Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo/Opinion of the Court

Respondent, Yee Chien Woo, is a native of mainland China, a Communist country, who fled that country in 1953 and sought refuge in Hong Kong. He lived in Hong Kong until 1959 when he came to the United States as a visitor to sell merchandise through a concession at a trade fair in Portland, Oregon. After a short stay, he returned to Hong Kong only to come back to the United States in 1960 to participate in the San Diego Fair and International Trade Mart to promote his Hong Kong business. Thereafter he remained in the United States although he continued to maintain his clothing business in Hong Kong until 1965. In 1965 respondent's wife and son obtained temporary visitor's permits and joined him in this country. By 1966 all three had overstayed their permits and were no longer authorized to remain in this country. After the Immigration and Naturalization Service began deportation proceedings, Yee Chien Woo applied for an immigrant visa claiming a 'preference' as an alien who had fled a Communist country fearing persecution as defined in § 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, 79 Stat. 913, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1964 ed., Supp. V).

The District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service denied respondent's application because 'the applicant's presence in the United States * *  * was not and is not now a physical presence which was a consequence of his flight in search of refuge from the Chinese mainland.' (Emphasis added.) On appeal within the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the decision of the District Director was affirmed by the Regional Commissioner on the ground that 'Congress did not intend that an alien, though formerly a refugee, who had established roots or acquired a residence in a country other than the one from which he fled would again be considered a refugee for the purpose of gaining entry into and or subsequently acquiring status as a resident in this, the third country.'

Respondent then sought review in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California which reversed the District Director's determination. That court, without ever deciding whether resettlement would have barred respondent's claim, found as a matter of fact that he had never firmly resettled in Hong Kong. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court affirmed the District Court because in its view whether Yee Chien Woo was 'firmly resettled' in Hong Kong was 'irrelevant' to consideration of his application for an immigration quota. It stated:

'Whether appellee was firmly resettled in Hong Kong is not,     then, relevant. What is relevant is that he is not a     national of Hong Kong (or the United Kingdom); that he is a      national of no country but Communist China and as a refugee      from that country remains stateless.' 419 F.2d 252, 254      (1969).

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a case, decided after the Ninth Circuit decision below faced the issue of the relevancy of resettlement and expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit interpretation of the statute. Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (1970). We granted certiorari in this case to resolve the conflict. 400 U.S. 864, 91 S.Ct. 99, 27 L.Ed.2d 103 (1970).

Since 1947 the United States has had a congressionally enacted immigration and naturalization policy which granted immigration preferences to 'displaced persons,' 'refugees,' or persons who fled certain areas of the world because of 'persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.' Although the language through which Congress has implemented this policy since 1947 has changed slightly from time to time the basic policy has remained constant to provide a haven for homeless refugees and to fulfill American responsibilities in connection with the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations. This policy is currently embodied in the 'Seventh Preference' of § 203 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), which provides in pertinent part:

'(a) Aliens who are subject to the numerical limitations     specified in section 201(a) shall be allotted visas or their      conditional entry authorized, as the case may be, as follows:

'(7) (A)liens who satisfy an Immigration and Naturalization     Service officer at an examination in any non-Communist or      non-Communist-dominated country, (A) that (i) because of      persecution or fear of persecution on account of race,      religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any      Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, *  *  * and      (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such country or      area on account of race, religion, or political opinion, and      (iii) are not nationals of the countries or areas in which      their application for conditional entry is made *  *  * .'

The Ninth Circuit supported its conclusion that the 'firmly resettled' concept was irrelevant under § 203(a)(7) upon two bases. First, the court noted that the 'firmly resettled' language was first introduced in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009, and was then expressly stated in the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 400, both of which are predecessors of the present legislation. However, when the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was extended in 1957, the 'firmly resettled' language was dropped in favor of a formula defining an eligible refugee as 'any alien who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion has fled or shall flee' from certain areas. 71 Stat. 643. The 1957 Act was then followed by the Fair Share Refugee Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 504, which defined 'refugee' as one 'not a national of the area in which the application is made, and (3) (who) is within the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.' Finally, the present legislation was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965. From the 1957 abandonment of the words 'firmly resettled' the Court of Appeals determined that Congress had purposely rejected 'resettlement' as a test for eligibility for refugee status.

Second, the Ninth Circuit gave particular significance to the statutory requirement that refugees 'are not nationals of the countries or areas in which their application for conditional entry is made.' Thus, in the ocurt's view, Congress intended to substitute the 'not nationals' requirement for the not 'firmly resettled' requirement. For substantially the reasons stated by the Second Circuit in Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (1970), we find no congressional intent to depart from the established concept of 'firm resettlement' and we do not give the 'not nationals' requirement of § 203(a)(7) (A)(iii) as broad a construction as did the court below.

While Congress did not carry the words 'firmly resettled' over into the 1957, 1960, and 1965 Acts from the earlier legislation, Congress did introduce a new requirement into the 1957 Act-the requirement of 'flight.' The 1957 Act, as well as the present law, speaks of persons who have 'fled' to avoid persecution. Both the terms 'firmly resettled' and 'fled' are closely related to the central theme of all 23 years of refugee legislation-the creation of a haven for the world's homeless people. This theme is clearly underlined by the very titles of the Acts over the years from the Displaced Persons Act in 1948 through the Refugee Relief Act and the Fair Share Refugee Act of 1960. Respondent's reliance on the Fair Share Refugee Act of 1960 to show that Congress abandoned the 'firmly resettled' concept is particularly misplaced because Congress envisioned that legislation not only as the means through which this country would fulfill its obligations to refugees, but also as an incentive to other nations to do likewise. Far from encouraging resettled refugees to leave one secure haven for another, the Act established United States quotas as a percentage-25%-of the refugees absorbed by all other cooperating nations. The Fair Share Refugee Act, like its successor and predecessors, was enacted to help alleviate the suffering of homeless persons and the political instability associated with their plight. It was never intended to open the United States to refugees who had found shelter in another nation and had begun to build new lives. Nor could Congress have intended to make refugees in flight from persecution compete with all of the world's resettled refugees for the 10,200 entries and permits afforded each year under § 203(a)(7). Such an interpretation would subvert the lofty goals embodied in the whole pattern of our refugee legislation.

In short, we hold that the 'resettlement' concept is not irrelevant. It is one of the factors which the Immigration and Naturalization Service must take into account to determine whether a refugee seeks asylum in this country as a consequence of his flight to avoid persecution. The District Director applied the correct legal standard when he determined that § 203(a)(7) requires that 'physical presence in the United States (be) a consequence of an alien's flight in search of refuge,' and further that 'the physical presence must be one which is reasonably proximate to the flight and not one following a flight remote in point of time or interrupted by intervening residence in a third country reasonably constituting a termination of the original flight in search of refuge.'

Finally, we hold that the requirement of § 203(a)(7)(A)(iii) that refugees not be 'nationals of the countries or areas in which their application for conditional entry is made' is not a substitute for the 'resettlement' concept. In the first place that section is not even applicable to respondent. He was applying for an immigrant visa, not a conditional entry permit to which part (A)(iii) of subsection 7 is expressly limited. He had already been granted entry to the United States as a business visitor. Second even if the provision were applicable, the country 'in which' respondent's application was made was the United States and he was certainly not a national of this country. Had he been a national he of course would have been entitled to remain here. Section 203(a)(7)(A)(iii) applies only to applications for conditional entry into this country made to Immigration and Naturalization officers authorized to accept such applications at points outside the United States.

Because it was under the erroneous impression that resettlement was irrelevant to refugee status under § 203(a)(7), the Court of Appeals failed to review the District Court's finding that respondent had never firmly resettled in Hong Kong. The District Director is, of course, entitled to review of that determination under the legal test set out in this opinion and the appropriate standards for judicial review. Consequently, the judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice BRENNAN, and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.