Snow v. United States (85 U.S. 317)

ERROR to the Supreme Court for the Territory of Utah; the case being thus:

By the organic act, passed September 9th, 1850, establishing the Territory of Utah, it was enacted:

'SECTION 6. The legislative power shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act.'

By the ninth section, the judicial power was vested in a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and justices of the peace, whose jurisdiction was to be limited by law; provided, that justices should not try land titles, nor cases exceeding $100 in amount; and that the Supreme and District Courts should possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction. Each District Court was invested with the same jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States as is vested in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States; and the first six days in each term were appropriated to such cases.

Another section thus enacted:

'An attorney-general shall be elected by the joint vote of the legislative assembly, whose term of office shall be one year, unless sooner removed by the legislative assembly, or until his successor is elected and qualified. It shall be the duty of the attorney-general to attend to all legal business on the part of the Territory before the courts where the Territory is a party, and prosecute individuals accused of crime, in the judicial district in which he keeps his office, in cases arising under the laws of the Territory, and such other duties as pertain to his office.'

Another section provided for the election of district attorneys, whose duty it was made to 'attend to legal business before the courts in their respective districts where the Territory is a party, prosecute individuals accused of crimes in cases arising under the laws of the Territory, and do such other duties as pertain to their office.'

Then, following all, was:

'SECTION 10. There shall be appointed as attorney for said Territory, who shall continue in office for four years, unless sooner removed by the President, and who shall receive the same fees and salary as the attorney of the United States for the present Territory of Oregon. There shall also be a marshal.'

The marshal's duties were defined, being declared to be to execute all process issuing from the courts constituted by the act, when exercising their jurisdiction as Circuit and District Courts of the United States. But about the duties of the district attorney of the United States, to be appointed as above mentioned, nothing at all was said.

In this state of things the legislative assembly, by joint vote, on the 19th of January, 1869, elected Zerubbabel Snow, 'attorney-general of the Territory,' and on the 3d of April, 1870, the President of the United States appointed C. H. Hempstead, to be 'the attorney of the United States' for the same Territory.

Hereupon, Mr. Snow having undertaken to prosecute in one of the District Courts of the Territory certain offenders 'against the laws of said Territory,' a quo warranto was issued by the United States on the relation of Mr. Hempstead against him; the purpose of the writ being to have it judicially settled which of the two persons,-whether the attorney of the United States for the said Territory, appointed by the President, or 'the attorney-general of the Territory,' elected by its legislature, was entitled to prosecute in Utah persons accused of offences against the laws of the Territory.

The Supreme Court of the Territory, assuming that the Supreme Court and the District Courts of Utah was courts of the United States, were of the opinion that the attorney of the United States was the proper person; and adjudged accordingly.

The attorney-general of Utah thereupon brought the case here.

Messrs. C. J. Hillyer and T. Fitch, on his behalf, referred to Clinton v. Englebrecht, in which this court decided that the Supreme Court and the District Courts of the Territory were not courts of the United States, but legislative courts of the Territory. The base, therefore, on which the Supreme Court of the Territory rested its judgment being removed, the judgment, they argued, fell also.

Mr. G. H. Williams, Attorney-General, and Mr. C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General, contra, submitted the case.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.