Powell v. McCormack/Opinion of the Court

In November 1966, petitioner Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected from the 18th Congressional District of New York to serve in the United States House of Representatives for the 90th Congress. However, pursuant to a House resolution, he was not permitted to take his seat. Powell (and some of the voters of his district) then filed suit in Federal District Court, claiming that the House could exclude him only if it found he failed to meet the standing requirements of age, citizenship, and residence contained in Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution-requirements the House specifically found Powell met-and thus had excluded him unconstitutionally. The District Court dismissed petitioners' complaint 'for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter.' A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, althougho n somewhat different grounds, each judge filing a separate opinion. We have determined that it was error to dismiss the complaint and that petitioner Powell is entitled to a declaratory judgment that he was unlawfully excluded from the 90th Congress.

During the 89th Congress, a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration conducted an investigation into the expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor, of which petitioner Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was chairman. The Special Subcommittee issued a report concluding that Powell and certain staff employees had deceived the House authorities as to travel expenses. The report also indicated there was strong evidence that certain illegal salary payments had been made to Powell's wife at his direction. See H.R. Rep. No. 2349, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (1966). No formal action was taken during the 89th Congress. However, prior to the organization of the 90th Congress, the Democratic members-elect met in caucus and voted to remove Powell as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor. See H.R. Rep. No. 27 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1967).

When the 90th Congress met to organize in January 1967, Powell was asked to step aside while the oath was administered to the other members-elect. Following the administration of the oath to the remaining members, the House discussed the procedure to be followed in determining whether Powell was eligible to take his seat. After some debate, by a vote of 363 to 65 the House adopted House Resolution No. 1, which provided that the Speaker appoint a Select Committee to determine Powell's eligibility. 113 Cong. Rec. 26-27. Although the resolution prohibited Powell from taking his seat until the House acted on the Select Committee's report, it did provide that he should receive all the pay and allowances due a member during the period.

The Select Committee, composed of nine lawyer-members, issued an invitation to Powell to testify before the Committee. The invitation letter stated that the scope of the testimony and investigation would include Powell's qualifications as to age, citizenship, and residency; his involvement in a civil suit (in which he had been held in contempt); and '(m)atters of * *  * alleged official misconduct since January 3, 1961.' See Hearings on H.R. Res. No. 1 before Select Committee Pursuant to H.R. Res. No. 1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1967) (hereinafter Hearings). Powell appeared at the Committee hearing held on February 8, 1967. After the Committee denied in part Powell's request that certain adversary-type procedures be followed, Powell testified. He would, however, give information relating only to his age, citizenship, and residency; upon the advice of counsel, he refused to answer other questions.

On February 10, 1967, the Select Committee issued another invitation to Powell. In the letter, the Select Committee informed Powell that its responsibility under the House Resolution extended to determining not only whether he met the standing qualifications of Art. I, § 2, but also to 'inquir(ing) into the question of whethr you should be punished or expelled pursuant to the powers granted *  *  * the House under Article I, Section 5, *  *  * of the Constitution. In other words, the Select Committee is of the opinion that at the conclusion of the present inquiry, it has authority to report back to the House recommendations with respect to * *  * seating, expulsion or other punishment.' See Hearings 110. Powell did not appear at the next hearing, held February 14, 1967. However, his attorneys were present, and they informed the Committee that Powell would not testify about matters other than his eligibility under the standing qualifications of Art. I, § 2. Powell's attorneys reasserted Powell's contention that the standing qualifications were the exclusive requirements for membership, and they further urged that punishment or expulsion was not possible until a member had been seated. See Hearings 111-113.

The Committee held one further hearing at which neither Powell nor his attorneys were present. Then, on February 23, 1967, the Committee issued its report, finding that Powell met the standing qualifications of Art. I, § 2. H.R.Rep. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1967). However, the Committee further reported that Powell had asserted an unwarranted privilege and immunity from the processes of the courts of New York; that he had wrongfully diverted House funds for the use of others and himself; and that he had made false reports on expenditures of foreign currency to the Committee on House Administration. Id., at 31-32. The Committee recommended that Powell be sworn and seated as a member of the 90th Congress but that he be censured by the House, fined $40,000 and be deprived of his seniority. Id., at 33.

The report was presented to the House on March 1, 1967, and the House debated the Select Committee's proposed resolution. At the conclusion of the debate, by a vote of 222 of 202 the House rejected a motion to bring the resolution to a vote. An amendment to the resolution was then offered; it called for the exclusion of Powell and a declaration that his seat was vacant. The Speaker ruled that a majority vote of the House would be sufficient to pass the resolution if it were so amended 113 Cong.Rec. 5020. After further debate, the amendment was adopted by a vote of 248 to 176. Then the House adopted by a vote of 307 to 116 House Resolution No. 278 in its amended form, thereby excluding Powell and directing that the Speaker notify the Governor of New York that the seat was vacant.

Powell and 13 voters of the 18th Congressional District of New York subsequently instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Five members of the House of Representatives were named as defendants individually and 'as representatives of a class of citizens who are presently serving * *  * as members of the House of Representatives.' John W. McCormack was named in his official capacity as Speaker, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms and the Doorkeeper were named individually and in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated the Constitution, specifically Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, because the resolution was inconsistent with the mandate that the members of the House shall be elected by the people of each State, and Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, which, petitioners alleged, sets forth the exclusive qualifications for membership. The complaint further alleged that the Clerk of the House threatened to refuse to perform the service for Powell to which a duly elected Congressman is entitled, that the Sergeant at Arms refused to pay Powell his salary, and that the Doorkeeper threatened to deny Powell admission to the House chamber.

Petitioners asked that the three-judge court be convened. Further, they requested that the District Court grant a permanent injunction restraining respondents from executing the House Resolution, and enjoining the Speaker from refusing to administer the oath, the Clerk from refusing to perform the duties due a Representative, the Sergeant at Arms from refusing to pay Powell his salary, and the Doorkeeper from refusing to admit Powell to the Chamber. The complaint also requested a declaratory judgment that Powell's exclusion was unconstitutional.

The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint 'for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter.' Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354 (D.C.D.C.1967). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed on somewhat different grounds, with each judge of the panel filing a separate opinion. Powell v. McCormack, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 395 F.2d 577 (1968). We granted certiorari. 393 U.S. 949, 89 S.Ct. 371, 21 L.Ed.2d 361 (1968). While the case was pending on our docket, the 90th Congress officially terminated and the 91st Congress was seated. In November 1968, Powell was again elected as the representative of the 18th Congressional District of New York, and he was seated by the 91st Congress. The resolution seating Powell also fined him $25,000. See H.R.Res. No. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 15 Cong.Rec. H21 (daily ed., January 3, 1969). Respondents then filed a suggestion of mootness. We postponed further consideration of this suggestion to a hearing on the merits. 393 U.S. 1060, 89 S.Ct. 713, 21 L.Ed.2d 704 (1969).

Respondents press upon us a variety of arguments to support the court below; they will be considered in the following order. (1) Events occurring subsequent to the grant of certiorari have rendered this litigation moot. (2) The Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 6, insulates respondents' action from judicial review. (3) The decision to exclude petitioner Powell is supported by the power granted to the House of Representatives to expel a member. (4) This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners' action. (5) Even if subject matter jurisdiction is present, this litigation is not justiciable eitehr under the general criteria established by this Court or because a political question is involved.

