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Rh Indeed, it is because petitioners’ view invokes these fictions that it generates results so counter to comity and so far afield from any reasonable interpretation of what qualifies as a domestic application of §1964(c). On petitioners’ primary view, a business owner who resides abroad but owns a brick-and-mortar business in the United States cannot bring a §1964(c) suit even if an American RICO organization burns down her storefront. Perhaps aware of how odd this seems, petitioners offer a fallback rule for intangible property. That rule fares no better. It provides that if racketeering activity targets the intangible business interests of two U. S. businesses, one owned by a U. S. resident and one owned by someone living abroad, only the former business owner can bring a §1964(c) suit. There is no evidence Congress intended to impose such a double standard, especially because doing so runs its own risks of generating international discord. These implausible consequences are strong evidence that petitioners have gone astray in assessing the focus of §1964(c) and, thus, the meaning of “domestic injury” as contemplated by RJR Nabisco.

Finally, petitioners, as well as the dissent, (opinion of ), argue that a contextual approach is unworkable because it does not provide a bright-line rule. Reply Brief 17–18. An approach is not unworkable, however, merely because it directs courts to consider the case-specific circumstances surrounding an injury when assessing where it arises. While “the ease with which [petitioners’] bright-line rule can be applied gives it some surface appeal,” Humphrey, 905 F. 3d, at 709, a look beneath the surface quickly reveals that the test is inconsistent with RJR Nabisco, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the thrust of §1964(c) itself. Concerns about a fact-intensive test cannot displace congressional policy choices, where a more nuanced test is true to the statute’s meaning.