San Francisco National Bank v. Dodge/Opinion of the Court

The appellant bank sued to restrain the enforcement of state, county, and city taxes, levied for the year 1900, upon shares of stock of the bank. Adequate averments were made to show equitable jurisdiction. Cummings v. ''Merchants' Nat. Bank'', 101 U.S. 153, 157, 25 L. ed. 903, 904; Hills v. ''National Albany Exch. Bank'', 105 U.S. 319, 26 L. ed. 1052; Lander v. ''Mercantile Nat. Bank'', 186 U.S. 458, 46 L. ed. 1247, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 908. The taxes were alleged to be in conflict with the law of the United States. Rev. Stat. § 5219, U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 3502.

The case was submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. A decree of dismissal was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit. That court deemed that the cause was controlled by the reasoning of an opinion delivered in deciding a previous case (Nevada Nat. Bank v. Dodge), the opinion in which case is reported in 50 C. C. A. 145, 119 Fed. 57.

Before considering the contentions relied on we quote the text of the Constitution of California directly relating to the subject in hand, and briefly advert to the legislation of that state which preceded the act under which the assailed tax was levied.

Section 1 of article 13 of the Constitution of California provides:

'All property in the state, no exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The word 'property,' as used in this article and section, is hereby declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and all other matters and things, real, personal, and mixed, capable of private ownership. . . . The legislature may provide, except in the case of credits secured by mortgage or trust deed, for a reduction from credits of debts due to bona fide residents of this state.'

Carrying out the command to provide for the ascertainment of the value of property to be taxed, it was enacted (Pol. Code, § 3627) that all taxable property shall be assessed 'at its full cash value,' and (Pol. Code, § 3617) that 'the terms 'value' and 'full cash value' mean the amount at which the property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.'

Prior to 1881 shares of stock of all corporations were taxed, and § 3640 of the Political Code commanded that the market value of the stock of a corporation should be taken as the value of the shares for assessment. Where the shares of stock were taxed no tax was levied upon the corporate property. This was because the supreme court of California had decided that to tax both the stock and the corporate property would be double taxation. Burke v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 594.

In the year 1881 the general system of taxing shares of stock was abandoned, and a rule was put in force taxing the corporate property. Section 3608 of the Political Code, which embodied this change, was as follows:

'Shares of stock in corporations possess no intrinsic value over and above the actual value of the property of the corporation, which they stand for and represent, and the assessment and taxation of such shares and also of the corporate property would be double taxation. Therefore, all property belonging to corporations shall be assessed and taxed, but no assessment shall be made of shares of stock; nor shall any holder thereof be taxed therefor.' The act of 1899, under which the tax in this case was levied, amended the section just quoted, by providing that all property belonging to corporations shall be assessed and taxed, 'save and except the property of national banking associations, not assessable by Federal statute;' and by adding to the provision commanding that no assessment shall be made of shares of stock in any corporation the following words: 'Save and except in national banking associations, whose property, other than real estate, is exempt from assessment by Federal statute.' To carry out the change made by the provision just referred to two sections were added to the Political Code, viz., 3609 and 3610. Section 3608, as amended by the act of 1899, and the two new sections resulting from that act, are in the margin.

3608. Shares of stock in corporations possess no intrinsic value over and above the actual value of the corporation which they stand for and represent; and the assessment and taxation of such shares, and also all the corporate property, would be double taxation. Therefore, all property belonging to corporations (save and except the property of national banking associations, not assessable by Federal statute) shall be assessed and taxed. But no assessment shall be made of shares and stocks in any corporation (save and except in national banking associations, whose property, other than real estate, is exempt from assessment by Federal statute).

3609. The stockholders in every national banking association doing business in this state, and having its principal place of business located in this state, shall be assessed and taxed on the value of their shares of stock therein; and said shares shall be valued and assessed as is other property for taxation, and shall be included in the valuation of the personal property of such stockholders in the assessment of the taxes at the place, city, town, and county where such national banking association is located, and not elsewhere, whether the said stockholders reside in said place, city, town, or county, or not; but in the assessment of such shares each stockholder shall be allowed all the deductions permitted by law to the holders of moneyed capital in the form of solvent credits, in the same manner as such deductions are allowed by the provisions of paragraph 6 of § 3629 of the Political Code of the state of Callfornia. In making such assessment to each stockholder there shall be deducted from the value of his shares of stock such sum as is in the same proportion to such value as the total value of its real estate and property exempt by law from taxation bears to the whole value of all the shares of capital stock in said national bank. And nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real estate of such national bank from taxation. And the assessment and taxation of such shares of stock in said national banking associations shall not be at a greater rate than is made or assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of this state.