MOOTNESS.

After certiorari was granted, respondents filed a memorandum suggesting that two events which occurred subsequent to our grant of certiorari require that the case be dismissed as moot. On January 3, 1969 the House of Representatives of the 90th Congress officially terminated, and petitioner Powell was seated as a member of the 91st Congress. 115 Cong.Rec. H22 (daily ed., January 3, 1969). Respondents insist that the gravamen of petitioners' complaint was the failure of the 90th Congress to seat Petitioner Powell and that, since the House of Representatives is not a continuing body and Powell has now been seated, his claims are moot. Petitioners counter that three issues remain unresolved and thus this litigation presents a 'case o controversy' within the meaning of Art. III: (1) whether Powell was unconstitutionally deprived of his seniority by his exclusion from the 90th Congress; (2) whether the resolution of the 91st Congress imposing as 'punishment' a $25,000 fine is a continuation of respondents' allegedly unconstitutional exclusion, see H.R.Res. No. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong.Rec. H21 (daily ed., January 3, 1969); and (3) whether Powell is entitled to salary withheld after his exclusion from the 90th Congress. We conclude that Powell's claim for back salary remains viable even though he has been seated in the 91st Congress and thus find it unnecessary to determine whether the other issues have become moot.

Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 35-37 (2d ed. 1941). Where one of the several issues presented becomes moot, the remaining live issues supply the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy. See United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-94, 67 S.Ct. 556, 562, 566, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947); 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice 57.13 (2d ed. 1966). Despite Powell's obvious and continuing interest in his withheld salary, respondents insist that Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528, 46 S.Ct. 600, 70 L.Ed. 1071 (1926), leaves us no choice but to dismiss this litigation as moot. Alejandrino, a duly appointed Senator of the Philippine Islands, was suspended for one year by a resolution of the Philippine Senate and deprived of all 'prerogatives, privileges and emoluments' for the period of his suspension. The Supreme Court of the Philippines refused to enjoin the suspension. By the time the case reached this Court, the suspension had expired and the Court dismissed as moot Alejandrino's request that the suspension be enjoined. Then, sua sponte, the Court considered whether the possibility that Alejandrino was entitled to back salary required it 'to retain the case for the purpose of determining whether he (Alejandrino) may not have a mandamus for this purpose.' Id., at 533, 46 S.Ct. 601. Characerizing the issue of Alejandrino's salary as a 'mere incident' to his claim that the suspension was improper, the Court noted that he had not briefed the salary issue and that his request for mandamus did not set out with sufficient clarity the official or set of officials against whom the mandamus should issue. Id., at 533-54, 46 S.Ct. at 601 602. The Court therefore refused to treat the salary claim and dismissed the entire action as moot.

Respondents believe that Powell's salary claim is also a 'mere incident' to his insistence that he was unconstitutionally excluded so that we should likewise dismiss this entire action as moot. This argument fails to grasp that the reason for the dismissal in Alejandrino was not that Alejandrino's deprivation of salary was insufficiently substantial to prevent the case from becoming moot, but rather that his failure to plead sufficient facts to establish his mandamus claim made it impossible for any court to resolve the mandamus request. By contrast, petitioners' complaint names the official responsible for the payment of congressional salaries and asks for both mandamus and an injunction against that official.

Furthermore, even if respondents are correct that petitioners' averments as to injunctive relief are not sufficiently definite, it does not follow that this litigation must be dismissed as moot. Petitioner Powell has not been paid his salary by virtue of an allegedly unconstitional House resolution. That claim is still unresolved and hotly contested by clearly adverse parties. Declaratory relief has been requested, a form of relief not available when Alejandrino was decided. A court may grant declaratory relief even though it chooses not to issue an injunction or mandamus. See United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, supra, at 93, 67 S.Ct. 556, 566; cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 25-26, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 1661-1662, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947). A declaratory judgment can then be used as a predicate to further relief, including an injunction. 28 U.S.C. § 2202; see Vermont Structural Slate Co. v. Tatko Brothers Slate Co., 253 F.2d 29 (C.A.2d Cir. 1958); United States Lines Co. v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 385 (C.A.2d Cir. 1952). Alejandrino stands only for the proposition that, where one claim has become moot and the pleadings are insufficient to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to another remedy, the action should be dismissed as moot. There is no suggestion that petitioners' averments as to declaratory relief are insufficient and Powell's allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of salary remains unresolved.

Respondents furthe argue that Powell's 'wholly incidental and subordinate' demand for salary is insufficient to prevent this litigation from becoming moot. They suggest that the 'primary and principal relief' sought was the seating of petitioner Powell in the 90th Congress rendering his presumably secondary claims not worthy of judicial consideration. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 87 S.Ct. 339, 17 L.Ed.2d 235 (1966), rejects respondents' theory that the mootness of a 'primary' claim requires a conclusion that all 'secondary' claims are moot. At the Bond oral argument it was suggested that the expiration of the session of the Georgia Legislature which excluded Bond had rendered the case moot. We replied: 'The State has not pressed this argument, and it could not do so, because the State has stipulated that if Bond succeeds on this appeal he will receive back salary for the term from which he was excluded.' 385 U.S., at 128, 87 S.Ct., at 345, n. 4. Bond is not controlling, argue respondents, because the legislative term from which Bond was excluded did not end until December 31, 1966, and our decision was rendered December 5; further, when Bond was decided, Bond had not as yet been seated while in this case Powell has been. Respondents do not tell us, however, why these factual distinctions create a legally significant difference between Bond and this case. We relied in Bond on the outstanding salary claim, not the facts respondents stress, to hold that the case was not moot.

Finally, respondents seem to argue that Powell's proper action to recover salary is a suit in the Court of Claims, so that, having brought the wrong action, a dismissal for mootness is appropriate. The short answer to this argument is that it confuses mootness with whether Powell has established a right to recover against the Sergeant at Arms, a question which it is inappropriate to treat at this stage of the litigation.

SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE.

Respondents assert that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 6, is an absolute bar to petitioners' action. This Court has on four prior occasions-Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951); and Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1881)-been called upon to determine if allegedly unconstitutional action taken by legislators or legislatie employees is insulated from judicial review by the Speech or Debate Clause. Both parties insist that their respective positions find support in these cases and tender for decision three distinct issues: (1) whether respondents in participating in the exclusion of petitioner Powell were 'acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,' Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 376, 71 S.Ct. at 788; (2) assuming that respondents were so acting, whether the fact that petitioners seek neither damages from any of the respondents nor a criminal prosecution lifts the bar of the clause; and (3) even if this action may not be maintained against a Congressman, whether those respondents who are merely employees of the House may plead the bar of the clause. We find it necessary to treat only the last of these issues.

The Speech or Debate Clause, adopted by the Constitutional Convention without debate or opposition, finds its roots in the conflict between Parliament and the Crown culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Drawing upon this history, we concluded in United States v. Johnson, supra, at 181, 86 S.Ct. at 755, that the purpose of this clause was 'to prevent intimidation (of legislators) by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.' Although the clause sprang from a fear of seditious libel actions instituted by the Crown to punish unfavorable speeches made in Parliament, we have held that it would be a 'narrow view' to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause to words spoken in debate. Committee reports, resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered, as are 'things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.' Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, at 204. Furthermore, the clause not only provides a defense on the merits but also protects a legislator from the burden of defending himself. Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, at 85, 87 S.Ct. at 1427; see Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788.

