Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company/Opinion of the Court

The appellants deny the jurisdiction of the circuit court in this case. There is no diverse citizenship in the case of this particular company, and the jurisdiction must depend upon the presence of a Federal question. The bill filed by the company herein attacked the validity of the act of the legislature of Kentucky of March 10, 1900 (above set forth in full), on several grounds, as in violation of § 1 of the 14th Amendment. It was also averred that the act was a violation of § 4, article 4, of the Federal Constitution, in that it constituted an abandonment by the state of Kentucky of a republican form of government, in so far as it vested legislative, executive, and judicial powers of an absolute and arbitrary nature over railroad carriers in one body or tribunal, styled the railroad commission. The company also contended that the act was in violation of the Federal Constitution, on account of the enormous fines and penalties provided in the act as a punishment for a violation of any of its provisions; also that the enforcement of the act would operate to deprive the company of its property without due process of law, and would deny to it the equal protection of the laws, in violation of § 1 of article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Other grounds of alleged invalidity of the act in question, as in violation of the Federal Constitution, are set up in the bill. The bill also contained the averment that the order of the railroad commission of Kentucky, in making a general schedule of maximum rates for the railroads mentioned in its order, was invalid, as unauthorized by the statute. This is, of course, a local or state question.

The Federal questions as to the invalidity of the state statute because, as alleged, it was in violation of the Federal Constitution, gave the circuit court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it, that court had the right to decide all the question in the case, even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions only.

This court has the same right, and can, if it deem it proper, decide the local questions only, and omit to decide the federal questions, or decide them adversely to the party claiming their benefit. Horner v. United States, 143 U.S. 570, 576, 36 L. ed. 266, 268, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 154, 41 L. ed. 369, 387, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685, 694, 42 L. ed. 626, 630, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223; Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295, 49 L. ed. 482, 485, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 52 L. ed. 278, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163; People's Sav. Bank v. Layman, 134 Fed. 635; Michigan R. Tax Cases, 138 Fed. 223. Of course, the Federal question must not be merely colorable or fraudulently set up for the mere purpose of endeavoring to give the court jurisdiction. Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 695, 42 L. ed. 630, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223; Michigan R. Tax Cases, supra.

The character of some of the Federal question raised is such as to show that they are not merely colorable, and have not been fraudulently raised for the purpose of attempting to give jurisdiction to a Federal court.

The appellants, however, contend that the jurisdiction of the circuit court did not attach under the 14th Amendment, because of the allegations contained in the bill of the company, in which was contained an averment that the defendants below (the appellants here) had not been vested with the power, by either the Constitution of the state of Kentucky or by any act of its legislature, or by any law, to make and enter the order of July 20, 1906, complained of in the company's bill. The argument of the appellants is that, in order to violate the 14th Amendment, the action complained of must be under the authority of the state; and where the allegation of the bill was that 'no power or authority had been vested in or conferred upon the appellants by the act of March 10, 1900, or by any law, to make or fix the rates complained of,' such allegation swept away the foundation for the claim of Federal jurisdiction, inasmuch as, in such case, the action of the railroad commission was not the action of the state, and the principle decided in Barney v. New York, 193 U.S. 430, 437, 48 L. ed. 737, 739, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, was applicable.

If the averment as to the invalidity of the order of the commission were the only ground upon which a Federal question was founded, and if the bill alleged that the order was invalid because it was not authorized by the state, either by statute or in any other way, the objection might be good; but the bill sets up several Federal questions. Some of them are directed to the invalidity of the statute itself, on the ground that it violates various named provisions of the Federal Constitution in addition to and other than the 14th Amendment, while some of the other Federal questions are founded upon the terms of the order made by the commission, under what is claimed by the commission to be the authority of the statute. The bill also sets up several local questions arising from the terms of the order, and which the company claims are unauthorized by the statute. The various questions are entirely separate from each other. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt that the circuit court obtained jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the Federal questions set up in the bill, without reference to the particular violation set up in regard to the 14th Amendment.

Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without important reasons. In this case we think it much better to decide it with regard to the question of a local nature, involving the construction of the state statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record.

The commission has assumed the power under this statute of making what are termed general maximum rates for the transportation of all commodities, upon all railroads, to and from all points within the state, and this company is included in the general order made by the commission. This is an enormous power. Jurisdiction so extensive and comprehensive as must exist in a commission in the making of rates by one general tariff upon all classes of commodities upon all the railroads throughout the state is not to be implied. The proper establishment of reasonable rates upon all commodities carried by railroads, and relating to each and all of them within the state, depends upon so many facts, which may be very different in regard to each road, that it is plain the work ought not to be attempted without a profound and painstaking investigation, which could not be intelligently or with discrimination accomplished by wholesale. It may be matter of surprise to find such power granted to any commission, although it would seem that it has in some cases been attempted. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 167 U.S. 479, 495, 42 L. ed. 243, 251, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896. In any event, the jurisdiction of the commission to establish all rates at one time, and in regard to all commodities, on all railroads in the state, on a general and comprehensive complaint to the commission that all rates are too high, or upon like information of the commission itself, must be conferred in plain language. The commission, as an extraordinary tribunal of the state, must have the power herein exercised conferred by a statute in language free from doubt. The power is not to be taken by implication; it must be given by language which admits of no other reasonable construction.

In this case we are without the benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we must proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject. Nevertheless, we are compelled to the belief that the statute does not grant to the commission any such great and extensive power as it has assumed to exercise in making the order in question.

The first section of the statute provides for a complaint being made to the commission, accusing the railroad company of charging or receiving extortionate freight or passenger rates over its lines of railroad in that state; or, if the commission receive information or have reason to believe that such rate or rates are being charged, it is its duty in either case to hear and determine the matter as speedily as possible. The commission is to give the company complained of not less than ten days' notice, and the notice must contain a statement of the nature of the complaint or matter to be investigated; and if the commission, after investigation of the complaint, or on its own information, determines that the company has been guilty of extortion, the commission is, in that case, authorized to make and fix 'a just and reasonable rate, toll, or compensation, which said railroad company or corporation shall charge, collect, or receive for like service thereafter rendered.' The whole section, it seems to us, proceeds upon the assumption that complaint shall be made of some particular rate or rates being charged, or if, without formal complaint, the commission receives information or has reason to believe that such rate or rates are being charged, then the investigation is to go on in relation to those particular rates. We cannot for one moment believe that, under such language as is contained in the section, the commission is clothed with jurisdiction, either upon complaint or upon its own information, to enter upon a general investigation of every rate upon every class of commoditites carried by all the roads of the state from or to all points therein, and make a general tariff of rates throughout the state, such as has been made in this case. No such power was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 167 U.S. 479, 42 L. ed. 243, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896, supra. As the express power was not given in so many words to the commission, this court held that it could not be implied.

The so-called complaints, in this case above mentioned, are, as we construe the statute, entirely too general to raise any objection to a specific rate. Guenther, in his petition, in substance, alleged 'that all local freight rates to and from all local points in the state of Kentucky, as fixed and charged by all railroads, on all classes of freight, are excessive, discriminatory, and extortionate.' The lumber companies, which were permitted to intervene, made substantially the same complaint (with an addition as to lumber, ties, and logs), and the attorneys appearing in behalf of the state of Kentucky joined in the general complaint of Guenther. If complaint were necessary to enable the commission to make rates, the allegations in the complaint of Guenther were mere sweeping generalities, and were in no sense whatever a fair or honest compliance with the statute. The commission itself, in order to act, must have had some information or had some reasons to believe that certain rates were extortionate, and it could not, under this statute, enter upon a general attack upon all the rates of all the companies throughout the state, and make an order such as this in question. Such action is, in our judgment, founded upon a total misconstruction of the statute, and an assumption on the part of the commission of a right and power to do that which the statute itself gives it no authority whatever to do.

