Ryan v. Carter/Opinion of the Court

The defendants, and those under whom they claim, have been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in controversy, claiming title to it for more than thirty-five years. The Justice of the case, growing out of such length of possession, is manifestly with the court below; and we think the law of it is equally so.

The property in suit is part of a tract of land known as Survey 422, in the county of St. Louis. The court below, by stipulation, tried the case, and made a special finding of facts, on which it based its conclusion of law, that the plaintiffs could not recover. It is objected that some of these facts were not warranted by the evidence; but this is not a subject of inquiry here. If the parties chose to adopt this mode of trial, they are concluded by the propositions of fact which the evidence, in the opinion of that court, establishes. Whether general or special, the finding has the same effect as the verdict of a jury; and its sufficiency to sustain the judgment is the only matter for review in this court. Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 125; Flanders v. Tweed, id. 425; Kearney v. Case, 12 id. 275; Miller v. ''Life Ins. Co.'', id. 285.

Both parties claim under Auguste Dodier, to whom the tract was confirmed in 1810, by the board of commissioners created to settle the title to lands in the Territories of Orleans and Louisiana. The plaintiffs insist that this confirmation vested only an equitable title, and that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run until the fee passed out of the United States by patent, in 1873. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the fee passed directly to him in 1812, by operation of the act of June 13 of that year (2 Stat. 748); and, if so, it is conceded that the Statute of Limitations gives them title. It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire how far the acts of Congress to protect the rights of property in the territory acquired from France by the treaty of April 30, 1803, apply to and affect the title to the land in controversy. The United States stipulated that the inhabitants of the ceded country should be protected in the free enjoyment of their property; and in discharge of this obligation, and with a view to ascertain and adjust their claims to land, Congress passed acts in 1805, 1806, and 1807. As the board progressed in its investigations, it was found that the enforcement of the rules prescribed for its guidance excluded from confirmation a large number of meritorious claims, and more liberal provision was made for them by the act of June 13, 1812. Its first section declares 'that the rights, titles, and claims to town or village lots, out-lots, common field-lots, and commons in, adjoining, and belonging to the several towns and villages (naming them), in the Territory of Missouri, which lots have been inhabited, cultivated, or possessed, prior to the twentieth day of December, 1803, shall be, and the same are hereby, confirmed to the inhabitants of the respective towns or villages aforesaid, according to their several right or rights of common thereto, provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect the rights of any person claiming the same lands, or any part thereof, whose claims have been confirmed by the board of commissioners for adjusting and settling claims to lands in the said Territory.' It does not require the production of proofs before any commission or other tribunal established for that special purpose, but confirms, proprio vigore, the rights, titles, and claims to the lands embraced by it, and operates as a grant, to all intents and purposes. Repeated decisions of this court have declared that such a statute passes the title of the United States as effectually as if it contained in terms a grant de nove, and that a grant may be made by a law, as well as by a patent pursuant to a law.

The court below found that the lot of ground, now known as Survey 422, was an 'out-lot' of the village of St. Louis, with definite boundaries and location, prior to and at the date of the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States, and that Dodier was in possession of it, and an inhabitant of the village. It follows that the confirmation became complete, and vested in him a legal title, valid against the United States, and all persons claiming under it by a subsequent patent, unless his case was taken out of the enacting clause by the proviso that the act shall not affect any confirmed claims to the same lands. How 'affect' them? If in the sense of simply acting upon them, then his title is excepted from the operation of the act. But this exception is not within the reason of the proviso, and the court is at liberty to adopt another construction, if it may be fairly done, by giving full and just effect to the words used.

