The Civil Service and the Patronage/Chapter 03

Madison's policy would have been had he become president under circumstances similar to those which Jefferson encountered is uncertain. The Federalist press supposed that, as secretary of state, he opposed the proscriptive system, and at one time announced that he was on the point of resigning because of it; yet even if it were not to his liking, he might have been forced to practise it had he become chief magistrate in 1801. As it was, he succeeded an administration with which he was in complete harmony; there was as yet no loud call for rotation in office, and he was not even tempted to reconstruct the civil service.

Madison did not, however, find the apparently simple task of filling the natural vacancies an easy one. His lack of personal force gave hostile factions an opportunity, and they attempted to control, through the Senate, the distribution of the patronage. A threat of opposition forced the president to relinquish his project of nominating Albert Gallatin for secretary of state; and this victory did not make his opponents more considerate. The nomination of General Dearborn as secretary of war was defeated; there was a contest over the confirmation of Monroe as secretary of state in 1811, and another in 1813 when Jonathan Russell was nominated as minister to Sweden. We have some interesting notes, taken by Pickering, on the debate which took

place when the name of Joel Barlow, for minister to France, was sent in. Pickering sarcastically defended the nomination, saying that Barlow was no mere poet, for he had made too much money, &mdash; an allusion probably to the Ohio Company frauds.

The War of 1812 brought unexpected patronage to the executive; but the administration escaped much of the toil involved by leaving military nominations almost wholly to the state delegations. William Lowndes wrote to his wife that he should have liked a commission, but that he felt a scruple about asking for one, as the delegation of which he was a member really made the appointment. The advice of the state delegation was not always followed, however. Gallatin complained that a Mr. Chrystie, selected by the New York members for a lieutenant-colonelcy, was nominated for a majority only, because of the hostility of the secretary of war. The nomination of Thomas Pinckney, a South Carolina Federalist, received some opposition in the Senate, and caused general surprise. Even Lowndes, an extremely liberal man, wrote to his wife regarding it, &ldquo;The Republican party, having so large a proportion of the population of the State, has enough of talents and of virtue to serve the country, if the administration knew how to select and employ them.&rdquo; Madison, however, adhered to the policy of the Federalists, in making the war a national and not a party measure. He recognized the opposition, not only in the military but also in the diplomatic appointments, by making James A. Bayard a member of the peace commission at Ghent. This was in no sense an erasure of party lines; it was merely a call for the

assistance of the minority, an assistance then much needed. In the selection of individuals from both parties, political motives played the usual prominent part. It was bi-partisan, not non-partisan.

Vastly more difficulty was experienced in reducing the army when the war was over than in creating it, for every hero wished a reward, and his claims were vociferously urged by his admirers. The work of selecting the officers to remain in the regular army was largely left to a board of officers, but a liberal discretion was retained in the executive, and was sometimes used. This part of the task is said to have been easily accomplished, owing to the good sense of General Ripley; but many who could not thus be provided for cast an eye on the civil departments. Dallas wrote to Madison, August 3, 1815: &ldquo;The cases of General Wilkinson, General Cushing, and General Boyd are urged upon me. The vacancies at Castine, etc., are too humble for these gentlemen; and I am requested to ask your authority to create vacancies of a higher kind in the collectorships of New York, New London, Newport, etc. There is no delicacy used on the occasion.&rdquo; On August 10, Madison replied with a touch of irony: &ldquo;The cases of the three generals you name are embarrassing, but the mode of relief merits serious consideration also. The principle of it is entirely new, and the extent of it not easily limited.&rdquo; Boyd, he says, is not in need, and Wilkinson is dangerous. &ldquo;Cushing's situation is probably urgent, and his conduct strengthens his claims. But is not the foundation of them the same with those on which the actual collector of New London received and has retained his appointment? . . . It is true, his political conduct has been justly exceptionable, but it is not on that ground that his removal is required. Ellery [at Newport]. . . was a revolutionary patriot in high public trusts, and on that ground also has been retained. . . notwithstanding frequent charges of political misconduct. . . . I am disposed to take into fair consideration the

mode proposed for rewarding or alleviating the cases to which it would apply; but I should be glad to learn, before it be adopted, some practicable rule for designating the officers to be displaced, and for selecting those to be provided for. If the deciding consideration be the wealth of the former and the poverty of the latter,&rdquo; the rule would not be popular. &ldquo;These remarks do not exclude the resource in favor of meritorious and indigent officers, which may be found in special removals pointed out by legitimate causes.&rdquo; General Cushing was appointed collector at New London; how Huntington, the incumbent, was disposed of does not appear on the Senate journal. The twenty-seven removals made by Madison would seem to show that not many of these &ldquo;indigent officers&rdquo; could have been relieved in the way suggested; and the correspondence between Madison and Dallas would indicate that some reason, at least nominally valid, was required in all such cases. The official record is not, however, entirely truthful, for pressure was sometimes brought to bear which caused officials to resign. On June 18, 1816, Dallas wrote to Madison that the removal of Mr. Du Plessis from the collectorship at New Orleans was asked for, but on general grounds. September 11 he told him that Beverly Chew was recommended for the place, but was insolvent. Madison answered, September 15, that as Du Plessis's accounts were satisfactory and Chew's financial situation was not the best, it would be well to delay, at least until Congress met. Eventually Du Plessis resigned and Chew was appointed.

