Page:Xenophon by Alexander Grant.djvu/121

Rh glaring piece of sophistry—so glaring, and so opposed to the ordinary doctrines of Socrates, that it is worth quotation. There is no rule which the sage is oftener represented as enforcing in all forms, than that no man should undertake to perform or superintend any business of which he has not competent special knowlege [sic]. This maxim was entirely of a piece with what we know from elsewhere of the Socratic doctrine, that virtue itself is knowledge, and life an art. Now, in the fourth chapter of the third book of the 'Memorabilia,' one Nichomachides is represented as coming disgusted from the election of office-bearers, and complaining to Socrates that the Athenians were capricious as ever—that after long military service, with credit, in all the lower grades of command, and after receiving many wounds in action, his claims had now been set aside, and another man, who had hardly seen any service, and who knew nothing except how to make money, had been chosen general. Socrates, however, did not give the least sympathy to the complainant. He took the opposite side, and declared that he who is a good man of business has capacities for managing anything, whether it be a family, a city, or an army. In vain did Nichomachides argue that when it came to fighting, the good man of business might find himself at a loss. "Not at all," said Socrates; "he will see exactly what is to be aimed at, and take the proper means accordingly." The paradox here is so great that we can hardly help believing that the conversation actually took place, though Xenophon is not subtle enough to point out, or perhaps to see, its bearing. On the one