The Civil Service and the Patronage/Chapter 02

Jefferson became president, he found nearly all the offices filled by his opponents. Was it right, when the people had expelled the Federalists from the elective offices and put Republicans in their places, that the old occupants of the appointive offices should be left in their positions merely because the people could not reach them? Should the government be administered, should the national salaries be enjoyed, by representatives of a minority of the population? Most of the Republicans agreed that it was not right, and that it should not be tolerated. Gideon Granger, Jefferson's postmaster-general, wrote: &ldquo;Upon entering on the duties of this office, my mind was impressed with an unusual anxiety and solicitude. Knowing as I did that most of the officers under me, from their official stations, had been in the habit of associating and corresponding, as well on politics as on business, with those lately in authority, from whom the people had withdrawn their confidence; and elevated to office men whose political principles they believed better calculated to preserve the constitution and public prosperity, and having a general knowledge of the most pronounced recent events, it occurred to me that some removals would become necessary, as well to effect an equal participation and enjoyment of office by the two great classes of citizens who are designated by the terms Federalists and Republicans, as to maintain and preserve confidence in the Department.&rdquo; The

bitterness of the preceding contest sharpened this call for action. The judiciary act was viewed in the worst possible light, the few removals made by Adams were magnified into a searching proscription, charges wholly false were fabricated, and cries for the punishment of the Federalists mingled with demands for a just recognition of the Republicans.

The Federalists foresaw the danger, and a story was circulated at the time, that some of their leaders attempted to ward off the blow by sowing dissension between Jefferson and his followers. Certainly during the early months of his term some of the well-known Federalist newspapers praised him and disparaged his party. The Columbian Centinel, August 12, 1801, told how, when a list of men to be appointed to office because of their services in the campaign of 1800 was presented to the president, he remarked, &ldquo;Yes, yes, I have read that Rome was saved by geese; but I do not remember that these geese were made Revenue Officers or Marshals.&rdquo; Jefferson was too clever to be caught by such chaff. Three days after his inauguration he wrote to Monroe: &ldquo;I have firmly refused to follow the counsels of those who have advised the giving offices to some of their leaders, in order to reconcile [them]. I have given, and will give only to Republicans, under existing circumstances.&rdquo;

The question of the patronage was of special importance to Jefferson because of his desire to win over the bulk of the Federalist party, and its delicacy was enhanced by the fact that his own party was not united; while the majority expected vigorous action, some desired that removals be made sparingly. He felt that efficiency was not the sole object to be kept in mind in administering the civil service; and wished so to

it as to bring about the best political results for country and for party. He wrote to Monroe, March 7, 1801, that he believed, as did others, &ldquo;that deprivations of office, if made on the ground of political principles alone, would revolt our new converts, and give a body to leaders who now stand alone. Some, I know, must be made. They must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or inherent disqualification. Where we shall draw the line between retaining all &amp; none, is not yet settled, and will not be till we get our administration together; and perhaps even then, we shall proceed à talons, balancing our measures according to the impression we perceive them to make.&rdquo; On the next day he wrote to Horatio Gates about the patronage, &ldquo;If we can hit on the true line of conduct which may conciliate the honest part of those who were called federalists, &amp; do justice to those who have so long been excluded from it, I shall hope to be able to obliterate, or rather to unite the names of federalists &amp; republicans.&rdquo;

With these ideas in mind, &mdash; of conciliation for the opposing party, and of justice for his own, &mdash; Jefferson sought out classes of officers for whose removal some special reason might be assigned. First, he treated as null and void all appointments about the validity of which there was any legal doubt. The best known of these cases was that of the justices of the peace for the newly organized District of Columbia, &mdash; the &ldquo;midnight appointments.&rdquo; Although the supreme court decided against the president in the famous case of Marbury vs. Madison, it declined to issue any writ; and the men whom he appointed to take the place of Adams's nominees retained office. The

eagerness with which Jefferson seized on every opportunity to get an opponent out of office without removing him is illustrated by an incident in Rhode Island. After the judiciary act of 1801 was passed, Adams had nominated Mr. Bourne for one of the new circuit judgeships and Mr. Ray Greene for the district judgeship that Mr. Bourne was to vacate. The latter did not resign his post until March 23, 1801; and Jefferson held that, as Mr. Greene had been nominated to a position which was not vacant, and which was held on the tenure of good behavior, his appointment was not valid, and he refused to recognize him. This action was violently attacked by the Federalists; and the president, in an apparent attempt to ward off their criticism, selected Mr. Barnes, a moderate Federalist, for the position of district judge thus made vacant.

The number of these so-called illegal appointments was small, and Jefferson was soon obliged to look beyond them for means to satisfy those of his followers who desired to serve their country in lucrative places. A class of officers subject to removal was soon discovered in those appointed by Adams after the Federalist defeat of 1800 became evident, on the ground that Adams should not have chosen men to positions in which he knew they would serve another president. The Federalists, of course, would not acknowledge that Adams was under any such obligations of law or courtesy; they saw no reason why customs officers need be in political sympathy with the president, and violently attacked this action, in which they foresaw the prelude to a promiscuous proscription. Jefferson was not the man to be silent under attack, and he spun out those persuasive arguments which always flowed so readily from his pen, and which provoked a full discussion of the problems of the civil service.

The particular case that called forth this discussion was the removal of Chauncy Goodrich from the collectorship at New

Haven. Connecticut, Jefferson considered as the fortress of the &ldquo;monarchial party,&rdquo; the one state whose conversion to republicanism was problematical. From the first the Connecticut Courant had led the press of the state in a fierce denunciation of every instance of proscription. With several other papers it followed the ingenious device of printing conciliatory sentences from the inaugural, and under them, in fancy type, the heading &ldquo;Practice,&rdquo; followed by all the instances of removals that could be accumulated. Jefferson was probably not sorry to have an opportunity to fight out the question in the home of the enemy: there was little to lose, and much might be learned of popular sentiment.

The collector at New Haven had died in February, 1801, and Adams, about a week before the inauguration of Jefferson, appointed Goodrich, who therefore fell under the ban which Jefferson had established. The president consulted his supporters in the state; and from them he received bitterly partisan letters calling for the removal of Goodrich and a clean sweep throughout the state. Gideon Granger urged that &ldquo;The principle cannot be controverted, that it is just, fair and honorable that the friends of the Government should have at least as great a proportion of the honors and offices of the

as they are of the whole people. . . . The general depression of the Republicans in this State, who have suffered everything, combatting a Phalanx vastly superior to what can be found in any other part of the union forms a strong reason. Nothing can be lost here, and something may be gained: how far this applies to other parts of the union is not for me to judge. A knowledge that we had the real confidence of the Executive I think would have a happy effect, for already it is used as an argument to affect our elections that the President used the Democrats to ride into office, that now seated there he has evinced his contempt for them, and will rely solely on the federalists for support. . . . Lastly, the sacred rule that no man shall be persecuted for his opinions decently and reasonably maintained will not apply to any of our official Characters. I believe without a single exception All, and I know most have been bitter persecutors.&rdquo; Pierrepont Edwards reiterated the charge that the Federalists expected Jefferson to look to them for support in Connecticut, and told stories of the violent hatred with which they nevertheless regarded him: how the &ldquo;collector at Middletown. . . violent, irritable, priest-ridden, implacable, a ferocious federalist, and a most indecent enimy to you and your administration,&rdquo; drank the toast &ldquo;Thomas Jefferson may he receive from his fellow Citizens the reward of his merit,&rdquo; adding, &ldquo;a halter.&rdquo; He suggested Samuel Bishop as the proper man to receive the New Haven collectorship, and the appointment was made.