There is not much evidence that office sought the man under Madison. The death of an officer was looked on with regret, as entailing numberless applications, in deciding between which political quiet would seem to have been the effectual motive, so far as one can judge from Madison's rather vague statements.

William Plummer was made successor to Gardner as loan officer in New Hampshire, because he was recommended by his father, the governor, and because he had planned a history of the War of 1812 to counteract the Federalist publications. Henry Wheaton was made judge advocate, because his &ldquo;talents are unquestionable, and it is desirable, on many accounts, to gratify him;&rdquo; and Madison was very sure that the selection of a certain Albany appointee would be &ldquo;more agreeable&rdquo; to Albany, and to the state in general, than that of any of his competitors. He could not, however, escape the toils of state politics; and there can be no doubt that the appointment of Dr. Leib to the post-office at Philadelphia, by Granger, still postmaster-general, and the subsequent removal of both of them, were due to political machinations in the faction-ridden state of Pennsylvania.

The abuse of the patronage was a subject much discussed during this period; but, so far as the national civil service was concerned, it consisted rather in lack of vigilance in guarding against favoritism and the influence of local faction, than in any direct misuse for the purpose of party or personal advantage. One practice was gaining ground, however, which was regarded as distinctly dangerous. It has been shown that, because of their local knowledge, the advice of congressmen had from the first been considered important; it is obvious that the congressmen themselves would be better known to the president than any other citizens of the more distant states, and that he would, therefore, often appoint them to office. Jefferson gave places to twenty, and Madison to twenty-nine. The dangers anticipated from this custom led to the first reform movement.

In January, 1811, Nathaniel Macon introduced an amendment to the constitution, by which it was provided that no senator or representative should be appointed to any civil office or &ldquo;employment, under the authority of the United States, until the expiration of the presidential term in which such person

shall have served as senator or representative.&rdquo; It has been seen that such a clause was proposed in the Constitutional Convention; and the twenty years of experience had brought the danger more clearly before men's minds. Roger Sherman's idea, that modesty would prevent the presentation even of the name of a relative of a colleague, had been proved delusive. Josiah Quincy moved to amend Macon's amendment by adding, &ldquo;and no person standing to any Senator or Representative in the relation of father, brother, or son, by blood or marriage, shall be appointed to any civil office under the United States, or shall receive any place, agency, contract, or emolument from or under any department or officer thereof,&rdquo; a suggestion which Mr. Wright sought to render ridiculous by further amending that every member be required to furnish a genealogical table. The amendments were rejected; the original suggestion received seventy-one votes against forty, but was thrown out, as this was not the two-thirds majority required for a constitutional amendment.

As a reform measure this movement seems aimless and ineffective. It was truly pointed out that it would seriously hamper the president by removing from the list of eligibles those who were presumably the most able and with whom he was best acquainted. The key to the movement lies in the fact that the object was not to secure a more efficient civil service, but to guard against a political danger. Macon was a Republican of the old school, and, in the appointment of members of the legislature by the president, foresaw the destruction of that separation of powers which was so highly prized. Quincy condemned that &ldquo;consolidation, which has grown and is strengthened under the influence of the office-distributing power, vested in the Executive. A consolidation perceptible to all, and which is the more fixed and inseparable, inasmuch as the cement is constituted by the strongest of all amalgams: that of the precious metals.&rdquo;

In 1811 there was special reason for dreading this danger, because of the development of the congressional caucus for the nomination of candidates for the presidency, a device which seemed calculated to break down utterly the barriers which separated the departments of government, and to open a wide breach for corruption. In 1808 the caucus for the first time had been really influential in selecting the successful candidate. Opposition at once appeared; and now in 1811, when a new election was approaching, Macon introduced his bill, though he disavowed the intention of attacking the caucus. An amendment to his amendment was introduced, extending the disqualification to any senator or representative &ldquo;who shall have been such at the time of the election of any President.&rdquo; Macon objected to this as too broad. He said that the caucus, at which it was aimed, should have no weight in the discussion, as it was unknown to the constitution, and hence could not be a subject of legislation. He would not dignify it by direct attack; but Quincy, who delivered the main speech in favor of the original amendment, was openly fighting the caucus. &ldquo;The Constitution,&rdquo; he said, &ldquo;prohibits the members of this and of the other branch of the Legislature from being Electors of the President of the United States. Yet what is done? The practice of late is so prevalent as to have grown almost into a sanctioned usage of party. Prior to the presidential term of four years, members of Congress having received the privileged ticket of admission assemble themselves in a sort of electoral college, on the floor of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. They select a candidate for the Presidency. To their voice, to their influence, he is indebted for his elevation. So long as this condition of things continues, what ordinary Executive will refuse to accommodate those who in so distinguished a manner have accommodated him? Is there a better reason in the world why a man should give you, Mr. Chairman, an office worth two or

