Sinnot v. Davenport

THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Phillips for the plaintiffs in error, and submitted or a printed brief by Mr. C. C. Clay, jun., for the appellees.

Mr. Phillips gave a history of the case, and then proceeded:

The construction given to this act by the Supreme Court of the State includes boats engaged in commerce between the ports of another State and a port within its own territory. See cases of Cuba, Swan, and Bell, 28 Ala. Rep., 185. And the question thus presented is, whether this is not an interference with the power to regulate commerce, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and in conflict with the acts of Congress on the same subject matter.

Commencing with the act of 1st September, 1789, 1 Stat., 55, we find a provision for registering vessels, coupled with the declaration, that vessels so registered 'shall be deemed and taken to be and denominated vessels of the United States, and entitled to the benefits granted by any law of the United States to ships or vessels of the descriptions aforesaid.'

This registry is to be made with the collector of the district to which the vessel belongs, and the form of a certificate is given, to be signed by the Secretary of the Treasury, the party applying having first made the prescribed oath, which, among other, contains the names of the owners and their residences.

Bond is to be given that the certificate thus issued shall not be transferred, and provision is made that, in case of any change of ownership, it is to be given up to be cancelled, and a new certificate issued. The 22d section of the act makes similar provisions as to enrolment.

These provisions are re-enacted in the act of December 31, 1792, 1 Stat., 287; 18th February, 1793, 1 Stat., 305.

The statute of 2d March, 1797, makes provision for the case of a sale by process of law. 1 Stat., 498.

The 2d section of the act 2d March, 1819, authorizes vessels licensed to trade between the different districts of the United States, to carry on said trade 'between the districts included within the aforesaid great districts, and between a State in one and an adjoining State in another great district, in manner and subject only to the regulations that are now by law required to be observed by such ships or vessels in trading from one district to another in the same State, or from a district in one State to a district in the next adjoining State.'By the act 29th July, 1850, 9 Stat., 440, it is provided that no bill of sale, mortgage, &c., shall be valid against any other person than the grantor or mortgagor, and those having actual notice, unless the same be recorded in the office of the collector of customs where the vessel is registered or enrolled. It is made the duty of the collector to keep a record of all such conveyances, and shall, when required, certify the same, setting forth the names of the owners, their proportionate shares, &c., for which fees are allowed.

The power to regulate commerce conferred in the Constitution of the United States includes the regulation of navigation, and was one of the primary objects which led to its adoption.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 567.

State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge, 18 How., 431.

The power to regulate navigation is the power to prescribe rules in conformity with which navigation must be carried on. It extends to the persons who conduct it, as well as to the instruments used.

Cooley v. Portwardens Phil., 12 How., 316.

Is the power to regulate commerce thus granted to the Federal Government exclusive? In Gibbons v. Ogden the court say: 'It has been concluded that, as the word 'regulate' implies in its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes necessarily the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated. There is great force in the argument, and the court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.'

In Miln v. State of New York, (11 Peters, 130,) which involved the constitutionality of an act requiring captains of vessels arriving in the port of that State to furnish a list of passengers, &c., and which was sustained as a police regulation, the court 'waived the examination of the question whether the power to regulate commerce be or be not exclusive of the States.'

In commenting on this case, Justice WAYNE says that the power to be exercised under State authority was after the passengers had landed. That on the question as to the exclusiveness of the power the judges were divided, four being in favor of the exclusiveness, and three opposed, and to this state of opinion was owing the waiver above quoted.

7 Howard, 431.

In the passenger cases (7 Howard) Justice McLEAN said: 'The power to regulate commerce, foreign and between the States, was vested exclusively in Congress.' (P. 400.)