Page:Works of Plato his first fifty-five dialogues (Taylor 1804) (Vol 3 of 5) (IA Vol3worksofplato00plat).pdf/160

152 possible. It will, therefore, neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures ; and so again it will no longer be the one, but as many as there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure: but it has appeared that the one cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. The one, therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few ; nor (since it in no respect participates of same) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or lesser either than itself or another. It is in every respect so.

But what ? Does it appear that the one can be either older Plato having proceeded in negations as far as to the mundane Gods, always taking away things in a consequent order from the one, through the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations always producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to the one, from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to separate from the one the divine essence itself, which first participates of the Gods, and receives their progression into the world ; or, to speak more accurately, he is now about to produce this essence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its subsistence from the monad of beings, both true being, and that which is assimilated to it, which of itself indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an obscure representation of being ; in like manner, from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful fo to speak, is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable transcendency, every divine number subsists, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The design, therefore, as we have before observed, of what is now said, is to show that the one is exempt from this essence. And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind, and this by showing that the one does not participate of time : for it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be foul; since every foul participates of time, and uses periods which are measured by time. ‘The one also is better than and is beyond intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent ; but it is demonstrated that the one neither Hands nor is moved : fo that, as Prod us well observes, through these things the three hypostases which rank as principles, viz. the one, intellect, and foul, become known to us. But that the one is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides demonstrates by showing in the first place that it is neither older, nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor with any other. For every thing which participates of time necessarily participates of these ; so that by showing that the one is exempt from these which happen to every thing that participates of time, he also shows that the one has no connexion with time. This, however, says Proclus, is incredible to the many, and appeared so to the physiologists or younger, or