Posthumous Memoirs of Talaat Pasha/The allies evasive

There was a belief that during this period, in which we tried to remain neutral, the Allies had offered us very alluring proposals, and that we refused them without serious consideration. This is an exaggeration of facts. The truth is, that from the beginning of the World War until the incident of the Black Sea, which caused us to enter the conflict, not a real or formal proposition had been handed us by the Allies. It is true also that the French and English Ambassadors advised us many times to keep our neutrality. Even when they observed our inclination toward Germany, the only promise they could give us was that, in the case of our preserving strict neutrality, they would guarantee the integrity of the empire and would persuade Russia to do the same. They never went further in their proposal than that, and never proposed anything else. The pledge to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had been repeated many times after the Paris conference, but never kept. It was not possible and wise, therefore, to give serious consideration to the evasive proposal of the Allies. Who could assure us that this promise would or could be kept after the war? We had a good example of what might happen in England's attitude regarding the eastern provinces. On the contrary, we had many reasons for not believing in their promises. In the very beginning of the war England, without any reason, without even a previous announcement, had requisitioned our two great dreadnoughts, Osman I. and Reshadie, in construction at English arsenals. These two warships were ordered from England at the cost of a tremendous sacrifice on the part of the Turkish people. Poor and rich alike had shared in the expense. The Turkish women had sacrificed their valuable jewels for these ships. In spite of all our efforts and protests, we lost them, because England refused to give ear to our representations. This fact created a very bad impression both on the Porte and on the public. The requisition was interpreted by the Turks as a scheme to secure in the Mediterranean the supremacy of the Greek Navy, which had been recently strengthened by an American dreadnought, renamed the Averoff. After these facts we could hardly believe that England would fulfill her assurance of integrity. It was true, however, that the Allies earnestly desired our neutrality. In many cases, for instance in the purchase of the German ships the Goeben and the Breslau, and in the abolition of the capitulations, they never went further than a formal protest, and never tried to break political relations with Turkey. The Allies, who were fighting against a formidable enemy, and who knew not what the result of the war would be, appreciated the importance of even a small and weak nation going against them. Their policy, therefore, was not to gain our assistance, because they soon understood that was impossible, but to keep us out of the war as long as they could. On the other hand, our aim was to delay joining the Central Powers as long as possible, and while watching the political changes which might occur in the Balkans, to secure our interest as best we might. The first military operations were favorable to Germany, and very hopeful for the Central Powers. Even after the battle of the Marne, in which the Germans were defeated, the military experts strongly believed that ultimate victory would belong to Germany. The Allies, meanwhile, were suspicious of the policy of the Porte. The German military mission was a source of real anxiety for them. We had changed the names of the German warships and put them under Turkish rule and the Turkish flag; the Allies, however, naturally protested against the keeping of the German officers and the German crews on board. On this score we were in a very difficult position, and yet the Allies limited their efforts to keeping us neutral.