Stafford v. Wallace Burton/Opinion of the Court

Section 316 of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 makes applicable to suits for injunction against the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture, the same procedure, original and appellate, provided in the Act of October 22, 1913 (38 Stat. 208, 219, 220), for suits for injunction against the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The latter act gives a right to a direct appeal to this court from the granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction. Hence the appeals herein are properly prosecuted.

In each bill the averments are sufficient, if the act be invalid, to show equitable grounds for injunction in the severe penalties incurred for failure to comply with the act before opportunity can be given to test its validity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764.

We have framed the statement of the case, not for the purpose of deciding the issues of fact mooted between the packers and their accusers before the Federal Trade Commission or the Committees of Agriculture in Congress, but only to enable us to consider and discuss the act whose validity is here in question in the light of the environment in which Congress passed it. It was for Congress to decide from its general information and from such special evidence as was brought before it, the nature of the evils actually present or threatening, and to take such steps by legislation within its power as it deemed proper to remedy them. It is helpful for us in interpreting the effect and scope of the act in order to determine its validity to know the conditions under which Congress acted. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238, 38 Sup. Ct. 242, 62 L. Ed. 683; Danciger v. Cooley, 248 U.S. 319, 322, 39 Sup. Ct. 119, 63 L. Ed. 266.

The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 seeks to regulate the business of the packers done in interstate commerce and forbids them to engage in unfair, discriminatory, or deceptive practices in such commerce, or to subject any person to unreasonable prejudice therein, or to do any of a number of acts to control prices or establish a monopoly in the business. It constitutes the Secretary of Agriculture a tribunal to hear complaints and make findings thereon, and to order the packers to cease any forbidden practice. An appeal is given to the Circuit Court of Appeals from these findings and orders. They are to be enforced by the District Court by penalty if not appealed from and if disobeyed. Title 3 concerns the stockyards and provides for the supervision and control of the facilities furnished therein in connection with the receipt, purchase, sale on commission basis, or otherwise, of live stock, and its care, shipment, weighing, or handling in interstate commerce. A stockyards is defined to be a place conducted for profit as a public market, with pens in which live stock are received and kept for sale or shipment in interstate commerce. Yards with a superficial area less than 20,000 square feet are not within the act. Stockyard owners, commission men, and dealers are recognized and defined, and the two latter are required to register. The act requires that all rates and charges for services and facilities in the stockyards and all practices in connection with the live stock passing through the yards shall be just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and nondeceptive, and that a schedule of such charges shall be kept open for public inspection, and only be changed after 10 days' notice to the Secretary of Agriculture, who is made a tribunal to inquire as to the justice, reasonableness, and nondiscriminatory or nondeceptive character of every charge and practice, and to order that it cease, if found to offend, with the same provisions for appeal and enforcement in court as in the case of offending packers. The Secretary is given power to make rules and regulations to carry out the provisions, to fix rates, or a minimum or maximum thereof, and to prescribe how every packer, stockyard owner, commission man, and dealer shall keep accounts.

The bills aver that the Secretary has given the notice which requires appellants to register, and has announced proposed rules and regulations, prescribing the form of rate schedules, the required reports, including daily accounts of receipts, sales, and shipments, forbidding misleading reports to depress or enhance prices, prescribing proper feed and care of live stock, and forbidding a commission man to sell live stock to another in whose business he is interested, without disclosing such interest to his principal.

The object to be secured by the act is the free and unburdened flow of live stock from the ranges and farms of the West and the Southwest through the great stockyards and slaughtering centers on the borders of that region, and thence in the form of meat products to the consuming cities of the country in the Middle West and East, or, still, as live stock, to the feeding places and fattening farms in the Middle West or East for further preparation for the market.