And again, the section provides that if the commission should determine that the company had been guilty of extortion, it must, instead of the extortionate rate, make and fix a reasonable and just rate, which the company may charge for its service thereafter rendered. This language is not apt by which to confer power to establish a schedule of rates applicable in all cases, to all commodities, and on all roads, and, on the contrary, it strengthens the view that no such general jurisdiction to establish rates in all cases for all roads throughout the state by a general tariff was in the contemplation of the framers of the statute.

It may also be stated that, if the statute was really intended to give the commission power to make a general schedule of rates, we should expect to find, almost necessarily, a right to increase as well as to reduce those rates in some instances, in order to produce an equality, where, otherwise, great inequalities might exist as a result of the putting the general schedule of reductions in force. Here is a case where the schedule of rates was reduced from 20 to 25 per cent upon an average. Some of the rates not touched might require increase in order to make the whole schedule fair and reasonable, and yet the commission could not make the increase over the amount theretofore collected by the company. This seems to us to be a very strong argument in favor of the view that the legislature never intended to, and did not in fact, give such a power to establish general maximum rates, but confined it to one or two or a few specified rates, which might be reduced upon complaint, and where there might be a real investigation of all the problems involved in the propriety of the reduction in a few distinct and separate cases. A sufficient investigation of the whole series of rates on all the roads in the state by one commission is almost an impossibility, and an attempt to do so would prove a failure, and would, in all probability, result in gross injustice to the roads. The statute, it will be remembered, gives no power to the commission to fix rates unless it has already determined that the rates complained of, or which it has investigated upon its own information, are extortionate after hearing the parties, and then it fixes the rates at a just and reasonable amount. If no extortion is found in any particular rate, there can be no fixing of rates in that particular. And yet that particular rate might require increase in order to make the whole schedule just, fair, and reasonable. A general power to fix rates under such limitations cannot be supposed to have been within the intent of the legislature. The difference between the fixing of one rate or a few, upon specific complaint or information, and the adoption of a general scheme of rates, applicable in all cases to all the roads, is vast and important. In the one case it can be fairly accomplished, while, in the other, the chances of injustice and great inequalities are infinite and almost certain to occur.

We do not say that, under this statute, as we construe it, there must be a separate proceeding or complaint for each separate rate. A complaint, or a proceeding on information by the commission itself, in regard to any road, may include more than the rate on one commodity or more than one rate, but there must be some specific complaint or information in regard to each rate to be investigated, and there can be, under this statute, no such wholesale complaint, which, by its looseness and its generalities, can be made applicable to every rate in operation on a railroad, or upon several or all of the railroads of the state. If the legislature intended to give such a universal and all-prevailing power, it is not too much to say that the language used in giving it should be so plain as not to permit of doubt as to the legislative intent.

The appellants contend that, in any event, the order made by the commission December 7, 1905, regarding rates on lumber, logs, and cross ties, to and from all points in the state, ought to stand as reasonable and proper. The complaint made by the lumber dealers in their petition to intervene in the Guenther proceeding adopted the language of that petition as to all rates, upon all commodities, upon all roads throughout the state, and then added a specific complaint as to the logs, etc. While the whole proceeding as to all rates was pending before the commission, it took up, as part of it, the question of the reasonableness of all the rates on lumber to and from all points in the state. This proceeding is, therefore, but a part of the whole proceeding, involving an investigation as to every rate on all commodities on every road throughout the state, and we do not think it a case where a particular rate on a specific commodity, applicable all through the state, upon all roads, should be separated from the general order, when the specific order was made after the general complaint was filed, and is itself a general order, and was made by the commission in the exercise of an assumed power claimed to be given by the statute, which claim we hold was totally unfounded. We therefore think that, in this particular case, the order as to lumber rates must fall with the rest of the assumed jurisdiction of the commission.

There is nothing in our decision in McChord v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 183 U.S. 483, 46 L. ed. 289, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165, which affects the question discussed in this opinion.

We are of opinion that, under the statute, the commission had no authority to make a general tariff of rates, and the final decree of the Circuit Court is, for that reason, affirmed.