Smithmeyer v. United States/Opinion of the Court

This is a suit brought against the United States in the court of claims by John L. Smithmeyer and Paul J. Pelz, architects, to recover the sum of $210,000, as 3 per cent. on $7,000,000, the alleged cost of the building for the library of congress, when completed.

The petition alleges that the claimants made and prepared the general plans and drawings for the library building now in process of construction at Washington city; that from the year 1873 to the year 1886 they, at the request of the United States, were employed in making plans and drawings for a building for the library; that in 1886 such plans and drawings were delivered to the United States, and accepted by the latter, which thereafter used, and is using, the same in the construction of said library building; that it will cost, when completed, $7,000,000; that the customary charge by architects for the making of general drawings and plans for the construction of said building, and the reasonable value of such service so rendered by them, is 2 1/2 per cent. upon the cost of the building; and that there is now due to the claimants 3 per cent. on the cost of said building, namely, $210,000.

The usual general traverse was put in by the United States. The court of claims heard evidence, and filed findings of fact, and a terwards additional findings of fact, all of which are set forth in the margin, with a conclusion of law that, upon the findings, the claimants were entitled to recover $48,000; and it entered a judgment in their favor for that amount, from which the claimants have appealed to this court. The opinion of the court of claims was delivered by Judge Nott, and is reported in 25 Ct. Cl. 481, but the additional findings of fact are not there set forth.

The claimants complain that, instead of being allowed $210,000, they were allowed only $48,000. The United States has not appealed, but says that, if the question of jurisdiction raised in the court of claims, and appearing on the face of the record, and hereinafter considered, is decided adversely to the United States, it is content that the judgment should be affirmed.

The question of the jurisdiction of the court of claims in this case arises on certain provisions of Act Oct. 2, 1888, c. 1069, (25 St. pp. 505, 523,) entitled 'An act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, and for other purposes,' referred to in finding 7, which read as follows: 'For the building for the library of congress, as herein provided for, and for each and every purpose connected therewith, including the cost of all professional and other personal services that the chief of engineers of the army may deem necessary for the work and shall specially order, five hundred thousand dollars.

'This appropriation, and all appropriations hereafter made, and all sums available from appropriations heretofore made for this purpose, shall be expended under the direction and supervision of the chief of engineers of the army, who shall have the control and management of all said work, and the employment of all persons connected therewith. And all contracts for the construction of said building, or any part thereof, shall be made by the chief of egineers of the army, and so much of the act entitled 'An act authorizing the construction of a building for the accommodation of the congressional library,' approved April fifteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-six, as requires the construction of said building substantially according to the plan submitted to the joint select committee on additional accommodations for the library of congress, by John L. Smithmeyer, and so much of the first section as provides for a commission, together with the eighth section of said act, be, and the same are hereby, repealed, and the duties of said commission under said act are hereby devolved upon the chief of engineers of the army, who shall annually report to congress at the commencement of each session a detailed statement of all the proceedings under the provisions of this act; and hereafter, until otherwise ordered by congress, no work shall be done in the construction of said fibrary except such as is herein provided for, and all contracts for work or materials not necessary for the execution of the work contemplated herein are hereby rescinded. And all loss or damage occasioned thereby or arising under said contracts, together with the value of the plan for a library building submitted to the joint select committee on additional accommodations for the library of congress by John L. Smithmeyer in the Italian renaissance style of architecture, may be adjusted and determined by the secretary of the interior, to be paid out of the sums heretofore or hereby appropriated: provided that, before any further contracts are let for the construction of said building, general plans for the entire construction thereof shall be prepared by or under the direction of the chief of engineers of the army, which plans shall be subject to the inspection and approval of the secretary of war and the secretary of the interior: and provided, further, that the total cost of said building shall not exceed four million dollars, exclusive of appropriations heretofore made.'

The particular provision referred to is that 'all loss or damage occasioned thereby, or arising under said contracts, together with the value of the plan for a library building submitted to the joint select committee on additional accommodations for the library of congress by John L. Smithmeyer, in the Italian renaissance style of architecture, may be adjusted and determined by the secretary of the interior, to be paid out of the sums heretofore or hereby appropriated.'

It is contended for the United States that the word 'may,' in such provision, means 'shall;' that the secretary of the interior was thus constituted a special tribunal to adjust and determine the equitable right of Mr. Smithmeyer for the value of his plan; that the secretary of the interior never had an opportunity to make payment for the plan, as, according to finding 14, the claimants did not submit any demand to him for an adjustment and determination under the act of October 2, 1888; and that neither the court of claims nor this court has any jurisdiction in the premises. It is contended that the act referred the claim to the secretary of the interior as a special tribunal, with exclusive power, not only to make an award, but also to pay its amount.

