Smith v. Adams/Opinion of the Court

The designation of the county-seat of a county in Dakota, or providing for its designation by popular election, was a matter properly belonging to the legislative department of the territorial government. It was not a matter, by itself, for judicial cognizance. But when the law of the territory left the designation of a county-seat to the voters of the county, and provided that the validity of the election could be contested by any competent elector of the county before the district court of the district within which the county was situated, upon leave obtained from such court for that purpose, and prescribed the mode in which such contest should be prosecuted by the contesting elector, and defended by the commissioners of the county under whose direction the election was held, and proofs be taken upon the matter in issue, and that the validity of the election should then be determined by the district court, the designation of a county-seat under the law became the subject of judicial cognizance, a case or controversy arising upon such proceedings being taken to which the judicial power of the territory attaches. This has been substantially the meaning given to the terms 'cases and controversies,' used in the judicial article of the constitution defining the limits of the judicial power of the United States. By those terms are intended the claims or contentions of litigants brought before the courts for adjudication by regular proceedings established for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs. Whenever the claim or contention of a party takes such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case of controversy. Thus, in Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 819, this court, speaking by Chief Justice MARSHALL, after quoting the third article of the constitution declaring the extent of the judicial power of the United States, said: 'This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law It then becomes a case, and the constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.' We are of opinion, therefore, that the validity of an election to determine the county-seat of a county in Dakota under the laws of the territory, when presented to the courts in the forms prescribed by those laws, becomes a subject of action within the jurisdiction of the territorial court. As thus presented, it is a case or controversy between an elector of the county and its commissioners, and the judgment thereon of the district court of the territory was subject to appeal to its supreme court. Whether the judgment of that court can be reviewed here must depend upon the act of congress of March 3, 1885, (23 St. c. 355, p. 443,) which provides as follows: 'Section 1. That no appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, or in the supreme court of any of the territories of the United States, unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars. Sec. 2. That the preceding section shall not apply to any case wherein is involved the validity of any patent or copyright, or in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States; but in all such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute.' The objection that no federal question is involved undoubtedly has reference to the second section of the above act, which provides that the appellate jurisdiction of this court over cases from the territorial courts shall not be determined by the amount in dispute, if the validity of a treaty or a statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, is drawn in question, but that in such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute. No such question being involved, our appellate jurisdiction in this case depends upon whether the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum designated. By matter in dispute is meant the subject of litigation,-the matter upon which the action is brought and issue is joined, and in relation to which, if the issue be one of fact, testimony is taken. It is conceded that the pecuniary value of the matter in dispute may be determined, not only by the money judgment prayed, where such is the case, but in some cases by the increased or diminished value of the property directly affected by the relief prayed, or by the pecuniary result to one of the parties immediately from the judgment. Thus a suit to quiet the title to parcels of real property, or to remove a cloud therefrom, by which their use and enjoyment by the owner are impaired, is brought within the cognizance of the court, under the statute, only by the value of the property affected. Alexander 6 Pet. 95; Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 402; 6 Pet. 95; Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 405; Jones v. Bolles, 9 Wall. 364, 369; and Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495. So in a case impeaching the right to an office, the amount of the salary attached to it is considered as determining the value of the matter in dispute. Thus in Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 173, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570, where the application was for a writ of prohibition restraining proceedings by court-martial against an officer, an objection being taken to the appellate jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the subject-matter of the suit was incapable of pecuniary estimation, the court, by Mr. Justice GRAY, replied: 'The matter in dispute is whether the petitioner is subject to a prosecution which may end in a sentence dismissing him from the service, and depriving him of a salary as paymaster general during the residue of his term as such, and as pay inspector afterwards, which in less than two years would exceed the sum of five thousand dollars. Rev. St. §§ 1556, 1565, 1624, arts. 8, 22, 48, 53. The case cannot be distinguished in principle from those in which it has been held that a judgment awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus to admit one to an office, or a judgment of ouster from an office, might be reviewed by this court upon writ of error, if the salary during the term of the office would exceed the sum named in the statute defining its appellate jurisdiction. Insurance Co. v. Wheelright, 7 Wheat. 534; U.S. v. Addison, 22 How. 174.' Not doubting the correctness of the doctrine thus stated, we do not perceive how it can help the appellants. It is true, they represent the county, but it is impossible to state any rule by which the benefit the county may gain, or the damage it may suffer, from the result of the election contested, can be estimated. The fact that the county may acquire or lose a parcel of land in Aberdeen exceeding in value $5,000, with the building thereon, by the conditional conveyance of that city, according as the county-seat is kept at or removed from the place designated as county-seat by the election the validity of which is contested, does not obviate the difficulty. The acquisition or loss of the land in question is not a necessary consequence of the election for the county-seat, such result not being created by law, but by a mere accident arising from a voluntary gift by Aberdeen, made contingent upon the removal of the county-seat to that place, and its continuance there. In Smith v. Whitney the salary was given by the law, and went with the tenure of the office. A promise by a third person to grant to a litigant certain lands, or make particular donations in case of a successful prosecution of a suit, will not confer jurisdiction on this court to review the judgment, if without such promise or conditional donation the court would not have the requisite jurisdiction. We think, therefore, there is not in the case such an amount in dispute as to enable this court to take jurisdiction of the appeal. Upon this ground the appeal must be dismissed.

It is not necessary, therefore, to consider the alleged refusal of a majority of the county commissioners to prosecute the appeal, and their application to the court below to vacate the order allowing it. The appeal had been perfected, and the jurisdiction over the cause thus transferred to this court, before the attention of the court below was called to the action of the majority. Whether such majority could afterwards authorize a withdrawal of the appeal, holding the relation the commissioners do to the county, need not now be discussed.

But there is a ground, not taken by the respondent, which forces itself upon our consideration, and that is that the judgment of the supreme court of the territory is not in form a final judgment. It not merely reversed the judgment of the district court, but remanded the cause to that court for further proceedings according to law and the judgment of the appellate court. A judgment of a lower appellate court which reverses the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction, and remands the case to it for further proceedings, is not a final judgment. A judgment of reversal is only final when it also enters or directs the entry of a judgment which disposes of the case. On this ground, therefore, as well as on the previous ground, the appeal must be dismissed, and it is so ordered.