three thousand dollars a year for which you are qualified, and which he could give as well as not, than this, that you had been greatly instrumental in giving him one worth five and twenty thousand for which he was equally qualified? It is in vain to conceal it. So long as the present condition of things continues, it may reasonably be expected that there shall take place regularly between the President of the United States and a portion of both Houses of Congress an interchange, strictly speaking, of good offices.&rdquo; When the time came for the caucus of 1812, &ldquo;Messrs. D. R. Williams, Cheves, and Lowndes from South Carolina, and Macon of North Carolina, all Democrats, refused to attend the. . . meeting of members of Congress to nominate a President. . . on the ground that it was improper, inexpedient, indelicate, unconstitutional, and a monstrous usurpation of the rights of the people.&rdquo;

This attack perhaps tended to make the executive a little cautious. A Mr. Smythe of Virginia, who had voted for the establishment of a new judicial district in that state, was proposed, at the close of his term as congressman, for the new judgeship thus created. President Monroe refused to nominate him, solely because such action seemed against the spirit, though not against the letter, of the constitution. Nevertheless, the appointment of congressmen continued, fostered by the fact that they were such persistent applicants. In 1821 John Quincy Adams said that one-half of the members of Congress were seeking office, and that the other half wanted something for their relatives. In the same year Niles stated that sixty members were applicants, and threatened to publish the names of those who were successful; five senators and forty-five representatives are said to have applied for one auditorship. From time to time congressmen were successful in obtaining places ranging from an important diplomatic mission to a post-office worth one hundred and fifty-five dollars a year. This

appetite for office, far keener among congressmen than it is today, was caused in part by the very small pay that they received for their legislative services. The six dollars a day voted by the first Congress was still the legal rate of compensation, and when the fourteenth Congress changed this to fifteen hundred dollars a year, the popular disapproval was shown by the defeat of many of its members on that issue alone. Clay had to retire from the speakership to recoup his fortunes. To a friend who was thinking of running for Congress he sent a rather dismal picture of the monotony of the life and the expense involved: after the first few months, he said, it retained the interest only of the rival leaders. It was not strange, then, that members were eager to exchange their legislative for civil positions.

Thus fed, the agitation for a constitutional amendment similar to that proposed by Macon continued active. Jackson declared himself emphatically in favor of an amendment, and from 1820 to 1840 almost every session of Congress saw a bill introduced to recommend one. The movement attained its greatest height between 1820 and 1830, and was constantly connected with attacks on the caucus. When the latter was superseded by the convention, the issue became less important and the discussion perfunctory. It was used as an election bogie; many sincerely reprobated the custom, but popular interest had subsided.

When James Monroe became president, he seemed face to face with the vision of universal good-will which Jefferson had seen as through a glass darkly. Only thirty-four Federalist

electors cast their votes against him; and the project of completing the affiliation of parties, by treating all citizens as alike worthy of the favors of the government, seemed feasible. Even before the election had actually taken place, urgent pressure was brought to induce Monroe to adopt such a policy. Andrew Jackson wrote to him, October 23, 1816, recommending Colonel William H. Drayton for the expected vacancy in the position of secretary of war. &ldquo;I am told,&rdquo; he said, &ldquo;before the war he was ranked with the Federalists, but the moment his country was threatened he abandoned private cares and a lucrative position for the tented field. Such acts as these speak louder than words. &lsquo;The tree is best known by its fruits,&rsquo; and such a man as this, it matters not what he is called, will always act like a true American.&rdquo; In another letter, written November 12, before he had received a reply to the first, Jackson again recommended Drayton, and added: &ldquo;Now is the time to exterminate the monster called party spirit. . . . Consult no party in your choice; pursue the dictates of that unerring judgment which has so long and so often benefited our country and rendered conspicuous its rulers. These are the sentiments of a friend. They are the feelings &mdash; if I know my own heart &mdash; of an undissembled patriot.&rdquo;

To these letters, Monroe replied, December 14, with a long dissertation setting forth the rise and growth of the Federalist party, and affirming his belief that government could be conducted without an opposition. He asserted that the administration should rest strongly on the Republican party, using toward the other a spirit of moderation, and evincing a desire to discriminate between its members and to bring the whole into the Republican fold as quickly as possible. He avoided, however, the expression of any opinion distinctly favoring the appointment of any Federalist to office. Cabinet officers, he thought, should certainly be &ldquo;decided friends, who stood firm in the day of trial.&rdquo; Moreover, except in &ldquo;great emergencies&rdquo; and in case of &ldquo;transcendent talents, the four heads of departments should represent the four great sections of the country.&rdquo; In the last month of his administration he did appoint a Federalist

to an important office, &mdash; George Izard, to be governor of Arkansas, &mdash; and told Adams that he regretted that he could not have done so oftener, but that he had gone as far as he could without forfeiting the confidence of his own supporters and thereby defeating the very object he had at heart.

Monroe was not a man from whom we should expect innovations; and the rather abundant evidence that we possess in regard to the detailed working of his administration shows a careful adherence to the traditional methods of securing the names of candidates, and of judging between them. While this was undoubtedly the intention, it could not, by reason of changed circumstances, be followed in every particular. Though parties seemed dead, politics were not; and three opposing political leaders, three rival candidates for the succession, were members of the cabinet. Under such conditions it is natural that the heads of departments should have played a more prominent part in the distribution of the patronage than ever before or since. The president attempted to avoid friction by giving to each head complete control of his own department. Adams gives an account of the appointment of Solomon Van Rensselaer to the post-office at Albany. The news that Meigs, the postmaster-general, intended to appoint him got abroad, and objections were made; whereupon the case was referred to the president. Crawford and Wirt thought that Meigs should have assumed full responsibility, but that, as the case was now before the president, the latter must act on it, or ground his refusal upon the general principle that he would never interfere in such appointments. Adams differed with them on both points. In the end the president refused to interfere, although he apparently had no high idea of Van Rensselaer. Crawford complained that his appointing power was sometimes interfered with. He wrote to Gallatin that the Florida appointments, even those &ldquo;connected with my own Department have been made without regard to my wishes, or rather without ascertaining what they were&rdquo;; and said he surmised that the rumor that

he had influenced the Senate to reject certain military appointments had &ldquo;soured&rdquo; Monroe, who favored Calhoun in these new selections. These appointments were doubtless of the presidential class, and were decided upon in cabinet meeting when Crawford happened to be absent. No instance appears where a strictly departmental office was interfered with.

When the question of offices came before the cabinet, the president endeavored to hold an even hand. At one time he announced that he was thinking of Mr. Southard for the vacant post of secretary of the navy; he said that Southard was a good man and that his state had never had a cabinet officer, but added that in view of the rivalry between the members of the cabinet, he would not make the nomination if any of them objected. This seems eminently fair, and that Monroe's intentions were good is beyond question; but Adams, who tells the story, adds that Southard was a Calhoun man. It was, in fact, an impossible task to suit all three of these ambitious men; and the cabinet, with its rivalries, so graphically revealed in Adams's diary and the contemporaneous letters of Crawford and Calhoun, must have been a disagreeable body during the &ldquo;era of good feeling.&rdquo;

The relations between the cabinet and the Senate during the administration are illustrated by a further study of the case of Solomon Van Rensselaer. On January 3, 1822, Rufus King and Martin Van Buren, the New York senators, wrote to Postmaster-general Meigs that they heard that a change was necessary in the Albany post-office, and desired &ldquo;a fit and full opportunity for all concerned to make their representations&rdquo; to him on that subject. He replied that the name of General Van Rensselaer had been presented and was before the president for consideration, and that a speedy appointment was desirable; and he continued to resist all attempts to delay action. It was a delicate affair, for the general was recommended by twenty-two representatives from New York belonging to both parties. Meigs threw the responsibility on Monroe, who, as has been seen, refused to shoulder it. King dropped out of the

but Van Buren induced many of the representatives who had signed for Van Rensselaer to change sides, and on January 7, 1822, a long letter with many signatures was sent to Meigs, summing up the views of the opposition. They wanted delay; they wanted to consult the citizens of Albany; they recommended Mr. Lansing, a destitute patriot of the Revolution; they accused Van Rensselaer of being a violent partisan; but they rested their case mainly on the question, &ldquo;Lansing's capacity and integrity are at least equal to Van Rensselaer's; should not preference be given him because he is a Republican?&rdquo; There is evidence that, when this letter was written, the appointment was known to have been already made, but that the letter was sent to record their opinion that appointments should in the future be confined to Republicans. The administration was able in this instance to resist pressure and appoint the man of its choice. It should, of course, be observed that the appointment, as it was in the post-office department, did not require the confirmation of the Senate; if it had, it might have met with more difficulty.

