Simmons v. United States (390 U.S. 377)/Concurrence Black

Mr. Justice BLACK, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in affirmance of the conviction of Simmons but dissent from reversal of Garrett's conviction. I shall first discuss Simmons' case.

1. Simmons' chief claim is that his 'pretrial identification (was) so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification, that he was denied due process of law.' The Court rejects this contention. I agree with the Court but for quite different reasons. The Court's opinion rests on a lengthy discussion of inferences that the jury could have drawn from the evidence of identifying witnesses. A mere summary reading of the evidence as outlined by this Court shows that its discussion is concerned with the weight of the testimony given by the identifying witnesses. The weight of the evidence, however, is not a question for the Court but for the jury, and does not raise a due process issue. The due process question raised by Simmons is, and should be held to be, frivolous. The identifying witnesses were all present in the bank when it was robbed and all saw the robbers. The due process contention revolves around the circumstances under which these witnesses identified pictures of the robbers shown to them, and these circumstances are relevant only to the weight the identification was entitled to be given. The Court, however, considers Simmons' contention on the premise that a denial of due process could be found in the 'totality of circumstances' of the picture identification. I do not believe the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision vests this Court with any such wideranging, uncontrollable power. A trial according to due process of law is a trial according to the 'law of the land'-the law as enacted by the Constitution or the Legislative Branch of Government, and not 'laws' formulated by the courts according to the 'totality of the circumstances.' Simmons' due process claim here should be denied because it is frivolous. For these reasons I vote to affirm Simmons' conviction.

2. I agree with the Court, in part for reasons it assigns, that the District Court did not commit error in declining to permit the photographs used to be turned over to the defense for purposes of cross-examination.

3. The Court makes new law in reversing Garrett's conviction on the ground that it was error to allow the Government to use against him testimony he had given upon his unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The testimony used was Garrett's statement in the suppression hearing that he was the owner of a suitcase which contained money wrappers taken from the bank that was robbed. The Court is certainly guilty of no overstatement in saying that this 'was undoubtedly a strong piece of evidence against (Garrett).' Ante, at 391. In fact, one might go further and say that this testimony, along with the statements of the eyewitnesses against him, showed beyond all question that Garrett was one of the bank robbers. The question then is whether the Government is barred from offering a truthful statement made by a defendant at a suppression hearing in order to prevent the defendant from winning an acquittal on the false premise that he is not the owner of the property he has already sworn that he owns. My answer to this question is 'No.' The Court's answer is 'Yes' on the premise that 'a defendant who knows that his testimony may be admissible against him at trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting the testimonial proof of standing necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.' Ante, at 392-393.

For the Court, though not for me, the question seems to be whether the disadvantages associated with deterring a defendant from testifying on a motion to suppress are significant enough to offset the advantages of permitting the Government to use such testimony when relevant and probative to help convict the defendant of a crime. The Court itself concedes, however, that the deterrent effect on which it relies comes into play, at most, only in 'marginal cases' in which the defendant cannot estimate whether the motion to suppress will succeed. Ante, at 393. The value of permitting the Government to use such testimony is, of course, so obvious that it is usually left unstated, but it should not for that reason be ignored. The standard of proof necessary to convict in a criminal case is high, and quite properly so, but for this reason highly probative evidence such as that involved here should not lightly be held inadmissible. For me the importance of bringing guilty criminals to book is a far more crucial consideration than the desirability of giving defendants every possible assistance in their attempts to invoke an evidentiary rule which itself can result in the exclusion of highly relevant evidence.

This leaves for me only the possible contention that Garrett's testimony was inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment because it was compelled. Of course, I could never accept the Court's statement that 'testimony is not always involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given to obtain a benefit.' Ante, at 394. No matter what Professor Wigmore may have thought about the subject, it has always been clear to me that any threat of harm or promise of benefit is sufficient to render a defendant's statement involuntary. See, Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 367, 83 S.Ct. 448, 463, 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963) (dissenting opinion). The reason why the Fifth Amendment poses no bar to acceptance of Garrett's testimony is not, therefore, that a promise of benefit is not generally fatal. Rather, the answer is that the privilege against self-incrimination has always been considered a privilege that can be waived, and the validity of the waiver is, of course, not undermined by the inevitable fact that by testifying, a defendant can obtain the 'benefit' of a chance to help his own case by the testimony he gives. When Garrett took the stand at the suppression hearing, he validly surrendered his privilege with respect to the statements he actually made at that time, and since these statements were therefore not 'compelled,' they could be used against him for any subsequent purpose.

The consequence of the Court's holding, it seems to me, is that defendants are encouraged to come into court, either in person or through other witnesses, and swear falsely that they do not own property, knowing at the very moment they do so that they have already sworn precisely the opposite in a prior court proceeding. This is but to permit lawless people to play ducks and drakes with the basic principles of the administration of criminal law.

There is certainly no language in the Fourth Amendment which gives support to any such device to hobble law enforcement in this country. While our Constitution does provide procedural safeguards to protect defendants from arbitrary convictions, that governmental charter holds out no promises to stultify justice by erecting barriers to the admissibility of relevant evidence voluntarily given in a court of justice. Under the first principles of ethics and morality a defendant who secures a court order by telling the truth should not be allowed to seek a court advantage later based on a premise directly opposite to his prior solemn judicial oath. This Court should not lend the prestige of its high name to such a justice-defeating stratagem. I would affirm Garrett's conviction.