The Belfast/Opinion of the Court

Persons furnishing materials or supplies for ships or vessels, within the State of Alabama, have a lien by the law of that State on the same for all debts contracted by the master, owner, or consignee therof for the work done, and for the materials and supplies furnished, in preference to other debts due and owing from the owners of such ships or vessels. By the code of that State it is also provided, under the title, 'proceedings in admiralty,' that whenever any steamboat or other water-craft shall receive on board, as a common carrier, any goods or merchandise as freight, to be delivered at any specified place, and shall fail to deliver the same as directed in the bill of lading or other contract of shipment, the owner or consignee of such goods or merchandise shall have a lien on such boat or other water-craft for his loss or damage, to be enforced in the same manner and subject to the rules and regulations prescribed in relation to similar liens for labor, materials, and supplies furnished to such steamboats or other water-craft, as described in the antecedent provision.

Pursuant to those statutory rules and regulations of the State, the libel in this case was filed in the City Court of Mobile, and the libellants alleged that they, on the twenty-third of January, 1866, shipped on board the steamboat Belfast, then lying at Vienna in that State, one hundred bales of cotton, to be transported to Mobile, in the same State, and there to be delivered to certain consignees, they paying freight therefor at the rate of five dollars per bale, the dangers of the river excepted; that on the way down the river, below Vienna, twenty-nine bales of the cotton were lost, not by the dangers of the river, and were never delivered to the consignees, whereby the libellants suffered loss to the amount of five thousand eight hundred dollars. Introductory allegations of the libel, also, are the same as in a libel in rem in the District Courts of the United States; and in conclusion, the 'libellants pray process in admiralty' against the steamer, 'her tackle, apparel, and furniture,' and that the same may be condemned to satisfy their damages and costs. Process was accordingly issued, commanding the sheriff to seize and take the steamer, &c., into his possession, and to hold the same until released by due course of law. Respondents appeared as claimants, and alleged that they were the owners of the steamer, and they admitted that the cotton was shipped on board at the time and place, and on the terms and for the purpose alleged in the libel; but they excepted to the jurisdiction of the court, and alleged that the steamer, at the time the cotton was shipped, was duly enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States; that she was then and there regularly engaged in commerce and navigation between the city of Columbus, in the State of Mississippi, and the city of Mobile, in the State of Alabama, and that the cotton described in the libel was lost in her trip down the river from the former city to her port of destination. Defence of the respondents upon the merits was, that the steamer and cargo were captured by a band of robbers in the trip down the river, within the ebb and flow of the tide, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and without any negligence or fault on the part of the officers and crew of the steamer. They also set up the defence, that it was agreed between the master and the shippers that the vessel should not be liable for the loss of the cotton, if it was captured by armed men during the voyage, without any negligence or fault on the part of the carrier. Libellants excepted to that part of the answer denying the jurisdiction of the cort, as insufficient and invalid; and they also excepted to the defence, as pleaded, that the steamer was robbed of the cotton, as no bar to a recovery in the case, and the court sustained the views of the libellants in both purticulars, and the respondents excepted to the respective rulings of the court.

Two other consignments of cotton were also on board the steamer at the time the alleged robbery occurred. Ninety bales were shipped by J. H. Steers & Company, at Columbus; and one hundred bales were shipped by John Watson & Company, at the same place. Both shipments were to be transported to the port of Mobile, and there to be delivered to certain consignees under a similar contract of affreightment as that alleged in the first case, except as to the price to be paid for the transportation. Steers & Company lost thirty-four bales of their shipment, and Watson & Company lost thirty bales, as alleged by the respective parties. Libels in the same form were also filed by those parties about the same time, in the same court, and the owners of the steamer appeared in each case as claimants, and pleaded the same defences in the three cases.

Evidence was introduced by the respective libellants, proving that the entire cotton lost, and not delivered, was of the value of four thousand dollars. They also introduced the several bills of lading, and the respondents admitted the shipments as alleged in the respective libels. On the other hand, the libellants admitted that the steamer was robbed. as alleged in the answer, and without any neglect or fault of the owners of the steamer, or those in charge of her navigation.