In 1820 a startling attack was made on the conduct of the civil service. DeWitt Clinton, in what is known as the &ldquo;green-bag&rdquo; message to the legislature of New York, and in a subsequent message of January 17, 1821, charged that the officers of the general government were an &ldquo;organized and disciplined corps.&rdquo; Speaking of one of them, he said, &ldquo;When the situation, connexion, education, and political principles of this officer of the United States are considered, there can be no doubt but that he had previously ascertained the sense of his political superiors, and that he was instructed to act accordingly.&rdquo; He accused Adams of partiality in selecting the newspapers which were to publish the laws, and the postmaster-general of making nine removals for factional reasons. A committee was appointed to investigate, vor rather, as the lower house was hostile to the governor, to disprove these charges. The report shows

that a certain amount of political activity on the part of the government officials was considered proper; and when the question is thus one purely of degree, we certainly cannot presume to pass judgment at this distance of time. The removal of the postmasters is shown to have been at the request of the representatives from their respective districts, the presumption being that, in most cases, the government would not look behind the reports. In at least one case the cause for dismissal was stated to be that the incumbent had lost the confidence of the people, which is another way of saying that he was politically opposed to the person who asked for the change. Several of these removals were secured by Mr. Van Buren on the ground that the incumbents were improperly using their influence against him by tampering with the circulation of certain newspapers.

The general impression left by a study of the papers relating to these charges is that the national offices in New York were being drawn into the whirlpool of state politics. That this was chiefly the work of state politicians, rather than of the national administration, seems clear. Monroe and William Wirt tried to be, and actually were, above faction. Adams, Calhoun, and Clay took a lively interest in New York politics, and were quick to believe in the vices of their enemies and the virtues of their friends; but their letters show little real understanding of local conditions &mdash; from a political point of view they are decidedly amateurish.

The case of William H. Crawford, secretary of the treasury, demands more detailed consideration. About no man of equal prominence in American history do we know so little; and the most definite contemporary testimony in regard to his political character is that given by his rival, John Quincy Adams, who was at the time tremblingly eager for the presidency and

nervously imputing to others motives of which he knew himself incapable. Adams certainly thought that Crawford was using the influence of his position to build up a faction, and he was not alone in that opinion; but Crawford believed somewhat the same thing of Adams. In tone, however, they are quite different: Adams is shocked, and seems to say, &ldquo;God, I thank Thee, that I am not as other men are&rdquo;; Crawford speaks of such action on Adams's part, as a matter of course, a difficulty to be guarded against, and one might readily suspect Crawford himself of adopting the tactics he so easily takes for granted in the case of his rival.

The special charge against Crawford is that he obtained, for unworthy purposes, the passage of the, famous Four Years' Law. This act was passed in i82O. It established a fixed term of four years, in place of the previous tenure at the pleasure of the president, for district attorneys, collectors of customs, naval officers, and for surveyors of customs, money agents, receivers of public money for lands, registers of land offices, paymasters in the army, the apothecary-general, his assistant, and the commissary-general of purchases. It was introduced into the Senate by Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey, but Adams says that Crawford acknowledged the authorship. Its ostensible object was to compel the regular submission of accounts; but according to Adams its real purpose was to elect Crawford president by turning all office-holders, their families and friends, and &ldquo;five or ten times an equal number of ravenous office-seekers,&rdquo; to his support. This charge was not made until 1828, and Adams then added that the sickness of Crawford during the last eighteen months of Monroe's administration prevented his active use of the weapon he had forged. Fortunately we have Crawford's own statement of the purpose of the bill, in a letter of June 12, 1820, evidently written to the

president. He said that he had told inquirers that reappointment would take place when there were no reasonable grounds of dissatisfaction unless some one was found with stronger claims than the incumbent; and that one advantage of the new system lay in the possibility of discontinuing unsatisfactory public servants without putting any stain upon their characters. The dissimilarity of these two statements demands examination.

Little is to be gleamed from the contemporaneous discussion. The debate in Congress, at least the report of it, is barren; and there was practically no public comment. Jefferson and Madison, however, corresponded rather vigorously on the subject. About this time Tench Coxe applied to both of them for their influence in securing a post. Jefferson, in forwarding Coxe's letter to Madison, said: &ldquo;This is a sample of the effects we may expect from the late mischievous law vacating every four years nearly all the executive offices of the government. It saps the constitutional and salutary functions of the president, and introduces a principle of intrigue and corruption, which will soon leaven the mass, not only of Senators, but of citizens. It is more baneful than the attempt. . . to make all officers irremovable but with the consent of the Senate&rdquo;; it puts all appointments under their control every four years, and &ldquo;will keep in constant excitement all the hungry cormorants for office.&rdquo; Madison replied, agreeing with Jefferson and claiming that the law was unconstitutional. He wrote also to Monroe in a similar strain, deprecating particularly the increase in the power of the Senate; and Adams says that Monroe regretted that he had signed the bill, and resolved to renominate the incumbent in every instance in which there was no misconduct. This criticism, however, only slightly touches the question of the purpose of the bill; no reflections were cast on Crawford, who was, in fact, the special representative of the old-fashioned Republicans, and a particular friend of Macon,

the watch-dog of the patronage. Madison feared an encroachment on the appointing power of the president, and Jefferson apprehended corruption in general.