3610. The assessor charged by law with the assessment of said shares shall, within ten days after he has made such assessment, give written notice to each national banking association of such assessment of the shares of its respective shareholders; and no personal or other notice to such shareholder of such assessment shall be necessary for the purpose of this act. And, in case the tax on any such stock is unsecured by real estate owned by the holder of such stock, then the bank in which said stock is held shall become liable therefor; and the assessor shall collect the same from said bank, which may then charge the amount of the tax so collected to the account of the stockholder owning such stock, and shall have a lien, prior to all other liens, on his said stock, and the dividends and earnings thereof, for the reimbursement to it of such taxes so paid.

The first contention is that the law of 1899 is on its face in conflict with § 5219 of the Revised Statutes, because it taxes shares of stock in national banks, and does not tax such shares in state banks and other state moneyed corporations. As it is patent that the state banks and corporations are taxed on their property, the proposition reduces itself to this: That the states may not pursue the method permitted by the act of Congress of taxing shares of stock in national banks, unless the same method is employed as to the stock of state banks and other state moneyed corporations.

In ''Davenport Nat. Bank v. Board of Equalization'', 123 U.S. 83, 31 L. ed. 94, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73, it was decided that the provision of § 5219 of the Revised Statutes [U.S.C.omp. Stat. 1901, p. 3502], authorizing the taxation of shares of stock in national banks, but exacting that the tax when levied should be at no greater rate than that imposed on other moneyed capital, did not require the states, in taxing their own corporations, 'to conform to the system of taxing national banks upon the shares of their stock in the hands of their owners.'

True it is in the Davenport Case it was also decided that the prohibition in the act of Congress of a higher rate of taxation of shares of stock in national banks than on other moneyed capital operated to avoid any method of assessment or taxation, the usual or probable effect of which would be to discriminate in favor of state banks and against national banks. True, also, is it that in the same case it was held that, even where no such discrimination seemingly arose on the face of the statute, nevertheless, if from the record it appeared that the system created by the state in its practical execution produced an actual and material discrimination against national banks, it would be the duty of the court to hold the state statute to be in conflict with the act of Congress, and therefore void.

As, then, no conflict necessarily arises between the act of Congress and the state law, solely because the latter provides one method for taxation of state banks and other moneyed corporations and another method for national banks, it follows that the contention, that the state law, for that reason, is repurgnant to the act of Congress, is without merit. And this brings us to consider the contention of the appellant, which we think was embraced in the pleadings, which was expressly covered by the stipulated facts, the overruling of which was assigned as error in the circuit court of appeals and in this court, and was elaborately discussed by both parties in the argument at bar, viz., that, irrespective of the face of the state law, that law is void because of a discrimination against national banks, within the principles settled in the Davenport Case.

To determine this latter contention requires an analysis of the two systems which the law of California enforces, in order that the two may be accurately compared.

Under the law the shares of national banks must be valued at their 'full cash value,' which the statute defines to mean the amount at which they 'would be taken for a just debt due from a solvent debtor.' These words are but synonymous with the requirement that, in assessing shares of stock, their market value must be the criterion. This is the case, for, eliminating exceptional and extraordinary conditions, giving an abnormal value for the moment to stock, it is apparent that the general market value of stock is its true cash and selling value. That such is the meaning of the words in the legislation of California is indisputable, in view of the provision of § 3640 of the Political Code, which made market value the rule for assessing shares of stock during the period when the taxation of shares of stock generally prevailed, and that such requirement was mandatory was in effect held by the supreme court of California. Miller v. Heilbron, 58 Cal. 133, 138.

What, then, was embraced in the assessment of the shares of stock at their full cash or selling or market value? It embraced, not only the book value of all the assets of the corporations, but the good will, the dividend-earning power, the ability with which the corporate affairs were managed, the confidence reposed in the capacity and permanency of tenure of the officers, and all those other indirect and intangible increments of value which enter into the estimate of the worth of stock, and help to fix the market value or selling price of the shares. Considering this subject in Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 211, 41 L. ed. 974, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604, the court said:

'The capital stock of a corporation, and the shares of a joint-stock association, represent, not only tangible property, but also the intangible, including therein all corporate franchises, and all contracts, privileges, and good will of the concern.'

