster down; he wrote of it March 4, 1829, &ldquo;What it says about reform in office may be either a prelude to a general change in office, or a mere sop to soothe the hunger, without satisfying it, of the thousand expectants for office who throng the city, and clamor all over the country. I expect some changes, but not a great many at present.&rdquo;

This blindness of the administrative class, whose views Webster voiced, is not without excuse. Impregnated with tradition, they felt themselves indispensable, and could not believe that the new president would attempt to run the government without them: it very often happens that a revolution surprises no one so much as its victims. Their sense of security was doubtless fostered by those letters of Jackson to Monroe which have been already cited; though if they could have interpreted these in

the light of an intimate knowledge of Jackson's character, they would have realized that his lenity toward Federalists arose, not from a disregard of party lines, but from a conviction that the old alignment of parties should be replaced by a new one depending on personal allegiance to himself; that while he could not proscribe a man for being a Federalist or a Republican, he would do so for a failure to support the candidacy of Andrew Jackson. While this air of confidence was sufficiently widespread to deceive most historians who have treated of the period into a belief that the cataclysm of 1829 was wholly unexpected, assurance was not universal even among Jackson's opponents; and doubtless many hearts beat fearsomely when, on the Sunday before inauguration, Robert Little preached from the text, &ldquo;When Christ drew near the city he wept over it.&rdquo;

The supporters of Jackson were boastfully confident that he would interpret reform as they desired. The Richmond Enquirer, the most powerful newspaper of the South, prophesied January 1, 1829, &ldquo;A salutary reform will be attempted under the coming Republican administration. . .; in perfecting it friends will be preferred to opponents &mdash; coöperatives to assailants.&rdquo; On the same day it said: &ldquo;Some have been pleased to speak of reform in this case as synonymous with proscription. This is a designed perversion of the word. The National Journal is loquacious as a parrot in its denunciations of the anticipated &lsquo;proscription.&rsquo; If that pensioned press can torture a salutary change in the administration of the general government, more or less applicable to all departments, and to official agents generally, into a proscription for opinion's sake, its powers are considerably greater than we or the public have hitherto given it credit for. As well may the people be charged with proscription for having removed an unfaithful executive and elected another. They began the work, they conferred the power to effect it.&rdquo; The official organ of the new party at Washington was the Daily Telegraph, edited by General Duff

Green. Certainly no one who read its pages could plead ignorance as to the intentions of the Jackson managers. As early as November 2, 1828, it announced, &ldquo;We know not what line of policy General Jackson will adopt; we take it for granted, however, that he will reward his friends and punish his enemies.&rdquo;

These and numerous other editorials of similar import expressed not only a popular expectation, but also a popular demand. The editors and politicians did not think that Jackson would falter; but if he should, they were prepared to teach him a lesson. The proscription was delayed at first, in order to avoid friction with the Senate. This check caused the Telegraph to &ldquo;hint it for the benefit of those of our party who are styled leading men, that every attempt to sustain in office, by their influence, those who should be removed, whether the feeling proceed from mistaken sympathy or from a wish to propitiate, it must prove alike injudicious, and it will necessarily have a tendency to lessen the regard of the Republican party of the nation, and ultimately overthrow ties which bind the great majority to their political interest.&rdquo; The Telegraph was right; the politicians demanded the spoils, and they had the support of the people. Jesse Hoyt wrote to Van Buren at this time, &ldquo;I have said from the commencement of the contest that I would not support any administration who would support men in power that had contributed to overthrow the democratic party in this State. I have preached this doctrine too long, and it has taken too [blank] a footing here, to be easily got rid of. This is not only the doctrine in theory, but we require it to be reduced to practice.&rdquo; The time had come when the spoils system was to be made national, and Jackson must assume the task or cease to be the leader of the people.

There does not seem to be room for doubt that the president was ready to gratify the wishes of his supporters, and yet considerable interest attaches to the steps by which the new policy was adopted. Something had been done toward committing

the president even before his arrival at Washington. The proscription was by some dated from 1827, when the printing of the Senate was taken from the National Intelligencer. The majority which enabled the Jackson managers to take this action also allowed them to postpone the confirmation of nominations sent in by President Adams in the last months of his term, and thus to prevent a recurrence of &ldquo;midnight appointments.&rdquo; The committee to which certain judicial nominations were referred reported: &ldquo;Because there are several propositions for a change of the judicial system now depending, and because the administration of the government is about to change hands, it is inexpedient to advise and consent to the nominations now.&rdquo;

Those politicians therefore, who wished the administration to &ldquo;go the whole hog,&rdquo; as Webster said, had certain accomplished facts to which they could point; but they had also strong opposition to overcome. Major Lewis warned the general that if he adopted the principle of rotation and fully carried it out, the days of the republic would be numbered. The foremost advocate of moderation, however, was John McLean, the postmaster-general under Monroe and Adams. He fully believed in making appointments for political reasons, and apparently was not vigorously opposed to removals in general; but he was unwilling personally to conduct a general slaughter of the postmasters, as he had appointed very many of them himself and was very popular among them. This situation caused much difficulty to the cabinet-makers. At first it was announced that he would be continued in his old position. Later an exchange was arranged with Major Eaton, who had been selected for the war department; but this proved unsatisfactory; and finally McLean asked for, and obtained, the nomination for associate justice of the Supreme Court; Barry, who was to have had that position, consenting to take the post-office.