Agreement of the parties, as stated in the bill of exceptions, was that the three cases should be tried together, and they were all submitted at the same time and upon the same issues. Finding of the court was that the whole loss in the three cases was four thousand dollars, and of that sum the decree of the court allowed one thousand dollars to the libellants in the first case, fourteen hundred dollars to the libellants in the second case, and sixteen hundred dollars to the libellants in the third case, with costs to the prevailing party.

Exceptions were seasonably tendered by the respondents to the rulings and decision of the court, and the exceptions were duly allowed by the court. Appeals were then taken by the respondents to the Supreme Court of the State, where the objections to the jurisdiction of the court were renewed in the formal assignment of errors. The parties were heard, but the court overruled the objections to the jurisdiction of the court, and affirmed the respective decrees rendered in the subordinate court. Writs of error were then sued out under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, and the respective causes were removed into this court.

Jurisdiction of this court to re-examine the questions presented in the pleadings may be assumed as existing without discussion, as it is conceded that the questions are the same as were raised and decided in the State courts, and it is not controverted that the questions are such as may be re-examined here under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.

Theory of the respondents is, that the respective libels were libels in rem to enforce a maritime lien in favor of the shippers of the cotton, under contracts of affreightment for the transportation of goods and merchandise from one port to another upon navigable waters, and that the State courts have no jurisdiction to employ such a process to enforce such a lien in any case; that the jurisdiction to enforce a maritime lien by a proceeding in rem is exclusively vested in the Federal courts by the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress. But the libellants controvert that proposition, and insist that the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction in these cases under that clause in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, which saves 'to suitors in all cases the right of a common law renedy where the common law is competent to give it.'

2. They also contend, if their first proposition is not sustained, that inasmuch as the three cases were heard together, under an agreement that they should be tried upon the same issues, and that the libel filed by W. C. Boon & Company, as stated in the bill of exceptions, was selected as the case to be tried in the court where the suits were commenced, the rights of the parties in the other two cases must abide the decision of this court in that case.

Assuming that to be so, then they contend that the State court had jurisdiction in the first case, because the contract of affreightment was for the transportation of goods and merchandise between ports and places in the same State. Impliedly, the argument admits that the rule is otherwise where the contract is for the transportation of goods and merchandise between ports and places in different States; but the proposition is, that where the contract is between citizens of the same State, for the transportation of goods and merchandise from one port to another in the same State, the case is not one within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts of the United States, unless it becomes necessary, in the course of the voyage, to carry the goods or merchandise into or through some other State or foreign domision.

Obviously the questions presented are questions of very great importance, as affecting the construction of the Federal Constitution, and the rights and remedies of the citizens engaged in an important and lucrative branch of commerce and navigation.

Judicial power to hear and determine controversies in admiralty, like other judicial power, was conferred upon the government of the United States by the Federal Constitution, and, by the express terms of the instrument, it extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; which, doubtless, must be held to mean all such cases of a maritime character as were cognizable in the admiralty courts of the States at the time the Constitution was adopted.

Admiralty jurisdiction, as exercised in the Federal courts, is not restricted to the subjects cognizable in the English courts of admiralty at the date of the Revolution, nor is it as extensive as that exercised by the continental courts, organized under, and governed by, the principles of the civil law.

Best guides as to the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts, are the Constitution of the United States, the laws of Congress, and the decisions of this court.

Two of the contracts of affreightment in these cases, were for the transportation of cotton between ports and places in different States; but as the contract alleged in the libel filed in the first case, was for the transportation of cotton from one port to another, in the same State, it becomes necessary to determine, irrespective of the questions presented in the other cases, whether such a contract is cognizable in the admiralty courts of the United States, because, if not, the libellants, in any view of the case, must prevail, as there would be, in that state of the case, no jurisdiction in this court to re-examine the decision of the State court in that case.

Much controversy has existed as to the true extent of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Federal courts, but great aid will be derived in the solution of this question by an examination of the decisions of this court at different periods since the judicial system of the United States was organized.

Principal subjects of admiralty jurisdiction are maritime contracts and maritime torts, including captures jure belli, and seizures on water for municipal and revenue forfeitures.

(1.) Contracts, claims, or service, purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation, are cognizable in the admiralty.

(2.) Torts or injuries committed on navigable waters, of a civil nature, are also cognizable in the admiralty courts.