The chief evil feared is the monopoly of the packers, enabling them unduly and arbitrarily to lower prices to the shipper, who sells, and unduly and arbitrarily to increase the price to the consumer, who buys. Congress thought that the power to maintain this monopoly was aided by control of the stockyards. Another evil, which it sought to provide against by the act, was exorbitant charges, duplication of commissions, deceptive practices in respect of prices, in the passage of the live stock through the stockyards, all made possible by collusion between the stockyards management and the commission men, on the one hand, and the packers and dealers, on the other. Expenses incurred in the passage through the stockyards necessarily reduce the price received by the shipper, and increase the price to be paid by the consumer. If they be exorbitant or unreasonable, they are an undue burden on the commerce which the stockyards are intended to facilitate. Any unjust or deceptive practice or combination that unduly and directly enhances them is an unjust obstruction to that commerce. The shipper, whose live stock are being cared for and sold in the stockyards market, is ordinarily not present at the sale, but is far away in the West. He is wholly dependent on the commission men. The packers and their agents and the dealers, who are the buyers, are at the elbow of the commission men, and their relations are constant and close. The control that the packers have had in the stockyards by reason of ownership and constant use, the relation of landlord and tenant between the stockyards owner, on the one hand, and the commission men and the dealers, on the other, the power of assignment of pens and other facilities by that owner to commission men and dealers, all create a situation full of opportunity and temptation, to the prejudice of the absent shipper and owner in the neglect of the live stock, in the mala fides of the sale, in the exorbitant prices obtained, and in the unreasonableness of the charges for services rendered.

The stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination. Thousands of head of live stock arrive daily by carload and trainload lots, and must be promptly sold and disposed of and moved out, to give place to the constantly flowing traffic that presses behind. The stockyards are but a throat through which the current flows, and the transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current from the West to the East, and from one state to another. Such transactions cannot be separated from the movement to which they contribute and necessarily take on its character. The commission men are essential in making the sales, without which the flow of the current would be obstructed, and this, whether they are made to packers or dealers. The dealers are essential to the sales to the stock farmers and feeders. The sales are not in this aspect merely local transactions. They create a local change of title, it is true, but they do not stop the flow; they merely change the private interests in the subject of the current, not interfering with, but, on the contrary, being indispensable to, its continuity. The origin of the live stock is in the West; its ultimate destination, known to, and intended by, all engaged in the business, is in the Middle West and East, either as meat products or stock for feeding and fattening. This is the definite and well-understood course of business. The stockyards and the sales are necessary factors in the middle of this current of commerce.

The act, therefore, treats the various stockyards of the country as great national public utilities to promote the flow of commerce from the ranges and farms of the West to the consumers in the East. It assumes that they conduct a business affected by a public use of a national character and subject to national regulation. That it is a business within the power of regulation by legislative action needs no discussion. That has been settled since the case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77. Nor is there any doubt that in the receipt of live stock by rail and in their delivery by rail the stockyards are an interstate commerce agency. United States v. Union Stock Yards Co., 226 U.S. 286, 33 Sup. Ct. 83, 57 L. Ed. 226. The only questior here is whether the business done in the stockyards, between the receipt of the live stock in the yards and the shipment of them therefrom, is a part of interstate commerce, or is so associated with it as to bring it within the power of national regulation. A similar question has been before this court and had great consideration in Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518. The judgment in that case gives a clear and comprehensive exposition, which leaves to us in this case little but the obvious application of the principles there declared.

The Swift Case presented to this court the sufficiency of a bill in equity brought against substantially the same packing firms as those against whom this legislation is chiefly directed, charging them as a combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh meat throughout the United States not to bid against each other in the live stock markets of the different states, to bid up prices for a few days, in order to induce the cattle men to send their stock to the stockyards, to fix prices at which they would sell, and to that end to restrict shipments of meat when necessary, to establish a uniform credit to dealers, and to keep a black list, to make uniform and improper charges for cartage, and finally to get less than lawful rates from the railroads, to the exclusion of competitors, and all this in a conspiracy and single connected scheme to monopolize the supply and distribution of fresh meats throughout the United States. In holding the bill good, this court said (196 U.S. 396, 25 Sup. Ct. 279, 49 L. Ed. 518):