The general rule of law is, that a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the body of the act; and those who set up any such exception must establish it, as being within the words as well as the reason thereof. United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 165. Why should Congress wish to exclude Dodier's title, if it did not conflict with any other, and was embraced by the general words of the statute? If it was left incomplete by the act of 1807, and completed by the act of 1812, there was certainly no reason for excluding it. It was within the power of Congress to favor the inhabitants of villages over other claimants; and the fact that he had documentary evidence of his title to this out-lot, which the commissioners recognized and approved, affords no ground for supposing that Congress meant to deprive him of the benefit of another law dispensing with this evidence, and still meeting the requirements of his case. This would lead to unjust consequences; for it would discriminate between villagers, and put claims, supported by paper-title with possession, on a less favored footing than those resting only on cultivation and possession. Besides, such a purpose is inconsistent with the avowed object of the law, which is to confirm to the villagers, without discriminating in favor of any class, their rights of property, whether held in severalty or in common. If Congress had intended to exclude confirmed claims, the fair presumption is, that it would have, in terms, excepted them, or by some form of words declared their exclusion. But common fairness required that successful claimants before the board of commissioners should, in any event, be protected, and that the general words of the law should be so limited as not to produce a conflict of title. It would have been wrong, in legislating for the inhabitants of ancient villages, to do any thing prejudicial to those who, having been invited to present their claims to the board, had obtained its approval of them. This was recognized by Congress; and, to guard against the possibility of conflict, the proviso was inserted. No known rule of law requires us to interpret it according to its literal import, when its evident intent is different. It may be that the words, taken in their usual sense, would exclude the case of Dodier; but if it can be gathered, from a view of the whole law, and others in pari materia, that they were not used in that sense, and if they admit of another meaning in perfect harmony with the general scope of the statute, it will be adopted as the declaration of the will of Congress. Especially is this so when this construction withdraws the least number of cases from the operation of the statute. It is unnecessary to give the various definitions of the word 'affect.' It is enough to say, that it is often used in the sense of acting injuriously upon persons and things; and in this sense, we are all of opinion, it was used in this proviso. This interpretation accords with the reason and manifest intent of the proviso. It unsettles no confirmed title, and secures to the inhabitants of the villages, according to their respective rights, the protection which Congress in its wisdom thought proper to afford them.

If there were any doubt remaining about the correctness of this construction, it would be removed by a consideration of the act of 1807, which is in pari materia. The various laws, from time to time passed respecting the claims to lands in the Territories of Orleans and Louisiana, were modified as policy required; but they constitute a land system, are all in pari materia, and, in explaining their meaning and import, are to be regarded as one statute. Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat. 336. The third section of the act of 1807 (2 Stat. 440) confirms the claim of the corporation of the city of New Orleans to the commons adjacent to the city, and provides, that 'nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect or impair the rights of any individual or individuals to the said commons which are derived from any grant of the French or Spanish governments.' The word 'impair' is dropped from the proviso in the act of 1812, doubtless because it was deemed superfluous and unnecessary. There was no reason why the different provisos should have different limitations. Both had a common object,-to protect individual rights and prevent conflict of titles. The grants of the New Orleans commons, in the one case, and of the village lots in the other, were simply on the condition that no adverse claimant should be injured by them. If it should turn out that any one was benefited by the grant, he was not barred from availing himself of it because he had given another title in evidence before a regularly constituted board of commissioners.

Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, is cited by the plaintiffs as an authority in this case; but it can hardly be considered in that light. It is true that the court treat Lucas's title as 'being a grant by the United States, under the confirmation of the commissioners and the act of 1812;' but the effect which that act has on a lot confirmed by the commissioners was not discussed at the bar, or considered in the opinion, nor has it, to our knowledge, been heretofore decided by this court.

It is claimed that the effect of the partition suit is to estop the defendants from setting up title to lands which were not assigned to Labeaume by the commissioners in partition. But the lines of partition were incorrect; for the court finds that the land in controversy is a part of that conveyed to Labeaume by deed from Dodier, and is not within the boundaries of the land set off to him. Besides, neither party recognized the proceedings in partition as binding; nor were they at all necessary, as the deed calls for the whole estate in a specified part of a tract of land. In such a case, the deed ought to and must control the rights of the parties.

It is unnecessary to notice any other assignments of error, for these views dispose of the whole case, and affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.