Jurisdiction in the former case depends upon the nature of the contract, but in the latter it depends entirely upon locality. Mistakes need not be made if these rules are observed; but contracts to be performed on waters not navigable, are not maritime any more than those made to be performed on land. Nor are torts cognizable in the admiralty unless committed on waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as defined by law.

Such jurisdiction, whether of torts or of contracts, was, and still is, restricted in the parent country to tide-waters, as they have no large fresh-water lakes or fresh-water rivers which are navigable. Waters where the tide did not ebb and flow, were regarded in that country as not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and such was the decision of this court in the case of The Jefferson, and the rule established in that case was followed for more than a quarter of a century.

Attempt was subsequently made to restrict the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts in torts to cases arising on the high seas, but this court held that it extended to all waters within the ebb and flow of the tide, though infra corpus comitatus, and as far up the rivers emptying into the sea or bays and arms of the sea, as the tide ebbed and flowed. And that rule, ever after it was promulgated, prevailed, and was universally applied by the District Courts in cases of collision.

Application of that rule was made by the Federal courts in collision cases arising upon the Hudson, the Penobscot, the Kennebec, the Merrimac, the Alabama, and many other rivers navigable only between ports and places in one State.

Exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, was conferred upon the District Courts by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, including all seizures under the laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas.

Remedies for marine torts, it is conceded, may be sought in the admiralty courts under that provision, although committed within the body of a county, but it is denied that redress can be obtained in the admiralty for the breach of a contract of affreightment in a case where the port of shipment and the port of destination are in the same State.

Repeated attempts were made at an early day to induce the court to hold that seizures on water were not cases of admiralty cognizance, and that contracts of affreightment were exclusively cognizable in the courts of common law; but this court refused to adopt either proposition, and held that the entire admiralty power of the Constitution was lodged in the Federal courts, and that Congress intended by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act to invest the District Courts with that power as courts of original jurisdiction; that the phrase, 'exclusive original cognizance,' was used for that purpose, and was intended to be exclusive of the State courts as well as the other Federal courts.

When the case of The Lexington was decided, it was still supposed that the admiralty jurisdiction was limited to waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, but the case is a decisive authority to show that the jurisdiction of the admiralty, in matters of contract, was understood to be coextensive with the jurisdiction in cases of marine torts.

Subject-matter of the suit in the case of Waring et al. v. Clarke, was that of a collision, and the subject-matter in the case of The Lexington was a loss of specie in transitu, under a contract of affreightment. Viewed in any light, those two cases settle the question that where the voyage and transportation are over tide-waters, the jurisdiction of the admiralty is the same in matters in maritime contracts as in marine torts.

Such was the state of the law upon the subject, as decided by this court, when the case of The Genesee Chief was brought here for re-examination; and in that case this court held that the jurisdiction in admiralty depended, not upon the ebb and flow of the tide, but upon the navigable character of the water; that if the water was navigable, it was deemed to be public, and if public, that it was regarded as within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution.

Prior to that decision, the Western lakes and navigable rivers of the United States, above tide-waters, were not supposed to be waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Strange as that proposition may now appear to one familiar with the provision contained in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, it is nevertheless true that the rule restricting admiralty jurisdiction to tide-waters had prevailed from the organization of the judicial system to that date, but the effect of that decision was to dispel that error and place the admiralty jurisdiction upon its true constitutional and legal basis, as defined in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress.

Subsequent decision of this court, in the case of The Magnolia, was, that the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts extends to cases of collision upon navigable waters, although the place of the collision may be within the body of a county and above the ebb and flow of the tide; and this court also held in that case that the District Courts exercise jurisdiction over fresh-water rivers, 'navigable from the sea,' by virtue of the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, and not as conferred by the act of the 26th of February, 1845, which is applicable only to the 'lakes, and navigable waters connecting said lakes.'

Direct proposition of the respondents in the case of The Commerce was, that the case before the court, which was a collision on the Hudson River, was not a case cognizable in the admiralty, because it did not appear that either of the vessels was engaged in foreign commerce, or in commerce among the several States; but the court held that judicial power in all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution, and that in cases of tort the question of jurisdiction was wholly unaffected by the considerations suggested in that proposition; and we reaffirm the rule there laid down, that locality is the true test of admiralty cognizance in all cases of marine torts; that if it appears, as in cases of collision, depredations upon property, illegal dispossession of ships, or seizures for the violation of the revenue laws, that the wrongful act was committed on navigable waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, then the case is one properly cognizable in the admiralty.

