Page:Yegiazaryan v. Smagin.pdf/9

Rh Russia and therefore experiences the loss from his inability to collect on his judgment in Russia.” App. 27a (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit reversed. It rejected petitioners’ invitation to follow the domestic-injury approach of the Seventh Circuit, “which has adopted a rigid, residency-based test for domestic injuries involving intangible property,” such as a judgment. 37 F. 4th 562, 568, 570 (2022) (citing Armada (Sing.) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol Int’l Corp., 885 F. 3d 1090 (2018)). Under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, which locates an injury to intangible property at the plaintiff’s residence, Smagin could not allege a domestic injury because he resides in Russia. See Armada, 885 F. 3d, at 1094. The Ninth Circuit instead adopted a “context-specific” approach to the domestic-injury inquiry, which it found consistent with the approaches of the Second and Third Circuits. 37 F. 4th, at 568–570; see Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 874 F. 3d 806, 809 (CA2 2017); Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F. 3d 694, 696 (CA3 2018). Applying that approach, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Smagin had pleaded a domestic injury because he had alleged that his efforts to execute on a California judgment in California against a California resident were foiled by a pattern of racketeering activity that largely “occurred in, or was targeted at, California” and was “designed to subvert” enforcement of the judgment in California. 37 F. 4th, at 567–568.

This Court granted certiorari to resolve the Circuit split. 598 U. S. ___ (2023). Because a context-specific inquiry is most consistent with this Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, and because the context here makes clear Smagin has alleged a domestic injury, the Court affirms.

The “domestic-injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits stems from this Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco.