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's dissent does at least answer how, in his view, the Constitution would resolve a conflict between the political branches, each acting pursuant to the powers granted them under the Constitution. He believes that congressional power should trump in any such conflict. Post, at 83–84. I see nothing in the Constitution that clearly mandates that solution to a difficult separation-of-powers question, and I need not opine on it. I find no power under which Congress could lawfully have enacted the passport directive of § 214(d), apart from its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to carry into effect the President's powers. And I have offered textual and historical support for my conclusion that the Clause does not include the power to direct the President's exercise of his passport power.

Finally, faults me for failing to consider a number of potential sources of congressional power for § 214(d) not argued by any of the parties, ranging from the Fourteenth Amendment; to the Migration or Importation Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 1; to the Territories Clause, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Post, at 80–81. But no onenot even has seriously contended that those provisions would afford a basis for the passport provision of § 214(d).

In the end, characterizes my interpretation of the executive power, the naturalization power, and the Necessary and Proper Clause as producing “a presidency more reminiscent of George III than George Washington.” Post, at 84. But he offers no competing interpretation of either the Article II Vesting Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. And his decision about the Constitution's resolution of conflict among the branches could itself be criticized as creating a supreme legislative body more reminiscent of the Parliament in England than the Congress in America.

Because the President has residual foreign affairs authority to regulate passports and because there appears to be