Sewall v. Haymaker/Opinion of the Court

Obviously, in view of the statutes of Ohio, the first inquiry must be whether the deed purporting to convey to Jones the interest of John Sinclair and wife in the lands in dispute was executed and acknowledged in conformity with the laws of Virginia, where that deed purports to have been made. There has been no appearance in this court by the defendant; nor, in the examination of the questions presented, have we had the benefit of a brief in his behalf. But we are informed by the brief of the plaintiffs in error that it was claimed in the court below that neither the acknowledgment nor record of the Sinclair deed constituted parts of the deed itself, and that the effect of the want of acknowledgment was simply that defined by section 4 of the Virginia act of 1819, namely, that the deed was valid and binding as between the parties and their heirs. We do not understand such to have been the law ofV irginia in respect either to the acknowledgment or recording of deeds made by husband and wife. In Bank v. Paul, 75 Va. 594, 600, the question was as to the admissibility of parol evidence to show that the privy examination of a married woman was regularly taken in the form prescribed by the statute, or that the officer taking the same, by mistake or inadvertence, omitted material statements required to be set forth in the certificate of such examination. Referring to section 7 of chapter 117 of the Virginia Code of 1873, which, as we shall presently see, is substantially the same as section 15 of the act of 1819, the court said: 'It will thus be seen that the statute prescribes the necessary steps to be taken preparatory to a valid relinquishment of the claim for dower. The certificate must set forth her declaration and acknowledgment as prescribed by the statute; it must be on or annexed to the deed; it must be admitted to record along with the deed; and when all these requirements shall have been complied with, and not till then, the writing operates to convey from the wife her right of dower.' After observing that the object of the statute was to provide a substitute for the proceeding by fine in England, which was never in force in Virginia, whereby the rights of the wife on the one hand might be carefully guarded, and an indefeasible title secured on the other, the court proceeds: 'As was said by Judge TUCKER, (Harkins v. Forsyth, 11 Leigh, 301:) 'The validity of the deed is made to depend, not upon the truth of the certificate, but upon its existence and its delivery to the clerk.' It is the authentie and sole medium of proving that the feme covert has acknowledged the deed with all the solemnities required by the statute.' The court of appeals of Virginia, in the same case, quotes with approval the following language from Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 330: 'What the law requires to be done and appear of record can only be done and made to appear of the record itself, or an exemplification of the record. It is perfectly immaterial whether there be an acknowledgment or privy examination in fact or not, if there be no record of the privy examination; for by the express terms of the law it is not the fact of privy examination merely, but the recording of the fact, which makes the deed effectual to pass the estate of a feme covert.' In Rorer v. Bank, decided in 1887, (not yet in the regular reports, but reported in 4 S. E. Rep. 820, 826, 831,) the court said that 'all the requirements of the statute, including recordation, as to both husband and wife, must be complied with, or else the wife's title does not pass.' After an extended review of the statutes of Virginia relating to conveyances, beginning with the act of 1674, and including those of 1705, 1710, 1748, 1785, 1792, 1814, and 1819, the court further said: 'The part of section 15, c. 99, 1 Rev. Code, 1819, prescribing the effect of acknowledgments of married women when recorded, was condensed substantially into what is now section 7, c. 117, Code 1873, which was the statute in force and applicable to the case in hand. * *  * The statute is absolute; there is no room for presumptions resulting from technical rules of construction; and all its requisites must be substantially complied with, or else nothing passes by the deed of a married woman. As colony and state, such has been not only the general policy, but the unmistakable spirit and letter, of the law in Virginia for over 200 years.' In view of these adjudications, it is clear that by the law of Virginia the acknowledgment and the recording of conveyances by husband and wife of lands in that commonwealth, in the mode prescribed by her laws, is essential to pass the estate of the wife in such lands.

