Seven Hickory v. Ellery/Opinion of the Court

The single question we have now to consider is whether a bill passed by both Houses, and presented to the governor before the legislature adjourns, becomes a law when signed by the governor after the session of the legislature has been terminated by an adjournment, but within ten days from its presentation to him. We have no hesitation in saying it does. There is certainly no express provision of the Constitution to the contrary. All that instrument requires is that, before any bill, which has passed the two Houses, can become a law, it shall be presented to the governor. If he approves it, he may sign it. If he does sign it within the time, the bill becomes a law. That is not said in so many words, but is manifestly implied. After a bill has been signed, the legislature has nothing more to do with it. Undoubtedly, if the legislature should be in session when the signing is done, it would not be inappropriate for the governor to communicate his approval to one or both the Houses; but there is nothing in the Constitution which requires him to do so. The filing of the bill by the governor in the office of the secretary of state with his signature of approval on it is just as effectual in giving it validity as a law, as its formal return to the legislature would be. The bill becomes a law when signed. Everything done after that is with a view to preserving the evidence of its passage and approval.

The other parts of the article of the Constitution under consideration relate only to what is to be done if the governor fails to indicate his approval of the bill by signing it. If the legislature continues in session and he positively disapproves the bill, he may, within ten days from the time of its presentation to him, return it with his objections to the House in which it originated. Under such circumstances the bill cannot become a law until it has again passed both Houses, and this time by a majority of all the members elected. Such a second passage, if secured and entered on the journal, makes the bill a law notwithstanding its disapproval by the governor. If the governor remains passive, and neither signs nor returns the bill within ten days, the legislature being at the time in session, it becomes a law without his approval.

In this way provision is made for every case that can arise, except when the governor fails to sign the bill and the legislature adjourns for the session before the expiration of the ten days. To meet such a state of things it was provided that the governor might return the bill with his objections on the first day of the next session, and that, if he did not, the bill was then to become a law. If he did, the bill must again be passed over his objections as in case of a return before an adjournment and within the ten days. If thus passed it became a law, otherwise not. So that, under the Constitution of Illinois, if a bill is passed by both Houses of the legislature it becomes a law,--

1, when approved and signed by the governor within ten days     after its presentation to him; 2, when the legislature being      in session, the governor fails to sign the bill or return it      with his objections to the House in which it originated      within the ten days; 3, when, after being returned within the      ten days, it is passed by the requisite majorities over his      objections; 4, when, if the session of the legislature      terminates by an adjournment before the expiration of the ten      days, he fails to return the bill with his objections the      first day of the next session; and, 5, when, having returned      it with objections of the first day of the next session, it is again passed by the requisite majorities      in both Houses. And it becomes a law at the time when the     event happens which is to give it validity. In the present     case the bill was approved and signed within the ten days,      and, therefore, as we think, it become a law from the date of      the approval, notwithstanding the legislature was not in      session at the time. This is in accordance with the ruling of     the Court of Appeals of New York in The People v. Bowen (21      N. Y. 517); of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in ''State, ex      rel. Belden, Attorney-General, v. Fagan (22 La. Ann. 545),     and of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Solomon v.      Commissioners of Cartersville'' (41 Ga. 157), upon provisions      somewhat similar in the constitutions of those States. In the     last case the decision was put on the ground that the      practice of the governor had been to sign the bills within      the limited time, whether the legislature was in session or      not, but not afterwards. The bill of exceptions in the     present case shows that the practice in Illinois has been to      sign after the legislature had adjourned.

In every view of the case, we think the judgment below was right, and it is consequently

Affirmed.