South Carolina v. Gaillard/Opinion of the Court

No question is raised in this case as to whether or not the act of 1877 impaired the obligation of the contract of the State, which is contained in the bills of the bank, or the charter. By accepting the act and bringing suit under it, Trenholm conceded its validity. He contends, however, that when he tendered his bills in payment of his taxes, and so far complied with the provisions of that act as to allow the bills to be deposited with the clerk of the court to abide the result of any proceeding that might be instituted in regard to them, the State entered into a new contract with him, by which it agreed to accept his bills in payment of his taxes if he established their validity in the way provided. It is the obligation of this alleged new contract which he claims has been impaired by the act of 1878.

We cannot find from the record that this question was presented in this precise form to the Supreme Court of the State, but it was undoubtedly involved in the case, and must have been decided directly or indirectly. No other question has been argued here.

As we look upon the act of 1877, it does no more than provide a way of determining whether bills offered in payment of taxes are binding on the State. It provides a remedy in case a county treasurer shall wrongfully refuse to accept a bill that is offered him. It is, in fact, what its title says it is, 'An Act to prescribe the mode of proving bills of the bank of the State tendered for taxes, and the rules of evidence applicable thereto.' It makes no offer of a new contract to a tax-payer or billholder, but simply says to him, if your bills are any time refused when offered in payment of taxes, you may proceed in a certain way to compel their acceptance if they are genuine and valid. There is no new contract, but a new way of enforcing an old one.

By the act of 1878 the remedy thus given has been taken away, with no saving in favor of tenders already made, except to give those who have made such tenders the right to pay their taxes under protest, without penalty, in sixty days, and sue to recover back what they have thus paid. They have still all their old remedies unless they have been taken away by the act of 1878, which is not the question here. All we have to decide is, w ether that act has taken away from Trenholm the remedy he had under the one of 1877.

The new remedy formed no part of the charter contract of the State. Passed, as the act was, long after the charter was granted, and long after all the outstanding bills of the bank were issued, the State was restrained by no contract obligation from taking away or changing the remedy it then gave. All the cases in this court, where the question has arisen, agree in holding that 'the States may change the remedy, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is impaired.' It is enough if the contract is 'left with the same force and effect, including the substantial means of enforcement, which existed when it was made. The guaranty of the Constitution gives it protection to that extent. Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69.

We agree with the Supreme Court of the State that the 'proceeding' contemplated by the act of 1877 was not 'instituted' when the repeal took place. The tender and deposit of the bills laid the foundation for the authorized proceeding, but did not institute it. This is clear from the language. The bills are to be deposited 'to abide the decision of the court in any proceeding which may be instituted,' thus implying that when the deposit was made proceedings had not been instituted. These proceedings may be 'by mandamus or otherwise to compel the reception of the bills.' The taxes are not paid by the tender. If the acceptance of the tender can be enforced, then the payment will be complete, but not before. This tender was made when a special remedy for its enforcement was allowed. Before Trenholm availed himself of that remedy it was taken away, and he was remitted to such as he had before this act, or such as were substituted on the repeal, if that rightfully took away those which existed when the charter contract was made. But whether this be so or not is unimportant, because it is well settled that if a statute giving a special remedy is repealed without a saving clause in favor of pending suits, all suits must stop where the repeal finds them. If final relief has not been granted before the repeal went into effect, it cannot be after. Railroad Company v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, and cases there cited. The simple question in this case is, whether this repeal was valid and constitutional as against Trenholm and his rights. We think it was.

Judgment affirmed.