Page:Wright v. Wright.pdf/4

108 to profit by the crime. Horn v. Cole, 203 Ark. 361, 156 S. W. 2d 787; Rest., Restitution, § 187. That principle would control this case were it not for the fact that the record contains no legal proof that the appellant killed Harold Dean. We cannot take judicial notice of the facts disclosed by the record in the earlier criminal proceeding."

Clearly, this expressed what our view would be whenever there is a proper judicial determination in a civil proceeding that one is the killer of someone from whom he seeks to inherit. In the case at bar the chancellor made an independent and unquestioned finding of fact that the son murdered both of his parents. This being true, it is our view that the "familiar principle" in Smith v. Dean, supra, is controlling in the instant case and precludes the slayer from sharing in the estate of either victim.

The reasoning for such a view is based upon the common law maxim that no sane person should be permitted to profit or acquire property by his own wrong or criminal act. 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Descent & Distribution, § 95. This rule of public policy, based upon centuries of usage, wisely requires this to be the law. Our general statutes on descent and distribution include, significantly, § 61-113 which reads:

"In all cases not provided for in this act, the inheritance shall descend according to the course of the common law, ."

See, also, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 1-101 (Repl. 1956). We have long recognized the rule that statutes in derogation of the rules of the common law are strictly construed by us. Gill et al v. State, ex rel Mobley, 242 Ark. 797, 416 S.W.2d 269 (1967). We do not think it was the legislature's intention to abrogate such a common law maxim in the absence of a specific statute to that effect.

We hold that upon the chancellor's finding in this proceeding that Leslie A. Wright murdered his parents,