This change astonished the Senate, and was at once perceived to be an omen of evil. The opinion got abroad that the change was made because McLean, though willing to remove officers for officious partisanship in the last election, refused to discriminate in so doing between the followers of Jackson and those of Adams. The National Journal, March 7, 1829, said, &ldquo;The President is to lose the valuable services of the able and independent officer, who, in the discharge of his important duties, has given universal satisfaction, for the purpose of increasing the power and patronage of the President.&rdquo;

If Jackson had really hesitated as to the advisability of adopting a proscriptive policy, the demonstration at Washington on the occasion of his inauguration must have been a convincing argument in favor of it. In the first administrations the personal solicitation of office-seekers was discouraged. When Jefferson took his seat, the newness of the Capitol and conditions of transportation forbade the assembling of a large crowd. Of the second Adams's inauguration, Mrs. Seaton wrote, &ldquo;The city is thronged with strangers, and Yankees swarm like the locusts of Egypt in our houses, our beds, and our kneading-troughs.&rdquo;

This visitation, however, was utterly forgotten in the horror and vexation with which old residents beheld the Jacksonian invasion, the first appearance of a species of four-year locusts that has never since failed to devastate our capital city. The difference was not in numbers of candidates alone, though that was marked, but still more decidedly in character. The trimly dressed gentlemen of the old regime, with their high stocks and good breeding, were jostled by hack politicians from New York and country editors and farmers from the West. &ldquo;After the ceremony was over,&rdquo; wrote Story, &ldquo;the President went to the palace to receive company, and there he was visited by immense crowds of all sorts of people, from the highest and most polished down to the most vulgar and gross in the nation. I never saw such a mixture. The reign of King Mob seemed

What happened at the executive mansion was so dramatic that it has been described at length by all the writers on the period. The wild stampede to the White House; the crowding round and crushing of the president, indicative of a new familiarity between the people and the government, to the immediate detriment of both; the mad scramble for the good things, &mdash; the cakes and ices and orange punch served out in lavish style, but wasted through careless distribution: all these scenes are not picturesque only, but are also emblematic.

Webster wrote to his sister on that day: &ldquo;A monstrous crowd of people is in the city. I never saw any thing like it before. Persons have come five hundred miles to see General Jackson, and they really seem to think that the country is rescued from some dreadful danger.&rdquo; It was evident, however, that they did not come solely to rejoice in this salvation. An office-seeking friend of Amos Kendall's said, &ldquo;I am ashamed of myself, for I feel as if every man I meet knew what I came for.&rdquo; &ldquo;Don't distress yourself,&rdquo; replied Kendall, &ldquo;for every man you meet is on the same business.&rdquo; Reports were rife that the office-hunters pressed their claims in a manner which was &ldquo;the reverse of courteous,&rdquo; that they intruded upon the president's private hours, and &ldquo;perforated&rdquo; all the rooms of his mansion &ldquo;to get a peep at him.&rdquo; These rumors were denied, and the organization of the presidential household was described as rendering such persecution impossible; but the accounts of members of the government confirm the story, &mdash; Hamilton, Ingham, and Van Buren all bear witness to the number and pertinacity of the applicants. Van Buren formulated a scheme to rid the streets of the mob before making removals; but it was not tried, and the disorder, though modified as time went on, seems to have continued until the most desirable places

had been disposed of. This crowd was in effect a monster petition in favor of removals.

The administration did not see fit to make a definite pronouncement of its policy. Retrenchment, rather than proscription, was hinted at in the inaugural, &ldquo;In the performance of a task thus generally delineated, I shall endeavor to select men whose diligence and talents will insure in their respective stations able and effective coöperation, depending for the advancement of the public service more on the integrity and zeal of the public officers than on their number.&rdquo; The editor of the Nashville Gazette went to Washington, and after he returned announced, &ldquo;In all cases where the official influence was prostituted in the last contest, to subserve the electioneering purposes of the coalition, the incumbents will be removed&rdquo;; others, however, even Adams men, were to be allowed to retain office &ldquo;provided no other objection existed.&rdquo; The Richmond Enquirer, in commenting on this, naïvely remarked, &ldquo;After this wholesome purgation, what portion of the original executive functionaries will be found worthy to be retained in the service, is not as yet foreseen.&rdquo; After the acts of the administration had revealed its policy, Jackson, in his first annual message, December, 1829, formulated the principles which had guided him: &mdash;

&ldquo;There are, perhaps, few men who can for any great length of time enjoy office and power without being more or less under the influence of feelings unfavorable to the faithful discharge of their public duties. Their integrity may be proof against improper considerations immediately addressed to themselves, but they are apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon the public interests and of tolerating conduct from which an unpracticed man would revolt. Office is considered as a species of property, and government rather as a means of promoting individual interests than as an instrument created solely for the service of the people. Corruption in some and in others a perversion of correct feelings and principles divert government from its legitimate ends, and make it an engine for the

support of the few at the expense of the many. The duties of all public offices are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I can not but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience. I submit, therefore, to your consideration whether the efficiency of the government would not be promoted, and official industry and integrity better secured, by a general extension of the law which limits appointments to four years.

&ldquo;In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another. Offices were not established to give support to particular men at the public expense. No individual wrong is, therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment to nor continuance in office is matter of right. The incumbent became an officer with a view to public benefits, and when these require his removal they are not to be sacrificed to private interests. It is the people, and they alone, who have a right to complain when a bad officer is substituted for a good one. He who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office. The proposed limitation would destroy the idea of property now so generally connected with official station, and although individual distress may be sometimes produced, it would, by promoting that rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed, give healthful action to the system.&rdquo;

The policy thus enunciated threw every office in the civil service open to competition. The vague charge of misusing office to support Adams was one that could be brought, and proved ex parte, against any office-holder. The contrast of this policy with Jefferson's practice of opening up first one set of offices and then another is striking. This possibility of a simultaneous change of the entire civil list meant that the appointing power must deal at once with a great number and a great variety of cases; and the complexity of its task was increased by the other principle, that the duties of the various offices were

so plain and simple that any men of intelligence could perform them. It was A B C democracy: any applicant could aspire to any office. When it is remembered in addition that the offices were hundreds and the office-beggars were thousands, the difficulties of distribution are apparent.

Necessity is sure to evolve any machine that is really essential, but time is required for the process. Thus, although means were finally found for systematically dividing the spoils, they were not discovered early enough to save the Jackson administration from embarrassment. As of old, congressmen were active and anxious to relieve the president by assuming the whole task themselves; delegations arranged slates, and it was reported that Congress dictated the appointment of Ingham as secretary of the treasury. On the whole, however, congressional influence seems to have been less than usual, and each member exerted influence according to his individuality. Much stress seems to have been placed on petitions. Duff Green urged on Governor Edwards the importance of &ldquo;signatures&rdquo;; and a marshalship in Pennsylvania is said to have been awarded to that candidate whose petition was largest. A man who desired the register's office at Crawfordsville brought a petition from the Republican members of the state legislature, with private letters. Probably petitions carried more weight than had been usual, though letters of influential men almost equalled them in importance.

Occasionally testimonials were brought proving the unfitness of the incumbents of the positions applied for. Some notes of this character have been published by a Mr. Derby, who claimed that he carried them with him to Washington. &ldquo;I certify that I heard Major &mdash;&mdash; [Melville?] say that he believed Jackson to be a damned rascal&rdquo;: &ldquo;I certify that many times, in conversation, Major &mdash;&mdash; said, that he was a public officer under Adams, and thought it his duty to stick by his superior officer, and believed he had more knowledge

in his little finger, than old Jackson had in his whole body.&rdquo; Few applicants, however, had sufficiently definite ideas of what they wanted to enable them to bring charges against a specific officer. Samuel Swartwout, in a letter to Jesse Hoyt, expresses the general attitude: &ldquo;I hold to your doctrine fully, that for the purpose of keeping Mr. Adams in, and Gen. Jackson out of power, is entitled to the least lenity or mercy, save that of hanging. So we think both alike on that head. Whether or not, I shall get anything in the general scramble for plunder, remains to be proven; but I rather guess I shall. What it will be is not yet so certain; perhaps Keeper of the Bergen lighthouse. I rather think Massa Pomp stands a smart chance of going somewhere, perhaps to the place you have named or to the devil.&rdquo;

Jackson's two most important advisers with regard to the distribution of the patronage were Martin Van Buren, secretary of state, and General Duff Green, administration editor and political manager of the Calhoun faction. Van Buren tried to avoid the turmoil of the conflict; he did not reach Washington until March 22; and he wrote to James Hamilton, his representative with the president, that he was anxious that his preferences for the cabinet should not be pressed in his name, though he was glad enough to have Hamilton urge them. The most important New York appointment, that of Swartwout as collector, was made against his wishes, and some of his New York supporters were restive at this unexpected passivity; but he was none the less a power. His was the velvet glove; his influence with Jackson lay in the very fact that he knew when to give way; his followers he rather managed than commanded, letting them fight out their family quarrels among themselves; but in the end the person who could serve him was rewarded. He was aptly called the &ldquo;Little Magician.&rdquo; As head of the Albany Regency he was

looked upon by many Northern politicians as the best man on whom to rely for support when asking for office, and many delegations were sent to Washington to assure him of support in his candidacy for the succession and to request his aid in pushing through a slate of appointments. It mattered not how few Jackson's supporters might be in any district &mdash; they were sure to be divided as to the sharing of the spoils. When, therefore, one faction had declared for Van Buren, the other was swift to enroll under the banner of the only other prominent candidate for the presidency, Vice-president Calhoun. The latter interfered in the politics of the patronage much less than Van Buren did, much less than he had done himself at an earlier period; but was ably represented by that typical office-monger, General Green, and so the Calhoun followers were as well taken care of as those of Van Buren.

One of these factional contests took place in Boston, and was described in an elaborate political pamphlet written by one of the participants after he had deserted to the Whig party, and corroborated by the Boston press of the period. The regular state organization declared for Calhoun, and sent Nathaniel Greene, editor of the Statesman, to the capital to press upon the administration a list of appointments. Another faction, represented by the Bulletin, cried &ldquo;Stop thief,&rdquo; hastily rallied in support of the Van Buren plan of a second term for Jackson, and sent a counter embassy to make plain to the president their services in the past and their influence for the future. Both delegations were well received, and the offices were divided between them.