'The scheme as a whole seems to us to be within reach of the     law. The constituent elements, as we have stated them, are     enough to give to the scheme a body and, for all that we can      say, to accomplish it. * *  * It is suggested that the several      acts charged are lawful and that intent can make no      difference. But they are bound to gether as the parts of a single plan. The plan may make the parts     unlawful. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206. The     statute gives this proceeding against combinations in      restraint of commerce among the states and against attempts      to monopolize the same. Intent is almost essential to such a     combination and is essential to such an attempt.'

Again (196 U.S. 396, 397, 25 Sup. Ct. 279, 49 L. Ed. 518):

'Although the combination alleged embraces restraint and     monopoly of trade within a single state, its effect upon      commerce among the states is not accidental, secondary,      remote, or merely probable. * *  * Here the subjectmatter is      sales, and the very point of the combination is to restrain      and monopolize commerce among the states in respect of such      sales.'

Again (196 U.S. 398, 399, 25 Sup. Ct. 280, 49 L. Ed. 518), in answer to the objection that what was charged did not constitute a case involving commerce among the states, the court said:

'Commerce among the states is not a technical legal     conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of      business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one     state, with the expectation that they will end their transit,      after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so,      with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at      the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly      recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of      commerce among the states, and the purchase of the cattle is      a part and incident of such commerce. What we say is true at     least of such a purchase by residents in another state from      that of the seller and of the cattle. * *  * '

The application of the commerce clause of the Constitution in the Swift Case was the result of the natural development of interstate commerce under modern conditions. It was the inevitable recognition of the great central fact that such streams of commerce from one part of the country to another, which are ever flowing, are in their very essence the commerce among the states and with foreign nations, which historically it was one of the chief purposes of the Constitution to bring under national protection and control. This court declined to defeat this purpose in respect of such a stream and take it out of complete national regulation by a nice and technical inquiry into the noninterstate character of some of its necessary incidents and facilities, when considered alone and without reference to their association with the movement of which they were an essential but subordinate part.

The principles of the Swift Case have become a fixed rule of this court in the construction and application of the commerce clause. It latest expression on the subject is found in Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed. --, decided at this term, February 27, 1922. In that case it was held, on the authority of the Swift Case, that the delivery and sale of wheat by farmers to local grain elevators in North Dakota, to be shipped to Minneapolis, when practically all the wheat purchased by such elevators was so shipped, and the price was fixed by that in the Minneapolis market, less profit and freight, constituted a course of business, and determined the interstate character of the transaction. Accordingly a state statute, which sought to regulate the price and profit of such sales, and was found to interfere with the free flow of interstate commerce, was declared invalid as a violation of the commerce clause. Similar confirmation of the principle of the Swift Case is to be found in Dahnke v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 42 Sup. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed. 239, in Eureka Pipe Line v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265, 42 Sup. Ct. 101, 66 L. Ed. 227, and in United Fuel Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277, 42 Sup. Ct. 105, 66 L. Ed. 234, all decided December 12, 1921; in Western Union Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 113, 38 Sup. Ct. 438, 62 L. Ed. 1006, 1 A. L. R. 1278; United States v. Reading, 226 U.S. 324, 367, 368, 33 Sup. Ct. 90, 57 L. Ed. 243; Ohio R. R. Co. v. Worthington, 225 U.S. 101, 108, 32 Sup. Ct. 653, 56 L. Ed. 1004, and Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488, 13 Ann. Cas. 815.

It is manifest that Congress framed the Packers and Stockyards Act in keeping with the principles announced and applied in the opinion in the Swift Case. The recital in section 2, par. b, of title 1 of the act, quoted in the margin, leaves no doubt of this. The act deals with the same current of business, and the same practical conception of interstate commerce.