Our cases make it clear that the legislative immunity created by the Speech or Debate Clause performs an important function in representative government. It insures that legislators are free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that they will be later called to task in the courts for that representation. Thus, in Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 373, 71 S.Ct. at 786, the Court quoted the writings of James Wilson as illuminating the reason for legislative immunity: 'In order to enable and encourage a rp resentative of the publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.'

Legislative immunity does not, of course, bar all judicial review of legislative acts. That issue was settled by implication as early as 1803, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60, and expressly in Kilbourn v. Thompson, the first of this Court's cases interpreting the reach of the Speech or Debate Clause. Challenged in Kilbourn was the constitutionality of a House Resolution ordering the arrest and imprisonment of a recalcitrant witness who had refused to respond to a subpoena issued by a House investigating committee. While holding that the Speech or Debate Clause barred Kilbourn's action for false imprisonment brought against several members of the House, the Court nevertheless reached the merits of Kilbourn's attack and decided that, since the House had no power to punish for contempt, Kilbourn's imprisonment pursuant to the resolution was unconstitutional. It therefore allowed Kilbourn to bring his false imprisonment action against Thompson, the House's Sergeant at Arms, who had executed the warrant for Kilbourn's arrest.

The Court first articulated in Kilbourn and followed in Dombrowski v. Eastland, the doctrine that, although an action against a Congressman may be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause, legislative employees who participated in the unconstitutional activity are responsible for their acts. Despite the fact that petitioners brought this suit against several House employees-the Sergeant at Arms, the Doorkeeper and the Clerk-as well as several Congressmen, respondents argue that Kilbourn and Dombrowski are distinguishable. Conceding that in Kilbourn the presence of the Sergeant at Arms and in Dombrowski the presence of a congressional subcommittee counsel as defendants in the litigation allowed judicial review of the challenged congressional action, respondents urge that both cases concerned an affirmative act performed by the employee outside the House having a direct effect upon a private citizen. Here, they continue, the relief sought relates to actions taken by House agents solely within the House. Alternatively, respondents insist that Kilbourn and Dombrowski prayed for damages while petitioner Powell asks that the Sergeant at Arms disburse funds, an assertedly greater interference with the legislative process. We reject the proffered distinctions.

That House employees are acting pursuant to express orders of the House does not bar judicial review of the constitutionality of the underlying legislative decision Kilbourn decisively settles this question, since the Sergeant at Arms was held liable for false imprisonment even though he did nothing more than execute the House Resolution that Kilbourn be arrested and imprisoned. Respondents' suggestions thus ask us to distinguish between affirmative acts of House employees and situations in which the House orders its employees not to act or between actions for damages and claims for salary. We can find no basis in either the history of the Speech or Debate Clause or our cases for either distinction. The purpose of the protection afforded legislators is not to forestall judicial review of legislative action but to insure that legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being called into court to defend their actions A legislator is nom ore or no less hindered or distracted by litigation against a legislative employee calling into question the employee's affirmative action than he would be by a lawsuit questioning the employee's failure to act. Nor is the distraction or hindrance increased because the claim is for salary rather than damages, or because the litigation questions action taken by the employee within rather than without the House. Freedom of legislative activity and the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause are fully protected if legislators are relieved of the burden of defending themselves. In Kilbourn and Dombrowski we thus dismissed the action against members of Congress but did not regard the Speech or Debate Clause as a bar to reviewing the merits of the challenged congressional action since congressional employees were also sued. Similarly, though this action may be dismissed against the Congressmen petitioners are entitled to maintain their action against House employees and to judicial review of the propriety of the decision to exclude petitioner Powell. As was said in Kilbourn, in language which time has not dimmed:

'Especially is it competent and proper for this court to     consider whether its (the legislature's) proceedings are in      conformity with the Constitution and laws, because, living      under a written constitution, no branch or department of the      government is supreme; and it is the province and duty of the      judicial department to determine in cases regularly brought      before them, whether the powers of any branch of the      government, and even those of the legislature in the      enactment of laws, have been exercised in conformity to the      Constitution; and if they have not, to treat their acts as      null and void.' 103 U.S., at 199.

EXCLUSION OR EXPULSION.

The resolution excluding petitioner Powell was adopted by a vote in excess of two-thirds of the 434 Members of Congress-307 to 116. 113 Cong.Rec. 5037-5038, Article I, § 5, grants the House authority to expel a member 'with the Concurrence of two thirds.' Respondents assert that the House may expel a member for any reason whatsoever and that, since a two-thirds vote was obtained, the procedure by which Powell was denied his seat in the 90th Congress should be regarded as an expulsion, not an exclusion. Cautioning us not to exalt form over substance, respondents quote from the concurring opinion of Judge McGowan in the court below:

'Appellant Powell's cause of action for a judicially     compelled seating thus boils down, in my view, to the narrow      issue of whether a member found by his colleagues *  *  * to      have engaged in official misconduct must, because of the      accidents of timing, be formally admitted before he can be      either investigated or expelled. The sponsor of the motion to     exclude stated on the floor that he was proceeding on the      theory that the power to expel included the power to exclude,      provided a 2/3 vote was forthcoming. It was. Therefore,     success for Mr. Powell on the merits would mean that the      District Court must admonish the House that it is form, not      substance, that should govern in great affairs, and      accordingly command the House members to act out a charade.'      129 U.S.App.D.C., at 383-384, 395 F.2d, at 606-607.

Although respondents repeatedly urge this Court not to speculate as to the reasons for Powell's exclusion, their attempt to equate exclusion with expulsion would require a similar speculation that the House would have voted to expel Powell had it been faced with that question. Powell had not been seated at the time House Resolution No. 278 was debated and passed. After a motion to bring the Select Committee's proposed resolution to an immediate vote had been defeated, an amendment was offered which mandated Powell's exclusion. Mr. Celler, chairman of the Select Committee, then posed a parliamentary inquiry to determine whether a two-thirds vote was necessary to pass the resolution if so amended 'in the sense that it might amount to an expulsion.' 113 Cong.Rec. 5020. The Speaker replied that 'action by a majority vote would be in accordance with the rules.' Ibid. Had the amendment been regarded as an attempt to expel Powell, a two-thirds vote would have been constitutionally required. The Speaker ruled that the House was voting to exclude Powell, and we will not speculate what the result might have been if Powell had been seated and expulsion proceedings subsequently instituted.

