Sigler v. Parker/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

Respondent was convicted of murder and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on June 2, 1956, nearly 14 years ago. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed. Parker v. State, 164 Neb. 614, 83 N.W.2d 347, and we denied certiorari, 356 U.S. 933, 78 S.Ct. 775, 2 L.Ed.2d 763.

In 1962 respondent filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the trial court which was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Parker v. State, 178 Neb. 1, 131 N.W.2d 678.

In 1963 respondent sought post-conviction relief in the Nebraska court, alleging that the confessions obtained from him and used at the trial were involuntary and in violation of the Federal Constitution. The court after an evidentiary hearing denied relief and the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed. State v. Parker, 180 Neb. 707, 144 N.W.2d 525.

In 1966 respondent filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, again challenging the voluntariness of the confessions. Again a full evidentiary hearing was held and the petition was denied. That was on June 27, 1968. On July 18, 1969, the Court of Appeals reversed, 413 F.2d 459, saying:

'The interest of justice would not be served by remanding     this case for a hearing upon the voluntariness of the      confession(s) if the factual background in the present case      is such that in event the state court again found the      confession(s) voluntary, a determination that such finding      was not warranted would be required. In both the state and     federal post conviction hearings reliance was placed upon the      extensive record made on voluntariness at the trial, and no      additional evidence was introduced. Thus it would seem     unlikely that either party has any additional substantial      evidence on the voluntariness issue.' Id., at 463.

The issue of voluntariness vel non of the confessions is a much-plowed field. If the federal courts were coming to this question without prior state opportunity to act, I would agree that the federal courts should not act until the state tribunal first had the opportunity to try the issue. Moreover, it would be more appropriate, as Mr. Justice BLACK says, to remand the case so that there might be a new trial before a jury. But if this issue is to be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding, where traditionally a jury does not sit, then we should affirm the Court of Appeals. The issue as to the voluntary character of the confessions has been hotly contested and the facts thoroughly exposed in the state proceedings. And the conclusion by the Court of Appeals that the confessions were not voluntary is a responsible one. Moreover the observation of the Supreme Court of Nebraska that there is no evidence of 'a real miscarriage of justice,' State v. Parker, 180 Neb., at 714, 144 N.W.2d, at 529, though popular in some legal circles, is irrelevant. For under our presumably civilized constitutional procedures, a conviction on a coerced confession, even of one whom we despise, is intolerable.