Of course, what we are considering here is not a bill in equity or an indictment charging conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce, but a law. The language of the law shows that what Congress had in mind primarily was to prevent such conspiracies by supervision of the agencies which would be likely to be employed in it. If Congress could provide for punishment or restraint of such conspiracies after their formation through the Anti-Trust Law as in the Swift Case, certainly it may provide regulation to prevent their formation. The reasonable fear by Congress that such acts, usually lawful and affecting only intrastate commerce when considered alone, will probably and more or less constantly be used in conspiracies against interstate commerce or constitute a direct and undue burden on it, expressed in this remedial legislation, serves the same purpose as the intent charged in the Swift indictment to bring acts of a similar character into the current of interstate commerce for federal restraint. Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly nonexistent.

In United States v. Ferger et al., 250 U.S. 199, 39 Sup. Ct. 445, 63 L. Ed. 936, the validity of an act of Congress punishing forgery and utterance of bills of lading for fictitious shipments in interstate commerce was in question. It was contended that there was and could be no commerce in a fraudulent and fictitious bill of lading, and therefore that the power of Congress could not embrace such pretended bill. In upholding the act, this court, speaking through Chief Justice White, answered the objection by saying:

'But this mistakenly assumes that the power of Congress is to     be necessarily tested by the intrinsic existence of commerce      in the particular subject dealt with, instead of by the      relation of that subject to commerce and its effect upon it. We say mistakenly assumes, because we think it clear that if     the proposition were sustained, it would destroy the power of      Congress to regulate, as obviously that power, if it is to      exist, must include the authority to deal with obstructions      to interstate commerce (In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564), and with      a host of other acts which, because of their relation to and      influence upon interstate commerce, come within the power of Congress to regulate,      although they are not interstate commerce in and of      themselves.'

The Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 456) presents a close analogy to this case. It authorizes supervision by the Interstate Commerce Commission of intrastate commerce, where it is so carried on as to work undue, unreasonable advantage or preference in favor of persons or localities in intrastate commerce, as against those in interstate commerce, or any undue, unjust, or unreasonable discrimination against interstate commerce itself. Railroad Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 257 U.S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371, decided February 27, 1922. That case followed the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 432, 433, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; Houston & Texas Ry. v. U.S., 234 U.S. 342, 351, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 245 U.S. 493, 38 Sup. Ct. 170, 62 L. Ed. 425; B. & O. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612, 618, 31 Sup. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed. 878; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26, 27, 32 Sup. Ct. 2, 56 L. Ed. 72; Second Employers' Liability Case, 223 U.S. 1, 48, 51, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44. The principle of these cases is thus clearly stated by the court in Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 399, 33 Sup. Ct. 739, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18:

'The authority of Congress extends to every part of     interstate commerce, and to every instrumentality and agency      by which it is carried on; and the full control by Congress      of the subjects committed to its regulation is not to be      denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and      intrastate operations. This is not to say that the nation may     deal with the internal concerns of the state as such, but      that the execution by Congress of its constitutional power to      regulate interstate commerce is not limited by the fact that      intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven      therewith that the effective government of the former      incidentally controls the latter. This conclusion necessarily     results from the supremacy of the national power within its      appointed sphere.' In section 311 of the act, quoted in the margin, Congress gives to the Secretary of Agriculture in respect to intrastate transactions that affect prejudicially interstate commerce under his protection, the same powers given to the Interstate Commerce Commission in respect to intrastate commerce which affects prejudicially interstate railroad commerce in paragraph 4, section 13, as amended in section 416 of the Transportation Act of 1920. This was the paragraph and section which were enforced in Railroad Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., supra, and the validity of which was upheld by this Court.