A similar conflict in Illinois may be studied in the letters of Duff Green himself to Governor Edwards. The latter expected to profit by the adoption of a policy which he had so long advocated, and his friends supposed that he would have &ldquo;as much influence over General Jackson as any other man in this state.&rdquo; He evidently desired to declare openly for Calhoun, and to rely upon General Green's influence at Washington; but Green

wrote: &ldquo;It is particularly desirable that the conflicting interests of our party be made to harmonize and to prevent a premature collision. It is agreed on all hands that Gen'l Jackson shall hold a position for re-election if necessary or expedient. Perhaps he may desire it, and if so, no one can prevent his re-election. You will therefore plainly see the impropriety of getting up at this time any new organization of parties based upon any speculation as to a competition between Van Buren and your personal friend.&rdquo;

The inevitable conflict came, however; and Kinney, an ancient political foe of Edwards, went to Washington, declared for Van Buren, and secured all the Illinois appointments. As early as July, 1829, one of the governor's friends wrote, &ldquo;I have seen that your expectations have not been realized with regard to the reforming system.&rdquo; Green wrote to him explaining the unfavorable nominations, blaming Edwards for not securing enough signatures in favor of his candidates, promising him better luck in the future, and urging him to stand by Jackson; but through all the letters there is a tone of nervousness and apprehension. By the spring of 1830 Green gave up his hope of defeating Van Buren by secret manœuvre, and acknowledged that his plans and those of his opponents must come into early conflict. He was not ready to break with Jackson, but he wrote: &ldquo;My own individual opinion is that Gen. Jackson will not be a candidate, and that Mr. Calhoun will be the candidate of the South and West, and that he will also obtain the Democracy of New England. Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio are more doubtful&rdquo;; and he added that the Van Buren plan was to have Jackson reflected. It is clear from the oscillation of his policy that Duff Green felt that he was losing ground, but not until October, 1830, did he confess to Edwards that his power was waning. &ldquo;The appointments in your State,&rdquo; he wrote, &ldquo;have been the source of much anxiety to me. I could not control them.&rdquo; In November he gave up all hope of reconciling the two factions or of keeping on good terms with both, but wrote to Edwards declaring for Calhoun, and adding,

&ldquo;I feel strong enough for the crisis.&rdquo; In January, 1832, he again wrote to Edwards, &ldquo;Instead of using the patronage upon the high principle on which it was given to him of promoting the public good, he [Jackson] uses it as a personal chattel, to be administered to advance his own re-election and to advance the private interests of a few dependants.&rdquo; The fact that his mortification over appointments rankled so long after the actual break with Jackson took place would seem to point to that as one reason for his following Calhoun to the tents of the Myrmidons.

Duff Green was not the only political leader who had cause complain that his recommendations were slighted. In regard to appointments, as in all other matters, Jackson was independent, and would willingly sacrifice party welfare to the calls of friendship or of personal whim. Private considerations alone seem to have led to the choice of Major Eaton to be secretary of war, and of Swartwout as collector at New York. Parton, in his life of Jackson, gives as authentic the autobiographical account of a &ldquo;Successful Politician&rdquo;; it is at any rate characteristic. A young man, belonging to one of the prominent political families of New York, but himself of no prominence, obtains a small clerkship at Washington through the influence of Van Buren, and his duties bring him into close contact with the president. One day he asked Jackson if he is not lonesome. &ldquo;Why should I be lonesome, with the house filled with people?&rdquo; said the president. &ldquo;Yes,&rdquo; said the young clerk, &ldquo;there are plenty here, but they all have axes to grind.&rdquo; The general confessed that he was lonesome, and as it developed that this young man had no axe to grind, he became the president's friend. Subsequently one of the very fat offices in New York became vacant, and he applied for it on his own responsibility, obtained it, and later received a reappointment. Of course Van Buren did not like to see such an office wasted on a political nonentity, but he was too wise to interfere with his chief.

When, however, he became president, he appointed another man to the post.

The position of postmaster at Albany was an important one for the New York democracy. In 1829 it was still held by that General Solomon Van Rensselaer whose appointment, it will be remembered, had been vigorously opposed by Van Buren, who now felt sure of his revenge, and arranged for a new appointment. General Van Rensselaer, however, went to Washington, gained access to the president, and prepared to tear open his shirt and show the wounds which he had received in fighting for his country. He was instantly confirmed in his post. Men might flatter themselves that they guided Old Hickory, but they needed to drive with a very loose rein, and must be ready to yield the direction on any show of resistance.

The plans of the party leaders were still further disturbed by the Senate. We have seen that friction between the two branches of the appointing power was by no means unusual, but never before 1829 had it assumed any considerable degree of political importance. Now trouble was anticipated from the first, as the Senate would be controlled by the opposition and would be sure to oppose the proscriptive policy. For some days after the 4th of March, Branch, Eaton, and Berrien, although nominated as members of the cabinet, retained their seats in the Senate, in order to facilitate the starting of the administration. So eager were the Jackson managers to secure a quiet launching for their new experiment in government that they deferred some nominations likely to be resisted; and such men as Amos Kendall and William B. Lewis were appointed to office the day after the Senate adjourned. Thus the special session passed off peacefully, and no difficulty was to be feared for eight months.

