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(c) A fair reading of relevant precedent illustrates that this Court has long considered recognition to be the exclusive prerogative of the Executive. See, ''e. g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co.,'' 13 Pet. 415, 420; United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 330; United States v. Pink, supra, at 229; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra, at 410; National City Bank of N. Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 358. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320, does not support a broader defnition of the Executive's power over foreign relations that would permit the President alone to determine the whole content of the Nation's foreign policy. The Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue. See, e. g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 523–532. Nonetheless, it is for the President alone to make the specifc decision of what foreign power he will recognize as legitimate, and his position must be clear. Pp. 17–23.

(d) The weight of historical evidence also indicates Congress has accepted that the recognition power is exclusive to the Presidency. Cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513. Since the frst administration, the President has claimed unilateral authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. And Congress, for the most part, has acquiesced, generally respecting the Executive's policies and positions on formal recognition and even defending the President's constitutional prerogative. Pp. 23–28.

2. Because the power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone, §214(d) infringes on the Executive's consistent decision to withhold recognition with respect to Jerusalem. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443. The provision forces the President, through the Secretary of State, to identify, upon request, citizens born in Jerusalem as being born in Israel when, as a matter of United States policy, neither Israel nor any other country is acknowledged as having sovereignty over Jerusalem.

If the recognition power is to mean anything, it must mean that the President not only makes the initial, formal recognition determination but also may maintain that determination in his and his agent's statements. Under international law, recognition may be effected by written or oral declaration. In addition, an act of recognition must leave no doubt as to the intention to grant it. Thus, if Congress could alter the President's statements on matters of recognition or force him to contradict them, Congress in effect would exercise the recognition power. An “exclusive” Presidential power “disabl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Youngstown, supra, at 637–638 (Jackson, J., concurring). If Congress may not pass a law, speaking in its own voice, effecting formal recognition, then it may not force the Presi-