Navigable rivers, which empty into the sea, or into the bays and gulfs which form a part of the sea, are but arms of the sea, and are as much within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States as the sea itself.

Difficulties attend every attempt to define the exact limits of admiralty jurisdiction, but it cannot be made to depend upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce, as conferred in the Constitution. They are entirely distinct things, having no necessary connection with one another, and are conferred, in the Constitution, by separate and distinct grants.

Congress may regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, but the judicial power, which, among other things, extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, was conferred upon the Federal government by the Constitution, and Congress cannot enlarge it, not even to suit the wants of commerce, nor for the more convenient execution of its commercial regulations.

Remarks, it is conceded, are found in the opinion of the court in the case of Allen et al. v. Newberry, inconsistent with these views; but they were not necessary to that decision, as the contract in that case was for the transportation of goods on one of the Western lakes, where the jurisdiction in admiralty is restricted, by an act of Congress, to steamboats and other vessels. . . employed in the business of commerce and navigation, between ports and places in different States and Territories.

No such restrictions are contained in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, and consequently those remarks, as applied to a case falling within that provision, must be regarded as incorrect.

Such a rule, if applied to the commerce and navigation of the Atlantic coast, would produce incalculable mischief, as the vessels in many cases, even in voyages from one port in a State to another port in the same State, are obliged, in the course of the voyage, to go outside of any particular State, and it would not be difficult to give examples where more than half the voyage is necessarily upon the high seas. Unless the admiralty has jurisdiction, in such a case, to enforce the maritime lien, in case of a collision or jettison, it is difficult to see to what forum the injured party can resort for redress. Piracy, it is said, is justiciable everywhere, but it cannot be admitted that maritime torts are justiciable nowhere.

Unable to deny that the admiralty has jurisdiction over marine torts, though the voyage is between ports and places in the same State, the advocates of the more restricted jurisdiction over maritime contracts set up a distinction, and contend that the admiralty jurisdiction over such contracts is limited by the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce. Reference may be made to the case of Maguire v. Card, as one where that distinction was adopted; but the decisive answer to that case, and the one preceding it in the same volume, will be found in the later cases already referred to, and in the case of The Mary Washington, where the opinion was given by the present Chief Justice. All three of the cases, therefore, as well the case of W. C. Boon & Company as the other two, are cases within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Federal courts.

II. Suppose that to be so, then, it is contended by the libellants, in the second place, that all three of the original actions were well brought in the State court as a court of concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of the United States in admiralty, and that the particular remedy, given by the statute of the State, and adopted in these cases, is within the true intent and meaning of the saving clause in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act.

Wherever a maritime lien arises the injured party may pursue his remedy, whether for a breach of a maritime contract or for a marine tort, by a suit in rem, or by a suit in personam, at his election. Attention will be called to three classes of cases only as examples to illustrate that proposition; but many more might be given to the same effect.

Shippers have a lien by the maritime law upon the vessel employed in the transportation of their goods and merchandise from one port to another, as a security for the fulfilment of the contract of the carrier, that he will safely keep, duly transport, and rightly deliver the goods and merchandise shipped on board, as stipulated in the bill of lading or other contract of shipment.

Owners of vessels damaged by collision, occasioned without fault on their part, and wholly through the fault of those in charge of the colliding vessel, also have a maritime lien on the vessel in fault as a security for such damages as may be awarded to them in the admiralty for the injury thereby caused to their vessel, and they may proceed in rem to enforce their claim for the damages, or they may waive the lien and bring their suit in personam against the master or owners of the vessel.

Material-men, also, who furnish materials or supplies for a vessel in a foreign port, or in a port other than a port of the State where the vessel belongs, have a maritime lien on the vessel as a security for the payment of the price of all such materials and supplies. They have such a lien because, upon the principles of the maritime law, such materials and supplies are presumed to be furnished on the credit of the vessel, and consequently they are entitled to proceed in rem in the admiralty court to enforce the lien, but they are not compelled to do so, as they may waive the lien and bring their suit in personam against the master or owners, as they are also liable as well as the vessel.

