Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over class actions in which, among other things, the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million in sum or value, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5), and provides that to determine whether a matter exceeds that amount the “claims of the individual class members must be aggregated,” § 1332(d)(6). When respondent Knowles filed a proposed class action in Arkansas state court against petitioner Standard Fire Insurance Company, he stipulated that he and the class would seek less than $5 million in damages. Pointing to CAFA, petitioner removed the case to the Federal District Court, but it remanded to the state court, concluding that the amount in controversy fell below the CAFA threshold in light of Knowles' stipulation, even though it found that the amount would have fallen above the threshold absent the stipulation. The Eighth Circuit declined to hear petitioner's appeal.

Held: Knowles' stipulation does not defeat federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Pp. 592–596.

(a) Here, the precertification stipulation can tie Knowles' hands because stipulations are binding on the party who makes them, see ''Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez'', 561 U.S. 661. However, the stipulation does not speak for those Knowles purports to represent, for a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315. Because Knowles lacked authority to concede the amount in controversy for absent class members, the District Court wrongly concluded that his stipulation could overcome its finding that the CAFA jurisdictional threshold had been met. Pp. 592–593.

(b) Knowles concedes that federal jurisdiction cannot be based on contingent future events. Yet, because a stipulation must be binding and a named plaintiff cannot bind precertification class members, the amount he stipulated is in effect contingent. CAFA does not forbid a federal court to consider the possibility that a nonbinding, amount-limiting, stipulation may not survive the class certification process. To hold otherwise would, for CAFA jurisdictional purposes, treat a nonbinding stipulation as if it were binding, exalt form over substance, and run counter [p589] to CAFA's objective: ensuring “Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.” § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 5.

It may be simpler for a federal district court to value the amount in controversy on the basis of a stipulation, but ignoring a nonbinding stipulation merely requires the federal judge to do what she must do in cases with no stipulation: aggregate the individual class members' claims. While individual plaintiffs may avoid removal to federal court by stipulating to amounts that fall below the federal jurisdictional threshold, the key characteristic of such stipulations—missing here—is that they are legally binding on all plaintiffs. Pp. 593–596.

Vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Theane Evangelis Kapur, Joshua S. Lipshutz, Amir C. Tayrani, Stephen E. Goldman, Wystan M. Ackerman, and Lyn P. Pruitt.

David C. Frederick argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Brendan J. Crimmins, Jonathan S. Massey, and Richard E. Norman.