Queen v. Alvey/Opinion of the Court

By the act of Congress of February 9, 1893, which established a court of appeals for the District of Columbia, it was provided—

'That any party aggrieved by any final order, judgment, or decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, or of any justice thereof, may appeal therefrom to the court of appeals hereby created; and upon such appeal the court of appeals shall review such order, judgment, or decree, and affirm, reverse, or modify the same as shall be just.' [27 Stat. at L. 434, chap. 74.]

And it was also provided—

'That said court of appeals shall establish by rule of court such terms in the court in each year as to it may seem necessary: Provided, however, that there shall be at least three terms in each year, and it shall make such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for the transaction of its business and the taking of appeals to said court. And said court of appeals shall have power to prescribe what part or parts of the proceedings in the court below shall constitute the record on appeal and the form of bills of exception, and to require that the original papers shall be sent to it instead of copies thereof, and generally to regulate all matters relating to appeals, whether in the court below or in said court of appeals.' [28 Stat. at L. 160, chap. 172.]

Under this provision the rule set out in the return of the respondents was established and amended. The question now is as to the interpretation of the rule. It will be observed that the rule states that 'when an appeal is entered in the court below which shall operate as a supersedeas of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from, or when there has been a special order or appeal bond for the stay or supersedeas of the judgment, decree, or order appealed from, in all such cases it shall be the duty of the appellant, within forty days from the time of the appeal entered and perfected in the court below (unless such time for special and sufficient cause be extended by the court below, or the judge thereof by whom the judgment, decree, or order may have been rendered, such time to be definite and fixed), to produce and file with the clerk of this court a transcript of the record of such cause.'

The contention of the parties turns on this provision. Is it to be interpreted independently or in connection with and as receiving meaning from the subsequent provision commencing with the words 'in any and all cases?' Or, in other words, is the rule to be applied differently when the appeal operates as a supersedeas from what it does when the appeal does not so operate? The appeal of relators did not so operate, and the relators contend that their cause 'was not of the class of cases to which the rule relates,' and therefore no rule or authority imposed on them the duty of filing the transcript within the forty days, but that their case falls under that part of the rule which provides for filing the record in cases where there was no supersedeas or stay. 'It does not enlarge in any manner,' counsel say, 'the cases specified in the former part of the rule, and to which the duty of filing within forty days is confined.' The court of appeals held otherwise, and declares in its reply, which is very circumstantial, that the rule, even as originally framed, was intended to have a different meaning from that which relators put upon it, but upon doubts arising it was amended to remove the doubts, and 'in all cases, whether there had been a supersedeas or not, to fix a period of time within which the transcript should be filed in the court of appeals (subject to the authority given by the rule itself, to the court below or a judge thereof, to extend the time). Otherwise there would have been no provision at all for cases in which there should be no supersedeas.'

The answer also states—

'The rule as so understood and construed by the respondents has been enforced in every case in which it has been brought to the attention of the respondents. So far as they know no case has arisen since September 29, 1894, in which the transcript has not been filed within forty days from the time of the appeal entered and perfected in the court below, except where the time has been extended in accordance with the rule, by an order made by a judge of the court below before the expiration of the time limited by the rule or by a previous order. In the case of the District of Columbia v. Humphries, 11 App. D. C. 68, the appeal was dismissed solely because the transcript was not filed in the court of appeals within the forty days prescribed by the rule in question, and without reference to whether the appeal operated as a supersedeas. The opinion of the court of appeals in that case was published among the regular reports of that court in 1898.'

Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the rule must receive the interpretation which was given it by the court of appeals.

Rule discharged.