None of these principles are controverted, but the libellants contend that the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to afford the parties the same remedies in all such cases. No warrant for that proposition, however, is found in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, nor in any other part of that fundamental regulation of our judicial system. On the contrary, the exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is, by the very terms of that section, conferred upon the District Courts of the United States, 'saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it.' Nothing is said about a concurrent jurisdiction in a State court or in any other court, and it is quite clear that in all cases where the parties are citizens of different States, the injured party may pursue the common law remedy here described and saved, in the Circuit Court of the district as well as in the State courts.

Original cognizance is exclusive in the District Courts, except that the suitor may, if he sees fit, elect to pursue a common law remedy in the State courts or in the Circuit Court, as before explained, in all cases where such a remedy is applicable. Common law remedies are not applicable to enforce a maritime lien by a proceeding in rem, and consequently the original jurisdiction to enforce such a lien by that mode of proceeding is exclusive in the District Courts.

State legislatures have no authority to create a maritime lien, nor can they confer any jurisdiction upon a State court to enforce such a lien by a suit or proceeding in rem, as practised in the admiralty courts. Observe the language of the saving clause under consideration. It is to suitors, and not to the State courts, nor to the Circuit Courts of the United States. Examined carefully it is evident that Congress intended by that provision to allow the party to seek redress in the admiralty if he saw fit to do so, but not to make it compulsory in any case where the common law is competent to give him a remedy. Properly construed, a party under that provision may proceed in rem in the admiralty, or he may bring a suit in personam in the same jurisdiction, or he may elect not to go into admiralty at all, and may resort to his common law remedy in the State courts or in the Circuit Court of the United States, if he can make proper parties to give that court jurisdiction of his case.

Undoubtedly most common law remedies in cases of contract and tort, as given in common law courts, and suits in personam in the admiralty courts, bear a strong resemblance to each other, and it is not, perhaps, inaccurate to regard the two jurisdictions in that behalf as concurrent, but there is no form of action at common law which, when compared with the proceeding in rem in the admiralty, can be regarded as a concurrent remedy.

Consignees or shippers may proceed in the admiralty in rem against the vessel to enforce their maritime lien, or they may waive that lien and still proceed in the admiralty in personam against the owners of the vessel to recover damages for the non-fulfilment of the contract, or they may elect to bring a common action against the owners to recover damages, as in other cases for the breach of a contract to be executed on land.

Proceedings in a suit at common law on a contract of affreightment are precisely the same as in suits on contracts not regarded as maritime, wholly irrespective of the fact that the injured party might have sought redress in the admiralty. When properly brought, the suit is against the owners of the vessel, and in States where there are attachment laws the plaintiff may attach any property not exempted from execution, belonging to the defendants.

Liability of the owners of the vessel under the contract being the foundation of the suit, nothing can finally be held under the attachment except the interest of the owners in the vessel, because the vessel is held under the attachment as the property of the defendants, and not as the offending thing, as in the case of a proceeding in rem to enforce a maritime lien. Attachment in such suits may be of the property of non-residents or of defendants absent from the State, as in suits on contracts not maritime, and the same rules apply in respect to the service of process and notice to the defendants.

Applying these rules to the cases before the court, it is obvious that the jurisdiction exercised by the State court was of the precise character which is exclusive in the District Courts of the United States sitting in admiralty. Authority does not exist in the State courts to hear and determine a suit in rem in admiralty to enforce a maritime lien.

Such a lien does not arise in a contract for materials and supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port, and in respect to such contracts it is competent for the States, under the decisions of this court, to create such liens as their legislatures may deem just and expedient, not amounting to a regulation of commerce, and to enact reasonable rules and regulations prescribing the mode of their enforcement.

Contracts for shipbuilding are held not to be maritime contracts, and, of course, they fall within the same category, but in all cases where a maritime lien arises, the original jurisdiction to enforce the same by a proceeding in rem is exclusive in the District Courts of the United States, as provided in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act.

Respective decrees REVERSED, and the several causes remanded, with instructions to

DISMISS THE RESPECTIVE LIBELS.