S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States/Concurrence Blackmun

[p19] MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join, concurring.

Because I agree that in this case, where neither fraud nor bad faith is charged, the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322, does not operate to give the United States the power to challenge a contract disputes clause finding of fact in favor of the contractor by the Government's own contracting agency, I join the Court's opinion and its judgment. I venture some supportive comments:


 * 1. The contracting officer and the Atomic Energy Commission acted here in an executive capacity for the United [p20] States. See Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 448-450 (1960). The Commission is the party to the contract with the contractor. Its exercise of executive judgment is necessarily that of the United States. Yet the Government, by its position here, would grant itself the right to challenge its own executive determination whenever the General Accounting Office, by interposition, thinks this should be done. This, for me, does not make good sense and, in the absence of clear congressional authorization, I doubt that it would make good law.


 * 2. The disputes clause in Government contracts has been employed for over four decades. The clause is one drawn and prescribed by the United States. It is not one drawn by the contractor or by any group of contractors with whom the United States deals. And for years, with the specified exceptions, that clause itself has been regarded as conferring no right of judicial review on the part of the Government.


 * 3. By accepting the disputes clause in his contract, the contractor bears the interim financial burden and gives up the right of rescission and the right to sue for damages. What he receives in return is the Government's assurances of speedy settlement and of prompt payment, not payment delayed for months or, as here, for years.


 * 4. To compel a contractor to go through the administrative process and to proceed and to perform with less than his usual arsenal of defenses against administrative arbitrariness or unfairness, and then to have that determination submitted to judicial review at the behest of still another agency of Government, subjects the contractor to untoward delay in payment and to a financial hazard that may well prove to be ruinous.


 * 5. The result would be a strange one if, as even the GAO here concedes, a contracting officer's decision favorable to a contractor possesses finality, United States v. Corliss [p21] Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1876); United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 (1922), while a decision at the higher level of the agency itself does not. When the officer and the contractor agree to the disposition of a dispute, there is no occasion for the issuance of a decision by a contracting officer, and the Wunderlich Act, by its terms, does not apply. And if the contractor accepts a decision of the contracting officer, and does not appeal to the Commission, that decision, by the specific provisions of the disputes clause, is final and conclusive as to questions of fact. Under the Government's position, however, the decision at the agency head would enjoy no such preferred and conclusive status.


 * 6. Lurking in the background of the Court's decision is advantage to the Government resulting from what strikes me as a possible breach of contract. The contractor here, according to the long-term understanding of the disputes clause, consented to the disposition of disputes by the contracting officer and by the AEC on appeal, and to the finality of decision at those points. It did not [p22] consent to its review or to the exercise of veto power by any other agency of Government. When the United States then disavows the Commission's decision—a decision that, as the Court notes, to this day has never been withdrawn or repudiated by the AEC—it seems to me that the Government imposes something to which the contractor has not agreed.


 * 7. The legislative history, which the dissent finds so clearly supportive of its conclusion, is not at all that clear for me. I doubt if anyone who reads and absorbs the Appendix to the dissent's opinion will find it clear and indicative. I regard it, as does the Court and as did the dissenters in the Court of Claims, as decidedly ambiguous at best. Even the Court of Claims majority struggled with the history and conceded that it did not "explicitly" provide for Government-instituted judicial review. 193 Ct. Cl. 335, 342, 433 F. 2d 1373, 1376. This is not surprising, for the Wunderlich Act was intended to relieve contractors from the holding in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951), where the Court restricted contractor-instigated judicial review to the situation of alleged and proven fraud. In Wunderlich the Government sought to reinstate an Interior Secretary's fact decision, favorable to the Government and adverse to the contractor, which the Court of Claims had set aside as "arbitrary," "capricious," and "grossly erroneous." The Government there urged—and prevailed over three dissenting votes—a narrow judicial review standard for the contractor. Congress reacted, and the Wunderlich Act overrode this restrictive measure of review and opened the door to the contractor to the extent permitted by the proviso clause of § 321.


 * I am not able to read into this legislative change a corresponding nod in the direction of the Government. The flat rejection by Congress of the proposed provision for GAO review is significant. There would be no point [p23] in that rejection if GAO has the power to defeat the finality of the disputes decision anyway. And the differing approaches taken on this appeal by the Department of Justice and the GAO themselves indicate the inconclusiveness of the legislative history.


 * 8. The issue is not whether advantage is or is not to be taken of the Government. Of course, the Government's rights are to be protected. That protection, however, is afforded by the nature and workings of the contract disputes system, by its emphasis on expeditious performance and getting the job done, and by the presence of the contracting officer and the agency, but not of the GAO. This results in fulfillment of the contract and, at the same time, gives the contractor the protection he needs against fraud, capriciousness, arbitrariness, bad faith, and absence of evidence. In the exercise of its legislative judgment, Congress has determined that in this area the Government needs no more.

I therefore join in reversing the judgment of the Court of Claims and in giving this contractor the benefit of the decision made by the Atomic Energy Commission itself, the very agency that was the contractor's opposite party to the contract.