The question now arises, Did the bill have any legitimate object? Certainly, in 1820, some method of securing more regular accounts might have seemed advisable. A special report presented at this time by Crawford showed many defalcations; some dating from Washington's administration, and amounting in all to $929,390 uncovered by bonds. This is not surprisingly bad considering the lax business methods of the country, nor yet is it strikingly good. The military accounts showed a deficit of about a million dollars, part of which, it was supposed, could be accounted for. Although there was some general distrust of the integrity of the public service, bills to secure a greater accountability did not pass readily; Crawford refused to accept the secretaryship of the treasury until one that he then prepared had been adopted.

Was this bill, then, calculated to secure a greater sense of responsibility? It was certainly a crude method, one quite inapplicable now; but in a service scattered as was that of 1820, when means of communication were so slow and unreliable, and the individual officer had so large a degree of independence, the prospect of a thorough overhauling at definite periods might well have served as a spur to accuracy and promptness. It would also enable the administration to freshen and invigorate the service by dropping the old and incapable without fixing upon their characters the stain of removal. An especially significant fact, which will be developed at length in the next chapter, is that this practice of limiting the term of office was very common in the states at this time, and was found in both Georgia and South Carolina &mdash; states with which Crawford was

most familiar and in which the limited tenure did not lead to actual rotation in office.

It is evident that the law would serve equally well as an incentive to continued political activity, if that was likely to be of account in the day of reckoning, and that it was as aptly framed for the easy dropping of political rivals as for ridding the service of decrepit members. Who were the persons that Crawford mentioned as having stronger claims upon the nation than the incumbents? Were they simply necessitous military officers, such as secured recognition from Madison? were they prominent Republicans? or were they the political supporters of William H. Crawford? It is impossible to answer fully all the questions thus suggested, but some light may be thrown upon them. James A. Hamilton wrote to Crawford, February 25, 1823, that he had just had an interview with Governor Gibbs of Rhode Island to discover the cause of the latter's dissatisfaction with Crawford. Gibbs said that it was based on Crawford's refusal to make certain removals in the customs service of that state, and added that this small matter was likely to turn Rhode Island to Clay in the coming contest. Hamilton argued that it was improper to remove subordinate officials merely because of their political opinion; whereupon Governor Gibbs replied that one of the men complained of not only held incorrect political views, but used the influence of his position to induce others to support them. The man thus mentioned still retained his position in 1825; but part of his duties had been taken from him, and his emoluments had been reduced by a half.

This case is certainly not conclusive as to Crawford's methods of dealing with the patronage; hence resort must be had to indirect evidence. Would the law of 1820 work advantageously to Crawford? Not all the offices affected by it fell within, his department, and, as he believed that his rivals were intriguing against him, he might well have feared lest it prove a

To be sure, the largest share fell to him; but as all presidential appointments were discussed in cabinet meeting, how could he expect to carry on an extensive campaign of personal aggrandizement under the noses of two avowed rivals and President Monroe? As a matter of fact, many of the men appointed to such positions under the secretary of the treasury favored the election of Calhoun. Crawford might reap some slight profit from the law, in that he had a high probability of success; and those who believed that he might be the next president would be nerved to more active service, while those who did not so believe would not support him under any circumstances. Possibly, too, he might have intended thus to bind the New York politicians to him, as his supporters there were men who practised the spoils system in their own state and afterward helped to introduce it into national politics. They would seem, however, for some time after the passage of this act, to have made no real agreement to support him. No definite conclusion seems safe, except that serious doubt is thrown on Adams's statement as to the purpose of the bill. It is a safe conjecture that Crawford expected it to be of value in the conduct of public business, particularly because it increased the flexibility of the service to the profit both of the nation and of the Republican party; that he intended to transform it into an instrument to secure his election and to introduce the spoils system seems distinctly improbable.

As the election of 1824 approached, and the closeness of the contest became more and more apparent, the supporters of the several candidates made efforts to attract the Federalist vote, which, though small, might prove decisive. In the interest of Jackson, his correspondence with Monroe advocating the appointment of Federalists was brought to light and published. The enemies of John Quincy Adams made public his father's correspondence with Mr. Cunningham, filled with invectives

against the Essex junto. Both of these publications had great effect; and when the election by the House of Representatives drew near, there were persistent reports that Adams would proscribe his father's enemies. Under these circumstances, Mr. Warfield of Maryland wrote to Webster that, as the vote of that state might rest with him, he desired certain information with regard to Adams's attitude on the subject.

Webster replied that his own vote would be for Adams, and that this would not be the case did he &ldquo;not believe that he [Adams] would administer the government on liberal principles, not excluding Federalists, as such, from his regard&rdquo;; he deprecated the desire to see any particular man in office, and the &ldquo;portioning&rdquo; of offices among men of &ldquo;different denominations,&rdquo; but thought it &ldquo;just and reasonable to be expected&rdquo; that &ldquo;by some one clear and distinct case, it may be shown that the distinction above alluded to does not operate as cause of exclusion. Some such case will doubtless present itself, and may be embraced, probably, in proper time and manner. . . . It will then be understood that the field is open.&rdquo; He added a note to the effect that he wrote this letter on his own responsibility, but before sending it showed the draft to Adams, who approved but was afraid that it might seem to refer to a cabinet appointment, a difficulty which Webster obviated by underlining it as above. Adams says that he told Webster that Clay or Crawford would probably pursue the same course as he. On February 16, Webster wrote to his brother: &ldquo;If there is any faith in man, we shall have a liberal administration. I think it not unlikely that if it were pressed, there might be a Federalist in the cabinet, but our friends are not at all satisfied that such a measure would be discreet. ..