At first Bishop's name was well received by the Federalist press, though the removal of Goodrich was condemned. New Haven Federalists, however, immediately raised a cry of indignation, the merchants sent a protest to Jefferson, and the party press rallied to their support. &ldquo;The office,&rdquo; they said, &ldquo;while filled by Mr. Goodrich, was conducted with a promptness, integrity and ability. . . not to be found in his successor.&rdquo; Jefferson

seized this opportunity to give expression to his views on the question of the patronage, embodying them in a reply (July 12, 1801) to the petition of the merchants. &ldquo;The removal, as it is called, of Mr. Goodrich,&rdquo; he writes, &ldquo;forms another subject of complaint. Declarations by myself in favor of political tolerance, exhortations to harmony and affection in social intercourse, and to respect for the equal rights of the minority, have, on certain occasions, been quoted and misconstrued into assurances that the tenure of offices was to be undisturbed. But could candor apply such a construction?&rdquo; He goes on to quote the usual arguments, that the Federalists had excluded from office those &ldquo;not of a particular sect of politics,&rdquo; and that, as a consequence, office was a monopoly in the hands of the minority. &ldquo;Does it violate their equal rights&rdquo; he continues, &ldquo;to assert some rights in the majority also? Is it political intolerance to claim a proportionate share in the direction of the public affairs? . . . If the will of the nation, manifested by their various elections, calls for an administration of government according with the opinions of those elected; if, for the fulfilment of that will, displacements are necessary, with whom can they so justly begin as with persons appointed in the last moments of an administration, not for its own aid, but to begin a career at the same time with their successors?&rdquo; Could the preference for another as successor to Mr. Austin be justly considered the removal of Mr. Goodrich? &ldquo;If a due participation of office is a matter of right, how are vacancies to be obtained? Those by death are few; by resignation, none. Can any other mode than that of removal be proposed? This is a painful office; but it is made my duty, and I meet it as such. I proceed in the operation with deliberation and inquiry, that it may injure the best men least, and effect the purposes of justice and public utility with the least private distress; that it may be thrown, as much as possible, on delinquency, on oppression, on intolerance, on ante-revolutionary adherence to our enemies. It would have been to me a circumstance of great relief, had I found a moderate participation of office in the hands of the majority. I would gladly have left to time and accident to raise them to their just share. But their total exclusion calls for prompter corrections. I shall correct the

procedure; but that done, return with joy to that state of things, when the only questions concerning a candidate shall be, is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?&rdquo;

With a zest and an analytical keenness worthy of the New York Evening Post of to-day, its first editor, William Coleman, probably with the assistance of Alexander Hamilton, dissected this programme of proscription, enunciated the Federalist doctrine, and imagined the president, &ldquo;Gazing round him with wild anxiety, he furiously enquires, &lsquo;How are vacancies to be obtained?&rsquo; &rdquo; He pointed out the absurdity of the contention that Goodrich had not been removed, but was less convincing when he endeavored to show a distinction between refusing to appoint opponents, as the Federalists had done, and removing them; nevertheless he acutely remarked in this connection that, if the first were proscription, it could not be cured, as Jefferson was trying to do, by more proscription. Enunciating his own principles on the subject, he said: &ldquo;Every man who accepts an office, takes it under an implicit contract from the Government, that he shall be continued in it, as long as he exercises it with fidelity and capacity. On this reliance he relinquishes his regular business,. . . and devotes his time and talents to his public employment.&rdquo; In marked contrast with a later famous utterance is the following statement: &ldquo;There are few offices, with the duties of which a person can, till after a considerable length of time, so far familiarize himself, as to perform with accuracy all the necessary details. . . if every change of a chief magistrate is to produce a similar change of subordinate officers. . . their places are to be supplied by a new set of men who have everything to learn. . .: the means of improvement being thus rejected, Government will be entirely deprived of all the benefits of experience, and the management of public offices, perpetually shifting from one tyro in office to another, will forever be kept in infancy and weakness.&rdquo; He goes on to point out that in America most men have to support themselves, that it is difficult to resume a business once laid aside, and that consequently the best men will not take office unless its tenure is fairly stable. The latter part of the pamphlet is taken up chiefly

with a discussion of some of the intricate constitutional questions of the civil service, and with an exhortation to the Senate to review carefully all removals and appointments made during the recess.

This discussion has been treated at considerable length, because it illustrates the contemporary idea of the civil service. It is noticeable that Jefferson did not put forward the idea that long tenure of office is unrepublican; and that Coleman, in spite of his general sanity, fell into the fallacy of commending an appointment made in order that the recipient, a veteran, might &ldquo;spend the evening of his days in ease and competence;&rdquo; that is, he sanctioned the popular view that the civil service was a pension fund for meritorious public servants, a view mistaken and baneful.

Samuel Bishop was a man of repute, and so much respected that he was at this very time holding office under the Federalist legislature; and Jefferson doubtless hoped that he would reflect his respectability on the Republican party in his state. Yet it was an altogether bad appointment. Bishop was deacon in one of the established churches, mayor of New Haven, justice of the peace, chief judge of the court of probate. He was seventy-seven years of age, and so far as the collectorship was concerned merely a figurehead. The office was really given to his son Abraham, an active Republican leader and pamphleteer, who acted as his father's clerk in nearly all his

and performed the functions of the collectorship not without causing complaint. Samuel Bishop died in 1803, and Abraham was appointed to succeed him.

Although Jefferson, in his answer to the New Haven remonstrance, hinted at a more general proscription if he could not by other means bring about the desired equality in the civil service between the parties, he continued to seek for special classes that seemed peculiarly proper subjects for removal. Charles Pinckney was nominated minister plenipotentiary at Madrid, &ldquo;vice David Humphreys, recalled on account of long absence from the United States.&rdquo; William Jarvis, hearing while in Lisbon that Jefferson had said that any well-qualified citizen of the United States who desired a consulate held by a foreigner might have it for the asking, wrote to General Dearborn requesting the place in that city, and obtained it. The president found that, although in general &ldquo;good men&rdquo; of no undue political activity were not &ldquo;proper subjects of removal,&rdquo; the principle did not apply to attorneys and marshals. &ldquo;The courts being so decidedly federal and irremovable,&rdquo; he wrote to Giles, March 23, 1801, &ldquo;it is believed that republican attorneys and marshals, being the doors of entrance into the courts, are indispensably necessary as a shield to the republican part of our fellow-citizens;&rdquo; and he strengthened his case by preferring charges of partiality and jury-packing against the officers then holding.

Having thus proceeded carefully step by step, observing the effect of the removals made, and particularly watching the masses of the opposition, whom he wished to ween from their leaders, Jefferson felt encouraged by the end of the first year of his administration to go farther. He wrote to Elbridge Gerry, August 28, 1802: &ldquo;After a twelve months' trial I have at length been induced to remove three or four more of those

most marked for their bitterness and active zeal in slandering and in electioneering. Whether we shall proceed any further will depend on themselves.&rdquo; In fact, the policy of removing his opponents was a political success, and had alienated from the Republican administration none of the elements upon which it counted for support. The Federalists had, in the beginning, hoped that Jefferson's action might meet with popular resentment. So suicidal did it seem, that they imagined that Burr, while endeavoring to dissociate himself from the proscription, was urging it on the president with a view to rendering him unpopular. Yet before the end of 1801 all were forced to acknowledge that their prognostications were unwarranted.

The Federalists, moreover, continued to give the administration some little ground for countercharges. June 13, 1801, the Columbian Centinel noted with satisfaction that after the election in New Hampshire &ldquo;all the vacancies&rdquo; were &ldquo;filled by federal men.&rdquo; The dismissal of the clerk of the court of common pleas in Massachusetts by Federalist superiors gave the Aurora an opportunity to speak of &ldquo;tyranny.&rdquo; The Columbian Centinel asserted that much of the material for the Republicans' countercharges was cleverly manufactured by their politicians; but, whether these allegations were genuine or not,

the unthinking reader of newspapers at that time must have believed that it was six of one party and half a dozen of the other. At the same time, some of the Republican elements were growing restive. The state committee of Republicans, appointed to correspond with the committees of the several counties in the state of Pennsylvania, signed an address in 1802 in which it referred to &ldquo;the slow, but we trust, certain progress of the executive, to restore the Republicans to that share in the public patronage, of which they have been so long, and so unjustly deprived.&rdquo;