Counsel for appellants cite cases to show that transactions like those of the commission men or dealers here are not interstate commerce or within the power of Congress to regulate. The chief of these are Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 19 Sup. Ct. 40, 43 L. Ed. 290, and Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 19 Sup. Ct. 50, 43 L. Ed. 300. These cases were considered in the Swift Case and disposed of by the court as follows (196 U.S. 397, 25 Sup. Ct. 280, 49 L. Ed. 518):

'So, again, the line is distinct between this case and     Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578. All that was decided     there was that the local business of commission merchants was      not commerce among the states, even if what the brokers were      employed to sell was an object of such commerce. The brokers     were not like the defendants before us, themselves the buyers      and sellers. They only furnish certain facilities for the     sales. Therefore, there again the effects of the combination     of brokers upon the commerce was only indirect and not within      the act. Whether the case would have been different if the     combination had resulted in exorbitant charges, was left      open. In Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, the     defendants were buyers and sellers at the stockyards, but      their agreement was merely not to employ brokers, or to      recognize yard traders, who were not members of their      association. Any yard trader could become a member of the     association on complying with the conditions, and there was      said to be no feature of monopoly in the case. It was held     that the combination did not directly regulate commerce      between the states, and, being formed with a different      intent, was not within the act. The present case is more like     Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38.'

It is clear from this that if the bill in the Swift Case had averred that control of the stockyards and the commission men was one of the means used by the packers to make arbitrary prices in their plan of monopolizing the interstate commerce, the acts of the stockyards owners and commission men would have been regarded as directly affecting interstate commerce and within the Anti-Trust Act. Congress has found as an evil to be apprehended and to be prevented by the act here in question, in the use and control of stockyards and the commission men to promote a packers' monopoly of interstate commerce. The act finds and imports this injurious direct effect of such agencies upon interstate commerce, just as the intent of the conspiracy charged in the indictment in the Swift Case tied together the parts of the scheme there attacked and imported their direct effect upon interstate commerce.

Again, if the result of the combination of commission men in the Hopkins Case had been to impose exorbitant charges on the passage of the live stock through the stockyards from one state to another, the case would have been different, as the court suggests. The effect on interstate commerce in such a case would have been direct. Similarly, in the Anderson Case, if the combination of dealers had been directed to collusion with the commission men to secure sales at unduly low prices to the dealers and to double commissions, or to practice any other fraud or oppression calculated to decrease the price received by the shipper and increase the price to the purchaser in the passage of live stock through the stockyards in interstate commerce, this would have been a direct burden on such commerce and within the Anti-Trust Act.

The other cases relied on by appellants are less relevant to this discussion than the Anderson and Hopkins Cases. Some of them are tax cases. As to them it is well to bear in mind the words of the Court in the Swift Case, 196 U.S. 400, 25 Sup. Ct. 281, 49 L. Ed. 518:

'But we do not mean to imply that the rule which marks the     point at which state taxation or regulation becomes      permissible necessarily is beyond the scope of interference      by Congress *  *  * where such interference is deemed necessary      for the protection of commerce among the states.'

Thus take the case of Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504, 33 Sup. Ct. 299, 57 L. Ed. 615. Bacon had purchased grain in transit from a western state to the east. He exercised the power under his contract to stop the grain in Illinois and put it in a grain elevator there. He intended to send it on to some other state for sale. He might have changed his mind. He did, however, after a time, send it out of the state. The grain was taxed while it was in Illinois. The question was whether it was immune from taxation because in transit in interstate commerce. Following the cases of Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. Ed. 382; Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715; Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct. 1091, 29 L. Ed. 257; Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 15 Sup. Ct. 415, 39 L. Ed. 538; Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U.S. 82, 93, 96, 23 Sup. Ct. 266, 47 L. Ed. 394; Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1, 5, 7, 23 Sup. Ct. 259, 47 L. Ed. 359; General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 28 Sup. Ct. 475, 52 L. Ed. 754; and American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. 365, 48 L. Ed. 538, it was held that property in a state which its owner intends to transport to some other state, but which is not in actual transit and in respect to the disposition of which he may change his mind is not in interstate commerce just because of the intention of its owner, and may, therefore, be taxed by the state where it is. The court brought out the distinction between such cases and this in the remark (227 U.S. 516, 33 Sup. Ct. 303, 57 L. Ed. 615):

'The question, it should be observed, is not with respect to     the extent of the power of Congress to regulate interstate      commerce, but whether a particular exercise of state power in      view of its nature and operation must be deemed to be in      conflict with this paramount authority.'