Nor is the distinction between exclusion and expulsion merely one of form. The misconduct for which Powell was charged occurred prior to the convening of the 90th Congress. On several occasions the House has debated whether a member can be expelled for actions taken during a prior Congress and the House's own manual of procedure applicable in the 90th Congress states that 'both Houses have distrusted their power to punish in such cases.' Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.Doc. No. 529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1967); see G. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives 32 (1961). The House rules manual reflects positions taken by prior Congresses. For example, the report of the Select Committee appointed to consider the expulsion of John W. Langley states unequivocally that the House will not expel a member for misconduct committed during an earlier Congress:

'(I)t must be said that with practical uniformity the     precedents in such cases are to the effect that the House      will not expel a Member for reprehensible action prior to his      election as a Member, not even for conviction for an offense. On May 23, 1884, Speaker Carlisle decided that the House had     no right to punish a Member for any offense alleged to have      been committed previous to the time when he was elected a      Member, and added, 'That has been so frequently decided in      the House that it is no longer a matter of dispute." H.R.Rep.      No. 30, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1925).

Members of the House having expressed a belief that such strictures apply to its own power to expel, we will not assume that two-thirds of its members would have expelled Powell for his prior conduct had the Speaker announced that House Resolution No. 278 was for expulsion rather than exclusion.

Finally, the proceedings which culminated in Powell's exclusion cast considerable doubt upon respondents' assumption that the two-thirds vote necessary to expel would have been mustered. These proceedings have been succinctly described by Congressman Eckhardt:

'The House voted 202 votes for the previous question      leading toward the adoption of the (Select) Committee report. It voted 222 votes against the previous question, opening the     floor for the Curtis Amendment which ultimately excluded      Powell.

'Upon adoption of the Curtis Amendment, the vote again  fell short of two-thirds, being 248 yeas to 176 nays. Only on the final vote, adopting the Resolution as  amended, was more than a two-thirds vote obtained, the   vote being 307 yeas to 116 nays. On this last vote, as a  practical matter, members who would not have denied   Powell a seat if they were given the choice to punish   him had to cast an aye vote or else record themselves as   opposed to the only punishment that was likely to come   before the House. Had the matter come up through the  processes of expulsion, it appears that the two-thirds   vote woud  have failed, and then members would have been   able to apply a lesser penalty.'

We need express no opinion as to the accuracy of Congressman Eckhardt's prediction that expulsion proceedings would have produced a different result. However, the House's own views of the extent of its power to expel combined with the Congressman's analysis counsel that exclusion and expulsion are not fungible proceedings. The Speaker ruled that House Resolution No. 278 contemplated an exclusion proceeding. We must reject respondents' suggestion that we overrule the Speaker and hold that, although the House manifested an intent to exclude Powell, its action should be tested by whatever standards may govern an expulsion.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.

As we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S.Ct. 691, 699, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), there is a significant difference between determining whether a federal court has 'jurisdiction of the subject matter' and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction is 'justiciable.' The District Court determined that 'to decide this case on the merits * *  * would constitute a clear violation of the doctrine of separation of powers' and then dismissed the complaint 'for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter.' Powell v. McCormack, 266 F.Supp. 354, 359, 360 (D.C.D.C.1967). However, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, the doctrine of separation of powers is more properly considered in determining whether the case is 'justiciable.' We agree with the unanimous conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the District Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. However, for reasons set forth in Part VI, infra, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this case is not justiciable.

In Baker v. Carr, supra, we noted that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter (1) if the cause does not 'arise under' the Federal Constitution, laws, or treaties (or fall within one of the other enumerated categories of Art. III); or (2) if it is not a 'case or controversy' within the meaning of that phrase in Art. III; or (3) if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute. And, as in Baker v. Carr, supra, our determination (see Part VI, B(1) infra) that this cause presents no non-justiciable 'political question' disposes of respondents' contentions that this cause is not a 'case or controversy.'

Respondents first contend that this is not a case 'arising under' the Constitution within the meaning of Art. III. They emphasize that Art. I, § 5, assigns to each House of Congress the power to judge the elections and qualifications of its own members and to punish its members for disorderly behavior. Respondents also note that under Art. I, § 3, the Senate has the 'sole power' to try all impeachments. Respondents argue that these delegations (to 'judge,' to 'punish,' and to 'try') to the Legislative Branch are explicit grants of 'judicial power' to the Congress and constitute specific exceptions to the general mandate of Art. III that the 'judicial power' shall be vested in the federal courts. Thus, respondents maintain, the 'power conferred on the courts by article III does not authorize this Court to do anything more than declare its lack of jurisdiction to proceed.'

We reject this contention. Article III, § 1, provides that the 'judicial Power * *  * shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may *  *  * establish.' Further, § 2 mandates that the 'judicial Power shall extend to all Cases *  *  * arising under this Constitution *  *  * .' It has long been held that a suit 'arises under' the Constitution if a petitioner's claim 'will be sustained if the Constitution *  *  * (is) given one construction and will be defeated if (it is) given another.'  Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). See King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, 263 U.S. 361, 363-364, 44 S.Ct. 127, 127-128, 68 L.Ed. 339 (1923). Cf. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824). See generally C. Wright, Federal Courts 48-52 (1963). Thus, this case clearly is one 'arising under' the Constitution as the Court has interpreted that phrase. Any bar to federal courts reviewing the judgments made by the House or Senate in excluding a member arises from the allocation of powers between the two branches of the Federal Government (a question of justiciability), and not from the petitioners' failure to state a claim based on federal law.

Respondents next contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners' suit is authorized by a jurisdictional statute, i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) Section 1331(a) provides that district courts shall have jurisdiction in 'all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy * *  * arises under the Constitution *  *  * .' Respondents urge that even though a case may 'arise under the Constitution' for purposes of Art. III, it does not necessarily 'arise under the Constitution' for purposes of § 1331(a). Although they recognize there is little legislative history concerning the enactment of § 1331(a), e spondents argue that the history of the period when the section was first enacted indicates that the drafters did not intend to include suits questioning the exclusion of Congressmen in this grant of 'federal question' jurisdiction.

Respondents claim that the passage of the Force Act in 1870 lends support to their interpretation of the intended scope of § 1331. The Force Act gives the district courts jurisdiction over 'any civil action to recover possession of any office * *  * wherein it appears that the sole question *  *  * arises out of denial of the right to vote *  *  * on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.' However, the Act specifically excludes suits concerning the office of Congressman. Respondents maintain that this exclusion demonstrates Congress' intention to prohibit federal courts from entertaining suits regarding the seating of Congressmen.

We have noted that the grant of jurisdiction in § 1331(a), while made in the language used in Art. III, is not in all respects co-extensive with the potential for federal jurisdiction found in Art. III. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 246, 88 S.Ct. 391, 394, 19 L.Ed.2d 444, n. 8 (1967). Nevertheless, it has generally been recognized that the intent of the drafters was to provide a broad jurisdictional grant to the federal courts. See, e.g., Mishkin, The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts, 53 Col.L. Rev. 157, 160 (1953); Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U.Pa.L.Rev. 639, 644-645 (1942). And, as noted above, the resolution of this case depends directly on construction of the Constitution. The Court has consistently held such suits are authorized by the statute. Bell v. Hood, supra; King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, supra. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 411, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913).

As respondents recognize, there is nothing in the wording or legislative history of § 1331 or in the decisions of this Court which would indicate that there is any basis for the interpretation they would give that section. Nor do we think the passage of the Force Act indicates that § 1331 does not confer jurisdiction in this case. The Force Act is limited to election challenges where a denial of the right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment is alleged. See 28 U.S.C. § 1344. Further, the Act was passed five years before the original version of § 1331 was enacted. While it might be inferred that Congress intended to give each House the exclusive power to decide congressional election challenges, there is absolutely no indication that the passage of this Act evidences an intention to impose other restrictions on the broad grant of jurisdiction in § 1331.