These circumstances probably helped give Jefferson courage for bolder acts than any he had yet attempted. The repeal of the judiciary bill of 1801 involved much broader issues than we are concerned with in this monograph, but it involved the question of the patronage also. Jefferson at an early date expressed a determination to cut off the &ldquo;excrescences from the judiciary&rdquo;; and in the debate on the measure Mr. Thompson of Virginia denounced the act because it had created sinecures. Jefferson, much to the amusement of the Federalist press, divided the number of cases by the number of judges, and so arrived at the decision that the system provided for was too expensive for the country. Of course, as the offices were abolished, Republicans could not obtain what was taken from the Federalists; and while the enemy was punished, friends were not rewarded.

The debate on this proposition brought out some facts which neither side relished. In the Senate, Giles showed that, while none of the congressmen who had voted for the judiciary act could constitutionally be appointed to the offices created, two senators had been made district judges in the place of men promoted to the new circuit judgeships, and thus the intent of the constitutional clause was violated. Bayard pointed out that

every man who &ldquo;had any distinguished means in the competition for the presidential office, of deciding the election,&rdquo; received some valuable appointment. It is probable that neither of these particular facts revealed any conscious corruption; yet the very fact that, without dishonest intention, questionable action had been taken by both parties, forced many to the conclusion that under the most honest men unworthy motives inevitably enter into the distribution of the patronage, and that the hands of those dispensing it are almost sure to be soiled. Both parties had now held the reins, and the purity of neither was untouched. There was about this time an appreciable change of tone in speaking of the civil service; speakers and writers while evincing more comprehension are more despondent; for the first time they begin to doubt the ability of their own party to deal with the question in an altogether satisfactory manner.

The repeal of the judiciary act was effected March 9, 1802, and just about this time began an active proscription of postmasters. The New York Evening Post of March 4 contains a letter which Postmaster-general Granger, in accordance with the Jeffersonian penchant for explaining the motives of the administration, wrote to a postmaster to be removed. &ldquo;From repeated complaints from the country, and from opinions which are entertained by persons who have been long in office, together with the reasons upon which those opinions are founded, I was soon convinced that as a general rule the printers of newspapers ought not to be employed as postmasters, because they have a special interest.&rdquo; This interest lay in their opportunities for suppressing rival papers, and in the possibility of extending their won circulation by abusing the franking privilege, which enabled postmasters to send free of charge letters and packages not exceeding two ounces in weight. Armed with such reasons, Granger began what seems to have been a general sweep in his

branch of the service. It is not surprising to find complaint that the Republican editors were allowed to hold postoffices in spite of their special interests.

Jefferson, in the course of his administration, removed 109 out of a total of 433 officers of the presidential class. This does not by any means show the total changes in personnel. In July, 1803, Jefferson wrote to Duane that, of 316 officers in his appointment, 130 were still held by Federalists; probably he meant that there had been 186 changes. From March 4, 1801, to July 16, 1803, there were 59 changes in the 165 offices of the external revenue service; 8 were due to death, 4 to resignation, 9 to misbehavior, and the remaining 38 were doubtless cases of political removal. Except for the last item, this would be but a normal list of changes, though possibly there would not have been so many removals for misbehavior if all the officers had been supporters of the administration. During Jefferson's first term there were, in all, 164 changes in 334 offices.

These figures do not adequately represent the severity of the proscription. In some localities the sweep was much more complete than in others: Jefferson wrote to Governor McKean of Pennsylvania, who had just turned out his opponents in that state, &ldquo;Some states require a different regimen from others.&rdquo; In Massachusetts alone there were almost as many removals as in the whole South, and in general the proportion of changes was greater in the North. Jefferson told John Quincy Adams

that not one request for appointment involving a removal had come from Virginia. This extreme statement was probably due to a lapse of memory; but it is true that the southern states, particularly those south of the Potomac and east of the Alleghanies, did not take kindly to the proscriptive system, and that it never really flourished in that region until after the Civil War. The small number of removals there at this time is further explained by the fact that Jefferson found some supporters in office, and that his conciliatory programme was so successful that the Federalist party in the South almost ceased to exist.