We may be deceived, but if we are, it will be a gross deception.&rdquo; The &ldquo;clear and distinct case&rdquo; was the appointment of Rufus King as minister to Great Britain. In 1827 Webster declared himself satisfied that Adams was fairly living up to the policy thus outlined. The latter could not go as far as he wished, however, because of the opposition of the rank and file of his own party; and he often lamented the fact that he could not appoint more Federalists, as they were usually the best men presented for the various vacancies.

President Adams carried political tolerance to an extreme, even offering to continue Crawford in the cabinet. The latter had the good sense to decline; but Postmaster-general McLean was retained throughout the administration, in spite of Adams's firm belief that the whole patronage of that department was being used to promote the interests of Jackson. The retention of McLean under these circumstances was hardly consonant with the president's determination that offensive partisanship, whether for or against the administration, should be sufficient cause for removal; and as only twelve removals altogether were made during his term, it is quite evident that this determination was not carried out. Adams abhorred the task of selecting officials; and it is not surprising to find him, when first elected, summarily closing an interview with certain senators who urged him not to renominate those whose terms were about to expire under the new Four Years' Law, but to initiate &ldquo;a principle of change or rotation in office.&rdquo; The purity of his conduct of the civil service is illustrated by the prominence given to the charge that he interfered with the appointment of a postmaster.

The ferret eyes of the opposition press were a little better rewarded in the case of Henry Clay. Clay advised the president, probably wisely, to remove the most active of his opponents among the office-holders; and himself struck a few newspapers from the list of those paid for printing the laws. The number, however, was very small: a comparison of the last list under Monroe with the first under Adams shows, out of seventy-five papers, ten changes, four being a usual number, and only one was of importance. In the District of Columbia the printing was taken from Gales and Seaton, publishers of the National Intelligencer, and given to Peter Force, who was editing the National Journal. The reason for this change was doubtless political, as the Intelligencer had supported Crawford; but if such a change is ever justifiable, it was in this instance. The printing in the District of Columbia gave a certain prestige to the paper receiving it, which thus became to a certain extent an official organ; it was therefore expedient that this paper should be in hearty sympathy with the administration. That Clay did not exclude opponents in general is seen by the fact that one of the papers he selected was the Jackson Republican of Nashville; he seems, indeed, to have continued the custom of giving the printing to at least one opposition paper in every state.

While the administration gave its enemies but slight basis for criticism, the lack of sympathy between Congress and the executive afforded an excellent opportunity to those who wished to effect a reform in the civil service. Macon, who had never lost sight of the matter since his futile attempt in 1811, once more, in 1826, introduced the subject; but, as his health was poor, Thomas H. Benton was made chairman of the committee appointed to consider it, and was ably assisted by Judge White of Tennessee, who was to be conspicuous in a similar movement ten years later. The report of this committee shows a much broader comprehension of the problem than is found in any of the speeches of fifteen years before, and a vastly more

ambitious attempt to handle it. Accompanying the report were documents showing the value of each office under the government, and indicating to whom the appointment belonged. From these figures, and from predictions as to the future, which have proved not extravagant, the committee deduced the proposition that the appointing power of the president should be reduced.

With this general object in view, six bills were introduced. The first was directed against the control of the press; the number of papers in the several states to which the printing of the laws should be assigned was to be limited to one-half the number of representatives from each state. The essential point of this proposition lay in the provision that these papers were to be selected by the congressional delegation from each state, a majority ruling; if they neglected to make the selection, the secretary of state might do it as before. It is significant that the committee did not show itself eager to reduce the amount of the patronage, but only to shift the control: the first bill would allow, in some states, a considerable increase of subsidized newspapers, three being the customary number. By other bills the president was required to state the cause of each removal of a presidential officer; the appointment of postmasters receiving compensation above a fixed amount was to be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; and a blow was struck at the executive by the provision that military and naval commissions should read &ldquo;during good behavior&rdquo; instead of &ldquo;at pleasure.&rdquo; The Four Years' Bill was to be repealed, and in its place was to be substituted a regulation that collectors and disbursers of the public revenues should submit their accounts to Congress once in four years, on penalty of losing their commissions.