With the first regular session in December, 1829, began an obstinate struggle. During the summer Jackson had, to a great extent, accomplished his proscription: the full issue was before

the country, and the opposition prepared to make the most of the popular outcry which, voiced by the anti-Jackson press, seemed to offer a chance for successful attack. They could not, of course, take the stand of rejecting all nominations; public opinion would not have endured a course so factious. Amos Kendall says that they did &ldquo;reject on frivolous grounds many of his [Jackson's] best nominations&rdquo;; and Louis McLane wrote to Hamilton, &ldquo;It is impossible that some evil spirit is not at work in that body, otherwise the reckless course of the opposition must have united the majority in spite of all men's dislike; but I confess I want the clue to some of the rejections.&rdquo;

The fact is that the Senate refused to confirm some of the most prominent Jackson politicians, men of great ability but particularly obnoxious to the opposition, &mdash; men like Isaac Hill and Mordecai M. Noah. Amos Kendall himself, one of the most efficient public officers that Jackson appointed, was confirmed only by the casting vote of Vice-president Calhoun. Some of the men rejected would seem to have deserved their fate; but whether rejected for good reasons or bad, they became sure of the good-will of the president, who was moved to inexpressible wrath at this unprecedented opposition to his will. Sometimes he would give the victim a new position; generally he would renominate him, even a third time. This bootless contest went on as long as the opposition controlled the Senate, the most conspicuous rejection being that of Van Buren when nominated as minister to England.

The opposition soon saw the futility of thus cutting off nominations in detail, and sought to devise some general bulwark to protect such of their friends as still remained in office, and to put a limit to the power of the executive. The Senate adopted a resolution in 1831, declaring &ldquo;that it is inexpedient to appoint a citizen of any one State to an office which may be vacated or

become vacant in any other State. . . without some evident necessity for such appointment.&rdquo; Jackson replied by a message, March 2, 1833, in which he claimed that this was an attempt unconstitutionally to restrain the president's appointing power, and said that he felt it to be his duty to abstain from any further efforts to fill the offices nominations to which had called out the resolution. In January, 1832, a more sweeping resolution was introduced by Senator Ewing: &ldquo;That it is inexpedient for the Senate to advise and consent to the appointment of any person, to fill a supposed vacancy in any office, occasioned by the removal of a prior incumbent, unless such prior incumbent shall appear to have been removed for a sufficient cause.&rdquo;

These resolutions were intended simply to guide the Senate in the execution of its constitutional function of advising and consenting to appointments; but there were many anti-Jackson men who wished to go farther, and to revive the old claim of the Senate to share in the removing power. A very good case might be made out for such a construction of the constitutional clauses governing the subject; but from the point of view of expediency such a course was most undesirable, and the more moderate of the opposition discountenanced it. John Quincy Adams saw the danger of tampering with constitutional principles to further the ends of the hour, and his son wrote an able pamphlet against the proposed action; while the venerable Madison, in almost his last letter, urged adherence to the accepted interpretation, which he had done so much to establish.

Nevertheless, in 1835 a committee to investigate the patronage proposed that the president submit to the Senate the reasons for each removal, a suggestion which had little practical significance, as there was no chance of making it a law, owing to the attitude of the House of Representatives. Jackson was sure to disregard a mere resolution of the Senate. In fact, when the reasons for the removal of Gideon Fitz were requested

on the ground that such information was necessary to enable the Senate to act wisely on the nomination of his successor, the president refused to comply, arguing that the power of removal belonged to him exclusively, and that, should the Senate in executive session consider the causes of removal, the officer would thus be subjected to trial by a secret tribunal.

Such crude machinery as did exist for distribution of offices was thus subjected to the double strain of Jackson's independence and the opposition of the Senate, which made it impossible for the leaders of the party to use the patronage with the best possible political effect. The spoils system was introduced, but the spoils were rather enjoyed as the fruit of the victory of 1828 than employed in the manner best calculated to secure victory anew in 1832. An illustration of the utter confusion prevailing in Washington early in the administration is found in the case of the Hartford post-office. One Norton was appointed to the position in place of Low removed. He transferred his family from Washington to Hartford, entered upon the duties of his office, and the next day found himself superseded by John M. Niles. Petitions in favor of Mr. Norton's retention received many signatures, but he was unable to regain the post.

In spite of this confusion and clash of interests, it is possible to distinguish some guiding principles which controlled appointments when Jackson was tractable and the Senate tired of opposition. Samuel Swartwout wrote to Jesse Hoyt (March 14, 1829), "The great goers are the new men; the old troopers being all spavined and ringboned from previous hard travel." A new generation, or rather the Democratic half of a new generation, came to the front with Jackson, bringing fresh blood and strange manners into the civil service. Moreover, old party distinction disappeared, and men of Federalist antecedents received recognition, though the prejudice against them had by no means died out.

It is the general opinion that fitness for the duties of office was scarcely considered by Jackson. James A. Hamilton, who was present at cabinet discussions and was in constant correspondence with Van Buren, tells us that it was never mentioned. Hamilton's memory, however, was very poor, and his statement is contradicted by letters which he himself made public. Thus, Van Buren wrote to him in March, 1829: &ldquo;I cannot, from my total want of knowledge as to Barry's professional talents, speak as to the propriety of his appointment. Politically it would be well.&rdquo; February 15, 1829, Van Buren wrote to Major Eaton: &ldquo;You want for the other concern [evidently the cabinet] practical, intelligent, and efficient men, who are conversant with the affairs of the nation, and in whom the people have confidence, men whose capacities are adapted to the discharge of the public business, whether they might, or might not, shine in the composition of essays on abstract and abstruse subjects.&rdquo; It is evident that efficiency was considered, though it was made of less importance than in previous administrations and was differently defined.