JUSTICIABILITY.

Having concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, we turn to the question whether the case is justiciable. Two determinations must be made in this regard. First, we must decide whether the claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution. Second, we must determine whether the structure of the Federal Government renders the issue presented a 'political question'-that is, a question which is not justiciable in federal court because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.

A. General Considerations.

In deciding generally whether a claim is justiciable, a court must determine whether 'the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.' Baker v. Carr, supra, at 198, 82 S.Ct. at 700. Respondents do no seriously contend that the duty asserted and its alleged breach cannot be judicially determined. If petitioners are correct, the House had a duty to seat Powell once it determined he met the standing requirements set forth in the Constitution. It is undisputed that he met those requirements and that he was nevertheless excluded.

Respondents do maintain, however, that this case is not justiciable because, they assert, it is impossible for a federal court to 'mold effective relief for resolving this case.' Respondents emphasize that petitioners asked for coercive relief against the officers of the House, and, they contend, federal courts cannot issue mandamus or injunctions compelling officers or employees of the House to perform specific official acts. Respondents rely primarily on the Speech or Debate Clause to support this contention.

We need express no opinion about the appropriateness of coercive relief in this case, for petitioners sought a declaratory judgment, a form of relief the District Court could have issued. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, provides that a district court may 'declare the rights * *  * of any interested party *  *  * whether or not further relief is or could be sought.' The availability of declaratory relief depends on whether there is a live dispute between the parties, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969), and a request for declaratory relief may be considered independently of whether other forms of relief are appropriate. See United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 93, 67 S.Ct. 556, 566, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947); 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice 57.08(3) (2d ed. 1966); cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 25-26, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 1661-1662, 91 L.Ed. 1889 (1947). We thus conclude that in terms of the general criteria of justiciability, this case is justiciable.

B. Political Question Doctrine.

1. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment.

Respondents maintain that even if this case is otherwise justiciable, it presents only a political question. It is well established that the federal courts will not adjudicate political questions. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918). In Baker v. Carr, supra, we noted that political questions are not justiciable primarily because of the separation of powers within the Federal Government. After reviewing our decisions in this area, we concluded that on the surface of any case held to involve a political question was at least one of the following formulations:

'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the     issue to a co-ordinate political department; or a lack of      judicially discoverable and manageable standards for      resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an      initial policy determination of a kind clearly for      nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's      undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of      the respect due co-ordinate branches of government; or an      unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political      decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various      departments on one question.' 369 U.S., at 217, 82 S.Ct., at      710.

Respondents' first contention is that this case presents a political question because under Art. I, § 5, there has been a 'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment' to the House of the 'adjudicatory power' to determine Powell's qualifications. Thus it is argued that the House, and the House alone, has power to determine who is qualified to be a member.

In order to determine whether there has been a textual commitment to a coordinate department of the Government, we must interpret the Constitution. In other words, we must first determine what power the Constitution confers upon the House through Art. I, § 5, before we can determine to what extent, if any, the exercise of that power is subject to judicial review. Respondents maintain that the House has broad power under § 5, and, they argue, the House may determine which are the qualifications necessary for membership. On the other hand, petitioners allege that the Constitution provides that an elected representative may be denied his seat only if the House finds he does not meet one of the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution.

If examination of § 5 disclosed that the Constitution gives the House judicially unreviewable power to set qualifications for membership and to judge whether prospective members meet those qualifications, further review of the House determination might well be barred by the political question doctrine. On the other hand, if the Constitution gives the House power to judge only whether elected members possess the three standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution, further consideration would be necessary to determine whether any of the other formulations of the political question doctrine are 'inextricable from the case at bar.'  Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710.

In other words, whether there is a 'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department' of government and what is the scope of such commitment are questions we must resolve for the first time in this case. For, as we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, supra, '(d)eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.' Id., at 211, 82 S.Ct. at 706.

In order to determine the scope of any 'textual commitment' under Art. I, § 5, we necessarily must determine the meaning of the phrase to 'be the Judge of the Qualifications of its own Members.' Petitioners argue that the records of the debates during the Constitutional Convention; available commentary from the post-Convention, pre-ratification period; and early congressional applications of Art. I, § 5, support their construction of the section. Respondents insist, however, that a careful examination of the pre-Convention practices of the English Parliament and American colonial assemblies demonstrates that by 1787, a legislature's power to judge the qualifications of its members was generally understood to encompass exclusion or expulsion on the ground that an individual's character or past conduct rendered him unfit to serve. When the Constitution and the debates over its adoption are thus viewed in historical perspective, argue respondents, it becomes clear that the 'qualifications' expressly set forth in the Constitution were not meant to limit the long-recognized legislative power to exclude or expel at will, but merely to establish 'standing incapacities,' which could be altered only by a constitutional amendment. Our examination of the relevant historical materials leads us to the conclusion that petitioners are correct and that the Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution.

Since our rejection of respondents' interpretation of § 5 results in significant measure from a disagreement with their historical analysis, we must consider the relevant historical antecedents in considerable detail. As do respondents, we begin with the English and colonial precedents.

The earliest English exclusion precedent appears to be a declaration by the House of Commons in 1553 'that Alex. Nowell, being Prebendary (i.e., a clergyman) in Westminster, and thereby having voice in the Convocation House, cannot be a member of this House * *  * .' J. Tanner, Tudor Constitutional Documents: A.D. 1485 1603, p. 596 (2d ed. 1930). This decision, however, was consistent with a long-established tradition that clergy who participated in their own representative assemblies or convocations were ineligible for membership in the House of Commons. See 1 E. Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons 125 (1963); T. Taswell-Langmead's English Constitutional History 142 143 (11th ed. T. Plucknett 1960). The traditional ineligibility of clergymen was recognized as a standing incapacity. See 1 W. Blackstone's Commentaries * 175. Nowell's exclusion, therefore, is irrelevant to the present case, for petitioners concede-and we agree-that if Powell had not met one of the standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution, he could have been excluded under Art. I, § 5. The earliest colonial exclusions also fail to support respondents' theory.

Respondents' remaining 16th and 17th century English precedents all are cases of expulsion, although some were for misdeeds not encompassed within recognized standing incapacities existing either at the time of the expulsions or at the time the Constitution was drafted in 1787. Although these early expulsion orders occasionally contained statements suggesting that the individual expelled was thereafter ineligible for re-election, at least for the duration of the Parliament from which he was expelled, there is no indication that any were re-elected and thereafter excluded. Respondents' colonial precedents during this period follow a similar pattern.

Apparently the re-election of an expelled member first occurred in 1712. The House of Commons had expelled Robert Walpole for receiving kickbacks for contracts relating to 'foraging the Troops,' 17 H.C.Jur. 28, and committed him to the Tower. Nevertheless, two months later he was re-elected. The House thereupon resolved '(t)hat Robert Walpole, Esquire, having been, this Session of Parliament, committed a Prisoner to the Tower of London, and expelled (from) this House, * *  * is, incapable of being elected a Member to serve in this present Parliament *  *  * .' Id., at 128. (Second emphasis added.) A new election was ordered, and Walpole was not re-elected. At least two similar exclusions after an initial expulsion were effected in the American colonies during the first half of the 18th century.

