Price v. Pennsylvania R Company/Opinion of the Court

The plaintiff argues here, and insisted throughout the progress of the case in the state courts, that, by reason of certain laws of the United States as applied to the facts found in the verdict of the jury, the decedent was a passenger, and the supreme court erred in holding otherwise. These laws are thus cited in the brief of plaintiff's counsel: 'Section 8, act March 3, 1865, (13 St. at Large U.S. 506,) provides that 'for the purpose of assorting and distributing letters and other matter in railway post-offices, the postmaster general may, from time to time, appoint clerks who shall be paid out of the appropriation for mail transportation.' Section 4000, Rev. St. U.S. requires that 'every railway company carrying the mail shall carry on any train which may run over its road, and without extra charge therefor, all mailable matter directed to be carried thereon, with the person in charge of the same."

We do not think these provisions either aid or govern the construction of the proviso in the Pennsylvania statute. The person thus to be carried with the mail matter, without extra charge, is no more a passenger, because he is in charge of the mail, nor because no other compensation is made for his transportation, than if he had no such charge; nor does the fact that he is in the employment of the United States, and that defendant is bound by contract with the government to carry him, affect the question. It would be just the same if the company had contracted with any other person who had charge of freight on the train to carry him without additional compensation. The statutes of the United States, which authorize this employment and direct this service, do not, therefore, make the person so engaged a passenger, or deprive him of that character, in construing the Pennsylvania statute. Nor does it give to persons so employed any right, as against the railroad company, which would not belong to any other person in a similar employment by others than the United States.

We are therefore of opinion that no question of federal authority was involved in the judgment of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and the writ of error is accordingly dismissed.