One class of appointments has brought to Jackson, as to other presidents, perhaps undeserved credit, &mdash; that of literary men to diplomatic posts. Such appointments are generally non-political and are therefore lauded; but poets and novelists are seldom better diplomats than are politicians, and it is almost as mischievous to use the civil service as a pension fund for literary celebrities as for disabled soldiers or defeated congressmen. The few appointments of this character made by Jackson brought in a flood of applications from budding geniuses all over the country. Livingston, when secretary of state, wrote to an incoming senator who had recommended such a young man for appointment that he had seen the latter and could not make him a consul, &mdash; that the selection of Cooper and Irving did not mean that all novelists were good diplomats.

In the majority of cases the most important reasons for appointment were political. Some of the fortunate had been &ldquo;original Jackson men&rdquo;; others had made sacrifices by

the party at the last moment; some, like Henry Lee and William B. Lewis, had done Jackson's writing for him. John Randolph, who spent ten days in Russia as minister, and drew $21,407 on his return, contributed the support of his name. As a class, the editors fared the best. The newspapers had been very influential in the campaign of 1828, spreading broadcast charges of dishonesty in Adams's civil service, and of bargain and corruption. The day of the great newspapers, moreover, had not come: the local sheet was the powerful factor; and as the list of subscribers was small, advertisements cheap, and the cost of distribution heavy, such papers were seldom very profitable, and often ruined their owners. It was for this reason particularly that men like Nathaniel Greene of Boston, Dabney F. Carr of Baltimore, Mordecai M. Noah of New York, Amos Kendall, Duff Green, and many others were acknowledged to deserve office. Such appointments were very generally attacked, but Niles pointed out that they were not objectionable if the editors resigned from their papers; otherwise he said, the franking privilege gave them an undue advantage over their competitors.

It was not proposed that editors resign, or that appointees generally relax their political exertions on receiving office; office was not merely a reward for past service, but an incitement to further activity. Amos Kendall wrote for the Washington press; and Mr. Noah, in an editorial concerning his appointment as naval officer at New York, said that since his new duties did not interfere with the duties and obligations he owed to the Republican party, he would not abate the attention hitherto paid to the columns of the Enquirer, which he hoped to improve in every department. Duff Green, in return for the government printing, made his journal the official mouthpiece of the administration. When the break between the president and vice-president took place, a new paper was

the Globe, and to its editors, Blair and Rives, was given what government printing the Democrats could control.

Service was expected of other officers as well. March 30, 1834, William B. Lewis wrote to Hamilton: &ldquo;Tell Swartwout to peel off his coat and roll up his sleeves also; but, perhaps, as he has to go through the &lsquo;glorious Senate,&rsquo; it would not be prudent for him to do so. Price, as his nomination will be certainly confirmed before the 8th, must do his own and Swartwout's part too.&rdquo; Charles T. Congdon, in his Reminiscences of a Journalist, says that in 1840 he saw a circular from Kendall to the deputy postmasters, asking them to work for Van Buren, and adding, &ldquo;I shall take care that the high-minded and patriotic men who do this service shall have no cause to regret their exertions.&rdquo; Political assessments also appear promptly on the incoming of the spoils system; Derby describes, apparently truthfully, an early instance of such practice in Boston. The significant fact in regard to the making of appointments is the prominence, hitherto unusual, which was given to partisan activity past and future: the Federalists demanded fitness and harmony of opinion; Jefferson in addition considered past usefulness to the party; under Jackson the promise of future activity became of paramount importance. To faith must be added good works.

We have discussed the machinery by which the spoils were divided, and the principles by which this machinery was controlled; the question now arises as to how complete a change was made in the public offices. The impression is very general that the sweep was, proportionally, the largest in our history; but doubtless the novelty of the proceeding, and the consequent effect it made upon contemporaries, is largely responsible for this view, which is decidedly a mistaken one. The very haphazard manner in which the matter was handled was as favorable to the retention of some officers as to the removal of others. There were Jackson men at Washington who worked to retain

some old public servants, either for personal reasons or because of their merit. Hamilton claims that he saved, among others, Henry Wheaton; and Van Buren felt that only with the greatest delicacy could he remove &ldquo;old Mr. Maury who, having been appointed by General Washington, has, on that account, some sanctity attached to his commission.&rdquo;

Of an approximate total of 612 presidential officers, only 252 were removed. The number of removals would be more imposing if the deputy postmasters were included; but they were not made presidential officers until 1836. Niles, April 3, 1830, gives a list of 400 removals in this department, and Benton places the number at 600. As there were about 8000 deputy postmasters in the country, the proportion removed was not large; but in many cases the emoluments were so very small as to discourage competition. Moreover, Jackson did not find the civil service entirely hostile to him. Adams's postmaster-general, McLean, was one of Jackson's most conspicuous supporters; and, though he was a moderate man and the charges that he had actively used his appointing power to further his political views are probably untrue, it is not to be supposed that he rigidly excluded Jackson men from office previous to Jackson's election. It is to be presumed, therefore, that a rather large portion of the appointees of the post-office department were Jackson men. Adams estimated, doubtless with some exaggeration, that more than four-fifths of the customs officials were opposed to his election in 1825; and as he made no removals, many would naturally oppose him in 1829. Some of these Jackson men found in office were doubtless removed as a result of the clashing of various interests at Washington; still many must have retained their places. A third explanatory consideration

is that comparatively few removals were made in the South, particularly the sea-board South. From these states came few office-beggars, that is, beggars for the smaller offices; for positions of dignity they were as eager as any section, and Virginia undoubtedly felt slighted at being left out of the cabinet. With these facts in mind, we may conclude, therefore, that Jackson's opponents were almost completely swept out of the paying presidential offices in the North and West.

The fate of subordinates in local offices and in the departments at Washington is obscure. The Blue Books or Official Registers give the changes every two years, but no indication as to cause. The policy varied, too, with each appointing official, who seems to have been allowed a very large measure of discretion. Van Buren wrote to Hamilton in March, 1829: &ldquo;As to the publication in the newspapers I have more to say.

So far as depends on me, my course will be to restore by a single order every one who has been turned out by Mr. Clay for political reasons, unless circumstances of a personal character have since arisen which would make the reappointment in any case improper. To ascertain that, will take a little time. There I would pause.&rdquo; In 1825 there were twelve clerks in the office of the secretary of state; by September 30, 1829, the number had grown to fifteen, but only four of the original twelve were still there; in 1833 but two of these four remained. Amos Kendall, on becoming fourth auditor, insisted that he should control the appointment of his clerks. In 1829 there were sixteen in his office, one more than there had been in 1825; eight of those serving in 1825 were still employed, but one was at a reduced salary. In 1833 two of these eight survivors had disappeared, but their places had not been filled.

The Globe, November 4, 1841, stated that there were employed in Washington 220 Democrats receiving $277,115, and 281 Whigs with salaries amounting to $336,308; and Benton says that a majority of the employees there were opposed to Jackson. Such estimates are totally unreliable, for parties during the period were in too chaotic a condition to allow an accurate computation; but it is evident that many subordinates were retained, some because they were indispensable, and some because they imitated the Vicar of Bray. In the local offices a similar diversity of practice is observable. In Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston notable changes were made, while in many places there was no abnormal break whatever.

In the discussion of Jefferson's administration, it was pointed out that the attack on the judiciary should be connected with the general policy toward the patronage. The Jackson managers were not greatly disturbed by a hostile judiciary, &mdash; they ignored it when it interfered with their plans; but there was another bit of patronage, not officially belonging to the public

service, which they were unwilling to let slip through their fingers, the United States Bank. Jefferson wrote to Gallatin, July 12, 1803: &ldquo;As to the patronage of the Republican Bank at Providence, I am decidedly in favor of making all the banks Republican, by sharing deposits among them in proportion to the disposition they show; if the law now forbids it, we should not permit another session of Congress to pass without amending it.&rdquo; In the days before the free banking system, all banks had the birthmark of politics; and it is not surprising that those in control of the national government demanded a share of the bank patronage. A recent writer has shown that Jackson's attitude was not determined by the Portsmouth episode, but has pointed out on the other hand that Biddle endeavored to conciliate Jackson by favorable appointments, turning the Nashville branch into a Democratic institution and corresponding continually with Major Lewis on this subject. Soon the break between the government and the bank became irreconcilable and the exchange of favors ceased.

Jackson promised more than the removal of unpopular officers; he announced that he would reform the administration, and made efforts to carry out this pledge. His first step, like Jefferson's when he became president, was thoroughly to investigate the accounts of the preceding administration, in hope that facts to its discredit might be discovered. Amos Kendall says: &ldquo;Among the custom-house officers and other receivers of public moneys, numerous peculators were discovered and hurled from office. The depredations of those who were removed within the first eighteen months of General Jackson's administration, in this department of the public service, were at least $280,000.&rdquo; The real result, however, was to show the substantial honesty of the service under Adams. In some instances it was found that the government was the debtor. The unfavorable balance against Tobias Watkins, whose case was most commented on by the Jackson press, was apparently only technical.

Various administrative reforms were attempted. To quote again from Kendall: &ldquo;The unrestrained power of the treasurer over the public funds, by which they could be drawn upon his individual check, was taken away by a new regulation. Frauds in payment of fishing bounties were stopped, and two collectors, believed to have been engaged in them, removed from office; in consequence of which there was a saving, in the first year of the administration in that branch of expenditure, of $51,271.41.&rdquo;

As for retrenchment, Niles asserted that the only action taken had been the abolition of the office of draughtsman in the House of Representatives. This is somewhat unfair. The Democrats had larger plans; in 1830 a House committee brought in an elaborate scheme, if not to reduce expenditures, at least to control them; and in 1833 the president sent to Congress a report from the secretary of state, proposing a reformation of the consular service. This latter plan, while not extensive, was wholesome; consuls were to be discouraged from entering into trade, adequate salaries were to be provided, and fees were to be curtailed and regulated, That more was not accomplished was not solely the fault of the Jackson leaders, for they did not have complete control of Congress. Even with this hindrance, some good was done. For example, the roll of salaries (there were some duplications of officers) at the Norfolk custom-house was reduced from forty-one in 1825 to thirty-three in 1829 and seventeen in 1833; the reduction in the amount paid, however, was only from $15,991.86 in 1825 to $13,164.50 in 1833. Nevertheless, it needs no accumulation of evidence to show that the whole method of appointment told against effective administration. The interest in reform lay in finding opponents wrong, rather than in watching friends carefully. Hamilton says that the president told him, &ldquo;Go to the duties of your office, and make as much money as you can.&rdquo; Kendall was an efficient officer; but the &ldquo;close devotion&rdquo; for six hours each day which he exacted from his clerks, he would

probably have dubbed aristocratic leisure before he came into office.

