The Adolf Hitler Trial before the People's Court in Munich Judgment/Information Regarding Individuals

Hitler
Hitler was the soul of the whole plot. He drew up its plan, took charge of its execution, and proclaimed the fall of the Reich government and the Bavarian government. He distributed new offices and claimed for himself the supreme leadership of Reich politics. He endeavored to initiate, extend, and then continue the action even when it must have been completely clear that he had no prospect whatsoever of gaining his ends.

Ludendorff
Long before November 8, Ludendorff had let it be known, by his conduct toward leading personalities of the Kampfbund and by his behavior towards the infantry cadets, that he would support with his name and with his person a violent, unconstitutional movement, should it take place on German soil. He would, moreover, place himself immediately at its disposal as soon as such a movement should present itself with a unified program for success. Ludendorff was also celebrated recently in the press-publicly and uncontestedly -- as the chosen leader of the coming nationalist rebellion. It is our belief that Ludendorff had been thoroughly apprised of the action of November 8 beforehand. At the latest he learned of the violent, unconstitutional nature of this undertaking on the evening of November 8 when a car brought him to the Bürgerbräkeller. Once at the Bürgerbräukeller, Hitler confirmed what Ludendorff learned on the way. He knew at that time that Kahr, Lossow, and Seisser had made no statement of any kind as to their future positions. He didn't bother to ask them their intentions but immediately declared that he would collaborate, and he urged Kahr, Lossow, and Seisser to do the same. Thus he immediately joined the rebels. He also acted as commander of the newly formed army in that he discussed and issued orders concerning territorial integrity, dissolution of the Kampfverbände, absorption into the Reichswehr, and quartering of the troops. He hailed the cadets marching under the swastika after their arrival at the Bürgerbräukeller, and he took command. He gave orders to the cadets. Finally, he placed himself at the head of the march into the city to lend credence to the whole affair through the power of his name and personality and to influence the Reichswehr and Landespolizei improperly.

Pöhner
Pöhner's sentiments coincided with those of Hitler and the Kampfbund. On the morning of November 7 Hitler sought him out, informed him of the coming putsch, and asked him if he was prepared to assume the office of president of the new Bavarian government. Pöhner answered in the affirmative and did act as president. He went immediately to the chief of police after the Bürgerbräukeller meeting was over, transferred power in the police presidium to Frick, and issued a series of orders. That same night he held a press conference and then went with Frick to visit Kahr in order to discuss the recent ministerial reorganization and the issuance of public notices. He then participated in the deliberations of the High Command at the Wehrkreiskommando and finally attempted to commandeer the police building by shutting out the police.

Frick
A very restricted, friendly relationship existed between Pöhner and Frick in that it was based on mutually congenial political views. Frick was constantly in touch with Pöhner. He also had good relations with the leaders of the Kampfbund, in particular with Kriebel, Dr. Weber, and Röhm, as well as Hitler. In the upper echelons of the Kampfbund it was generally held that Frick would become Minister of Police in Munich if and when a popular revolution should occur. This happened with Frick's full knowledge and consent. From Frick's behavior it was clear that he would accept such an offer in the event of a putsch. As soon as Hitler's Shock Troops broke into the BürgerbräuKeller -- even before the outcome of the ambush could be predicted -- Frick was designated as new Minister of Police by leading members of the Kampfbund. A note pad which was confiscated from a Kampfbund file cabinet had the following written on its back: " Frick June 26, 80 -- head of intelligence Hofmann -- chief of police's first message to Frick: safely delivered." With this last cue, the initiates knew that the surprise attack had been a success. Therefore, Frick must have known what would transpire on the evening of November 8. In fact, he was ready in his office at police headquarters and waiting for the call from the Bürgerbräukeller which indeed came. After he was informed of the ambush, he neglected, in dereliction of his duty, to alert Landespolizei and special security, and he neglected to contact the Reichswehr. He also failed in his duty to notify the duly appointed representative of the arrested chief of police, although he was in a position to do so. Finally, he immediately placed himself at the disposal of the new, unconstitutional regime, and up until the time of his arrest he issued orders which only the legal Minister of Police or his duly appointed representatives are empowered to issue.

Dr. Weber
Weber played a decisive role in planning the action of November 8. It was he who made the whole thing possible in that he was political leader of Bund Oberland and cast his decisive vote for the action. He immediately adjusted the military apparatus of Bund Oberland to suit the putsch, initiated the military leaders into the affair, and himself saw to the alert of outlying units. On the afternoon of November 8, he obtained assurance via telephone that Colonel Seisser would appear that evening at the Bürgerbräukeller, and he also made certain that the villa of his stepfather, Lehmann, would be in order for quartering the ministers and various other people arrested at the Bürgerbräukeller. During the early morning of the 9th, at police headquarters, he recommended that the most important buildings -- post offices, telegraph office, main train station, and others -- be seized by units of Bund Oberland and that police sentries be removed. He also looked after the feeding and quartering of outlying Oberland groups and participated in the deliberations of the High Command in the Bürgerbräukeller and at the Wehrkreiskomznando, and he finally decided to join the march into the city although he knew the true disposition of Kahr, Lossow, and Seisser.

Röhm
Röhm was probably present at the decisive conference on November 8. At the latest, he learned of the planned putsch on the evening of November 7 and then participated in individual consultations on the course and scope, of the action. The Reichskriegsflagge celebration, scheduled for November 8 at the Löwenbäukeller presented him with an opportunity to inconspicuously aid and abet the, action in the Bürgerbräukeller and to gather as large a striking force as possible. In any case, Röhm occupied the Wehrkreiskommando in the interest of and on the orders of the new rulers, and he made all the preparations to defend the building with guns against a Reichsewehr attack. He continued this conduct, although, he certainly knew that he was offering open resistance to the legal governmental authority.

Brückner
Brückner arranged the mobilization of his National Socialist Munich Regiment in anticipation of the planned action. Supported by the people he had armed and led, he helped start and continue the action together with the new rulers. Above all, he and his men joined the march into Munich.

Wagner
With foreknowledge of the action, Wagner willingly cooperated with the other defendants to execute the coup to inform the cadets of the action behind the backs, of their superiors. Further, he was able to persuade the cadets to aid the Kampfbund without the knowledge of and against the will of their superiors.

Kriebel
Kriebel was military leader of, the Kampfbund. He cooperated in the final decisions concerning the action of November 8, 1923, made preparations for military action, and gave orders for military performance in individual cases. He was responsible for the success of the taki-over at the Bürgerbräukeller and the subsequent detainment of the ministers there, and the president and the head of Section 6 of the police. He directed the occupation of the Wehrkreiskommando by units of the Kampfbund. He made arrangements to transfer police headquarters, the executive office building, the main telegram office, and the main train station from the custody of the Landespolizei to the Kampfbund. After General Ludendorff had agreed to head the National Army, Kreibel served as Ludendorff's chief of staff and ordered a number of military measures, the object of which was to aid the action and to stiffen resistance to the legal governmental forces. And so, among other things, he attended to the stationing, feeding, quatering, and payment of the Kampfbund troops, and he gave orders on the morning of November 9 to the men of the Kampfbund to seize the bridges on the Isar. He even had a few mortars wheeled up so that the Kampfbund might better defend itself against the police or Reichswehr. Kriebel certainly knew well before November 8 that the Generalstaatskommissar and his colleagues were determined to put down any putsch, using force as necessary. Kriebel's letter to various patriotic bands leaves no doubt in the matter. Kriebel would not be dissuaded. He continued to support the action even he must have known that Kahr, Lossow, and Seisser did not consider their promise binding, even when he knew they were taking measures to suppress the putsch. Backed by the massed might of the Kampfbund and the Infantry School, Kreibel had undertaken the violent removal of the Bavarian and Reich governments. He had undertaken to violently change the Constitution of the German Reich and the Bavarian Free Satate and set up in its place an unconstitutional regime based on force of arms.

Pernet
Pernet was a member of the Nazi Party, knew well the leading personalities of the Kampfbund, and was familiar with and supported the attempts to topple the government He participated in meetings with cadets and got to know Lieutenant Wagner. He also endeavored to have individual cadets present at the meeting with General Ludendorff on November 4. On the morning of November 7, he received an order from Dr. Scheubner-Richter to go to the Infantry School that day, or at the latest the next morning, and summon Lieutenant Wagner to come to the High Command on Schellingstrasse at noon on November 8. Pernet went to the Infantry School on the morning of November 8, conveyed Scheubner-Richter's message to Lieutenant Wagner, and accompanied Wagner to the High Command, where preparations for that evening's action were in full swing. On the evening of November 8, Pernet went to the Bürgerbräukeller in uniform. After witnessing the take-over by Hitler's Shock Troops, he went to the quarters of General Ludendorff with Ludendorff's servant, Neubauer, and with Scheubner-Richter's aide, Aigner, and brought him to the Bürgerbräukeller. Later, Pernet and Aigner drove into the city to find Captain Ehrhardt, tell him of the birth of the national government, and sound him out. At the end of the gathering at the Bürgerbräukeller, Pernet helped to guard the participants and, as a result, served as ordnance officer at the Kampfbund High Command. In particular, he directed arriving Kampfbund troops to their quarters, and, on the morning of November 9, he took the money confiscated from the Parcus and Mühltaler printing house on Hitler's orders, made up a receipt, and distributed the money among the individual organizations as wages for the men.

With the exception of Pernet, all defendants are charged with the collective commission of the crime of high treason. Pernet is charged as an accessory to the crime of high treason.