And in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. ''Central Transp. Co.'' 171 U.S. 138, 43 L. ed. 108, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, this was reiterated. The court, after observing that, while the franchise was one of the things entering into the computation of market value of shares of stock, said (p. 154, L. ed. p. 115, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 815):

'The probable prospective capacity for earnings also enters largely into market value, and future possible earnings again depend to a great extent upon the skill with which the affairs of the company may be managed. These considerations, while they may enhance the value of the shares in the market, yet do not in fact increase the value of the actual property itself. They are matters of opinion upon which persons selling and buying the stock may have different views.'

That this doctrine is the rule in California is clearly shown by Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 64 L. R. A. 918, 100 Am. St. Rep. 130, 75 Pac. 832, for in that case the court, speaking of such elements of value as 'dividend or profit earning power, or good will,' said (p. 289, L. R. A. p. 924, Am. St. Rep. p. 141, Pac. p. 838):

'In this connection, it will be observed that these elements, so far as they may enter into the value of shares of stock, would be included in an assessment of such shares to the stockholders.'

The state banks and other corporations are assessed on their property. Conceding that every species of property is assessed which is specifically enumerated as taxable in the state Constitution, it does not follow that the assessment of property as such includes good will, dividend earning power, confidence in the ability of the management, and all those other intangible elements which necessarily enter into the cash or selling value of shares of stock. As said in the passage already quoted from the Pullman Case, 171 U.S. 138, 43 L. ed. 108, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, such elements 'may enhance the value of the shares [of stock] in the market, yet [they] do not in fact increase the value of the actual property itself. They are matters of opinion upon which persons selling and buying the stock may have different views.' In the argument at bar no law of the state was referred to requiring that the assessing officers, in valuing the property of a corporation, should assess as property its good will, its dividend earning power, the confidence reposed in its officers, etc. From this analysis it results that in the one case, that of national banks, not only the value of all the tangible property, but also the value of all the intangible elements above referred to, is assessed and taxed, whilst in the other case, that of state banks and other moneyed corporations, their property is taxed, but the intangible elements of value which we have indicated are not assessed and taxed; the consequence being to give rise to the discrimination against national banks and in favor of state banks and other moneyed corporations forbidden by the act of Congress.

In the argument at bar this conclusion, it is insisted, is avoided, because, whilst under the text of the state statutes it may be that all the elements of value which are included in the assessment of shares of stock are not eo nomine assessed against state banks and other moneyed corporations as property, they are, nevertheless, assessed against such corporations under the denomination of 'franchise,' the duty of the assessing officer to do so being imperative, as the result of the interpretation given to the taxing law by the supreme court of the state. The proposition is thus stated in the argument of counsel:

'Under the California system, all the property of California corporations is assessed, including their franchises. It is frequently the case that the market value of the stock of the corporation is greatly in excess of the value of its property, other than its franchise. This fact was called to the attention of the state court, which recognized the force of this suggestion, and held, the Constitution and laws of the state require the assessment and taxation of the franchise of the corporation, and that its value, for the purpose of such assessment and taxation, was properly ascertained by deducting from the market value of its stock the value of its corporate property and assessing the remainder as franchise.'

It may be conceded that, if the statutes have been interpreted by the supreme court of the state as thus asserted, and that, as so interpreted, they have been applied by the assessing officers, there would be an end to the discrimination which we have seen arises from the consideration of the result of the statutes when not so interpreted.

The question then is, Do the decisions of the supreme court of California, as contended, place the positive duty on the assessor of including in an assessment of the franchises of state corporations all the elements of value which form part of the market or selling value of shares of stock? Three cases are cited to sustain the proposition, viz., San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614; Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69; and Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 64 L. R. A. 918, 100 Am. St. Rep. 130, 75 Pac. 832.