Political reform fared worse than administrative. The appointment of numerous members of Congress to office by the party which had long been denouncing such practice delighted Jackson's opponents, and grieved many of his friends. In Tennessee, Mr. Miller, who intended to run for Congress in support of Jackson, withdrew, ostensibly at least, because the latter had seduced one governor and three senators into his cabinet. Jackson felt such criticism, and in his first annual message said, &ldquo;While members of Congress can be constitutionally appointed to offices of trust and profit it will be the practice, even under the most conscientious adherence to duty, to select them for such stations as they are believed to be better qualified to fill than other citizens,&rdquo; and he advised Congress to prepare an amendment prohibiting such appointments, but it took no action on the recommendation, and interest in this issue gradually died out after the overthrow of the congressional caucus.

Early in Jackson's term, Philip Hone visited Washington and conversed with many persons prominent in society and in politics. He records: "The proscriptive course which has been pursued in relation to removals and appointments has served to cool their friends and to exasperate their enemies. . . . If Jackson succeeds for another term, it will be owing to the difficulty of agreeing upon his successor, rather than to the popularity of his administration." An intense gloom hung over the city in the spring of 1829; and when, shortly after the proscription began, John Henshaw, a clerk in the treasury department, committed suicide, Adams attributed his act to fear of removal. There can be no doubt that the public opinion of Washington condemned the administration, especially because

of its policy of removals. The capital was thirty years old, with a stable population and an established society. Its solitary industry was government, and when its respected citizens were thrown out of office there was little for them to do but to go back and try to reëstablish their connection with the home communities from which they had long been severed. The alteration of political methods affected Washington more nearly than any other part of the country, and it took time to make the adjustment. July 13, 1829, Van Buren wrote to Hamilton, &ldquo;Mr. Calvert. . . damns us up hill and down for reducing the value of real estate.&rdquo; When it is recalled that in 1801 very few, even of the higher officers, had brought their families to the wilderness town on the Potomac, and that consequently few homes were broken up by Jefferson's removals, it will seem less strange that this proscription has not lived in the popular memory, while that of Jackson is a well-established tradition.

In the country at large the feeling was not so intense; but the big-letter headings of the Columbian Centinel indicate a disposition to make party capital out of the innovation; while the newspaper correspondence on the subject is voluminous, containing many letters from dismissed officers, which show the evils of rotation and the true aim of the civil service. Particularly the case of the venerable Major Melville, called the &ldquo;last of the Mohawks,&rdquo; or participators in the Boston Tea-Party, was exhibited to excite sympathy. The character of many of the new appointees was roundly attacked. Yet the contest was not without its amenities: McLean wrote to one man removed, that he had faithfully performed his duties; and the Adams papers occasionally acknowledged that good appointments were made.

Aside from personal hardships and the more obvious evils of frequent change of officers, the opposition press most deplored the tendency of the new system to create a class of office-seekers. The Massachusetts Spy feared that the nature of our

institutions tempted every man to fit his son for a profession, that the ranks were becoming overcrowded, and that the unsuccessful would be encouraged to seek government support; and even the Jackson Gazette voiced similar fears. It is interesting to note that De Tocqueville, in spite of his American experience, believed that office-hunting was characteristic rather of monarchies than of democracies. The true significance of the crowd of applicants we shall discuss later.

The dissatisfaction was not entirely confined to the opponents of Jackson. Hamilton wrote, April 23, 1829, that he was &ldquo;cruelly disappointed at the manner in which, and to the extent removals and appointments are made&rdquo;; and he was not alone. Particularly in the Southern press a note of dissent is perceived: removals are defended as necessary under the circumstances, but obviously it was not universally desired that the custom should become established. In contradistinction to Jackson's optimistic observation in regard to the ability of any American to fill any vacancy, the Jackson Gazette said that even the subordinate places required several months, or even years of experience.

No doubt or misgiving, however, can be found in the jubilant note of the Telegraph and the Globe: they foretold, welcomed, and defended every step in the progress of the spoils system. &ldquo;Reform,&rdquo; said the Telegraph, &mdash; &ldquo;the very word acts like an electric shock upon some men.&rdquo; They had no sympathy for men removed, &mdash; those who could not get a living otherwise were not worth their salaries to the government, &mdash; let them &ldquo;root, hog, or die.&rdquo; &ldquo;There are many clerks in the departments,&rdquo; wrote a correspondent to the Telegraph, March 27, 1829, &ldquo;who feel they have a vested right in the premises, based on the proscriptive claims of the term of twenty, thirty, and forty years' actual possession. Secondly, some approximation of equality in the distribution of the government favors among its citizens ought always to be held in the view of the republic.&rdquo;

The arguments of the Telegraph were widely echoed by the press, and were summed up by Marcy in his famous phrase, &ldquo;To the victors belong the spoils.&rdquo; The elections showed that, if the people did not support Jackson because of his method of reform, they at any rate supported him in spite of it.