In estimating the severity of this first proscription, as of all later epochs of removal, it must always be remembered that if the lists of removals were made out on the basis of salary, or of the influence which the various offices carried with them, the proportion of changes would be very much greater. Among the removals are always found the collectors of the great cities, the postmasters, the great territorial and foreign officers, and, under Jefferson, the supervisors of the revenue. These officers had subordinates under them and carried on minor proscriptions. It is difficult to secure information with regard to local and departmental removals at this period; there are no figures, and the policy was vacillating. July 25, 1801, Gallatin sent Jefferson the draft of a proposed circular to the collectors, particularly intended for those of them who were Federalists. In it they were ordered &ldquo;no longer to shut the door to the offices under them to any man merely on account of his political opinions,&rdquo; and were told that an electioneering collector was necessarily a bad one. Jefferson expressed qualified approval; he thought that the circular should be delayed until his answer to the New Haven remonstrance had been published, and said that he had

intended to have the collectors produce &ldquo;an equilibrium&rdquo; before the non-partisan regime went into effect. The circular was never sent. At Boston, Dearborn, the new collector, made removals. Jefferson wrote to John Burke that there was a &ldquo;redundancy of applications&rdquo; for departmental places; and Duane prepared lists of the clerks holding such positions, appending to each name reasons for removal. As the president, however, left to each head of a department much freedom of action, the treatment of the patronage differed in the various localities and in the various branches of government.

In the summer of 1803 Jefferson apparently decided that the desired equilibrium had been attained, and removals ceased. At that time the balance of office-holding weighed down considerably on the Republican side; but it should be borne in mind that the Federalists no longer constituted half the population, and were therefore, according to the Jeffersonian rule, not entitled to half the offices. If Jefferson had lived up to his principles, the attainment of the equilibrium should have been followed by the adoption of a non-partisan standard for appoint- ments. There was an abundant opportunity for this, as forty-six new appointments were made in the customs service alone; but the opportunity was neglected, and by 1806 the civil service must have been as strongly Republican as it had been Federalist in 1801.

This proscription is pleasantly distinguished from later ones by the fact that it was conducted with a certain degree of courtesy. Reasonable notice was given to the victims, who, in their turn, often initiated their successors into the mysteries of the craft. One letter of removal reads in part as follows: &ldquo;Accept, Sir, my thanks for all the faithful services you have rendered while in office. With esteem and respect, Gideon Granger.&rdquo;

Jefferson did not plan to fill all the offices thus vacated. During a long period of our history, our civil service has been hampered by the popular prejudice against large salaries. The Massachusetts Centinel of September 17, 1789, pointed out that to people accustomed to deal in pounds a fair salary in dollars looked large, and urged that cheap rogues and dunces would cheat and lose more than could be saved on the salary account; but this argument did not appeal to the democracy of the time, and the liberal schedule established for the federal officers caused opposition. Retrenchment, therefore, was a natural plank in the Republican platform. Not high salaries alone were attacked, but also the tendency to strengthen the central government, and particularly the executive, by creating an extensive patronage; and it was urged that the civil service must be reduced to the lowest terms.

Both of these objects had been in mind when the judiciary act was repealed, and Jefferson struck a popular chord when he lopped off two missions and saved about twenty thousand dollars a year in the diplomatic service. More important was Gallatin's plan for the abolition of the internal taxes. Throughout the discussion of this measure, particularly in the House of Representatives, the Republican members repeatedly asserted that one of its main objects was the reduction of the patronage. The Federalists argued that, if this was the end desired, the taxes might be collected by the customs officers and the postmasters. There were, of course, other motives for passing the bill; but there seems little doubt that the majority of the Republicans were sincerely pleased at the reduction of the civil service thus entailed. The actual annual saving effected seems to have been about one hundred and fifteen thousand dollars. The only important offices abolished were sixteen supervisorships and

inspectorships, together with the post of commissioner of the revenue. These officers could not be spared at once, as there were taxes already due that must be collected; but a year later provision was made that the president be authorized to attach their duties to those of any other officer in the district. It was proposed also to discontinue the mint, but the measure was never adopted.