Respondents urge that the Walpole case provides strong support for their conclusion that the pre-Convention English and colonial practice was that members-elect could be excluded for their prior misdeeds at the sole discretion of the legislative body to which they had been elected. However, this conclusion overlooks an important limiting characteristic of the Walpole case and of both the colonial exclusion cases on which respondents rely: the excluded member had been previously expelled. Moreover, Walpole was excluded only for the remainder of the Parliament from which he had been expelled. 'The theory seems to have been that expulsion lasted as long as the parliament * *  * .' Taswell-Langmead, supra, at 584, n. 99. Accord, 1 W. Blackstone's Commentaries * 176. Thus, Walpole's exclusion justifies only the proposition that an expulsion lasted for the remainder of the particular Parliament, and the expelled member was therefore subject to subsequent exclusion if reelected prior to the next general election. The two colonial cases arguably support a somewhat broader principle, i.. , that the assembly could permanently expel. Apparently the colonies did not consistently adhere to the theory that an expulsion lasted only until the election of a new assembly. M. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies 196-202 (1943). Clearly, however, none of these cases supports respondents' contention that by the 18th century the English Parliament and colonial assemblies had assumed absolute discretion to exclude any member-elect they deemed unfit to serve. Rather, they seem to demonstrate that a member could be excluded only if he had first been expelled.

Even if these cases could be construed to support respondents' contention, their precedential value was nullified prior to the Constitutional Convention. By 1782, after a long struggle, the arbitrary exercise of the power to exclude was unequivocally repudiated by a House of Commons resolution which ended the most notorious English election dispute of the 18th century-the John Wilkes case. While serving as a member of Parliament in 1763, Wilkes published an attack on a recent peace treaty with France, calling it a product of bribery and condemning the Crown's ministers as "the tools of despotism and corruption." R. Postgate, That Devil Wilkes 53 (1929). Wilkes and others who were involved with the publication in which the attack appeared were arrested. Prior to Wilkes' trial, the House of Commons expelled him for publishing 'a false, scandalous, and seditious libel.' 15 Parl.Hist.Eng. 1393 (1764). Wilkes then fled to France and was subsequently sentenced to exile. 9 L. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution 37 (1956).

Wilkes returned to England in 1768, the same year in which the Parliament from which he had been expelled was dissolved. He was elected to the next Parliament, and he then surrendered himself to the Court of King's Bench. Wilkes was convicted of seditious libel and sentenced to 22 months' imprisonment. The new Parliament declared him ineligible for membership and ordered that he be 'expelled this House.' 16 Parl.Hist.Eng. 545 (1769). Although Wilkes was re-elected to fill the vacant seat three times, each time the same Parliament declared him ineligible and refused to seat him. See 1 Gipson, supra, at 207-215.

Wilkes was released from prison in 1770 and was again elected to Parliament in 1774. For the next several years, he unsuccessfully campaigned to have the resolutions expelling him and declaring him incapable of re-election expunged from the record. Finally, in 1782, the House of Commons voted to expunge them, resolving that the prior House actions were 'subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom.' 22 Parl.Hist.Eng. 1411 (1782).

With the successful resolution of Wilkes' long and bitter struggle for the right of the British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice, it is evident that, on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, English precedent stood for the proposition that 'the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of members to serve in parliament' and those qualification were 'not occasional but fixed.' 16 Parl.Hist.Eng. 589, 590 (1769). Certainly English practice did not support, nor had it ever supported, respondents' assertion that the power to judge qualifications was generally understood to encompass the right to exclude members-elect for general misconduct not within standing qualifications. With the repudiation in 1782 of the only two precedents for excluding a member-elect who had been previously expelled, it appears that the House of Commons also repudiated any 'control over the eligibility of candidates, except in the administration of the laws which define their (standing) qualifications.' T. May's Parliamentary Practice 66 (13th ed. T. Webster 1924). See Taswell-Langmead, supra, at 585.

The resolution of the Wilkes case similarly undermined the precedential value of the earlier colonial exclusions, for the principles upon which they had been based were repudiated by the very body the colonial assemblies sought to imitate and whose precedents they generally followed. See Clarke, supra, at 54, 59 60, 196. Thus, in 1784 the Council of Censors of the Pennsylvania Assembly denounced the prior expulsion of an unnamed assemblyman, ruling that his expulsion had not been effected in conformity with the recently enacted Pennsylvania Constitution. In the course of its report, the Council denounced by name the Parliamentary exclusions of both Walpole and Wilkes, stating that they 'reflected dishonor on none but the authors of these violences.' Pennsylvania Convention Proceedings: 1776 and 1790, p. 89 (1825).

Wilkes' struggle and his ultimate victory had a significant impact in the American colonies. His advocacy of libertarian causes and his pursuit of the right to be seated in Parliament became a cause celebre for the colonists. '(T)he cry of 'Wilkes and Liberty' echoed loudly across the Atlantic Ocean as wide publicity was given to every step of Wolkes's public career in the colonial press * *  *. The reaction in America took on significant proportions. Colonials tended to identify their cause with that of Wilkes. They saw him as a popular hero and a martyr to the struggle for liberty. * *  * They named towns, counties, and even children in his honour.' 11 Gipson, supra, at 222. It is within this historical context that we must examine the Convention debates in 1787, just five years after Wilkes' final victory.

Relying heavily on Charles Warren's analysis of the Convention debates, petitioners argue that the proceedings manifest the Framers' unequivocal intention to deny either branch of Congress the authority to add to or otherwise vary the membership qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution. We do not completely agree, for the debates are subject to other interpretations. However, we have concluded that the records of the debates, viewed in the context of the bitter struggle for the right to freely choose representatives which had recently concluded in England and in light of the distinction the Framers made between the power to expel and the power to exclude, indicate that petitioners' ultimate conclusion is correct.

The Convention opened in late May 1787. By the end of July, the delegates adopted, with a minimum of debate, age requirements for membership in both the Senate and the House. The Convention then apo inted a Committee of Detail to draft a constitution incorporating these and other resolutions adopted during the preceding months. Two days after the Committee was appointed, George Mason, of Virginia, moved that the Committee consider a clause "requiring certain qualifications of landed property & citizenship" and disqualifying from membership in Congress persons who had unsettled accounts or who were indebted to the United States. 2 Farrand 121. A vigorous debate ensued. Charles Pinckney and General Charles C. Pinckney, both of South Carolina, moved to extend these incapacities to both the judicial and executive branches of the new government. But John Dickinson, of Delaware, opposed the inclusion of any statement of qualifications in the Constitution. He argued that it would be 'impossible to make a compleat one, and a partial one would by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from supplying the omissions.' Id., at 123. Dickinson's argument was rejected; and, after eliminating the disqualification of debtors and the limitation to 'landed' property, the Convention adopted Mason's proposal to instruct the Committee of Detail to draft a property qualification. Id., at 116-117.

The Committee reported in early August, proposing no change in the age requirement; however, it did recommend adding citizenship and residency requirements for membership. After first debating what the precise requirements should be, on August 8, 1787, the delegates unanimously adopted the three qualifications embodied in Art. I, § 2. Id., at 213.

