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authority] only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter,” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). His asserted power must be both “exclusive” and “conclusive” on the issue, id., at 637–638, and he may rely solely on powers the Constitution grants to him alone, id., at 638. To determine whether the President's power of recognition is exclusive, this Court examines the Constitution's text and structure and relevant precedent and history. P. 10.

(b) The Constitution's text and structure grant the President the power to recognize foreign nations and governments. The Reception Clause directs that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” Art. II, §3. And at the time of the founding, receiving an ambassador was considered tantamount to recognizing the sending state's sovereignty. It is thus logical and proper to infer that the Reception Clause would be understood to acknowledge the President's power to recognize other nations. This inference is further supported by the President's additional Article II powers: to negotiate treaties and to nominate the Nation's ambassadors and dispatch other diplomatic agents. Though ratifying a treaty and confirming an ambassador require congressional approval, Congress lacks authority to initiate the actions without the President's involvement. The President, unlike Congress, also has the power to open diplomatic channels simply by engaging in direct diplomacy with foreign heads of state and their ministers. The Constitution thus assigns the President, not Congress, means to effect recognition on his own initiative.

Functional considerations also suggest that the President's recognition power is exclusive. The Nation must “speak. . . with one voice” regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United States and which are not, ''American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi,'' 539 U. S. 396, 424, and only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times. Unlike Congress, the President is also capable of engaging in the delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts that may lead to a recognition decision, see, e. g., United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 229, and is better positioned to take the decisive, unequivocal action necessary to recognize other states at international law. The President has also exercised unilateral recognition power since the founding, a practice endorsed by this Court, see, e. g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 410.

Under basic separation-of-powers principles, Congress, which has the central role in making laws, see Art. I, §8, cl. 18, does have substantial authority regarding many policy determinations that precede and follow an act of recognition. The President's recognition determination is thus only one part of a political process. Pp. 11–17.