But this right of action accrued in 1886, and the court of claims from that time had full jurisdiction over it, under its general jurisdiction. The act of October 2, 1888, did not repeal, either expressly or by implication, the general jurisdictional act of the court of claims, to the extent of this case. The purport of the act of 1888 seems to have been to provide a method of adjusting the claim, if the claimants so desired, without a suit. The claimants had a right to the additional method, but they could also waive its benefit. The general jurisdiction of the court of claims, and the additional method of adjustment, can both of them well stand together. De Groot v. U.S., 5 Wall. 419, 432; Gordon v. U.S., 7 Wall. 188; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652; Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 151; Bechtel v. U.S., 101 U.S. 597; Campbell v. U.S., 107 U.S. 407, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 759; Chew Heong v. U.S., 112 U.S. 536, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; U.S. v. Great Falls Manuf'g Co., 112 U.S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306; U.S. v. Harmon, 147 U.S. --, infra.

The contention on the part of the claimants is that the value of their plans or services ought not to be estimated according to the rule of quantum meruit, but that they ought to be paid according to the rates established by the general usage of the architects' profession throughout the United States. On the evidence, the court of claims, by finding 16, found the fair and reasonable value of the services of the claimants, in preparing the plans delivered to the joint select committee, reported to congress on January 14, 1881, and which are now used by the government in the construction of the library building, to be $48,000. This was a finding on the evidence. The evidence is not before us, and, without it, we are asked, on findings of facts as to work done in connection with plans which were not adopted, to reverse the judgment of the court of claims as to the reasonable value of the plans which were adopted, and for which alone the right to compensation exists.

It appears from the findings of the court of claims that no contract, express or implied, was entered into with the claimants, or either of them, by any commission, committee, or public officer empowered to adopt plans, or employ architects, or to enter upon the construction of the building, until Act April 15, 1886, c. 50, (24 St. p. 12,) referred to in finding 8, was passed, which adopted the plan of Smithmeyer. The act did not constitute a contract, but only declared the intention of the legislature. It might have been rescinded at any subsequent time before the claimants changed their position and entered upon the performance of the proposed work, without either party becoming liable to the other. Tilley v. County of Cook, 103 U.S. 155, 160, 161. From 1873 to 1886 the services of the claimants were of an advisory nature, for compensation, and were such services as are mentioned in the statement of payments in finding 13 as 'professional services.'

As found in finding 11, the commission created by the act of April 15, 1886, (24 St. p. 12,) appointed Smithmeyer, on October 1, 1886, to be architect of the library building, at a compensation of $5,000 per annum; and on November 13, 1886, it also appointed the claimant Pelz to be principal draughtsman, at a compensation of $3,000 per annum; both appointments being in writing. Mr. Smithmeyer continued in the service of the United States, as architect of the building, until October 3, 1888, a period of over two years. It is further found in finding 11 that the claimants, at the time of accepting those appointments, did not notify congress or the commission that they intended to charge according to the schedule of the American Institute of Architects for the plans furnished; nor did they so notify congress or the commission before the work began on the building under the act of April 15, 1886, although they had previously notified the chairman of the joint select committee that they intended to charge for plans.

The acceptance by the claimants of employment at an agreed compensation per annum, before either party had acted on the faith of a different understanding, leaves no room for implying any other contract or usage. There was an express contract by which the claimants, as architects, were under the duty of furnishing plans at the agreed compensation.

In the opinion given by the court of claims it is stated that the court was of opinion that the acts of the parties indicated that the services of the claimants should be estimated according to the rule of quantum meruit, and not according to the schedule of charges of the American Institute of Architects; that, instead of a percentage, the United States elected to give, and the claimants consented to take, two annual salaries amounting to $8,000 a year, as an equivalent for such percentage; that, as the claimants thus departed from the general rule of architects, of measuring their compensation by the customary fees of their profession, and did so without any express agreement or reservation as to the preceding part of their service, the court was of the opinion that such part should be estimated according to the same rule, which the parties had themselves adopted; and that, taking those facts of mutual acquiescence as elements for computing damages, bearing in mind that a period of about six years existed between October, 1874, when the claimants began to give their entire time to what may be termed the evolution of their plans, and January 14, 1881, when the plans were submitted to congress, and remembering also that one of the claimants had received from the government, for other professional services connected with the library, the sum of $4,600, the court found as the value of perfecting the design and preparing the plans a like equivalent of six years' service at $8,000 a year, and fixed the damages at $48,000. This we consider a proper and reasonable decision.

Judgment affirmed.