On August 10, the Convention considered the Committee of Detail's proposal that the 'Legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.' Id., at 179. The debate on this proposal discloses much about the views of the Framers on the issue of qualifications. For example, James Madison urged its rejection, stating that the proposal would vest

'an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The     qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental      articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the     Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the     Constitution. A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy     or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being      elected, as the number authorised to elect. * *  * It was a      power also, which might be made subservient to the views of      one faction agst. another. Qualifications founded on     artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in      order to keep out partizans of (a weaker) faction.' Id., at      249-250.

Significantly, Madison's argument was not aimed at the impost ion of a property qualification as such, but rather at the delegation to the Congress of the discretionary power to establish any qualifications. The parallel between Madison's arguments and those made in Wilkes' behalf is striking.

In view of what followed Madison's speech, it appears that on this critical day the Framers were facing and then rejecting the possibility that the legislature would have power to usurp the 'indisputable right (of the people) to return whom they thought proper' to the legislature. Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut, noted that a legislative power to establish property qualifications was exceptional and 'dangerous because it would be much more liable to abuse.' Id., at 250. Gouverneur Morris then moved to strike 'with regard to property' from the Committee's proposal. His intention was 'to leave the Legislature entirely at large.' Ibid. Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina, expressed concern that if a majority of the legislature should happen to be 'composed of any particular description of men, of lawyers for example, * *  * the future elections might be secured to their own body.' Ibid. Madison then referred to the British Parliament's assumption of the power to regulate the qualifications of both electors and the elected and noted that 'the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious parties.' Ibid. Shortly thereafter, the Convention rejected both Gouverneur Morris' motion and the Committee's proposal. Later the same day, the Convention adopted without debate the provision authorizing each House to be 'the judge of the * *  * qualifications of its own members.' Id., at 254.

One other decision made the same day is very important to determining the meaning of Art. I, § 5. When the delegates reached the Committee of Detail's proposal to empower each House to expel its members, Madison 'observed that the right of expulsion * *  * was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies (one) faction might be dangerously abused.' Id., at 254. He therefore moved that 'with the concurrence of two-thirds' be inserted. With the exception of one State, whose delegation was divided, the motion was unanimously approve without debate, although Gouverneur Morris noted his opposition. The importance of this decision cannot be over-emphasized. None of the parties to this suit disputes that prior to 1787 the legislative powers to judge qualifications and to expel were exercised by a majority vote. Indeed, without exception, the English and colonial antecedents to Art. I, § 5, cls. 1 and 2, support this conclusion. Thus, the Convention's decision to increase the vote required to expel, because that power was 'too important to be exercised by a bare majority,' while at the same time not similarly restricting the power to judge qualifications, is compelling evidence that they considered the latter already limited by the standing qualifications previously adopted.

Respondents urge, however, that these events must be considered in light of what they regard as a very significant change made in Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, by the Committee of Style. When the Committee of Detail reported the provision to the Convention, it read:

'Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the     age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen      of (in) the United States for at least three years before his      election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a      resident of the State in which he shall be chosen.' Id., at      178.

However, as finally drafted by the Committee of Style, these qualifications were stated in their present negative form. Respondents note that there are no records of the 'deliberations' of the Committee of Style. Nevertheless, they speculate that this particular change was designed to make the provision correspond to the form used by Blackstone in listing the 'standing incapacities' for membership in the House of Commons. See 1 W. Blackstone's Commentaries * * 175-176. Blackstone, who was an apologist for the anti-Wilkes forces in Parliament, had added to his Commentaries after Wilkes' exclusion the assertion that individuals who were not ineligible for the Commons W. Blackstone's Commentaries * 175-176. be denied their seat if the Commons deemed them unfit for other reasons. Since Blackstone's Commentaries was widely circulated in the Colonies, respondents further speculate that the Committee of Style rephrased the qualifications provision in the negative to clarify the delegates' intention 'only to prescribe the standing incapacities without imposing any other limit on the historic power of each house to judge qualifications on a case by case basis.'

Respondents' argument is inherently weak, however, because it assumes that legislative bodies historically possessed the power to judge qualifications on a case-by-case basis. As noted above, the basis for that conclusion was the Walpole and Wilkes cases, which, by the time of the Convention, had been denounced by the House of Commons and repudiated by at least one State government. Moreover, respondents' argument misrepresents the function of the Committee of Style. It was appointed only 'to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to * *  * .' 2 Farrand 553. '(T)he Committee * *  * had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so; and certainly the Convention had no belief *  *  * that any important change was, in fact, made in the provisions as to qualifications adopted by it on August 10.'

Petitioners also argue that the post-Convention debates over the Constitution's ratification support their interpretation of § 5. For example, they emphasize Hamilton's reply to the antifed-eralist charge that the new Constitution favored the wealthy and well-born:

'The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich     the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications      of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But     this forms on part of the power to be conferred upon the      national government. Its authority would be expressly     restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, the      manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who     may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other      occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are      unalterable by the legislature.'

The Federalist Papers 371 (Mentor ed. 1961). (Emphasis in     last sentence added.) Madison had expressed similar views in an earlier essay,  and his arguments at the Convention leave no doubt about his agreement with Hamilton on this issue.

Respondents counter that Hamilton was actually addressing himself to criticism of Art. I, § 4, which authorizes Congress to regulate the times, pa ces, and manner of electing members of Congress. They note that prominent antifederalists had argued that this power could be used to 'confer on the rich and well-born, all honours.' Brutus No. IV, N.Y. Journal, Nov. 29, 1787, p. 7. (Emphasis in original.) Respondents' contention, however, ignores Hamilton's express reliance on the immutability of the qualifications set forth in the Constitution.

The debates at the state conventions also demonstrate the Framers' understanding that the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution. Before the New York convention, for example, Hamilton emphasized: '(T)he true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imperfect in proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed.' 2 Debates on the Federal Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876) (hereinafter cited as Elliot's Debates). In Virginia, where the Federalists faced powerful opposition by advocates of popular democracy, Wilson Carey Nicholas, a future member of both the House and Senate and later Governor of the State, met the arguments that the new Constitution violated democratic principles with the following interpretation of Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, as it respects the qualifications of the elected: 'It has ever been considered a great security to liberty, that very few should be excluded from the right of being chosen to the legislature. This Constitution has amply attended to this idea. We find no qualifications required except those of age and residence, which create a certainty of their judgment being matured, and of being attached to their state.' 3 Elliot's Debates 8.

c. Post-Ratification.

As clear as these statements appear, respondents dismiss them as 'general statements * *  * directed to other issues.'  They suggest that far more relevant is Congress' own understanding of its power to judge qualifications as manifested in post-ratification exclusion cases. Unquestionably, both the House and the Senate have excluded memberselect for reasons other than their failure to meet the Constitution's standing qualifications. For almost the first 100 years of its existence, however, Congress strictly limited its power to judge the qualifications of its members to those enumerated in the Constitution.

Congress was first confronted with the issue in 1807, when the eligibility of William McCreery was challenged because he did not meet additional residency requirements imposed by the State of Maryland. In recommending that he be seated, the House Committee of Elections reasoned:

'The committee proceeded to examine the Constitution, with     relation to the case submitted to them, and find that      qualifications of members are therein determined, without      reserving any authority to the State Legislatures to change,      add to, or diminish those qualifications; and that, by that      instrument, Congress is constituted the sole judge of the      qualifications prescribed by it, and are obliged to decide      agreeably to the Constitutional rules *  *  * .' 17 annals of      Cong. 871 (1807).

Lest there be any misunderstanding of the basis for the committee's recommendation, during the ensuing debate the chairman explained the principles by which the committee was governed:

'The Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of     members to have been unalterably determined by the Federal Convention, unless changed by an      authority equal to that which framed the Constitution at      first; that neither the State nor the Federal Legislatures      are vested with authority to add to those qualifications, so      as to change them. * *  * Congress, by the Federal      Constitution, are not authorized to prescribe the      qualifications of their own members, but they are authorized      to judge of their qualifications; in doing so, however, they      must be governed by the rules prescribed by the Federal      Constitution, and by them only. These are the principles on     which the Election Committee have made up their report, and      upon which their resolution is founded.' Id., at 872.

The chairman emphasized that the committee's narrow construction of the power of the House to judge qualifications was compelled by the 'fundamental principle in a free government,' id., at 873, that restrictions upon the people to choose their own representatives must be limited to those 'absolutely necessary for the safety of the society.' Id., at 874. At the conclusion of a lengthy debate, which tended to center on the more narrow issue of the power of the States to add to the standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution, the House agreed by a vote of 89 to 18 to seat Congressman McCreery. Id., at 1237. See 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States § 414 (1907) (hereinafter cited as Hinds).

There was no significant challenge to these principles for the next several decades. They came under heavy attack, however, 'during the stress of civil war (but initially) the House of Representatives declined to exercise the power (to exclude), even under circumstances of great provocation.' Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.Doc. No. 529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., § 12, p. 7 (1967). The abandonment of such restraint, however, was among the casualties of the general upheaval produced in war's wake. In 1868, the House voted for the first time in its history to exclude a member-elect. It refused to seat two duly elected representatives for giving aid and comfort to the Confederacy. See 1 Hinds §§ 449-451. 'This change was produced by the North's bitter enmity toward those who failed to support the Union cause during the war, and was effected by the Radical Republican domination of Congress. It was a shift brought about by the naked urgency of power and was given little doctrinal support.' Comment, Legislative Exclusion: Julian Bond and Adam Clayton Powell, 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 151, 157 (1967). From that time until the present, congressional practice has been erratic;  and on the few occasions when a member-elect was excluded although he met all the qualifications set forth in the Constitution, there were frequently vigorous dissent. Even the annotations to the official manual of procedure for the 90th Congress manifest doubt as to the House's power to exclude a member-elect who has met the constitutionally prescribed qualifications. See Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.Doc. No. 529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., § 12, pp. 7-8 (1967).

Had these congressional exclusion precedents been more consistent, their precedential value still would be quite limited. See Note, The Power of a House of Congress to Judge the Qualifications of its Members, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 673, 679 (1968). That an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date. Particularly in view of the Congress' own doubts in those few cases where it did exclude members-elect, we are not inclined to give its precedents controlling weight. The relevancy of prior exclusion cases is limited largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously, therefore, the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175, 47 S.Ct. 21, 45, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926). And, what evidence we have of Congress' early understanding confirms our conclusion that the House is without power to exclude any member-elect who meets the Constitution's requirements for membership.

d. Conclusion.

Had the intent of the Framers emerged from these materials with less clarity, we would nevertheless have been compelled to resolve any ambiguity in favor of a narrow constuction of the scope of Congress' power to exclude members-elect. A fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in Hamilton's words, 'that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.' 2 Elliot's Debates 257. As Madison pointed out at the Convention, this principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself. In apparent agreement with this basic philosophy, the Convention adopted his suggestion limiting the power to expel. To allow essentially that same power to be exercised under the guise of judging qualifications, would be to ignore Madison's warning, borne out in the Wilkes case and some of Congress' own post-Civil War exclusion cases, against 'vesting an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature.' 2 Farrand 249. Moreover, it would effectively nullify the Convention's decision to require a two-thirds vote for expulsion. Unquestionably, Congress has an interest in preserving its institutional integrity, but in most cases that interest can be sufficiently safeguarded by the exercise of its power to punish its members for disorderly behavior and, in extreme cases, to expel a member with the concurrence of two-thirds. In short, both the intention of the Framers, to the extent it can be determined, and an examination of the basic principles of our democratic system persuade us that the Constitution does not vest in the Congress a discretionary power to deny membership by a majority vote.

For these reasons, we have concluded that Art. I, § 5, is at most a 'textually demonstrable commitment' to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution. Therefore, the 'textual commitment' formulation of the political question doctrine does not bar federal courts from adjudicating petitioners' claims.

2. Other Considerations.

Respondents' alternate contention is that the case presents a political question because judicial resolution of petitioners' claim would produce a 'potentially embarrassing confrontation between coordinate branches' of the Federal Government. But, as our interpretation of Art. I, § 5, discloses, a determination of petitioner Powell's right to sit would require no more than an interpretation of the Constitution. Such a determination falls within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law, and does not involve a 'lack of the respect due (a) coordinate (branch) of government,' nor does it involve an 'initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, at 710. Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1722, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-614, 72 S.Ct. 863, 898, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293, 47 S.Ct. 21, 84 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Nor are any of the other formulations of a political question 'inextricable from the case at bar.' Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710. Petitioners seek a determination that the House was without power to exclude Powell from the 90th Congress, which, we have seen, requires an interpretation of the Constitution-a determination for which clearly there are 'judicially * *  * manageable standards.' Finally, a judicial resolution of petitioners' claim will not result in 'multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.' For, as we noted in Baker v. Carr, supra, at 211, 82 S.Ct., at 706 it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Thus, we conclude that petitioners' claim is not barred by the political question doctrine, and, having determined that the claim is otherwise generally justiciable, we hold that the case is justiciable.

CONCLUSION.

To summarize, we have determined the following: (1) This case has not been mooted by Powell's seating in the 91st Congress. (2) Although this action should be dismissed against respondent Congressmen, it mayb e sustained against their agents. (3) The 90th Congress' denial of membership to Powell cannot be treated as an expulsion. (4) We have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this controversy. (5) The case is justiciable.

Further, analysis of the 'textual commitment' under Art. I, § 5 (see Part VI, B (1)), has demonstrated that in judging the qualifications of its members Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution. Respondents concede that Powell met these. Thus, there is no need to remand this case to determine whether he was entitled to be seated in the 90th Congress. Therefore, we hold that, since Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected by the voters of the 18th Congressional District of New York and was not ineligible to serve under any provision of the Constitution, the House was without power to exclude him from its membership.

Petitioners seek additional forms of equitable relief, including mandamus for the release of petitioner Powell's back pay. The propriety of such remedies, however, is more appropriately considered in the first instance by the courts below. Therefore, as to respondents McCormack, Albert, Ford, Celler, and Moore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed. As to respondents Jennings, Johnson, and Miller, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia with instructions to enter a declaratory judgment and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.