Before coming to consider the last ease cited, which is the one principally relied upon, we dispose of the two others by saying that they do not support the proposition. The first simply decided that where a part of a tax was asserted to be illegal, and a part was admitted to be valid, the duty existed to pay the confessedly legal part to justify relief concerning the portion claimed to be illegal. The second case but decided that the franchises of corporations were taxable as property, and, where a corporation enjoyed other franchises than the right to exist as a corporation, and the board of equalization, in assessing such franchises, had treated them as equivalent in value to the selling value of the capital stock, the courts had no power to interfere with the discretion lodged in the assessing officers. In the last-cited and latest-decided case, Bank of California v. San Francisco, the controversy was this: The Bank of California was assessed on its property. The difference between the value of such property and the cash or selling or market value of the shares of stock of the corporation was $2,943,096.92. The franchise, instead of being assessed for this amount, was valued only at $750,000. This valuation was resisted by the bank, upon the ground that it was so large that it must have included good will, dividend-earning capacity, etc., which, it was asserted, could not under the law be embraced in an assessment of franchises. The court elaborately reasoned (there being two dissenting judges) that, in view of the power of the assessors to value property, it 'could not say' that the assessing officers had transcended their authority in making the valuation complained of. Speaking of the duty of the assessing officers, it was said (p. 288, L. R. A. p. 923, Am. St. Rep. p. 141, Pac. p. 837):

'The duty of making the valuation was cast upon the assessor. The method of arriving at the valuation, the process by which his mind reached the conclusion [in cases where, as here, it is not pretended that he acted fraudulently or dishonestly], is matter committed to his determination.'. . . This appears to be determinative of the contention here made. . . . (p. 289, L. R. A. p. 924, Am. St. Rep. p. 141, Pac. p. 838.) Whether or not the whole difference between the aggregate market value of the shares of stock and the value of the tangible property,-viz., $2,943,096.92,-was the value of the franchise, the assessor certainly had the right to take the value of the shares into consideration in determining the value of the franchise; and, were we at liberty to review the judgment of the assessor and of the board of equalization upon those matters, we could not say that an assessment of $750,000 thereon is unjust, or that it includes such elements as dividend or profit-earning power, or good will, which, it is claimed, should not be taken into consideration in determining the value of the property of the corporation.'

After pointing out that these elements entered into the assessment of shares of stock at their market value, it was observed (p. 289, L. R. A. p. 924, Am. St. Rep. p. 741, Pac. p. 838):

'It is clear that, if the laws of the state properly express the intention that everything that gives value to the shares of a corporation shall be assessed as property of the corporation, the true value of those shares is a most important element in determining the value of such property.'

In other words, the court simply declared that if the law of the state properly expressed the purpose to tax everything of value, the assessor had a discretion to consider what was the selling value of shares of stock in fixing the value of the franchise. Instead of supporting the contention that the law obliged the assessor to attribute to the franchise the value of those intangible elements which it was conceded were embraced in the assessment of shares of stock, the reasoning of the opinion is to the contrary. As the cash, selling, or market value of the stock in the case before the court was conceded to have been nearly $3,000,000 greater than the tangible property assessed to the corporation, and the assessor had valued the franchise, not at that sum, but at only $750,000, it is patent that, if the law of California had been what it is now asserted the court held it to be, that the claim that there was an overvaluation of the franchise would have been so frivolous as to require only a statement of the law to decide against the claim of overvaluation.

But the court made no such statement. On the contrary, it stated its inability to judicially declare that an assessment was extravagant and grossly unjust which was more than $2,000,000 lower than it should have been if the law imposed the obligation on the assessor of valuing the franchise by the difference between the value of the tangible property assessed and the cash or selling value of the shares of stock. This inability to give relief was placed solely upon the discretion which the law lodged in the assessor. But this interpretation of the statute serves only to further demonstrate the discrimination which has been previously pointed out. This result is made clear by comparing the discretion lodged in the assessor in valuing the franchise of state banks or other moneyed corporations with the duty resting on him as to the valuation of shares of national banks. The wide difference between the discretion on the one hand and the duty on other will be additionally demonstrated by a consideration of the discrimination against national banks which has arisen in the practical execution of the statutes.

