Poe v. Ullman/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

These cases are dismissed because a majority of the members of this Court conclude, for varying reasons, that this controversy does not present a justiciable question. That conclusion is too transparent to require an extended reply. The device of the declaratory judgment is an honored one. Its use in the federal system is restricted to 'cases' or 'controversies' within the meaning of Article III. The question must be 'appropriate for judicial determination,' not hypothetical, abstract, academic or moot. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617. It must touch 'the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.' Id., 300 U.S. at pages 240-241, 57 S.Ct. at page 464. It must be 'real and substantial' and admit of 'specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character.' Id., 300 U.S. at page 241, 57 S.Ct. at page 464. The fact that damages are not awarded or an injunction does not issue, the fact that there are no allegations of irreparable injury are irrelevant. Id., 300 U.S. at page 241, 57 S.Ct. at page 464. This is hornbook law. The need for this remedy in the federal field was summarized in a Senate Report as follows:

' * *  * it is often necessary, in the absence of the      declaratory judgment procedure, to violate or purport to      violate a statute in order to obtain a judicial determination      of its meaning or validity.' S.Rep. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d     Sess., pp. 2-3.

If there is a case where the need for this remedy in the shadow of a criminal prosecution is shown, it is this one, as Mr. Justice HARLAN demonstrates. Plaintiffs in No. 60 are two sets of husband and wife. One wife is pathetically ill, having delivered a stillborn fetus. If she becomes pregnant again, her life will be gravely jeopardized. This couple have been unable to get medical advice concerning the 'best and safest' means to avoid pregnancy from their physician, plaintiff in No. 61, because if he gave it he would commit a crime. The use of contraceptive devices would also constitute a crime. And it is alleged-and admitted by the State-that the State's Attorney intends to enforce the law by prosecuting offenses under the laws.

A public clinic dispensing birth-control information has indeed been closed by the State. Doctors and a nurse working in that clinic were arrested by the police and charged with advising married women on the use of contraceptives. That litigation produced State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856, which upheld these statutes. That same police raid on the clinic resulted in the seizure of a quantity of the clinic's contraception literature and medical equipment and supplies. The legality of that seizure was in question in State v. Certain Contraceptive Materials, 126 Conn. 428, 11 A.2d 863.

The Court refers to the Nelson prosecution as a 'test case' and implies that it had little impact. Yet its impact was described differently by a contemporary observer who concluded his comment with this sentence: 'This serious setback to the birth control movement (the Nelson case) led to the closing of all the clinics in the state, just as they had been previously closed in the state of Massachusetts.' At oral argument, counsel for appellants confirmed that the clinics are still closed. In response to a question from the bench, he affirmed that 'no public or private clinic' has dared give birth-control advice since the decision in the Nelson case.

These, then, are the circumstances in which the Court feels that it can, contrary to every principle of American or English common law, go outside the record to conclude that there exists a 'tacit agreement' that these statutes will not be enforced. No lawyer, I think, would advise his clients to rely on that 'tacit agreement.' No police official, I think, would feel himself bound by that 'tacit agreement.' After our national experience during the prohibtion era, it would be absurd to pretend that all criminal statutes are adequately enforced. But that does not mean that bootlegging was the less a crime. Cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551. In fact, an arbitrary administrative pattern of non-enforcement may increase the hardships of those subject to the law. See J. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process, 69 Yale L.J. 543.

When the Court goes outside the record to determine that Connecticut has adopted 'The undeviating policy of nullification * *  * of its anti-contraceptive laws,' it selects a particularly poor case in which to exercise such a novel power. This is not a law which is a dead letter. Twice since 1940, Connecticut has reenacted these laws as part of general statutory revisions. Consistently, bills to remove the statutes from the books have been rejected by the legislature. In short, the statutes-far from being the accidental left-overs of another era-are the center of a continuing controversy in the State. See, e.g., The New Republic, May 19, 1947, p. 8.

Again, the Court relies on the inability of counsel to show any attempts, other than the Nelson case, 'to enforce the prohibition of distribution or use of contraceptive devices by criminal process.' Yet, on oral argument, counsel for the appellee stated on his own knowledge that several proprietors had been prosecuted in the 'minor police courts of Connecticut' after they had been 'picked up' for selling contraceptives. The enforcement of criminal laws in minor courts has just as much impact as in those cases where appellate courts are resorted to. The need of the protection of constitutional guarantees, and the right to them, are not less because the matter is small or the court lowly. See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654; Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749. Nor is the need lacking because the dispensing of birth-control information is by a single doctor rather than by birth-control clinics. The nature of the controversy would not be changed one iota had a dozen doctors, representing a dozen birth-control clinics, sued for remedial relief.

What are these people-doctor and patients-to do? Flout the law and go to prison? Violate the law surreptitiously and hope they will not get caught? By today's decision we leave them no other alternatives. It is not the choice they need have under the regime of the declaratory judgment and our constitutional system. It is not the choice worthy of a civilized society. A sick wife, a concerned husband, a conscientious doctor seek a dignified, discrete, orderly answer to the critical problem confronting them. We should not turn them away and make them flout the law and get arrested to have their constitutional rights determined. See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 65 S.Ct. 1483, 89 L.Ed. 2072. They are entitled to an answer to their predicament here and now.

The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need no extended discussion. The leading cases on freedom of expression are generally framed with reference to public debate and discourse. But as Chafee said, 'the First Amendment and other parts of the law erect a fence inside which men can talk. The law-makers, legislators and officials stay on the outside of that fence. But what the men inside the fence say when they are let alone is no concern of the law.' The Blessings of Liberty (1956), p. 108.

The teacher (Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311) as well as the public speaker (Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430) is included. The actor on stage or screen, the artist whose creation is in oil or clay or marble, the poet whose reading public may be practically nonexistent, the musician and his musical scores, the counselor whether priest, parent or teacher no matter how small his audience-these too are beneficiaries of freedom of expression. The remark by President James A. Garfield that his ideal of a college was al og in the woods with a student at one end and Mark Hopkins at another (9 Dict.Am Biog., p. 216) puts the present problem in proper First Amendment dimensions. Of course a physician can talk freely and fully with his patient without threat of retaliation by the State. The contrary thought-the one endorsed sub silentio by the courts below-has the cast of regimentation about it, a cast at war with the philosophy and presuppositions of this free society.

We should say with Kant that 'It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt.' Leveling the discourse of medical men to the morality of a particular community is a deadening influence. Mill spoke of the pressures of intolerant groups that produce 'either mere conformers to commonplace, or time-servers for truth.' We witness in this case a sealing of the lips of a doctor because he desires to observe the law, obnoxious as the law may be. The State has no power to put any sanctions of any kind on him for any views or beliefs that he has or for any advice he renders. These are his professional domains into which the State may not intrude. The chronicles are filled with sad attempts of government to stomp out ideas, to ban thoughts because they are heretical or obnoxious. As Mill stated, 'Our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion.' When that happens society suffers. Freedom working underground, freedom bootlegged around the law is freedom crippled. A society that tells its doctors under pain of criminal penalty what they may not tell their patients is not a free society. Only free exchange of views and information is consistent with 'a civilization of the dialogue,' to borrow a phrase from Dr. Robert M. Hutchins. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 197, 73 S.Ct. 215, 222, 97 L.Ed. 216 (concurring opinion).

I am also clear that this Connecticut law as applied to this married couple deprives them of 'liberty' without due process of law, as that concept is used in the Fourteenth Amendment.

The first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been made applicable to the States only in part. My view has been that when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, its Due Process Clause incorporated all of those Amendments. See Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 1684, 91 L.Ed. 1903 (dissenting opinion). Although the history of the Fourteenth Amendment may not be conclusive, the words 'due process' acquired specific meaning from Anglo-American experience. As Mr. Justice BRENNAN recently stated, 'The Bill of Rights is the primary source of expressed information as to what is meant by constitutional liberty. The safeguards enshrined in it are deeply etched in the foundations of America's freedoms.' The Bill of Rights and the States (1961), 36 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 761, 776. When the Framers wrote the Bill of Rights they enshrined in the form of constitutional guarantees those rights-in part substantive, in part procedural which experience indicated were indispensable to a free society. Some would disagree as to their importance; the debate concerning them did indeed start before their adoption and has continued to this day. Yet the constitutional conception of 'due process' must, in my view, include them all until and unless there are amendments that remove them. That has indeed been the view of a full court of nine Justices, though the members who make up that court unfortunately did not sit at the same time.

Though I believe that 'due process' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of the first eight Amendments, I do not think it is restricted and confined to them. We recently held that the undefined 'liberty' in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment includes freedom to travel. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-127, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 1118-1119, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204. Cf. Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 178, 62 S.Ct. 164, 169, 86 L.Ed. 119 (concurring opinion). The right 'to marry, establish a home and bring up children' was said in Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, to come within the 'liberty' of the person protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As I indicated in my dissent in Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467, 72 S.Ct. 813, 823, 96 L.Ed. 1068, 'liberty' within the purview of the Fifth Amendment includes the right of 'privacy,' a right I thought infringed in that case because a member of a 'captive audience' was forced to listen to a government-sponsored radio program. 'Liberty' is a conception that sometimes gains content from the emanations of other specific guarantees (N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488) or from experience with the requirements of a free society.