Moreover, it will be noted that even in tax cases where the tax is directed against a commodity in an actual flowing and constant stream out of a state from which the owner may withdraw part of it for use or sale in the state before it reaches the state border, we have held that a tax on the flow is a burden on interstate commerce which the state may not impose because such flow in interstate commerce is an established course of business. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277, 42 Sup. Ct. 105, 66 L. Ed. 234, decided December 12, 1921. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan et al., 257 U.S. 265, 42 Sup. Ct. 101, 66 L. Ed. 227, decided December 12, 1921. In the former, the court summed up as follows:

'In short the great body of the gas starts for points outside     the state and goes to them. That the necessities of business     require a much smaller amount destined to points within the      state to be carried undistinguished in the same pipes does      not affect the character of the major transportation. Neither     is the case as to the gas sold to the three companies changed      by the fact that the plaintiff, as owner of the gas, and the      purchasers after they receive it might change their minds      before the gas leaves the state and that the precise      proportions between local and outside deliveries may not have      been fixed, although they seem to have been. The typical and     actual course of events marks the carriage of the greater      part as commerce among the states and theoretical      possibilities may be left out of account. There is no break,     no period of deliberation, but a steady flow ending as      contemplated from the beginning beyond the state line. Ohio     R. R. Commission v. Worthington, 225 U.S. 101, 108; United      States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 367; Western Union      Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 113.'

The case of Blumenstock v. Curtis, 252 U.S. 436, 40 Sup. Ct. 385, 64 L. Ed. 649, is easily distinguished from the one at the bar. There it was merely held that an attempt of a publisher to monopolize the business of publishing advertising matter in magazines, resulting in refusal of such publisher to accept advertisements in his magazines, was too remote in its relation to the interstate commerce of circulating magazines. The court said:

'This case is wholly unlike International Text-Book v. Pigg,     217 U.S. 91, wherein there was a continuous interstate      traffic in text-books and apparatus for a course of study      pursued, by means of correspondence, and the movements in      interstate commerce were held to bring the subject matter within the domain of federal control, and to exempt it      from the burden imposed by state legislation.'

Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U.S. 21, 24 Sup. Ct. 202, 48 L. Ed. 325, relied on by counsel for appellants and said to be exactly applicable to the case at bar, was an effort by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to secure immunity from city regulation for a cab system which it ran in New York to and from its station to points in New York City, on the ground that it was part of interstate commerce. This court held that, because it was independent of the railroad transportation, and not included in the contract of railroad carriage, it did not come within interstate commerce. The case was distinguished in the Swift Case, 196 U.S. 401, 25 Sup. Ct. 281, 49 L. Ed. 518, from cartage for delivery of the goods when part of the contemplated transit. There is nothing in the case to indicate that if such an agency could be and were used in a conspiracy unduly and constantly to monopolize interstate passenger traffic, it might not be brought within federal restraint.

As already noted, the word 'commerce,' when used in the act, is defined to be interstate and foreign commerce. Its provisions are carefully drawn to apply only to those practices and obstructions which in the judgment of Congress are likely to affect interstate commerce prejudicially. Thus construed and applied, we think the act clearly within Congressional power and valid.

Other objections are made to the act and its provisions as violative of other limitations of the Constitution, but the only one seriously pressed was that based on the commerce clause, and we do not deem it necessary to discuss the others.

The orders of the District Court refusing the interlocutory injunctions are

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS dissents.

Mr. Justice DAY did not sit in these cases and took no part in their decision.