In addition to the actual retrenchments, a number of useful regulative acts were passed. One of these fixed the maximum compensation for customs officials; it did not save much money, but was a step toward the correct principle of fixed salaries as opposed to fees. While these measures tended to show the good faith of the Republicans, the sum total of the economies was not very great. One bill, the judiciary act of 1802, actually increased the patronage of the president by transferring to him, from the district judges, the appointment of commissioners of bankruptcy, thus giving Jefferson the opportunity to do the ungracious act of displacing John Quincy Adams. What little reduction was made in the patronage of the president was soon offset by the increases made necessary by the growth of the country, and particularly by the annexation of Louisiana.

Jefferson had, therefore, more offices to fill than had Washington, and he devoted himself to the task with great energy. The Federalist press represented him as overwhelmed by &ldquo;strange beings continually. . . crying More, More, Give, Give.&rdquo; Some cases presented little difficulty; he accepted as an axiom that all officers removed by Adams for political reasons should receive appointments, preferably to their old

Gardner and Whipple went back to their posts, and Tench Coxe became supervisor for Pennsylvania. Two clerks claimed appointments as martyrs of the previous regime: one had been removed by Adams, the other had apparently been forced to resign. These men, in plain violation of good faith and actual legal regulation, had given Duane information which enabled him to bring charges of defalcation against Timothy Pickering and Jonathan Dayton. Gallatin wrote: &ldquo;Whatever impropriety there might be in their conduct, I have reason to believe Gardner to be a man of honor. Campbell is very impudent, but as enthusiastic as his friends (the United Irishmen, I mean) commonly are.&rdquo; Gardner was made consul at Demarara; and Campbell, as the new auditor refused to restore him to his old position, was made an ensign in the army.

Where no such special claim existed, the decision called for more consideration, and a procedure developed much like the old Federalist machinery. Members of Congress continued to be the main purveyors of information. The New Yorkers, already becoming adept at businesslike politics, agreed upon a slate, to be submitted to the president by Burr in the name of the whole delegation in Congress. This was accepted, but with a few changes. Although this form was not always followed, the successful candidate seems generally to have been the one who had the support of his state delegation; and if congressmen did not take the initiative, the president usually consulted some of them in regard to names presented. It was natural,

considering the democratic principles of the party, that petitions should be numerous. The Massachusetts Spy, under Pennsylvania news, told how &ldquo;A secret committee of accusation, established for the blackest purposes, in a neighboring commercial town, lately forwarded a memorial to President Jefferson against their Collector, a worthy citizen,. . . praying that he should be removed from office.&rdquo; While petitions of unconnected individuals doubtless had full weight, Jefferson refused to be influenced even by those from organized bodies. Certain prominent men, incipient political bosses, exercised much influence. In New York the Livingstons, the Clintons, and Burr, in Pennsylvania, Duane and Dallas, struggled to gain advantage from the distribution of the patronage; Dearborn seemed to control that of Maine without struggle, and Caesar Rodney that of Delaware. Burr fared ill in the conflict. Davis, his candidate for naval officer at New York, was not appointed, though he pressed the nomination on Jefferson in a personal interview, and wrote a most abject letter to Gallatin. Perhaps with a view of keeping up his hopes and so preventing a break in the administration no change was made in the office for two years, although the Federalist incumbent was guilty of &ldquo;ante-revolutionary adherence to enemies.&rdquo; The post-office was given to a friend, but not the one selected by the vice-president; nor could the latter secure the withdrawal of the printing from Cheetham, who was abusing him. On the other hand, he was highly favored in the Louisiana appointments. Jefferson apparently endeavored so to treat him as to

avoid the danger of making him too powerful on the one hand, and of causing a premature break with him on the other. Although these men and many more exercised influence, there is no hint in the correspondence of the period that the administration felt itself in the least dependent on any individual or organization: no matter what its position or power, no dictation was allowed. To Mr. Larkin Smith, who presumed to dictate on the ground that he was a presidential elector, Jefferson replied in a letter of admirable dignity and self-restraint, utterly dismissing the claim.