This report is certainly not without merit. The repeal of the Four Years' Law was highly desirable, and there was certainly no good reason why the larger post-offices should remain outside the list subject to confirmation while the collectorships and naval offices were on it. It is evident that the ultimate object of the reformers was still not so much to improve the service

as to reduce the power of the president, which they rightly judged was liable to great extension. Their method, however, was different from that advocated by Quincy. In 1811 the functions of the president were respected; the aim then was to reduce his power to control Congress: now the design was to divide the patronage between the executive and legislative departments. This was the first distinctly aggressive act on the part of the Senate in the great struggle between that body and the president for the control of the patronage. There had been friction before: the Four Years' Law Madison believed to be a usurpation on the part of the Senate. In the first Congress the claims of the Senate had been advocated. Now for the first time, however, was presented a well-considered programme of encroachment. The bills reported by this committee were tabled by Macon himself, as he was too feeble to conduct the debate necessary before they could be adopted; but they were not lost sight of. They remained a tangible threat held over the head of any president who should fail to recognize the prerogatives of the Senate.

During no administration before 1828 was there so much contemporary criticism of the civil service as in that of John Quincy Adams, and none has received more praise from posterity. Part of the praise is doubtless due to the fact that Adams was the last of the presidents sometimes called &ldquo;statesmen&rdquo; in rather invidious distinction from the &ldquo;politicians&rdquo; who succeeded; most of the criticism is explained by the conditions of the time, which will be discussed in the next chapter. A detailed study of actual conditions shows that there was some ground for both.

The efficiency of government service cannot be expected long to maintain a standard much higher than that of the community in which it works. Principles of business promptness and responsibility were not highly developed in the United States during the first fifty years of its existence, and the common belief that the administration of the government before 1828

attained a level of efficiency which it has since sought in vain to recover, seems to be unfounded. Yet of the central offices it was to some extent true: one able, honest man succeeded another in the chief positions of state, and by many years of unbroken service was enabled to master fully the details of his duties. It was impossible, however, to find men of exceptional character for all the minor and local offices. The annual reports of the comptroller of the treasury, and occasional special reports, as that of Crawford in 1820, bring to light a record far from brilliant. Defalcations are shown, beginning with the time of Washington, and amounting in 1820 to $927,390 in the civil service and to about the same in the military; for these, causes are assigned varying from the dishonesty of a trusted clerk to the absconding of the officer himself to the West Indies. It is evident that even the &ldquo;Fathers&rdquo; could not wrench the government entirely away from its environment. Under Adams the service was probably more honest than it had been at any time since the War of 1812, as it was able to stand the fiery test of investigation by the Jackson leaders and to reveal only one defaulter; but there was enough irregularity to furnish the small spark that alone was necessary to raise a great smoke of accusation.

Emphasis must again be laid on the fact that honesty and efficiency are not entirely synonymous, and that the latter is not so easily measured as the first. That there were active, able men in office under Adams is evinced by the careers of some of them after they were turned out by Jackson; but it is probable that there was also a certain amount of dead timber. Although Jefferson was the only president as yet to abuse the removing power, none of the others seem to have used it with proper vigor. The neglect to remove officers who were dragging through long sicknesses sure to end in death is certainly to be

condoned; but the continuance of this practice gave strength to the popular impression that officials were beginning to feel a property in office. Less excusable was the failure to prune the service of superfluous officers, of which there was at least one well authenticated case, &mdash; that of the Norfolk custom-house, where, with a constantly diminishing revenue, the full staff was retained from the days when its trade had promised to make it the peer of any port in the country. The retention of men whose usefulness had passed was due to the fact that it was inhumane to discharge them without adequate provision, which, in a country as democratic as the United States was at the time, could not be given except in the form of salary. Thus the civil service became a pension fund for its disabled members. This policy would not have been so disastrous if the notion had not extended. Instances have been related already where civil posts were bestowed to reward distinguished success in war or politics; and they might be multiplied, with many a contemporary note of commendation. Thus the idea was gaining ground, among the most intelligent classes too, that past service rather than future efficiency should be the primary reason for appointment. From the political point of view, the question of efficiency was of little moment; there were few complaints of the manner in which the service was conducted, and some of its very best features contributed most to its unpopularity. During the period of twenty-eight years, from 1801 to 1829, there was something like a system of promotion: consuls were transferred to more and more important ports, to become in time, perhaps, chargés d'affaires; naval officers became collectors of customs, and district attorneys, judges. Commendable as this practice was,

it did foster in the service a bureaucratic feeling, and in the public an apprehension lest government officers should consider themselves a class. An examination of the various Blue Books shows, moreover, that sons were often appointed to succeed fathers, which increased the disapprobation. A bureaucracy is always aristocratic; and this tendency was strengthened by the custom, established by Washington and continued in general by his successors, of appointing citizens rather prominent in their communities. Men originally of standing, holding life offices, and with the hope of placing their sons somewhere in the national service, are not likely to be popular in the heat of a democratic revolution; and when the people voted in 1828 that John Quincy Adams should leave office, they undoubtedly intended to vote that most of the civil servants should go with him.