Page:Zivotofsky v. Kerry.pdf/4

4 dent, through §214(d), to contradict his prior recognition determination in an offcial document issued by the Secretary of State. See Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 9 Pet. 692, 698. Section 214(d)'s flaw is further underscored by the fact that the statute's purpose was to infringe on the President's exclusive recognition power. While Congress may have power to enact passport legislation of wide scope, it may not “aggrandiz[e] its power at the expense of another branch” by requiring the President to contradict an earlier recognition determination in an official Executive Branch document. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 878. Pp. 28–32.

725 F. 3d 197, affirmed.

, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which, , , and , joined. , filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 32. , filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 32. , filed a dissenting opinion, in which, joined, post, p. 61. , filed a dissenting opinion, in which, and , joined, post, p. 67.

Alyza D. Lewin argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Nathan Lewin and Chaim Z. Kagedan.

Solicitor General Verrilli argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Branda, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Ginger D. Anders, Douglas N. Letter, and Dana Kaersvang.