For years the Court struck down social legislation when a particular law did not fit the notions of a majority of Justices as to legislation appropriate for a free enterprise system. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, rightly said that 'a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.' Lochner v. State of New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76, 25 S.Ct. 539, 547, 49 L.Ed. 937.

The error of the old Court, as I see it, was not in entertaining inquiries concerning the constitutionality of social legislation but in applying the standards that it did. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834. Social legislation dealing with business and economic matters touches no particularized prohibition of the Constitution, unless it be the provision of the Fifth Amendment that private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation. If it is free of the latter guarantee, it has a wide scope for application. Soem go so far as to suggest that whatever the majority in the legislature says goes (cf. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 64, 33 S.Ct. 667, 672, 57 L.Ed. 1063), that there is no other standard of constitutionality. That reduces the legislative power to sheer voting strength and the judicial function to a matter of statistics. As Robert M. Hutchins has said, 'It is obviously impossil e to raise questions of freedom and justice if the sole duty of the court is to decide whether the case at bar falls within the scope of the duly issued command of a duly constituted sovereign.' Two Faces of Federalism (1960), p. 18. While the legislative judgment on economic and business matters is 'well-nigh conclusive' (Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32, 75 S.Ct. 98, 102, 99 L.Ed. 27), it is not beyond judicial inquiry. Cf. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649, 81 S.Ct. 1278, 1281, 6 L.Ed.2d 575 (dissenting opinion).

The regime of a free society needs room for vast experimentation. Crises, emergencies, experience at the individual and community levels produce new insights; problems emerge in new dimensions; needs, once never imagined, appear. To stop experimentation and the testing of new decrees and controls is to deprive society of a needed versatility. Yet to say that a legislature may do anything not within a specific guarantee of the Constitution may be as crippling to a free society as to allow it to override specific guarantees so long as what it does fails to shock the sensibilities of a majority of the Court.

The present legislation is an excellent example. If a State banned completely the sale of contraceptives in drug stores, the case would be quite different. It might seem to some or to all judges an unreasonable restriction. Yet it might not be irrational to conclude that a better way of dispensing those articles is through physicians. The same might be said of a state law banning the manufacture of contraceptives. Health, religious, and moral arguments might be marshalled pro and con. Yet it is not for judges to weigh the evidence. Where either the sale or the manufacture is put under regulation, the strictures are on business and commercial dealings that have had a long history with the police power of the States.

The present law, however, deals not with sale, not with manufacture, but with use. It provides:

'Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or     instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be      fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than      sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and      imprisoned.' Conn.Gen.Stat.1958, § 53-32.

The regulation as applied in this case touches the relationship between man and wife. It reaches into the intimacies of the marriage relationship. If we imagine a regime of full enforcement of the law in the manner of an Anthony Comstock, we would reach the point where search warrants issued and officers appeared in bedrooms to find out what went on. It is said that this is not that case. And so it is not. But when the State makes 'use' a crime and applies the criminal sanction to man and wife, the State has entered the innermost sanctum of the home. If it can make this law, it can enforce it. And proof of its violation necessarily involves an inquiry into the relations between man and wie.

That is an invasion of the privacy that is implicit in a free society. A noted theologian who conceives of the use of a contraceptive as a 'sin' nonetheless admits that a 'use' statute such as this enters a forbidden domain.

' * *  * the Connecticut statute confuses the moral and legal,      in that it transposes without further ado a private sin into      a public crime. The criminal act here is the private use of     contraceptives. The real area where the coercions of law     might, and ought to, be applied, at least to control an evil      namely, the contraceptive industry-is quite overlooked. As it     stands, the statute is, of course, unenforceable without      police invasion of the bedroom, and is therefore indefensible      as a piece of legal draughtsmanship.' Murray, We Hold These      Truths (1960), pp. 157-158.

This notion of privacy is not drawn from the blue. It emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.

'One of the earmarks of the totalitarian understanding of     society is that it seeks to make all subcommunities-family, school, business, press, church      completely subject to control by the State. The State then is     not one vital institution among others: a policeman, a      referee, and a source of initiative for the common good. Instead, it seeks to be coextensive with family and school,     press, business community, and the Church, so that all of      these component interest groups are, in principle, reduced to      organs and agencies of the State. In a democratic political     order, this megatherian concept is expressly rejected as out      of accord with the democratic understanding of social good,      and with the actual make-up of the human community.'

Can there be any doubt that a Bill of Rights that in time of peace bars soldiers from being quartered in a home 'without the consent of the Owner' should also bar the police from investigating the intimacies of the marriage relation? The idea of allowing the State that leeway is congenial only to a totalitarian regime.

I dissent from a dismissal of these cases and our refusal to strike down this law.