Posthumous Memoirs of Talaat Pasha/Turkey pushed into war

Immediately after the Black Sea incident had occurred, the Russian Ambassador sent a vigorous protest, which was followed by similar protests from the allied representatives. The French and British, however, showed a certain inclination for a peaceful settlement, and, in order to close the matter amicably, they proposed that we disarm the two German ships, the Goeben and the Breslau, which had been annexed to the Ottoman fleet; that we send back all the German officers and crew, end our secret relations with Germany, and fulfill all the requirements of neutrality. Acceptance of these conditions would have amounted to breaking our alliance with Germany. The situation, already critical, had become acute. It was impossible to prolong this rather ridiculous position. We had to choose one of two alternatives; either to satisfy the demands of the allied Ambassadors, which meant to lose Germany forever, or to join the Central Powers. At a meeting of the Cabinet we discussed the matter very minutely. Personally I regretted the incident, which aggravated the already existing difficulties, but in fact I was in favor of war. I firmly believed that, if we avoided the fulfillment of our agreement then, we should lose the confidence of all the civilized world. The Allies had already observed that we inclined toward Germany. We could hardly hope for effective help or material advantages from the Allies. They had never done more than give meaningless and ludicrous assurances of integrity. If we insisted upon keeping our neutrality until the end of the war, refusing aid to our allies in the time of their necessity, Germany and Austria also would reasonably refuse to help us in case they were victorious. Consequently, no matter whether the Allies were victorious or not, if we did not take part on one side or the other, Turkey was doomed. In both cases the victorious party would punish Turkey for her inaction, and would try to satisfy its political ambitions against the empire. At the end of the war we should be in a most disadvantageous position. As a statesman, I could not consent to yield my country to such a disastrous fate. I was, therefore, in favor of entering the war on the side of Germany. I wished only to delay this decisive act as long as possible and to join Germany at the most propitious time. The Black Sea incident accelerated Turkey's entrance into the war, which I believed to be inevitable. Djavid and Kahmy Beys, in whom I had unlimited confidence, opposed our entry, not because they were against it, but because they believed that the propitious moment had not yet arrived. But once the necessity of war was admitted, the question of time was of very little importance. In the meantime, while we were discussing what decisive attitude to take, the news reaching the Porte from the Caucasian frontier indicated an increasing concentration of Russian forces on the front. This concentration, which necessitated equal precautionary measures by us, had created a very tense feeling between the two armies. Since we had advanced so far. and had reached this climax, it was hardly possible to retreat. I therefore advised the members of the Cabinet to consider the Black Sea incident as an accomplished fact, and openly to declare war against the Allies. As this suggestion was backed by a majority in the meeting, we refused the conditions proposed by the allied Ambassadors, and openly joined Germany.