Plymouth Cordage Company v. Smith/Opinion of the Court

By the bankruptcy law, the district courts of the United States in the several states, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, the district courts of the several territories, and the United States courts in the Indian territory and the district of Alaska, are made courts of bankruptcy.

By subdivision 3 of § 1, the words 'appellate courts' are defined to 'include the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, the supreme courts of the territories, and the Supreme Court of the United States.'

'Appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they have appellate jurisdiction in other cases,' is vested by § 24a in the Supreme Court of the United States, the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, and the supreme courts of the territories. And by § 24b it is provided that the several circuit courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction in equity 'to superintend and revise, in matter of law, the proceedings of the several inferior courts of bankruptcy within their jurisdiction.'

By § 25a appeals, 'as in equity cases, may be taken in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy to the circuit court of appeals of the United States, and to the supreme court of the territories' from judgments adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendant a bankrupt; granting or denying a discharge; and allowing or rejecting a claim of $500 or over.

The act clearly distinguishes between 'controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings' and 'bankruptcy proceedings' proper, and between supervisory jurisdiction in a summary way in matter of law, and jurisdiction by appeal or writ of error. Appellate jurisdiction over controversies, as in other cases, is vested by § 24a, and over certain designated bankruptcy proceedings by § 25a, by appeal, as in equity cases, bringing up both law and fact.

The question before us arises on a petition to revise certain proceedings in a court of bankruptcy of the territory of Oklahoma. That territory, by order of this court, as required by law, was assigned in 1891 to the eighth judicial circuit, 139 U.S. 707, 35 L. ed. 1128 b, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. IV., and the courts of the territory were thereby brought within the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals for that circuit.

By the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, that jurisdiction embraced the review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the supreme courts of the territories in cases in which the judgments of the circuit courts of appeals were made final by that act, but in other cases the jurisdiction remained in this court. Shute v. Keyser, 149 U.S. 649, 37 L. ed. 884, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 960.

Then came the bankruptcy law making the district courts of the territories courts of bankruptcy, and providing that their proceedings as such might be revised by the circuit courts of appeals within whose jurisdiction they happened to be.

We think the law should be taken as it is written, and perceive no adequate reason for concluding that the real intention of Congress is not expressed in the language used. Congress may well have believed it wisest that the circuit courts of appeals should deal in this summary way with questions of law arising in the progress of bankruptcy proceedings in the territorial courts, although jurisdiction by appeal or writ of error, and by appeal, as provided, was vested in the supreme courts of the territories.

The circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit has announced the same conclusion (Re Seebold, 45 C. C. A. 117, 105 Fed. 910, 914), as has the supreme court of Oklahoma (Ex parte Stumpff, 9 Okla. 639, 60 Pac. 96). A different view appears to have been entertained by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit in Re Blair, 45 C. C. A. 530, 106 Fed. 662, though apparently the case did not necessarily require the precise question to be passed on.

Question answered in the affirmative.