Page:Yegiazaryan v. Smagin.pdf/22

4 stock, a trademark, etc. In these cases, however, the relationship between the California judgment Smagin has obtained and the underlying arbitral award that that judgment confirmed is uncertain, so the precise property at issue is another aspect of this suit that is shrouded in confusion. Smagin acknowledged at oral argument that even though he has obtained multiple judgments confirming the arbitral award, he can collect on only one. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. There is thus at least some relevant relationship between the California judgment and the London arbitral award—the latter of which is not “domestic” in any way—but the Court does not address this point, either.

Even with respect to the two factors it focuses on, the Court engenders confusion. It offers no hint which of the two might be more important (should they point in different directions), whether either or both are necessary, or whether either is sufficient. And the Court acknowledges that there was also substantial foreign conduct in these cases, but writes that off because it was “ ‘initiated in and directed towards’ ” the United States. Ante, at 10. Once more, I am unsure of the origin or scope of this rule. If domestic conduct is “initiated in” a foreign nation, does that make it foreign? What exactly does it mean to direct conduct “towards” the United States? All in all, were I a lower-court judge, I would struggle to apply today’s decision to any set of facts other than the precise combination present here. In my view, it is not worth our deciding a case when we provoke so many more questions than we provide answers. That is especially so now that the lower courts must additionally decide whether and how today’s cryptic decision binds them, rather than continuing to think through unencumbered when intangible-property injuries are the basis of a domestic application of civil RICO.

It is not just that we are contributing little by deciding