In the agreed statement of facts it was admitted that there are in the state of California 178 commercial (or state) banks, possessing a vast amount of capital, 18 of which were located in San Francisco. And, to quote from the statement, 'that the manner in which franchises of commercial banks and trust companies were assessed for said fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, by the assessor of the city and county of San Francisco, is illustrated by the case of the Bank of California, a banking corporation organized under the laws of the state of California.' The assessment in question, which it is thus declared in the statement of facts is illustrative of the other assessments against state banks, was the one which was involved in the controversy decided in the Bank of California Case, supra. It is then recited in the agreed statement that the total property resources of the Bank of California, correcting a misprint in the record, were $5,156,903.08; and that the market or selling value of its capital stock was $8,100,000, a difference of $2,943,096.92; and that, deducting from the resources of the bank certain exemptions, the bank was assessed for property at $2,311,774. To this last-mentioned sum was added for franchise tax, not the difference between the value of the property and the selling value of the stock, which, as stated, was nearly $3,000,000, but only $750,000. It is insisted in argument that this statement shows but a single case of undervaluation of a state bank by the assessors, and therefore does not justify the conclusion that, in the exercise of their discretion, the assessors had generally, as to state banks and corporations, valued the franchises at less than the difference between the value of the property taxed and the market or selling value of the stock. But this contention disregards the fact that, by the agreed statement, it was expressly admitted that the assessment in question was illustrative of the assessments upon the other state banks and moneyed corporations. In view of the issues in the cause, as to which the facts were agreed, to say that the assessment in question only illustrated the case of the Bank of California would require us to disregard the agreed statement.

Finally, it is contended that, even if the state banks and other state moneyed corporations were assessed as illustrated by the valuation placed on the Bank of California, the complainant national bank has no reason to complain because the assessment put upon its shares of stock was relatively no higher than that put upon the Bank of California, and therefore no discrimination was occasioned. This is predicated upon the fact that the value per share affixed to the stock of the complainant national bank was not higher, having sole reference to the value of the stock as shown by the book value of the assets, and, considering allowable deductions, than was the assessment put upon the Bank of California, considering, alone, the same elements. But there is no proof whatever that the stock of the complainant bank had a market or selling value higher than the value affixed to it by the assessor; and the items which were made the basis of the assessment against the stock are declared in the agreed statement to be the entire assets of the bank, and in the argument at bar on behalf of the assessor the value of the shares of stock of the bank in excess of their book value is assumed to have been only nominal. The proposition, therefore, comes to this,-although the complainant national bank was assessed at the full value of its stock, there was no discrimination in favor of the state bank, albeit there was a difference in excess of $2,000,000 between the value put upon the property and franchise of the state bank and the sum which should have been levied against it, if all the elements had been assessed which enter into the value of shares of stock. And, thus analyzed, the contention is again reducible to this proposition,-that, where property of one person worth a given amount is assessed for its full value, no discrimination in favor of another results when the latter is assessed for a sum greatly below the value of the property assessed.

What has just been said disposes, also, of the contention that, if the national bank had been assessed under the state law by the rule applied to state banks, it would have had affixed to its property a slightly higher valuation than was given as the value of the shares of its capital stock. Without stopping to point out the error in the calculation by which this result is supposed to be demonstrated, it suffices to say that the contention would have merit only in the event that the property and franchise of all state banks had no higher value than the book value of the shares of stock. The fallacy underlying the whole contention cannot better be made clear than by the mere reiteration of the statement that, under the facts as agreed, it is obvious that the shares of stock of the national bank were assessed for all they were worth under the rule of market or selling value, whilst the state bank was only assessed for $750,000 above the book value of the stock, although the cash, selling, or market value would have required an assessment of nearly $3,000,000.

Many contentions were argued at bar involving the assertion that the state law was invalid because of deductions of debts or exempt property which, it was asserted, the law allows to state banks and other moneyed corporations on an assessment of their property, and does not allow holders of shares of stock in national banks. Most of these contentions are, in effect, disposed of by the consideration which we have given to the proposition that the state law was void simply because it established different methods of taxation as to the two classes of corporations. In so far as the contentions referred to are not, in effect, disposed of by our conclusions on that subject, we content ourselves with saying that we think all such propositions were rightly decided by the court below to be without merit, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered by that court in the Nevada Bank Case, to which the court referred, and upon which it placed its rulings. We decide this case solely upon the record before us. Our conclusion, therefore, does not deny the power of the state of California to assess shares of stock in national banks, provided only the method adopted does not produce the discrimination prohibited by the act of Congress. From this, of course, it would follow that, if the statutes of California, either from their text or as construed by the highest court of that state, compelled the assessing officers in the valuation of the property of state banks and other state moneyed corporations to include all those elements of value which are embraced in the assessment of shares of stock in national banks so that there would be an equality of taxation as respects national banks, the discrimination which we find to exist under the present state of the law of California would disappear.

The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed; the decree of the Circuit Court is also reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Brewer, with whom the CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice Brown, and Justice Peckham concur, dissenting: