Rabang v. Boyd/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

The act of February 18, 1931, 8 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) § 156a, provided for the deportation of 'any alien' convicted of violating a narcotic law after the date of the Act. Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines and is therefore an alien by virtue of the Philippine Independence Act, 48 Stat. 456, c. 84, § 8; and he was convicted of narcotics violation in 1951, which was after his status had been changed from a national to an alien. If the 1931 Act is to be read literally, the deportation of this Filipino is warranted.

But to read the Act literally is, I think, to miss its real import.

First. In 1931 the only aliens here were those who had made an 'entry' into this country. The condition of 'entry' seems, herefore, necessarily implicit in the 1931 Act. Without that condition the Act would have had no application whatsoever at the time of its passage, for at that time every 'alien' was a national of another country who had 'entered' here. While the Philippine Independence Act later made Filipinos 'aliens,' that class of 'aliens' who were resident here at the time never made an 'entry' into this country. As Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 74 S.Ct. 822, 98 L.Ed. 1009, holds, they were nationals to whom the concept of 'entry' was inapplicable.

Second. The 1931 Act provides that the offending alien shall be deported 'in (the) manner' provided in §§ 19 and 20 of the 1917 Act, 8 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) §§ 155, 156. The words 'in (the) manner' are said to refer to the means for securing deportation which, by § 19(a) of the 1917 Act, are described as 'upon the warrant of the Attorney General.' Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978, construed the language of an earlier deportation Act in that way. It held that 'in the manner provided' in that Act meant 'the means for securing deportation.' Yet it is difficult for me to say that by that ruling 'in the manner' became words of art in legislative drafting. The Bugajewitz case involved a statute with a very special legislative history. The words 'in the manner provided' had been substituted for 'as provided.' So it was apparent that Congress by the amendment had narrowed the meaning. There is no such special legislative history here. The words 'in the manner' seem to me to be synonymous in this setting with 'as provided' or 'under the conditions of.' And the condition of the 1917 Act most relevant here is a crime committed 'after entry.' No matter how the case is viewed, the 1931 Act is applicable only to aliens who had made an 'entry' in this country.

This Filipino came to the United States in 1930 and he has never left here. If the spirit of the 1931 Act is to be observed, he should not be lumped with all other 'aliens' who made an 'entry.' The Filipino alien, who came here while he was a national, stands in a class by himself and should remain there, until and unless Congress extends these harsh deportation measures to his class.