The question, however, remains as to the effect of the death of Mrs. Sinclair before her husband had acknowledged the deed. This question is by no means free from difficulty. It was suggested, in a somewhat i fferent form, but not decided, in the case of Rorer v. Bank. It was there argued that, if a married woman's deed only became effectual when duly admitted to record, it would result that, if the wife died between the date of her acknowledgment and the recording of the deed, the instrument would be wholly void. But the court said: 'Not so, however; for, as between the husband and the grantee, the deed would be valid and binding, though as to the wife it would be inoperative-ineffectual to pass her title-until duly recorded, for it is only then that a married woman's conveyance becomes a complete transaction. But it is useless to argue this proposition, as the pretended recordation in 1875 of the deed of 1861 was prior to Mrs. Rorer's death. It is sufficient to say that, if the question were presented directly for decision, it would be an exceedingly interesting one, as the authority for recordation at a time subsequent to the execution and delivery of the deed seems to rest solely upon her presumption of the wife's continuing acquiescence; and in 2 Tuck. Bl. Comm. bk. 2, p. 268, the distinguished author significantly suggests the question whether recordation after the death of the wife would be effectual.' While it was not essential, under the Ohio statute, that the deed signed by Sinclair and wife be put upon record in Virginia, we are of opinion that, upon the death, the deed, previously signed and acknowledged by her upon privy examination, but not acknowledged by the husband prior to her death, became, so far as the laws of Virginia are concerned, inoperative as a conveyance of her interest in the lands in controversy. Until the husband acknowledged it, and thereby, in the only way prescribed by statute, gave his assent to her conveying away her interest, the deed was ineffectual for any purpose. While it may not have been necessary that they should acknowledge the deed at the same time, or upon the same occasion, or before the same officer, the statute of Virginia, upon any fair interpretation of its words, and having regard to the policy which induced its enactment, must be held to have required that the acknowledgment of the husband should occur in the life-time of the wife, while she was capable of asking his consent to the conveyance of her lands. But that assent was of no avail after the death of the wife, before the husband had, by acknowledgment of the deed, signified his willingness to have her convey to Jones, under whom the defendant claims title. Upon her death the title passed to some one. It did not pass to Jones, for the reason that there was not then in existence any completed conveyance sufficient, under the law, to transfer her estate to a grantee. It, therefore, must have passed to her heirs, and their title could not be divested by any subsequent act of the husband. The fourth section of the Virginia statute declaring certain conveyances to be valid and binding as between the parties and their heirs has no application to conveyances by a wife in which the husband does not join, during her life-time, by an acknowledgment in the mode prescribed by law. It results that, if the admissibility as evidence of the deed to Jones depends upon its validity, under the laws of Virginia, as a conveyance of Mrs. Sinclair's interest in these lands, the court erred in not excluding it from the jury.

Was the deed executed and acknowledged in conformity with the laws of Ohio, where the lands are situated? In other words, would the deed have conveyed the interest of Mrs. Sinclair if if had been executed and acknowledged in Ohio by the wife in her life-time, but not acknowledged by the husband until after the death of the wife? If so, it may be that, under the Ohio statute of 1831, the deed would be good as between the heirs of Mrs. Sinclair and Jones; for that statute declares that a conveyance of lands in Ohio will be valid if acknowledged in conformity either with the laws of the state in which it is executed, or in conformity with thel aws of Ohio. Upon examining the statutes of Ohio, the controlling provisions of which have been referred to, and also the decisions of the supreme court of that state to which our attention has been called, we find nothing to justify us in holding that a deed for land acknowledged by the wife, but not acknowledged by the husband in the life-time of the wife, will pass her estate in the lands conveyed. In Ludlow v. O'Neil, 29 Ohio St. 181, it was held, using the language of the syllabus, that 'under the statute of February 22, 1831, it is not indispensable to the validity of a deed executed by husband and wife that they should acknowledge it before the same officer, or at the same time and place, or that their acknowledgment should be certified by a single certificate.' Yet 'the acknowledgment of the wife is not binding upon her until the deed is executed and acknowledged by the husband.' 'The husband,' the court said, 'can render the wife every needed protection by himself refusing the sign and acknowledge the deed. If she acknowledged if before the husband, it is presented to him with the wife's signature and acknowledgment, and he has only to refuse to acknowledge.' We are of opinion that, equally under the Ohio and Virginia statutes, a deed by the husband and wife conveying the latter's land is inoperative to pass her title unless the husband, she having duly acknowledged the deed, should, in her life-time, and by an acknowledgment in the form prescribed by law, signify his assent to such conveyance. For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed, with directions to grant a new trial, and for further proceedings in conformity with law and the principles of this opinion.

MATTHEWS, J., took no part in the decision of this case.