Page:Works of Plato his first fifty-five dialogues (vol 1 of 5) (Taylor, 1804).pdf/340

 THE REPUBLIC. BOOK II.

When i had said these things I imagined that the debate was at an end ; but this it seems was only the introduction : for Glauco, as he is on all occasions most courageous, so truly at that time did not approve of Thrasymachus in giving up the debate ; but said, Socrates, do you wish to seem to have persuaded us, or to have persuaded us in reality, that in every respect it is better to be just than unjust ? I would choose, said I, to do it in reality, if it depended on me. You do not then, said he, do what you desire. For, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would choose to have ; not regarding the consequences, but embracing it for its own sake ? as joy, and such pleasures as are harmless ; though nothing else arises afterwards from these pleasures, than that the possession gives us delight. There seems to me, said I, to be something of this kind. But what ? is there something too, which we both love for its own fake, and also for what arises from it : as wisdom, fight, and health ; for we somehow embrace these things on both accounts. Yes, said I. But do you perceive, said he, a third species of good, among which is bodily labour, to be healed when sick, to practise physic, or other lucrative employment ? for we say, those things are troublesome, but that they profit us ; and we should not choose these things for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and those other advantages which arise from them. There is then, indeed, said I, likewise this third kind. But what now ? in which of these, said he, do you place justice ? I imagine, said I, in the most handsome ; which, both on its own account, and for the sake of what arises from it, is desired by the man who is in pursuit of happiness. It does not, however, said he, seem fo to them any, but to be of the troublesome kind, which is pursued