It was Jefferson, therefore, who outlined the qualifications for office, although he did not as rigorously adhere to a fixed rule as had Washington. Fitness continued to be considered essential; and while careful character studies are lacking, such as Henry Marchant sent to Hamilton and the latter to Wolcott, Jefferson and Gallatin sought out suitable candidates, not confining their choice to those who offered their services. That these efforts were genuine is evinced by the many declinations they received; Jefferson wrote to Gouverneur Morris that he feared he should have to advertise for a secretary of the navy. The majority of the appointees came from the same class of the population as those under the Federalists. The president wrote to Gallatin in regard to a man proposed for a New England position, &ldquo;His family has been among the most respectable on that shore for many generations.&rdquo; Some selections were even commented on by the Federalist newspapers as &ldquo;judicious and proper.&rdquo; The Jefferson Democracy, however,

brought new classes into politics, and, to the dismay of the conservative, these received some recognition. Especially the appointment of the foreign-born &mdash; &ldquo;wild Irishmen&rdquo; and French refugees &mdash; called out such voluble criticism as to drown the occasional faint praise.

Among the elements of selection, geographical distribution may be regarded as permanent; but under Jefferson we find a markedly greater stress laid on politics than previously. Not only was the general political effect of appointments anxiously discussed, but party services were vigorously urged as paramount reason for receiving office, and very often were given recognition. There were some complaints that the new Republican office-holders engaged actively in politics; General Lincoln, for example, was accused of causing an expense of three thousand dollars for extra clerk hire while he was electioneering in Massachusetts. Such complaints, however, were not numerous, and there is no indication that such activity was required or expected.

Jefferson professed to be, and apparently was, free from nepotism; it was opposed to his character, and, moreover, he understood full well its political danger. To do a favor for a friend, however, was second nature to him, and his administration of the civil service is marred by favoritism. July 3, 1806, he wrote to John Page that, having consulted &ldquo;the best medical judge&rdquo; on the subject, he expected the early demise of the commissioner of loans for the Richmond district. &ldquo;The office is a perfect sinecure,&rdquo; he wrote. &ldquo;The introduction of one of your sons into the office [as clerk], besides adding the benefit of the additional thousand dollars to the family, would, by placing him as it were in possession of the office, secure his succeeding to it in that event which you and I ought now to consider as not

very remote.&rdquo; The appointment was made; but Page's health failed, and Jefferson, solicitous lest he should overexert himself, wrote, &ldquo;Would it be a relief to transfer the office to your son Francis. . . for the benefit of the family?&rdquo; Francis did not succeed his father, but was later appointed by Madison as collector of Yorktown. Freneau, while editing the leading administration paper of Charleston, South Carolina, held one of these sinecures until 1810, when financial disaster forced him to relinquish paper and position.

It is evident that, in spite of favoritism and politics, Jefferson succeeded in the main object which he placed before himself in dealing with the patronage, &mdash; that of satisfying the people. In this, as in many other cases, his sympathetic response to popular desire gave him unexpected victory; to satisfy his own followers, and at the same time not to alienate the masses of the opposition, was indeed a wonderful feat. So cleverly did Jefferson steer his bark that the patronage had ceased to be an issue by 1809. Technically one must assign to Jefferson the introduction of the spoils system into the national service, for party service was recognized as a reason for appointment to office, and party dissent as a cause for removal. It was not, however, the sole reason required; and, as has been shown, the character of the civil service was really not much changed. The natural question, why this proscription, proportionately as extensive as that of Jackson, affected the civil service and subsequent politics so much less, can best be answered in the discussion of Jackson's administration.