Page:Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community Unclassified 2016.pdf/9

 the group’s highly sophisticated media without direct guidance from ISIL leadership and individuals in the United States or abroad who receive direct guidance and specific direction from ISIL members or leaders.

ISIL’s global appeal continues to inspire individuals in countries outside Iraq and Syria to travel to join the group. More than 36,500 foreign fighters—including at least 6,600 from Western countries—have traveled to Syria from more than100 countries since the conflict began in 2012. Foreign fighters who have trained in Iraq and Syria might potentially leverage skills and experience to plan and execute attacks in the West. Involvement of returned foreign fighters in terrorist plotting increases the effectiveness and lethality of terrorist attacks, according to academic studies. A prominent example is the November 2015 attacks in Paris in which the plotters included European foreign fighters returning from Syria.

ISIL’s branches continue to build a strong global network that aims to advance the group’s goals and often works to exacerbate existing sectarian tensions in their localities. Some of these branches will also plan to strike at Western targets, such as the downing of a Russian airliner in October by ISIL’s selfproclaimed province in Egypt. In Libya, the group is entrenched in Surt and along the coastal areas, has varying degrees of presence across the country, and is well positioned to expand territory under its control in 2016. ISIL will seek to influence previously established groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, to emphasize the group’s ISIL identity and fulfill its religious obligations to the ISIL “caliphate.”

Other terrorists and insurgent groups will continue to exploit weak governance, insecurity, and economic and political fragility in an effort to expand their areas of influence and provide safe havens for violent extremists, particularly in conflict zones. Sunni violent extremist groups are increasingly joining or initiating insurgencies to advance their local and transnational objectives. Many of these groups are increasingly capable of conducting effective insurgent campaigns, given their membership growth and accumulation of large financial and materiel caches. This trend increasingly blurs the lines between insurgent and terrorist groups as both aid local fighters, leverage safe havens, and pursue attacks against US and other Western interests.

No single paradigm explains how terrorists become involved in insurgencies. Some groups like ISIL in Syria and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali have worked with local militants to incite insurgencies. Others, like Boko Haram, are the sole instigators and represent the primary threat to their respective homeland’s security. Still others, including al-Shabaab, are the primary beneficiaries of an insurgency started by others. Finally, other groups, such as core al-Qa‘ida, have taken advantage of the relative safe haven in areas controlled by insurgent groups to build capabilities and alliances without taking on a primary leadership role in the local conflict.

Although al-Qa‘ida’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been significantly degraded, it aspires to attack the US and its allies. In Yemen, the proven capability of AQAP to advance external plots during periods of instability suggests that leadership losses and challenges from the Iranian-backed Huthi insurgency will not deter its efforts to strike the West. Amid this conflict, AQAP has made territorial gains in Yemen including the seizure of military bases in the country’s largest province. Al-Qa’ida nodes in Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey are also dedicating resources to planning attacks. Al-Shabaab, al-Qaida's affiliate in East Africa, continues its violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia despite losses of territory and influence and conflict among senior leaders.